JAI HIND |
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Acknowledgments
Inspired by the life and deeds of Netaji S.C. Bose, I have been studying about him for more than two decades. The way in which he went around the world in a bid to liberate his Motherland, distinguishes him from his contemporaries. When I was a student of Political Scince in Govt. College Hoshiarpur, my honourable teachers Prof. G.S. Thaper, Prof. O.P. Datta, Late Prof. Surinder Singh, Mrs. Bhalla and Ms. K. Kohli taught us about the freedom struggle and the sacrifices made by the freedom fighters for the liberation of the country. In one of the books I read that after the Presidential elections of Congress in 1939, the candidate of Mahatma Gandhi lost to Subhash
Chandra Bose, and the former said,
“Since I was instrumental in inducing Dr. Pattabhai not to withdraw his name when Maulana Sahib withdrew as a candidate, the defeat is more mine than his.”
It urged me to study more and more about Netaji. My involvement in him touched such great heights that from a reader I became a writer and my first book’ Aches and Echoes of Netaji’s Heart’was released on 23rd March 1992. The present book is second in the chain and in writing it I have been helped and inspired by a number of people to whom I am highly grateful.
I am grateful to.Col. G.S. Dhillon and Late Col. P.K. Sehgal, both I.N.A heroes of the Red Fort trials for giving me the interviews and inspiring me to work on Netaji. I am highly obliged to Col. Mrs. Lakshmi Sehgal and Col. Gulzara Singh, both the members of Netaji’s cabinet, for sparing time for interviews with me and giving me the invaluable information. I am thankful to S. Shamsher Singh, AD.C. to Netaji for the detailed information which he gave me about the inner life and working style of Netaji. I am grateful to Capt. S.S. Yadav, General Secretary, All India I.N.A. Committee, for giving me all the relevant records about the I.N.A
I am obliged to Mr. D.K. Jain of Meerut for giving us some rare books on Netaji for our research work. I am grateful to the staff of the libraries of the British High Council and the Punjab University from where I could consult some rare books, journals and newspapers. I am grateful to Dr. Gobind Ram Jasuja, the librarian of the District Library, Ropar for assisting us in research work by giving some relevant and useful books.
My research work is based primarily on the books written by the various authors on the subjects of Indian Independence Movement, Netaji and I.N .A., Mountbattens,
I and others related to the different aspects of Indian Freedom Struggle. Without the study of these books I could not have been able to write this book which is purely a research work though the conclusions of the research may have wider implications. I express my heart-felt gratitude to all the writers whose books are included in the bibliography.
I owe my special thanks to Prof. O.P.Datta, the Head of Post Graduate Department of Political Science (Retd.), Govt. College, Ropar, my teacher, for his untiring efforts which he made for checking most of the manuscript time and again, and giving me the most invaluable guidance at each stage of the research work.
The people who have to suffer the most for such type of research work are the family members and the friends of the persons engaged in such research work. I am grateful to my wife Mrs. Kalpana for extending her cooperation in the writing of this book and to my children Kranti, Bharti and the little Sankalap for sparing me for this work. I am obliged to Mrs. and Me. H.L Behl for encouraging and inspiring their daughter Miss Anshu Behl for actively associating in the writing of this book. I am obliged to all the friends, members of the staff of Netaji Model School, Ropar, and the members of Netaji S.C. Bose. Youth Club, Ropar, S. Shamsher Singh, S. Gurnek Singh, S. Amarjit Singh, Mr. Naresh Grover, Mr. Balraj Sharma, S. Mohan Singh and particularly Mr. Tirloki Nath Gupta, for helping me in the completion of this book.
Though I do not have the moral right to express my gratitude yet I must acknowledge that if there is anyone who worked harder and with greater spirit, paid heavier price and worked even when I relaxed, for the completion of this book, is Miss Anshu Behl, my research assistant.
V.P. SAINI
Preface
In spite of having a golden past with a rich cultural heritage, the history of modem India has very few bright patches. In fact the period of the last a few centuries can be described as the darkest period and has been very humiliating and disappointing. "Governed by the incapable and weak rulers, its rich cultural heritage and unlimited invaluable material natural resources were exposed and finally lost to the foreign invaders. The last invaders to rule India were the Britishers, who robbed, mutilated, most mercilessly and savagely robbed her. The pitiable plight of the Motherland electrified the blood gushing through the veins of patriotic, dare-devil and death defying sons and daughters of Mother India. Through the efforts and sacrifices of such people, the nation got independence on 15th August, 1947.
Unfortunately the history of the freedom struggle of India has been written in a distorted, biased and lop-sided manner. We have been told and made to believe that the nation was liberated through non-violence only. The role of revolutionaries has almost been completely omitted, ignored and eclipsed from the history of independence struggle. It so happened primarily on account of the fact that after the independence, the seats of authority were occupied by the so called protagonists of nonviolence. It is really lamentable that the revolutionaries, who believed in the cult of violence, did not survive to see the dawn of independence. The adherents of nonviolence let the revolutionaries like S. Bhagat Singh to be hanged and perhaps did not want that the revolutionaries should survive in the post-independence period because if it had so happened, they might have staked their claims to the seats of authority and privileged positions.
It must be conceded that in most of the cases the revolutionaries could not rise to such leve1sfrom which they could effectively challenge the position of moderates, to be more specific, the followers of Gandhiji. It was only Subhas Chandra Bose, the firebrand and most adventurous revolutionary, who could not only effectively challenge and convincingly defeat but also looked like a permanent threat to the positions of the Gandhiites. He had not only vanquished the political giants in India but also almost liberated the country with the help of arms while operating from the foreign lands. There is hardly an Indian who has not felt the impact of the big and great adventurous strides undenaken by him. This is inspite of the fact that many of the greatest things done by him have not been presented in the true and proper spirit. The Congress leaders of the post-independent India were too over-awed to dispassionately and objectively talk about him. His magnified image and legendry accomplishments had raised him above almost everybody. He looked like a serious challange to their privileged positions.
In every country, the founding fathef~, because of their positions .at the crucial moments in the history of their respective countries, have special duties towards the nation and posterity. They have to act like lamps which bum themselves in order to enlighten the path of others, like the trees which bear fruits for the others, and act like Pole Star and the Light House which guide the sailors on the High Seas even in the most stormy and the darkest nights. They have to set some such great precedents a!r maybe respectably followed by the coming generations and which may become the basis for the future edifice of the nation.
America, the greatest and most powerful nation of today, owes its greatness to the precedents set by George Washington and his contemporaries; if Germany is powerful and strong today it is because of the efforts of Bismark who unified Germany; if France could become a great power it is on account of the strong foundation laid by Napoleon Bonaparte; if the modem China stands today as one of the big powers, it is because of the contribution made by Mao Tse Tung by channelising the energy of his countrymen for strengthening and uplifting his country; and if Japan has been able to re-establish herself even after the frightful and devastating disasters of the second world war, it is because of the precedents of sacrificing self for the national interest Like this, every country, which has or had been great, owes its greatness to the role played by the selfless, far-sighted and nationalistic founding fathers.
In the case of our country., unfortunately, the role played by our founding fathers has not been as constructive, honourable and worth appreciation as it should have been to give independent India a solid and sound start, and a bright future. Unfortunately they manipulated and misused their positions and situations to grind their own axe. They presented a lop-sided and distorted history to the posterity. Instead of paying due regards to the sacrifices and views of all those who had contributed to the nation's .independence, the occupants of the seats of authority tried to monopolies and credit all the good things to their own account. Instead of making themselves useful for the nation, they tried to misuse the nation for the~ own upliftment. I wish they should have had the same feelings as late John-F. Keneddy, the President of America, had once said,
"Ask not what your country can do for you, Ask what you can do for your country.' ,
It is regretting to point out that when the Prime Ministers of India, on the independence day, address the nation from the Rostrum of Red Fort, they refer to Mahatma Gandhi, J.L. Nehru, Indira Gandhi and the clan. What to talk of referring to the persons like Netaji SC. Bose, S. Bhagat Singh, Chandra Sheikhar Azad, Ram Parsad Bismil and other revolutionaries, even many senior moderate Congress leaders of pre-independence days and the post-independence period are very rarely referred. It seems to be out of context for the Prime Ministers to refer to the Presidents of India like Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Dr. Radha Krishnan and their successors, and the former Prime Minister Shri. Lal Bahadur Shastri. The posterity has been given the impression and made to believe that it were the efforts of only Gandhi, Nehru and a few others who won independence for us and laid the foundation of modem India. Consequently posterity has no option but to look to only these people for inspiration, guidance and solution of nation's problems. The youth of the post-independence period is almost unaware of the sacrifices made by many such people, belonging to revolutionary faction, as strengthened the struggle for independence.
As already stated Netaji was the person who came very close to giving our national struggle a completely new and aggressive approach. About him we can say, 'Life in Death, Death in Life, Thy Name is Subhas Chandra Bose.' There must be very few instances in the history of the world in which even forty seven years after the disappearance of a leader, the people not only disbelieve the death story of the one who is alleged to have died, but also wish for his return as they look to him as their saviour. There have been many leaders, some of them very popular and even legendary (like Mr. Winston Churchill) who became irrelevant and fell from public esteem even during their life-time. Such people appeared like thundering storm and disappeared like lightning. There are very few who inspire hope and remain relevant even for decades to come. Netaji is one such leader about whom the masses believe, even forty seven years after his disappearance, that he didn't die and also that if he had returned, he would have changed for the better, the very fate of the nation. He had written in the Fundamental Questions of Indian Revolution,
"The times always produce the Required men and this will happen in India also."
While writing these lines he might not have been conscious of the fact that these words will best apply to him.
Because of his ability to fore-see the political developments, he was able to prove that he was much ahead of his contemporaries. He was able to anticipate the coming events and wanted to steer the freedom movement accordingly. Unfortunately the contemporaries failed to match the flight of his imagination and failed to make the optimum use of his potentiality. Not to talk of making the optimum use, they tried to obstruct his activities and path. The manner in which they dealt him could have demoralised and dispirited anyone else but since his nerves were of steel, he remained strong and stable. Normally it is believed that Gandhi, Nehru and others were friendly and sympathetic towards him but the facts were completely opposite. The Congress party, after removing him from the Presidentship, expelled him. The leadership had thought that after the expulsion he will be finished, but he bounced back with greater strength.
When he escaped from the house arrest and remained underground for quite sometime, people thought that he had died but in fact he had not. Later on when an aeroplane with the senior members of the Indian Independence League, crashed in South East Asia, his enemies again tried to spread the impression as if he had died in the crash. But again he had not. The way the news of his possible death was spread time and again, indicated that they wanted him to be dead. When the world thought that he was planning his next moves sitting in Germany, he moved to Japan in a submarine, after undertaking 92 days long hazardous journey of the submarine. At a time when the Congress leaders were engaged in begging for minor gains from the British Govt., he was able to extract major favours and concessions from Germany and Japan. What his army couldn't accomplish in the battle fields of Kohima and Imphal, was accomplished in the Red Fort trials of I.N.A. The agitation inspired by these trials completely transformed the nature of independence struggle and forced the Britishers to leave India much earlier than they had planned.
With the independence in sight, the leadership started vying with each other for grabbing political power and ensuring their positions. The higher the stakes, the more intense and serious were the efforts made by the claimants to secure their positions. Since in the parliamentary democracy, the type of Govt. which was to be adopted for independent India, the office of the Prime Minister was the most powerful and coveted. Pt. Nehru had fixed his eyes on it. Since there was no contemporary leader of equal status, the choice appeared to be unanimous and unquestioned. Masses believed that Nehru felt and found himself secure and well entrenched in chair but he himself was not feeling secure. It was on account of the fear in his mind that Netaji had not died in the crash. Since there was no evidence of Netaji's death in the alleged air crash, Nehru was scared of his return as he could stake his claims to the office of Prime Minister. It was on account of this that he preferred to sleep over the issue of Netaji. Surprisingly and paradoxically, the Govt, the Congress Party and even the All India I.N.A. Committee, accepted the death story as it was presented. It appears that the socalled moderate leadership of our country of those days wished him to die even if he had not. Even the veterans of I.N.A. didn't feel it feasible or possible to pursue the matter. They were haunted by their survival and couldn't think of undertaking the venture of establishing the true facts about the real fate of Netaji. Besides this, I.N.A. personnel had realised that the people in power were not interested in knowing the real facts. Whatever was stated by Col. Habibur Rehman, with a different motive, was accepted by the Govt. for opposite motives. A lie which was told to camouflage Netaji's movements, was used to prove his death.
His staying away from India suited the Congress as well as the foreign powers. India has everything, except really dynamic leader, to become one of the major powers of the world. The big countries never wanted India to come up to their level. Hence they wanted to deprive India of her most valuable asset, Netaji, the leader. All the interested parties hatched a conspiracy and succeeded in keeping Bose away. Though it is difficult to believe, keeping in view the image which has been portrayed before us, that Nehru could be a party to such a conspiracy yet enough evidence is available to prove that Congress leadership could stoop to any extent to grab the positions of power and maintain their image.
Though I may not have the evidence to prove where is Netaji now and where had he been all these years yet there is sufficient and convincing evidence to prove that he didn't die in the alleged air crash. IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT SOME PROMINENT LEADERS OF THOSE DAYS HAD DEFINITE INFORMATION ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS OF NET All AND EVEN THE DOCUMENTAL EVIDENCE IS LYING IN THE INDIAN OFFICES AND THE BRITISH, AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN ARCHIVES. IF THE GOVT. MAKES EFFORTS TO SEEK AND TRACE THAT INFORMATION THERE IS NO REASON THAT THE REQUIRED INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE. If the Govt. of Sweden can be compelled to make public the top secret documents, if the Swiss banks can be pressed to divulge even the top secret information, there is no reason that why can't we press the Governments of England, Russia and America to come out with the true facts about Netaji. BEFORE APPROACHING THE FOREIGN GOVTS., LET THE Govt OF INDIA MAKE PUBLIC THOSE REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS WHICH THEY ARE SUPRESSING IN THE NAME OF 'TOP SECRET'. It would have been
a greater tribute to Netaji if before conferring 'Bharat Ratna' award to him, the real facts about his whereabouts should have been traced.
Through the pages of this book, we have endeavoured to criticaIly analyse the whole issue and prove the involvement of some very powerful and highly placed persons in the conspiracy which kept Bose away from India and deprived the nation of the services of her greatest son.
V.P. SAINI
CHAPTER I
Simmering Volcano
Subhash Chandra Bose, known in the history as Netaji, had such a multidimensional, dynamic and magnetic personality that he has been variously described as a dreamer, a rebel, a revolutionary, an extremist, an insurgent, a mutineer, a radical, a beacon, a springing tiger and the like. He was the pole star of Indian freedom struggle. It is universally recognized fact that the brightest stars are those which glow with their own light and not those which shine by reflecting light from other sources. It is a scientific and historical truth that even the highest mountains in the world are the product of the red hot molten lava which is found very deep below the crest of the earth because of the very high temperature. Whenever the pressure within mounts high and this lava finds some weak point, it pierces through the crest of earth, gushes out, burns everything which comes in its way or in its contact, and finally results into some huge mountain which proudly stands in the vast fields surrounding it and becomes a source of relief and inspiration for the generations to come. Same is the case of the revolutionaries like Netaji S.C. Bose who are the product of adverse, frustrating and explosive situations, and become the light house for the generations to come. Just as the highest mountains, the mightiest rivers and everything big and great starts from an invisible small atom or some very small units, similarly the fire which engulfed the British empire in the final stage of India's Independence Struggle originated in the form of the small splinter, Subhash Chandra Bose. This very bright, energy-packed, glowing and powerful splinter was born in Cuttack, to Mrs Prabhavati and Mr. Jankinath Bose.
Most of us are not aware of the fact that Subhash inherited the seeds of revolution not from the mortal human beings but from the nature itself. He was a born revolutionary. Revolution was in his blood and marrow. Right from his childhood he was a visionary, a dreamer and a romancer who dreamt of things which were far away from his, nay ordinary human being's sight, too illusionary to be true for most of the people. Every revolution which has rocked, remodelled and refashioned the world at some stage had been the dream of some individual. This dream at some later stage materialised through the adventurous and death-defying efforts of the dreamer turned practical actionist. Hitler had once said,
"Some one man proclaims some true thing, appeals for solution of some definite problem, marks out an objective, and creates a Movement having as its aim the realisation of his intentions... It is an essential characteristic of great questions of any period that thousands are at work on solving them, and many imagine themselves proposed for election by Destiny to that end, so that, in the free play of forces, the stronger and bolder shall be finally victorious and shall be entrusted with the task of solving the problem."1
For Subhash, life was really a dream, a missionary dream, a meaningful and immortal dream, and a dream for the very rosy, fragrant, promising and prosperous future for his four hundred million compatriots. He never hesitated in accepting himself to be a dreamer. In fact he summed up the whole meaning of his life in what he said on 27th Sept., 1944,
"They call me a dreamer, do they. But I confess that I am a dreamer. I have always been a dreamer-even when I was a child. The progress of the world has depended on dreamers...
I have been a dreamer of dreams, but the dream of all my dreams, the dearest dream of my life, has been the dream of freedom for India.
They think that it is a discredit to be a dreamer. I take pride in being one. They do not like my dreams. But that is nothing new.
If I did not dream dreams of Indian freedom, I would have accepted the chains of slavery as something eternal... The real crux of the question is, can my dreams become realities. The Army is one such dream come true... No, I do not mind being a dreamer. The progress of the world has depended on dreamers and their dreams,-not dreams of exploitation and aggrandisement and perpetuating injustice,-but dreams of progress, happiness for the widest masses, liberty and independence for all nations. "2
His dreams of free India never permitted him to accept the fact of Mother India in the yoke of slavery. If anything, relations, customs or compulsions, ever tried to stand between him and his cause, he smashed it. It was because of his dreams that he couldn't compromise with the British Rule over India and felt agitated, frustrated and infuriated to see the lethargic, slavish and non-combatant attitude of his fellow freedom seekers. As a teen-ager, he wrote to his mother,
"I wonder if Mother India in this age has one single selfness son--is our motherland really so unfortunate? Alas! What happened to our hoary past? Where are those Aryan heroes who would freely sacrifice their precious lives in the service of Mother India?"3
He fervently pined to pay the price through self-sacrifice and self-suffering.
A little deeper ,analytical look into his childhood amply reveals that he was highly disturbed, perturbed, worried and annoyed at the pitiable condition of the Indian people in those days and their lack of ability and will to fight against the enemy. He couldn't bear the sight of illiterate, starved, naked and unsheltered millions of fellow countrymen. The sufferings of the Indian people all-around him, further intensified the revolutionary fervour in him and while thinking of them, he forgot even about his own self. At each stage of his life, he tried to the best of his capacity and capability to lessen their sufferings. When he saw the plight of an old, infirm woman, sitting outside his home in a miserable and pathetic condition, he stopped going to college by train, and helped her with the amount he saved by walking three miles to his college. Such an isolated, charitable gesture of sympathy and goodwill might not have ameliorated the fate of the country but it definitely reflected that in the sufferings of the countless Indians, he saw the reflection of bleeding Mother India and he was prepared to shed the last drop of his sweat and blood for improving their lot. This he proved by the events which followed in later life.
The process of organising the like-minded people for socially useful work had been started by him right from the childhood. When he was just a school-going child at Cuttack he organised a group of like-minded fellow students to educate the illiterate people of the villages. Along with his friends he went to the rural areas, and helped the needy people. In Calcutta also, during his student life, he joined an organisation which was looking after the orphans. The volunteers of this organisation, with gunny bags in their hands, had to go to the people and collect rice and other eatables for the orphans. Inspite of his affluent background and mental conflicts, while begging for his less fortunate brethren countrymen, he went ahead with his determination and for quite some time performed this otherwise socially awkward and difficult duty. During the vacation, when he came to Cuttack, instead of enjoying the vacation by visiting some tourist resorts, he opted to visit those villages which had been seriously affected by the epidemic of cholera. It must be remembered that in those days cholera was a fatal disease and even relatives used to desert the patients. Though its treatment had been invented, yet it was not readily available. He undertook all these activities without any information to or consent of the parents. To the masses and most of the leaders or observers it might have appeared to be just another effort by some sincere, if not eccentric, young man to serve the society out of sympathetic or humanitarian considerations but for Subhash Chandra Bose, it was nothing short of nursing the wounds of the elements of the Mother India. How deep were the roots of nationalism in his heart and in what spirit he had done all these things, is not for the ordinary people to assess and understand. Unfortunately we are accustomed to judging and evaluating others with our personal experience and standards, which in turn depend on our outlook, values, capacity and capability, in most of the cases and most of the time the young people, undertaking such type of venture are misunderstood. Fearing and apprehending that the others around him will not be able to understand and appreciate the real spirit and sentiments behind all these activities, he confided in his mother when he was hardly fifteen years, in the following words,
"Mother, do you know why I am writing all this to you? To whom else can I talk? Who will listen to me? Who else will take all this seriously? Those, whose lives are motivated only by selfish considerations, cannot afford to think on such lines-will not think on such lines-lest their self interest should be impaired. But, a mother's life is not motivated by selfish considerations. Her life is dedicated to her children--to the country. ".
His heart and soul were completely immersed in the cause of motherland and each unpleasant sight of misery and insult to the nation, strengthened his determination to fight for national cause and added fuel to the fire of zeal which was already burning very strongly with the passion of emancipating the lot of motherland. He could never forget that due to his being an Indian he was not allowed to appear in the scholarship exams conducted at primary and middle levels.
For quite some time, in the childhood, like most of us, he believed that the obedience to the parents and elders was the most sacred duty and he tried his level best to observe this norm. But very soon, with the passage of time, his values underwent a drastic change. He came across the collected works of Swami Vivekanand and the study of these books brought a revolutionary change in his outlook. While recollecting the effects of the study of these works, Subhash wrote,
"I was barely fifteen when Vivekananda entered my life. Then there followed a revolution within and every thing was turned upside down. It was, of course, a long time before I could appreciate the full significance of his teachings, or the greatness of his personality, but certain impressions were stamped indelibly on my mind from the outset-Many of the questions which vaguely stirred my mind, and of which I was to become conscious later on, found in him a satisfactory solution. "5
Influenced by the Swami's teachings, he became increasingly self-dependent, even arrogant and disobedient, not for some negative, selfish and personal purposes but for the services of greater ideals in life.
His parents, on noticing these developments, felt disturbed and tried to control him, but in vain. They were unable to fathom the reasons for such a transformation in him. Later, he himself recorded,
"I was questioned, warned in a friendly manner, and ultimately rebuked. But all to no purpose. I was rapidly changing and was no longer the goody-goody boy afraid of displeasing his parents. I had a new ideal before me now which had inflamed my soul-to effect my own salvation and to serve humanity by abandoning all worldly desires and breaking away from all undue restraints. I no longer recited Sanskrit verses inculcating obedience to one's parents; on the contrary, I took to verses which preached defiance.”6
In fact his growing involvement in his commitment and cause made him increasing by more unfit for what is called the worldly wise society. His each action indicated that he would not adjust with the traditional society, and he should work to change the society in accordance with his cherished ideals. While recollecting his experiences of school days, he wrote,
"The more my parents endeavoured to restrain me, the more rebellious I became. When all other attempts failed, my mother took to tears. But even that had no effect on me. I was becoming callous, perhaps eccentric, and more determined to go my own way, though all the time I was feeling inwardly unhappy. To defy my parents in this way was contrary to my nature and to cause them pain was disagreeable, but I was swept onwards by an irresistible current. "7
Though he wanted to avoid situations where he had to disobey his parents yet he never felt guilty in disobeying where it was a must and breaking those social norms which didn't go with his point of, view or which militated against his scheme of things. In fact, with the passage of time his impressions about the rebellious attitude glorified and he started taking pride in acting as a defiant young man. It is very clear from the following observations which he made in his prison note-book during his incarceration in Mandlay from 1925 to 1927,
"Those who are considered good boys in the society are in fact nothing but eunuchs. Neither in this world nor in any other has any great work been achieved or will any great work be done by these people. These boys somehow or the other reduce their burden of sin and they follow the track of the most orthodox people like a herd of sheep. Throughout their most prosaic life there is no taste of anything new or novel, there is no outburst of full-hearted laughter, there is no inspired self-sacrifice... One has to love new things, one has to grow mad for unknown, one has to express himself in the free mind and under the open sky by the breaking through all the barriers of life and by razing them to the ground."8
He was unable to understand the reason behind the resistance to his efforts by his parents though whatever he was doing was really noble and great. The extent and nature of resistance from within the family give him the feeling that even his family members considered him to be a lunatic. But he realised and was thoroughly convinced that for some great result in life and self fulfillment, revolting against many of the traditions is a practical and natural necessity. Unlike most other prominent Indian leaders of the independence struggle, he had chosen his mission at a very early age. From his very childhood he had resolved to work for the upliftment of humanity. He wrote in his autobiography,
"Though I was passing through a period of stormy transition when I left school, I had by then made certain definite decisions for myself-I was not going to follow the beaten track, come what may. I was going to lead a life conducive to my spiritual welfare and the uplift of humanity."9
It is easy to resolve to work for others with dedication and selflessness, but it is not easy to match it with actual deeds. During these formative days, he had to pass through great ordeals and face very tough resistance from all quarters but he felt neither discouraged nor complained about these hardships. He not only welcomed and' enjoyed these hardships but also realised that these adversities in fact will be blessings in disguise. He learnt some of the most valuable lessons of his life from such experiences. Long after this struggle had come to an end, or changed its shape, while recollecting those experiences, he stated,
"Now that I have come out of the ordeal comparatively sacrifice, I do not regret what I have been through. I have this consolation to offer myself that the struggle made a man of me. I gained self-confidence, which I had lacked before and I succeeded in determining some of the fundamental principles of my life. "10
Since he had resolved to work for others and follow the path of self-sacrifice, he felt that matrimony would hamper his efforts for his aims. Hence he decided in favour of celibacy.
He was comparatively a very sensitive, sincere and thoughtful young man and besides many other types of urges, he had urge for spiritual pursuits also. He sincerely tried to satisfy this urge also. He met a large number of saints and visited many religious places. These experiences were very frustrating, disappointing and dis-illusioning. When he failed to find solace from the religious people whom he had met and the religious places which he had visited, he ventured to undertake a visit to the various other religious places of repute during the summer vacation of 1914. His parents had absolutely no idea of his venture and they were extremely worried about his whereabouts and physical well-being. During this pilgrimage he visited many temples, met a large number of saints, but inspite of all this he failed to find satisfaction. He realised that the so-called houses of God were being occupied by the villains and God was nowhere to be seen there. Completely disappointed, he returned home at his own. His parents felt highly relieved. What he could not find in his pilgrimage, he found in the studies of Swami Vivekanand.
After failing in his spiritual pursuits, he tried to concentrate on the national problems. At that time he had neither that much of political awareness, nor political power to solve the national problems yet he always nursed the feeling that he was to be one of the doctors of the national ailments. In January, 1916, when he was in the Presidency College, an incident of far-reaching significance took place. This incident not only reflects his contempt for the alien rulers but also can be said to be a turning point in his life. Mr. Oaten, one of the professors of the college, misbehaved with some of the Indian students. Subhash was the representative of the class. He, along with his classfellows, approached the Principal for justice but couldn't get it. As a result of it, the students were furious and agitated. Inaction of the college authorities seems to have emboldened Mr. Oaten who did not mend and repeated his misbehaviour. Now, the students, led by Subhash, retaliated by manhandling the errant professor. The Principal was put in an unenviable situation. He was suspended and there was a possibility that the college might be permanently closed. The Principal, before relinquishing his charge, suspended Subhash from the college with the remarks, "Bose, you are the most troublesome man in the college. I suspend you."l1
An important and interesting thing in this affair was that Bose did not express regrets for his conduct and returned home after thanking the Principal for the punishment. Little did the Principal know while making this comment that the boy whom he was suspending for being the most troublesome man in the college, would one day prove to be the most troublesome man for the British Empire in India, and the person who was being suspended for protesting against the degradation of his fellow students, would one day be responsible for not only suspension but also the expulsion of the British from the Indian soil. At that time, under the circumstances, Subhash had taken a very tough and bold stand in support of his class-fellows and their cause, yet later on he felt that he could have taken a comparatively stronger and bolder stand. In a letter addressed to his brother Sarat Chandra Bose on 23.4.1921, he wrote,
"I feel, very strongly, as a result of my past experience that compromise is a very unholy thing. If I had stood up before James in .1916 and admitted that I had assaulted Oaten, I would have been a better and truer man and would have served the students' cause better-though perhaps with unfavourable consequences to myself."12
Subhash Chandra Bose himself attached great importance to this incident in his life and wrote at some later stage,
"Little did I then realise the inner significance of the tragic events of 1916. My Principal had expelled me; but he had made my future career. I had established a precedent for myself from which I could not easily depart in future. I had stood up with courage and composure in a crisis and fulfilled my duty. I had developed self-confidence as well as initiative, which was to stand me in good stead in future. I had a foxtaste of leadership-though in a very restricted sphere-and of the martyrdom that it involves. In short, I acquired character and could face the future with equanimity."l3
How prophetic his words proved to be while writing these words. He must not have been aware of the fact that in life, in order to prove his point and build up his career, every time he shall have to invite or face expulsion. First expulsion from the college, then from the Congress Party, and finally from the country.
As already pointed out he was an extremely sensitive, emotional, sincere and committed young man who took everything very deeply. In whatever he did, he believed that he was solving some major problem of the country or doing something of far-reaching importance. His actions were in fact initial steps in his long term plans, and the experiments which he conducted on small scale during youth, had to be made on larger scale at the appropriate time. While recollecting the real significance of activities such as serving the cholera patients (mentioned previously), he wrote,
"Moreover, nursing was but an expedient; it was not a permanent remedy for any of our national ills. In our group, we have always criticised the Rama Krishna Mission for concentrating on hospitals and flood and famine relief and neglecting nation building work of a permanent nature and I had no desire to repeat their mistake. "14
In fact it appears that he was not interested in doing anything which did not ultimately help and further the cause of complete independence for the nation. Whatever spare time he had during the college days, he spent in the service of society and nation.
Hardly had he finished his graduation in India, then he got an opportunity to go to England for competing for the I.C.S. When this offer was made to him, he was not clear whether to accept it or not. Because he had already made up his mind not to serve the British govt. finally he accepted it though reluctantly. The only purpose of his visit to England was lo experience the effects of politically free atmosphere there and learn the ways to liberate his motherland. During his stay in England he devoted less time to preparation for the said competition and more to study the polity, in its totality, milieu of that country. He realised that the people there were deeply attached to their liberty and any encroachment on it invited violent reaction. Even their moderates were much more revolutionary than our so-called revolutionaries of those days. Once Lokmanya Tilak, the fire-brand Indian leader, went to the Cambridge to address the Indian students there. Some British students also joined the audience hoping that they will listen something really stirring and explosive but after listening to the speech, they felt disappointed and some of them remarked,
"If these are your extremists, we don't want to hear your moderates."15
When Bose heard such type of remarks, he concluded that Britishers need comparatively more fiery, aggressive and revolutionary leader in India if the former had to be thrown out of India. He did not cherish the idea of a passive and smooth life. Though he had come for appearing in the I.C.S. examinations yet he had neither intended to join it (in case of selection) nor he had expected to get contentment out of it. He appeared in the exams, passed with distinction and decided not to serve in the cadre. The I.C.S. was the most glamorous and lucrative career in those days and anybody thinking of resigning it, was bound to be Considered an eccentric or lunatic. Very heavy pressure was put on him from all sides not to resign, but he stuck to his decision. It is because he knew himself full well whereas the others did not know him that well. While narrating his feelings at that time, he wrote,
"But for a man of my temperament who has been feeding on ideas which might be called eccentric-the line of least resistance is not the best line to follow. Life loses half its interest if there is no struggle-if there are no risks to be taken. The uncertainties of life are not appalling to one who has not, at heart, worldly ambitions. Moreover, it is not possible to serve one's country in the best and fullest manner if one is chained to the Civil Services. In short, national and spiritual aspirations arc not compatible with obedience to Civil Service conditions." 16
He was strongly convinced that unless and until great sacrifices for the nation were made, the country would not be freed. At that time he agreed with most of the political observers that India would get Home Rule within ten years but he was convinced that it would not be possible without making the requisite sacrifices. He observed in his letter dated 6.4.1921 to his brother from Oxford,
"I believe we shall get Home Rule within ten years and certainly earlier if we are ready to pay the price. The price consists of sacrifice and suffering. Only on the soil of sacrifice and suffering can be raised our National Edifice. If we all stick to our jobs and look after our own interests, I don't think we shall get Home Rule even in fifty years. Each family-if not each individual-should now bring forward its offering to the feet of the Mother. Father wants to save me from this sacrifice. I am not so callous as not to appreciate the love and affection which impels him to save me from this sacrifice, in my interests. He is naturally apprehensive that I am perhaps hasty in my judgement or overzealous in my youthful enthusiasm. But I am perfectly convinced that the sacrifice has got to be made--by somebody at least."17
In the same letter he added,
"I theretofore, do not see how I can save myself from this sacrifice. I know what this sacrifice means. It means poverty, suffering, hard work and possibly other hardships to which I need not expressly refer but which you can very well understand. But the sacrifice has got to be made-cautiously and deliberately."18
So far the Indian National Congress, the chief vanguard of freedom fighters, had been following a policy where the sacrifice and suffering had to be the minimum. We can say that Subhash initiated a new chapter of 'conscious and deliberate sacrifices' in the Indian freedom struggle. Normally what happens is that the leaders ask others to make sacrifices but in this case the leader, Subhash, himself wanted to be one of the first to sacrifice himself and his career. He wanted to be a true and real leader. He had been seriously perturbed by the lethargic, inactive and disappointing attitude of his fellow-countrymen. In one of the letters to mother from Ranchi he had written,
"Mother, I wonder if Mother India in this age has one single selfless son--is our motherland so really unfortunate? Alas, what happened to our hoary past? Where are those Aryan heroes who would freely sacrifice their precious lives in the service of Mother India?"19
In the same letter he had asked his mother,
"Will the condition of our country continue to go from bad to worse--will not any son of Mother India in distress, in total disregard of his selfish interests, dedicate his whole life to the cause of the Mother?
Mother, how much longer shall we sleep? How much longer shall we go on playing with non-essentials? Shall we continue to turn a deaf ear to the wailings of our nation? Our ancient religion is suffering the pangs of near death--does that not stir our hearts?20
At the end of this letter he added,
"If I cannot achieve anything more in this life, why live?"
Throughout his life he tried' to follow the spirit of this last sentence of his letter. He always tried to make his life as meaningful, useful and action packed as it was humanly possible under the given circumstances. It won't be an exaggeration to say that very often he tried to cross the limits of his capacity and it was only on account of this that he became a legend in his life-time. In one of the letters to one of his friends, he quoted Swami Vivekanand who had once said,
"Iron nerves and a very intelligent brain and the whole world is at your feet. "21
He had the determination to bring the world at his feet. At that time the world which he wanted to bring at his feet was the world on which the sun of the British rule never set.
All the human beings, irrespective of the role which they have to play in life, have a tender heart beneath their hard exterior. Everyone feels for those with whom one is intimately related but there are very few who can sacrifice their personal feelings for the national feelings. Subhash, who had taken very harsh and hard decision, had a very delicate, sensitive and sentimental heart. He was confronted with very strong mental conflicts at different stages of life and at times he was on the verge of surrendering but every time he managed to overcome the conflict in favour of the national cause. While deciding to resign the LC.S., he had to pass through the fire test of life. On the one hand were the considerations of personal career and parental pressure while on the other hand was national interest; on the one side there were the tears of his mother and on the other were the sight of the bleeding wounds of the Mother India which he wanted to nurse; on the one hand were the allurement of a comfortable and luxurious career and on the other hand the dragon of challenges, discomforts and sufferings was staring in him. He opted for difficult path and decided to lay down all other comforts and considerations at the feet of the Mother India. In the letter to his brother from Cambridge, he expressed these conflicts in the following words,
"You have done all that you could for me and all that I could expect from you--and without being solicited either. I feel that I have been placed under a kind of moral obligation--the meaning and depth of which I do not sufficiently comprehend. The result is that I feel that my proposal to resign is, to say the least, a cruel one. Such a proposal means that the sum of Rs. 10,000 spent for my sake will yield no return whatsoever. But when I appeal to you to consent to my resignation I do so, not as a personal favour but for the sake of our unfortunate country which is in dire need of whole-hearted devotees. You will have to look upon the money spent for my sake as a gift laid at the feet of the Mother without any expectation of return in any shape or form."22
This makes it absolutely clear that though he posed like a hard rock yet beneath the hard crest there was fluid lava of sentiments for the relations and friends. He was neither dead nor blind to the damage which he had caused to the feelings of his parents. He wrote,
"I know I have hurt father beyond measure and I shall never excuse myself for having done so. Time alone will prove whether I am right or wrong. If you think that I have been guilty of rashness and indiscretion, I pray that you will suspend your judgement and restrain your condemnation till my folly is thoroughly exposed by time. If you think I am not wrong in my choice I am sure your blessings and good wishes will always attend on me in my future career."23
In this way after swinging like a pendulum, he plunged into the turbulent ocean of Indian politics. He knew his goal, he knew the strength within him, he was aware of the sufferings and obstructions awaiting him on the way. Here was an Arjuna who was his own Krishna, driving his own chariot, into the battlefield of nation's liberation. In one of his letters from Cambridge to Mr. Charu Chandra Ganguli, he wrote,
"You arc aware that once before I sailed on the sea of life at the call of duty. The ship has now reached a port offering great allurement--where power, poverty and wealth are at my command. But, the response from the innermost corner of my heart is 'You will not find happiness in this. The way to your happiness lies in your dancing around with the surging waves of the ocean.'
Today, in response to that call, I am sailing forth again with the helm in His Hands. Only He knows where the ship will land... Let us see what happens."24
Like this, the simmering volcano, after building up a powerful pressure,- pierced a hole in the dull, dry and barren crest of Indian political field and acquired such a huge and mighty shape and stature that all those who were already in the field, found themselves to be small and swerving. They were political giants, as huge as mountains, but here was a volcano which was in the process of eruption and a new mountain was in the process of formation, daily gaining more height and getting closer to the sky.
CHAPTER II
Too Genius and Rebellious to be Tolerated by the Contemporaries
Darwin had expounded the theory of 'survival of the fittest'. This theory which was meant for explaining the process of evolution in the nature, applies to all the aspects of life. There is a very tough, neck and neck race in every field of life. Political power is the most alluring and captivating factor in the present day life. Like all other fields, even in politics, professional jealousy plays an important part. Though each person desires, aspires and likes to presume himself to be an excellent person and feels that his excellence should be recognised by all, yet it is a tragedy that the so-called (self-proclaimed) excellent, outstanding and established persons find it intolerable to see the rise and recognition of new excellence. The 'establishment' generally discourages any change because the change is always at its cost. The god-fathers of revolution become reactionary when their leadership comes to be revolted against. Revolution is never a stagnant, smooth and dormant process. It is always a very volatile, explosive and action-packed thundering and lightning activity. It appeals to the youth- because youth has the attitude to understand it and the strength to materialise the aims of the revolution. Subhash, who right from the childhood, had dynamic and revolutionary tendencies, thought the Indian National Congress (I.N.C.) to be a revolutionary organisation and decided to join it at the earliest possible opportunity.
The first Indian, after having passed the I.C.S. with distinction and deciding to resign it, landed in Bombay on 16.7.1921. This young man was to become the pole star of Indian political struggle and challenge the positions and career of many political leaders of the country. He decided to begin his political career with a meeting with the god-father of Indian politics at that time. Incidentally Mahatma Gandhi was in Bombay at that time. Subhash met him and a very meaningful, interesting and probing dialogue took place between the two. Subhash, who was a new entrant in the Indian politics, felt the necessity and had the curiosity to know the mind of the person who was steering the ship of Indian freedom struggle. Mahatma Gandhi in his usual patient manner, listened to Bose and replied his questions to the best of his capacity and capability. After an hour's discussion, Subhash did not feel satisfied with the answers. He found the old man to be vague and evasive. His inquisitive and stormy mind couldn't find solace and satisfaction. He recorded in his autobiography,
"Though I tried to persuade myself at the time that there must have been lack of understanding on my part, my reasons told me clearly again and again, that there was a deplorable lack of clarity in the plan which the Mahatma Gahdhi had formulated, and that he himself didn't have a clear idea of the successive stages of the campaign which would bring India to her cherished goals of freedom. I was depressed and disappointed."1
It is really tragic for the nation that the Captain could not win the confidence of one of the most intelligent, enthusiastic and committed soldiers of the independence struggle. It may be on account of Mahatma's realisation that Subhash was unfit to be his political disciple or that he himself was unfit to be the political patron of the 'Simmering Volcano'. It is also possible that Gandhi realised that Subhash was too aggressive and violent to fit into his framework of non-violent campaign. Perhaps it was on account of such a feeling that Mahatma advised Subhash to contact Deshbandhu Chitranjan Dass for political patronage. We can say that Gandhi and Bose were just like the sky and earth which give the illusion of meeting at a very distant horizon but in fact never meet anywhere. Perhaps it was on account of the fundamental differences in the approaches of these two political stalwarts of Indian Independence struggle that they could never meet at any point on the horizon of Indian politics.
In search of his ideal political mentor, he proceeded to Calcutta and met Desh Bandhu Chitranjan Dass. They had a very warm meeting, and in the very first meeting he felt that he had the person who could be his political mentor. Commenting about this meeting, Subhash wrote in his autobiography,
"During the course of our conversation I began to feel that here was a man who knew what he was about-who could give all that he had and who could demand from others all they could give-a man to whom youthfulness was not a shortcoming but a virtue. By the time our conversation came to an end, my mind was made up. I felt that I had found a leader, and I meant to follow him."2
Bose resolved to follow the footprints of Dass. During the brief period in which they worked together, Subhash learnt a lot and proved to be a true disciple of his Guru. It is unfortunate that the cruel hands of death separated .the two very soon. It can be ventured that if the Guru had not died so early, the fate of the country must have been quite different.
Mahatma Gandhi, who during those days, represented the comparatively aggressive elements in the I.N.C., had fixed Swaraj as the goal of his movement. He had launched non-cooperation movement for the achievement of this aim. The response to the movement was very warm and enthusiastic. Gandhi's call for ten million members and ten million rupees had been warmly responded to by the people. They were fired with a new spirit and excitement. They expected some important and significant results. They had given what was asked of them but inspite of all this, Swaraj was not in sight. In the absence of the result, with the passage of time, the enthusiasm of the people went on subsiding and even Congressmen felt disillusioned. Dr. Annie Besant, the important Congress leader, on watching the slow progress of the movement, complained that 'Swaraj was to arrive by thirteenth September but it is as far off as ever'. Gandhi, who was not mentally prepared to concede the defeat, in his own evasive and complacent style, replied,
"Swaraj had dawned in the minds of the masses and had freed them from the shackles which had bound them."3
Mahatma Gandhi in fact had realised that in spite of the enthusiastic response to his call, he was not in a position to give to the people what he had promised. He had realised that he would not be able to steer the struggle to some conclusive end. Hence he appeared to be in search of an excuse for suspending the movement. Gandhi tried to save his skin by giving some philosophical explanation for his failures.
Prince of Wales had to visit India. Congress decided to boycott his visit and demonstrate against him wherever he went to highlight the demands and problems of India. Wherever the Prince of Wales went he was confronted with hostile demonstrations. He had to visit Calcutta. Deshbandhu had planned demonstration on a large scale. To encourage and inspire the masses to actively participate in the demonstrations, Deshbandhu sent his son and wife to the prison. This boosted the morale of the people and urged them to throng the jails in large numbers. Subhash tried his level best to make this demonstration a great success. He was also arrested.
Such a large number of people had courted arrest that the govt. was short of space to accommodate the arrested people. At a time when the movement was progressing so well and the govt. had started feeling the impact of the movement, unfortunately for India but more so for Mahauna Gandhi, at Chauri Chaura, a small town in Gorakhpur District in V.P., an angry crowd of people surrounded the police station and put it on fire. As a result of it, one police inspector and twenty-one constables died. This was a sufficient excuse for the Dictator of the movement, to retrace his steps. He decided to suspend the movement. Surprisingly in taking a decision of such a great historical and national importance, Gandhi did not consult even his seniormost colleagues. All the political leaders, irrespective 01 their personal relationship with Gandhi, felt offended by such an irresponsible, irrational and untimely decision of Mahatma Gandhi. Subhash, who was considerably young felt greatly disturbed and expressed his anguish in the following words,
"The Dictator's decree was obeyed at the time but there was a regular revolt in the Congress camp. No one could understand why the Mahauna should have used the isolated incident at Chauri Chaura for strangling ~e movement all over the country-To sound the order of retreat just when public enthusiasm was reaching the boiling point was nothing short of a national calamity."4
The principal lieutenants of Mahatma. Deshbandhu C.R. Dass, Pt. Moti Lal Nehru, Lala Lajpat Rai, who were all in prison, shared the popular resentment. Subhash who was with Deshbandhu in the prison at that time, saw Deshbandhu in great anger and sorrow at the way Mahatma Gandhi had been repeatedly bungling. Earlier Gandhi had to unceremoniously and unsuccessfully abandon the Bardoli movement. Lala Lajpat Rai, in sheer disgust, was reported to have addressed a seventy page letter to the Mahatma from the prison. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad also could not restrain his anger and expressed his anguish in the following words,
"This caused political reaction in political circles and demoralised the country. The govt. took full advantage of the situation-Gandhiji had erred grievously in calling off the movement. This had so demoralised the political workers that it could take many years before public enthusiasm could again be roused."5
So, there was hardly anyone who did not criticise Gandhi for his decision. It has been the tragedy of Indian politics that some people had been so much idolised and glorified that they started presuming themselves to be infallible and this resulted in irreparable loss and damage to the national cause. Same was done by Mahatma Gandhi also. He kept on committing blunder but never realised it. Subhash felt that Gandhi was unfit to lead the national movement because he lost control on his nerves and situation in the most crucial moments.
Most of the senior leaders realised that Gandhi was stumbling time and again but they did not have the courage to tell him this thing on his face. During the freedom struggle, the unpleasant but essential duty of showing Mahatma Gandhi his real face was to be performed by Deshbandhu C.R. Dass and his disciple Subhash Chandra Bose. The process started at the Gaya session of Congress which was presided over by C.R. Dass. This session witnessed, the battle royal between the 'Non-changers' led by Mahatma Gandhi and the 'Pro-changers' led by Deshbandhu, Motilal Nehru and Madan Mohan Malviya. In this battle the group of Gandhi succeeded in getting passed their resolution in favour of no change in the policy. The session concluded on 31.12.1922 and the AICC met on 1.1.1923 to adopt a programme for the year. Since the clash had become public, there was no option for Deshbandhu except to resign from the Presidentship of the I.N.C. The senior leaders decided to form a new party named 'Swaraj Party'. To propagate the policies and programmes of the Swarajist Party, a newspaper 'Forward' was started. Subhash Chandra Bose was appointed it,> editor-in-chief. Swarajist Party had its first conference in Allahabad in March 1923 and it fixed dominion status as its aim. 'Forward' newspaper played a very important role in propagating the views of Swarajist Party. In the elections to the Assembly, Swarajists registered a great success. It was a feather in the crown of Subhash also.
In 1924, in the Corporation elections of Calcutta, the Swarajist Party won with overwhelming majority. Subhash Babu was returned unopposed. Deshbandhu, in spite of stiff resistance from the Britishers, appointed Subhash as the Chief Executive Officer-cum-Municipal Commissioner. He was the youngest person to hold this office. In spite of young age and lack of experience, he worked very efficiently and did full justice to the confidence which his political mentor had reposed in him. During the brief tenure as Executive Officer, he introduced far-reaching changes in the working of the Corporation. For the first time, an education department was started with Chatopadhaya, an eminent scholar from the Cambridge, as it,> head. He opened health and education centres in each ward. Keeping in view the importance of public grievances, he personally attended to the complaint,> of the people and with his warm and practical approach, he left indelible impressions on their minds. He set great precedent by donating half of his monthly salary i.e.; Rs. ]500/- out of Rs. 3000/- to the Corporation. Unfortunately he didn't get the opportunity to show his excellence by working under the normal conditions and for long. In October ]924 he was arrested and put in Alipur jail. Imprisonment did not deter him from the performance of his I duties. He asked his Secretary to bring the files in the prison and he kept on performing his official duties from the prison. The jail supervisory staff did not behave in responsible and cooperative manner. At times he had to pull up the irresponsible and I arrogant police officials. Annoyed by the dominating nature of Subhash Chandra Bose, the police officials transferred him to Berahampur jail. Finally, in January ]925, he was transferred to Mandlay jail. The living conditions there were not only unhygienic but also injurious to health. The climate was not favourable. All seriously affected his health and he fell ill. As a result of it he lost forty pounds weight. Gradually his health deteriorated so much that he was unable to move from his bed. When his condition became critical and recovery appeared to be difficult, he was offered conditional release but he declined to accept it. Even in the distant land and as a prisoner, he did not compromise with his self-respect and dignity. The jail authorities, realising that there was a positive threat to his life, were left with no option but to release him unconditionally. The period of Mandlay was very damaging to Bose not because he had lost health but because he had lost his political mentor and the guiding spirit Deshbandhu who had expired during his imprisonment in Mandlay.
The hardships of Mandlay, the weight of the chains and the loss of the mentor did not demoralise him. In fact like a pressed rubber ball bounced back with greater strength and enthusiasm, he was elected the President of Bengal Provincial Congress Committee. It gained all the more importance because the session of Indian National Congress was held in Calcutta in December, 1928. This session provided an opportunity to Subhash to exhibit .his superb organisational qualities. He acted as the Chainnan of the Reception Committee and made excellent elaborate arrangements for the session. Clad in a very impressive uniform of General Officer Commander-in-Chief, he headed the Presidential procession. It was a superb, suplendid performance, and it looked like a rehearsal for the events which followed fifteen years later. Those who might have had the opportunity to see this performance, as wen as his performance as the Commander-in-Chief of the I.N.A., must have realised that Subhash had learnt the first lesson for the I.N.A. days in Calcutta session.
Bose was a strong man and never scared of confronting even the mightiest. In fact he always, aware of his strength, wanted to confront the mightiest. In this session, against the explicit wishes of Mahatma Gandhi, he moved an amendment to the resolution of Mahatma. This was nothing short of a little mound striking against the Mount Everest. Though the amendment was defeated by 1350 votes to 973, yet the magnitude and scope of his political plans and programmes had become abundantly clear. Besides this, this experience gave him the feeling that within the I.N.C., besides him, there are quite many who held a point of view different from that of Gandhi. They however failed to gather courage to face the worst He was highly critical of Mahatma Gandhi because of the latter's opposition to industrialisation and piece-meal policy of struggle. Even at the young age of just 32, he could foresee the developments which were likely to take place at international level after ten years. Besides this he was thinking of not only how to achieve freedom but also 'After Freedom, What?' The later developments proved that he was a very far-sighted statesman.
At the Lahore Session of the I.N.C., which was held in the following year and presided over by J.L. Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi himself moved the resolution for complete independence as the goal of the party. In this way, Mahatma Gandhi who had opposed and worked for the defeat of identical resolution moved by S.C. Bose at Calcutta a year back, had to eat the humble pie. This shows the sagacity of Subhash over other leaders including Mahatma Gandhi. Bose appreciated the resolution but he criticised the absence of any programme for achieving the declared aim. He moved an amendment to the effect that a programme should be chalked out to execute the resolution related to the attainment of complete independence. This amendment was defeated, not because there was something wrong in it but 'because Mahatma Gandhi did not want to give any political mileage to Subhash. As the cumulative effect of such activities of Subhash, he was dropped from the Congress Working Committee (C.W.C.). Undisturbed by the treatment given to him, he continued his efforts for accelerating the pace of struggle for freedom. He addressed a large number of conferences in which he elaborated and explained his point of view to the people.
The way he had been repeatedly arrested and released, it appeared as if jail was his another home. On the occasion of his 34th birthday (23.1.1930) he was arrested. What an appropriate Birthday Gift he had got from the British Govt. The arrangements in the jails and attitude of the jail authorities had always been inhumane and barbarous. Even while under arrest, he did not bear or submit to the excesses and injustices of the jail authorities. When he was in jail, he saw that some prisoners were being mercilessly beaten by the police officers. He tried to defend the fellow prisoners. While defending, he was brutally assaulted on the chest by some policemen. He fell unconscious and was dragged to his cell without being given any medical aid. When the people learnt about it, they organised mass demonstrations. The govt. had no option but to give him the proper medical treatment and also had to suspend the Superintendent of the jail. He was released from the prison on 26.12.1930. He was elected the Mayor of Calcutta. As Mayor he initiated many policies and programmes which greatly benefitted the masses. On 26.1.1931, while leading a massive independence procession, he again had to face the blows of police lathis on his head. He was arrested and sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment.
Gandhi must have realized the latent strength of Bose and appeared to be somewhat scared of him. When Gandhi had to negotiate with Lord Irwin, he knew that Subhash will oppose the signing of any agreement or pact with Irwin. It is believed that Gandhi told Lord Irwin also about the attitude of Subhash. When the Pact was actually signed, Bose very strongly attacked it. This Pact had not gained anything for India but had given great advantage to England. Even Nehru was shocked on the terms of the Pact and asked,
"Was it for this that our people had behaved so gallantly for a year? Were all our brave words and deeds to end in this? The Independence resolution of the Congress, the pledge of Jan. 1926, so often repeated."6
Before going to the Karachi Session of the I.N.C. Bose decided to meet Gandhi at Bombay and seek clarifications on some points. Bose wanted that Gandhi should use his influence and weight to compel the Britishers not to carry out the death sentence on Bhagat Singh, Raj Guru and Sukhdev for their involvement in the Lahore Conspiracy case. Mahatma Gandhi did not agree to it. On the way to Karachi, Subhash was shocked to learn that Bhagat Singh and his comrades had already been executed. This sent shocking waves throughout the country. When Mahatma Gandhi reached Karachi, instead of getting a usually warm welcome, he had to face hostile demonstrations. The young people waved black flags to him.
The policy of the I.N.C. appeared to be one step ahead, two steps backward. The same was witnessed at Karachi also. To the great surprise and distress of the leftists and the persons like Subhash, Vallabhai Patel, President of the Congress Party, announced that Lahore declaration of complete Independence had been dropped and now the goal was dominion status for India. In this way, instead of marching ahead, the Congress slided backwards. It was not a tactical retreat but a sort of withdrawal realising that they were not strong or good enough for achieving their fixed target. Not only this, the Congress did not appear to be in a mood to condemn the execution of Bhagat Singh and his comrades.' It was only under very heavy pressure that Congress passed a resolution praising their martyrdom. At the same time, as if to dissociate itself from those whom Congress had appreciated, it condemned the cult of violence. It won't be out of place to say that Congress did many things out of expediency and not out of conviction. The resolution of complete independence adopted at the Lahore Session was illustrative of such approach. Mahatma Gandhi wanted to take the wind out of the sails of Subhash. What can be more unfortunate for the country that even the Commander-in-Chief of the freedom struggle did not want to fight for the ultimate end and wanted to prepare the nation to accept a step short of ultimate aim. Mahatma Gandhi, who, on
29-8-1931 went to London to participate in the Round Table Conference, returned empty-handed on 28-12-1931. He had gone almost alone there and was not accompanied by any mature and strong colleague to help and advise him. The result was already written on the wall but to the Indian masses it didn't make much difference. So great and infinite is the magnanimity of Indian masses that they can worship plants, animals, stars, stones and what not, hence they had no problem in welcoming the half-naked Indian political saint who had returned more empty-handed from England than when he left India. In fact it was because of such wild and irrational responses of the masses that Mahatma Gandhi formed a hollow hallowed image about himself.
29-8-1931 went to London to participate in the Round Table Conference, returned empty-handed on 28-12-1931. He had gone almost alone there and was not accompanied by any mature and strong colleague to help and advise him. The result was already written on the wall but to the Indian masses it didn't make much difference. So great and infinite is the magnanimity of Indian masses that they can worship plants, animals, stars, stones and what not, hence they had no problem in welcoming the half-naked Indian political saint who had returned more empty-handed from England than when he left India. In fact it was because of such wild and irrational responses of the masses that Mahatma Gandhi formed a hollow hallowed image about himself.
Though Bose was not a member of the Congress Working Committee yet, keeping in view the important role played by him he was invited by Mahatma Gandhi to Bombay for consultations and discussions. When Bose was on his way to Calcutta from Bombay, he was arrested on Jan. 3, 1932. Without any trial, he was detained in prison and shifted from one place to another. During this period of imprisonment, once again his health deteriorated seriously. In the prison also, Bose continued his work of teaching, preaching and preparing the fellow prisoners. When his physical condition deteriorated too much, the govt. fearing violent reactions in case of his death, had to agree to release him for going abroad for treatment. He accepted the offer but the British Govt. was so inhuman and heartless in its attitude towards him that before departure he was not allowed to see his parents.
He went to Vienna for health considerations. Another great veteran of Indian politics Vithal Bhai Patel was also undergoing treatment there. When Mahatma Gandhi, as usual, called off the disobedience movement, both of them felt extremely agitated and disappointed. They issued the following strong worded statement about this suicidal decision:
"We arc clearly of opinion that as a political leader Mahatma Gandhi has failed. The time has, therefore, come for a radical reorganisation of the Congress on a new principle and with a new method If the Congress as a whole can undergo this transformation, it would be the best course. Failing that, a new party will have to be formed within the Congress, composed of all radical elements. Non-cooperation will have to be changed into a more militant one and the fight for freedom to be waged on all fronts."7
This reflects how bitter was the reaction of those who were opposed to Gandhian ways of doing the things. It is just by chance that those people, who had the potential to challenge the position of Gandhi, could not come together and give him a befitting fight. .
There are some people who fail to avail of even the best opportunities which come across them whereas there are a few others who take something out of even nothing. In fact the great people are those who make the best use of their adversities under all circumstances and at all the places they work for their cherished ideals. Some of our leaders like Mahatma Gandhi lost even the best opportunities in hand whereas there were others like Subhash, who did the impossible even in the foreign lands. The Britishers, presuming him to be a dangerous splinter, believed that wherever he may be, will play his damaging role for the British Empire. They wanted to keep him as far away from India as possible but little did they know that in an open and free atmosphere, the splinter will become all the more devastating. Bose decided to avail his presence in Europe 10 internationalise the issue of India's Freedom. He visited many European countries and organised many societies to work for the promotion of the cause of India's independence. In Austria, he organised an Austro-Indian Society. He visited Czecho-slovakia and studied the youth movements there. With the help of Prof. Lesseni, he organised a 'Czecho-Indian Association'. He visited Poland also and studied the various political movements there. His visit to Gennany was of the greatest importance because there he was confronted against the rising Dictator and the strong man of those days. When he visited Berlin in July 1933, the Indo-German Society and the German Foreign Office made elaborate arrangements to receive him. All this was done keeping in view his political potentialities. When Subhash learnt that Adolf Hitler, the ruler of the nation, in his autobiography, had made some derogatory remarks about India, he refused 10 accept the hospitality. He tried to get an appointment with Hitler but could not. When Hitler passed some unworthy remarks about the Indians, Bose lodged strong protest. He was offered a civic reception in Munich but when he learnt that Hitler had praised the British system of administration in India, he refused to accept the invitation for the reception. So great was the man and so bold was his attitude! He was one of the very few persons who had dared to roar back at Hitler and that 100 in the latter's den. As a result of his efforts, Hitler agreed to make amends in his speech. In this way he fought for the cause of India at all the places and under all the circumstances, and there-in lay his greatness. He was invited to London to preside over the Indian Political Congress but was not permitted to visit England. His speech was read out in absentia.
Besides visiting many countries and raising the issue of India's Independence, he wrote his book 'The Indian Struggle'. Miss Emile Sehenkal played an important role in the completion of this book. This book not only received world-wide recognition but also enlightened the people of the world about the real problem of India. While in Europe he studied the revolutionary movements in different countries of the world and the methods employed by the various revolutionaries in their respective countries. Bose visited Ireland also and met President D. Valera. He critically studied the Irish revolutionary movement because Ireland's case was also like that of India. Because of his background and the attitude of Irish people towards England, he was warmly welcomed there and assured active help by the people of Ireland.
At the international level, Britishers and some others were trying to tarnish the image of Indians. He defended the interest and honour of Indians everywhere. When he learnt that in Germany, some movie presenting Gandhi in a very ugly form, was being screened, he protested very strongly against it. As a result of his effons, the screening of the film was banned. It is very important to point out that at that time many ardent followers of Mahatma Gandhi were in Europe but none of them raised any voice against such misrepresentations. Here, he was not concerned with whether it was some politician with whom he personally agreed or not but it was the question of the interest and image of India. The stay in Europe was very valuable for Subhash. He had learnt many valuable lessons related to the struggle for national liberation. These lessons proved very helpful to him in his later life. He had a comparatively very comfortable and convenient life during his stay in Europe but the passion for motherland was so strong that all this appeared to be very uncomfortable. He decided to return to India. All his friends and well-wishers advised him not to do so because they apprehended that the moment he landed in India, he would be put under arrest. For Subhash, as already pointed out, jail was just another home and he was not scared of being arrested. The allurement of returning to the lap of motherland was stronger than the fear of arrest. He returned to India and the inevitable happened. He was arrested and imprisoned. Once again his health deteriorated. On learning about his health, the people observed hartal and organised demonstrations against his arrest but the govt did not release him till his position became too critical to be ignored. The govt. had to release him unconditionally. From the chain of events it appeared that he was given some relief from prison to improve his health and the moment it improved, he was again driven back to the prison. He went to Dalhousie and later to Europe for covalescence. Once again he started his work there. When he was attending a function in London, he was conveyed the pleasant important information that he had been elected the President of All India Congress Party. He went to Austria and Ireland before returning to India. During this period he completed his book . An Indian Pilgrim'. After this he returned to his homeland.
The dynamic young man, who started his political career in 1921, because of his sincerity, commitment and relentless effons for the nation's independence, rose to the most prestigious office in Indian politics by 1938. It appears to be little surprising that the person who opposed Mahatma Gandhi throughout his political career, right from the first day, was unanimously elected to this august office even in his absence. Such a move by these veteran political leaders was not without motive. Because of the international experiences, dynamic nature, organisational capacity, adventurous outlook and such other factors, he had become a force to reckon with. The Gandhites apparently elected him to this office to express their recognition for the services rendered by him. But the real motive appeared to be to bring this dynamic and overgrowing forceful leader in their fold. Perhaps Mahatma Gandhi felt that as he could encage J.L. Nehru, similarly he would be able to encage and entrap S.C. Bose also. In this case the disappointment was in store for them. He had already made it clear that due to the slow pace of activities, there was an urgent need for either overhauling the Congress party or organising a new party having a more dynamic and agressive approach. Mahatma Gandhi had recognised the potential strength of Bose and he was not prepared to take the risk of facing rift in the party. Still another reason for electing Bose as President could be that they wanted to burden him with such a heavy responsibility as may compel him to fall in line with Gandhites. Bose had a very optimistic, bright and glorious view of India and in his first statement after being elected as President, he asserted,
"On our close contact with the progressive movements will depend not only the salvation of India but also of the suffering humanity as well."8
When Bose, as President of the Congress party, arrived in India on the auspicious occasion of his birthday i.e. 23.1.1938, he was received by an impressive crowd at Karachi airport. The 51st session of the Congress party was held at Haripura on the banks of the river Tapti. The chariot of the President was drawn by 51 bullocks passing through 51 arches and 51 patriotic songs were sung. In his presidential address he made it very clear that he had very high goals in mind and he had done quite good homework before taking up the assignment. He referred to planning commission, family planning, industrialisation, agricultural-indebtedness, illiteracy, poverty and above all the need for severing relations with the British, our foreign rulers. He said,
"The ultimate stage in our progress will be severance of the British connection. When that severance takes place and there is no trace left of British domination, we shall be in a position to determine our future relations with Great Britain through a treaty of alliance voluntarily entered into by both parties. What our future relations with Great Britain will or should be, it is too early to say. That will depend to a large extent on the attitude of the British people themselves. On this point I have been greatly impressed by the attitude of President de Valera. Like the President of Eire, I should also say that we have no enmity towards the British people. We are fighting Great Britain and we want the fullest liberty to determine our future relations with her."9
Though Subhash was not able to act as independently and as confidently as he wanted to but still whatever he did, amply showed that he was not going to act as a puppet. Besides this he wanted to give his own leadership to the Congress. From the nature of the things done by him and the policies adopted by him, it is quite clear that in spite of the younger age, he was far ahead of even the seniormost congress leaders. He appointed a planning commission to plan the future developments in India. He was in favour of adopting advance scientific technology for national reconstruction and development. Because of his experience and strong analytical power, he was in a better position to judge the attitude of the Britishers and adopt appropriate policy for dealing with them. He had realised that the Britishers, who were generally called gentlemen, were not the gentlemen in fact. They understood the harsh language more than the polite language. He knew that those who were talking of democracy for themselves had denied the same to a great section of the population of the world. It is lamentable that the senior Congress leaders, particularly Mahatma Gandhi, J.L. Nehru, G.B. Pant and a few others could not agree with an idea of adopting an aggressive policy towards the Britishers. During the first tenure of Presidentship, Bose did not find himself in a position to give practical shape to his views and plans. In fact they had wanted to use him like a pawn but how could a tiger behave like a timid pet. The tiger has to pounce on the enemy or the prey. His strength and swiftness are his greatest assets.
This springing tiger who had resolved to fight against the mightiest empire of the world, found himself positioned against the stalwarts of his own political party. He decided to try his might, stand on his own feel and lead the nation in his own way. He resolved the contest for re-election as President of All India Congress Party. It was not with an idea to show down somebody in the election but it was due to his conviction that the policy of compromise being adopted by Mahatma Gandhi would not be able to win freedom for India. Besides this, he was convinced that Europe was going to face some major crisis and that would provide India the most golden opportunity to work for her independence. Bose wanted to make maximum out of the difficulties of enemy whereas Mahatma Gandhi and his pseudo-moralist comrades did not want to embarrass the Britishers during the war. Unfortunately, Mahatma Gandhi and other senior leaders were not in a position to foresee the developments which Bose was able to anticipate.
The presidential election was contested, Bose vs. Sitarammaya (Gandhi's protege). Bose won the contest. Mahatma Gandhi and coterie lost it. They had never dreamt of defeat and it completely rocked their minds. Mahatma Gandhi, on finding that the storm had already uprooted the Oak tree, conceded his defeat and like the complacent and over confident god-fathers, instead of congratulating the winner i.e. Subhash, made a prophecy of misfortune for India in Bose's success. Mahatma Gandhi had never talked like that earlier. This powerful and heavy blow of defeat disturbed his balance of mind. All the old guards found their feet swept off the ground. They tried neither to find the cause of their failure nor thought of the way to cooperate with S.C. Bose. All these Congress veterans, like the great Kaurva veteran warriors, started thinking of the way to liquidate this Abhimanyu of the Indian freedom struggle, who had, like a lightning penetrated the Chakraview of the Congress old guards. In the interest of the nation, Bose tried his level best to arrive at some compromise with the old guards but failed. To them Bose appeared to be an enemy more dreadful than the Britishers. Mahatma Gandhi, the so-called champion of non-violence and truth, who posed to be considerate towards everything and everyone, did not take note of the illness of Bose and pressed him for holding the session at Tripuri. Though the team of expert doctors had declared that the physical condition of Bose was too critical 10 be burdened with any work, they moved a very strong worded and injurious resolution against him. They took full advantage of the illness of the springing tiger and passed resolutions which compelled him 10 resign from the presidentship of Congress party. (More about this episode in the next chapter)
In these ways the person, whom the veterans had unanimously elected President even in his absence, within fifteen months was forced 10 resign in the humiliating conditions. His rise and fall in the Congress hierarchy was so abrupt that the historians would have to analyse in detail the eruption of the Simmering Volcano which was not allowed to cool down in the natural process, but was cooled down by the man-made showers. Man can cool down the crest only, not the deeper lava. Outflow of lava can't be plugged from the above, it stops only when the temperature and pressure inside reduces. If pressure doesn't reduce, and the opening gets blocked, lava finds some other opening and erupts. With the blocking of this opening, the Simmering Volcano started his efforts for some other opening, elaborated in the succeeding chapters.
CHAPTER III
Mahatma Gandhi and Bose
The exit of Subhash from the Indian politics opened a new chapter in the freedom struggle of India. In order to properly understand the cause of Netaji's exit from the Indian political scene and his failure to return to his beloved Motherland after the independence, it is very essential to understand the real nature of relationship between Gandhi and Bose. Rightly or wrongly, it is believed that during the last decades of Indian freedom struggle, nothing could be done against the wishes, rather whims of Gandhi. Any challenge, direct or indirect, to his position or principles, virtually amounted to committing political harakiri. Bose happened to be the only political leader who not only effectively challenged Gandhi's position but also succeeded in democratically defeating him. Consequently he had to suffer and in spite of his best efforts he couldn't escape unhurt, unburnt or unscathed.
Mahatma Gandhi, the proclaimed father of the nation, is credited with steering our nation to independence through the most stormy and volcanic period of the struggle. He is acclaimed to be the innovator of the technique of non-violence as an instrument of struggle for political freedom. He believed that keeping in view the social, economic and political atmosphere prevailing in our country, non-violence was the only way to win independence. The way he conducted the freedom struggle, he appeared to be an expert human psychologist and sociologist who could very accurately feel the pulse and then manipulate the gullibility of the people of those days. He adopted a way of life which brought him closer to the people. He opted for a comparatively safe path which involved minimum losses. He was really successful in mobilising the people for the freedom struggle.
Britishers, though troubled by Gandhi, yet preferred to act in a way which heightened his image because they wanted to keep him at the helm of affairs. They were aware of the fact that the Gandhian methodology was going to be of minimum inconvenience to them; and they would be able to perpetuate their regime for indefinitely long period because Gandhi believed in 'slow and steady wins the race'. They wanted this 'flame' of non-violence to keep burning and gain more strength because they were aware of the fact that even if it burnt at its full capacity, it won't be able to bum even their hair. Through his activities and policies, Gandhi proved himself to be the chief security guard of British interest, and safety and security of the Britishers in India. When the Britishers were in the most critical situation, Mahatma Gandhi suspended the movements even when they were at their peak. This amounted to defending these Britishers who felt pride in hunting the Indian masses as stray dogs, and who relished the soup of the blood of the innocent Indians. Initially the policies of Gandhi had such an effect on the thinking of masses that even Subhash could not escape its influence. With the passage of time and because of the snail's pace of development in the freedom struggle and because of the controversial decisions taken by Gandhi, some of the prominent Indian leaders developed differences with him on the mode of conducting the freedom struggle. Subhash was not only just one of such dissidents but also the most prominent and effective of them.
The differences in the approaches of these two stalwarts was on account of their different perceptions about our alien rulers. Mahatma Gandhi had faith in the honesty and sincerity of the Britishers and he always treated them as Gentlemen. Bose suspected the Britishers and believed them to be cunning and robbers. Gandhi felt satisfied even with the minor gains in the struggle whereas Subhash was not prepared to accept anything short of complete independence. Gandhi preached self-suffering of dubious philosophical merit instead of troubling others; Bose, on the other hand, was of aggressive nature and wanted to hit the enemies of nation in every possible way. Gandhi was so much attached to non-violence that he could even withdraw his movement in the wake of comparatively small and insignificant incidents of violence, whereas Bose held that the cause of freedom had to be nursed with the blood of the freedom fighters. That is why he gave the call, "Tum Mujhe Khoon Do, Main Tumhe Azadi Doonga." (Give me blood and I shall give you freedom) Gandhi was in favour of avoiding direct action against and conflict with Britishers as far as possible, but Bose wanted to engage them in a direct clash and throw them out of the country. Gandhi adhered to the principle of hating the evil, not the evil-doer; but Bose believed in not only just hating but also eliminating, both the evil as well as evil-doer. Gandhi's advocacy of non-violence was not just on account of his conviction for its righteousness but also because of his realisation that the Britishers were a mighty force and it was not possible for Indians to match their armed strength and to throw them out with our limited strength of arms or other tools of violence. Gandhi had contended that nonviolence was an instrument of the strong but it is hard fact that he opted for it because of the realisation and firm belief that Indians were weak and incapable of facing the armed might of the Britishers. As far as Bose was concerned, he was not afraid of direct confrontation with the Britishers. He believed that the people could be prepared to pay the highest price for the cause of freedom and the Britishers, who were ruling us with and through our help, would find it impossible to do so if we decided to boycott and challenge them. He did not consider the Britishers to be too strong and invincible.
Another important difference in their approach was that Gandhi was not confident enough to conduct an aggressive struggle and always tried to adopt the path of passive resistance, rather of the least resistance. It is comparatively easier to lead such type of movement than to lead aggressive movement. It is also noteworthy that he was not able to lead any of his movements to the logical and fixed end. In fact he abandoned half-way his movements like Civil Disobedience or Quit India, on one pretext or the other and that too at a time when these were at their climax. It appears that in the decisive moments or the hour of crisis, he was in search of some escape route, and minor incidents of violence provided him God-sent golden opportunities. He provided a very handy tool to the Britishers to fail all our movements. Every time he failed, he tried to explain his failure as success and it appeared as if he had mastered the art of presenting his failures as success. Bose, in turn, was so self-confident right from his childhood that he was never afraid of plunging into the unknown, untrodden and most dangerous paths. Even during the college days, by involving himself in violence against one of his teachers, he slaked his career. Though he suffered yet he had no regrets. Later, after having been selected in LC.S., he decided to resign from it and never looked back. In fact till the last known adventure of his life, be exhibited absolute self-confidence in himself and in his decisions. It was because of such differences in the basic approaches of these two giants of Indian freedom struggle that India had to wait till the Fifteenth of August, 1947, for the attainment of independence. If, they had better mutual understanding and managed to sink their differences and put up a common front against the Britishers, nation would have got independence much earlier.
As already stated, Gandhi, the Captain of Indian ship during the freedom struggle, steered the nation and is credited with liberating our nation from the Britishers and that too through non-violent means, without shedding any blood. He laid so much emphasis on non-violence that many a time for the sake of his principle, the cause of nation's independence was allowed to suffer. He tried to build up his image at the cost of national interest Throughout his political career, he tried to build and maintain an atmosphere, which helped in building his such an image and position as automatically subordinated and subjugated other political leaders to his wishes and whimsical ideas. It is no wonder that his personality had been so highly idolised, glorified and magnified that none dared to resist him or his ideas and this made him so much accustomed to unquestioning obedience from others, that he couldn't bear even the thought of somebody else raising a divergent viewpoint. He appeared to believe that he was the only living Indian, most intelligent and best suited person, who could think correctly in the best interests of the nation.
Though Mahatma Gandhi had attained such high position yet he was not able to win the confidence of all, and could not convince all that his methods were the only plausible and fittest methods for waging the struggle against the Britishers. One of such persons, fiery, indomitable and adventurous was, Subhash. He did not agree with the policies, ideas and strategies of Gandhi. He was not in favour of begging for independence in piece-meal, as desired by Gandhites. Bose was opposed to any compromise with the British on the issue of complete independence for India. He had believed that by engaging the Indian leaders in parleys, the British were earning more time for themselves. He was opposed to any compromise with the alien rulers on the issue of complete independence of India. He opposed Gandhi's signing of any agreement with Lord Irwin. After signing the Gandhi-Irwin Pact when Gandhi came to Karachi to attend the session of A.I.C.C., Naujawan Bharat Sabha held a conference at Karachi. Bose had requested Gandhi to plead the case of revolutionaries i.e. Bhagat Singh, Raj Guru and Sukhdev in his meeting with Lord Irwin but Gandhi had not done it and these revolutionaries had been executed. As a mark of protest Bose led a demonstration against Gandhi. Black flags were shown and some of the more agitated youth even threw bricks. A black flower was also ,resented to Gandhi. He strongly criticised Mahatma Gandhi for signing the Pact with Irwin. .In 'Fundamental Questions of Indian Revolution', Subhash wrote,
"In the circumstances which prevailed in March, 1931 better terms could have been extracted from the Govt. if our leaders had possessed greater statesmanship and diplomacy."1
British Govt. wanted to borrow more time for consolidating its position. And our worthy leaders, led by Gandhi, obliged. Unfortunately, the stand-point of Indian revolutionaries was compromised and they were let down by Gandhi in negotiations with Britishers. Bose described it as a betrayal. It not only harmed the revolutionaries but also dissipated the strength of the Indian freedom movement and it provided Britishers an opportunity to create the dissensions among the leaders of our freedom movement.
First time, when conflict between them took place publicly, was in December 1928. In the Congress session at Calcutta, Gandhi moved a resolution threatening Non-Cooperation if Dominion Status constitution was not considered by December, 1929. Subhash didn't agree with the resolution and proposed an amendment to the effect that Congress would be contented with nothing short of independence. He was not in favour of seeking independence in parts or phases. Mahatma Gandhi thought this idea to be too advanced under the circumstances. He thought that the nation was not prepared to launch a struggle for this aim. The amendment proposed by Subhash lost by 973 votes for and 1350 against. Though Subhash had lost yet it was clear to him that the defeat of the amendment was not on account of the undesirability of the amendment but because of the fact that had his amendment been accepted, it would have amounted to no confidence against Mahatma. At the time, the nation or the Congress was not prepared to go to that extent against Gandhi, even if Gandhi was in the wrong. Besides, Subhash gathered another feeling that within Congress there were many other persons who agreed with him and wanted to have independence as the immediate goal of Congress. Subhash had not to wait for very long for his views to be accepted. Just a year later, meeting at the historic session in Lahore, Congress adopted the resolution of complete independence as the goal of struggle against British Govt. The passage of this resolution generated unprecedented enthusiasm in the Congress. Everybody was fired with new hopes and aspirations. Though Subhash had not moved this resolution, yet it had vindicated the validity, acceptability and sagacity of the amendment moved by him just a year back. Gandhi took one year to realise the significance and necessity of the amendment suggested by Subhash. It shows that Gandhi's political reflexes were slow and delayed. What an irony, after this session, Subhash was dropped from the Working Committee.
This punishment did not deter him in any way and he kept on pursuing his mission. He was elected the President of All India Trade Union Congress and held this office for two years. He did a lot of work for the improvement of the fate of the working class. Though he gave due personal regards to Gandhi yet where he differed from his views and programmes, he offered resistance in a forceful manner. Fortunately or unfortunately, after this, most of his time was spent either in prison or abroad. He kept on working round the clock for the national cause wherever he happened to be. In spite of personal reverence for Gandhi and others he never hesitated in expressing his views critical of them. While in Vienna, along with Mr. Vithal Bhai Patel, he issued a very strong worded statement criticising the role played by Mahatma Gandhi.
Whatever Subhash did abroad added to his political stature. On the other hand it appeared that the storm against the policies and programmes of Gandhi had been building up for quite some time and Bose, on account of being one of the chief architect of this storm, was becoming increasingly unacceptable to Gandhi. Still Gandhi didn't find it easy to ignore this rising star. Instead of waiting to see the confrontation and accept the challenge, Gandhi decided to try to tide over the storm and bring Subhash in his fold. Subhash was unanimously elected the President of All India Congress Party in 1938. Gandhi might have thought that as Nehru had been enticed, Subhash may also fait in the trap. Unlike Nehru, who in spite of his reservations and differences fell in line with Gandhites and continued working with them, Bose did not oblige. He raised the fundamental issues and revolted against the monopolistic and reactionary tendencies in the Congress. He wanted that Congress should be dynamic and living organisation, always growing and responding positively to the changing situations. He was not in favour of letting the cause of nation suffer because of his personal regards for any individual. In a speech delivered at Calcutta in the All India Youth Conference (1927-28) while denouncing Gandhian philosophy, he said,
"Mystics would always hold an honoured place in India but it is not their lead we shall have to follow if we are to create a new India, at once free, happy and great.. We have to live in the present."2
Fearing that Gandhites may not avail the golden opportunity which may appear with the beginning of war in Europe, and also that the Congress may compromise on the issue of Federation, Bose decided to contest for re-election as President of All India Congress Party in 1939. Gandhi was opposed to his re-election as the former felt and believed that there was no such urgency of re-election. Bose was anticipating the beginning of the war in Europe and wanted Congress to avail of this opportunity. Gandhi, as usual, wanted to avoid any confrontation. Besides, Bose feared that Gandhites were trying to arrive at some compromise with the Britishers on the point of Federation and because of it he thought it essential to again contest the Presidential election. As late as on 27.1.1939, in the election campaign, Subhash made it clear in his press statement,
"Even at this late hour if they accept an anti-Federationist President, they can end this controversy at once and there by avert dissensions within the Congress. Speaking for myself, I have already -announced in public that the real issue is that of Federation. If a genuine anti-Federationist is accepted as the President, I shall gladly retire in his favour. This offer publicly announced will stand till the eve of the election."3
This offer was not accepted by the old guards. They were not prepared to concede even an inch of space to the leftists and anti-Federationists. In fact the old guards had started treating Congress as their personal fief and they were collectively acting as its Board of Directors. They had started expecting that each of their decisions should be accepted without resistance, discussion or question. They wanted to have some one in the presidential chair as should obey their dictates and blindly follow the guidelines laid down by them. Left to them, they would have preferred to have collective presidium when they did not have their own man as President. Rationally speaking they did not behave as democrats, rather they behaved more like feudal barons. That is why they treated leftists as outsiders, unwanted and even outlawed, and refused to accommodate their views. Objecting to such an attitude of the old guards, Bose issued a hard hitting statement on 28.1.39,
"It is, therefore, too much for a group within the Working Committee to claim that they will dictate the selection of the President every time. If we are to have a proper election by the delegates and not nomination by group within the Working Committee, then it is essential that the delegates should have a free and unfettered choice."4
He added, "I am a candidate by mere accident, simply because nobody else from the left came forward to contest the election. And as I have already stated more than once, it is still possible to avoid a contest if the Right wing will accept as President somebody who will command the confidence of the Left."4 (a)
What more could have been offered by Subhash for bringing about an understanding between the warring groups but it seems that the Rightists led by Gandhi, were in no mood to have a settlement as they were confident of victory. They were not concerned about the principles and ultimate aim of the party. To them the personalities mattered more. They were decidedly opposed to Bose's re-election not because of some clash of principles but just because they didn't want to have him as President for the second time. Most of them believed that they were the best custodians and guards of the interest of the nation. Patel went to the extent of saying,
"The re-election of Bose will be harmful to the cause of the country."5
Most of the members of the Working Committee belonged to Gandhi's group and they made every possible effort to convincingly defeat Bose and push out him and other political opponents. Unfortunately for them, in spite of their best possible efforts, they could not succeed and they had the worst possible shock of their life in store for them.
In the election, Bose defeated Pauahhai Sitaramaya, the other candidate fielded by the Rightists. Out of 2957 votes polled in all the provinces Bose polled 1580 whereas Pattabhai polled 1377. Masses had ratifed the view-point of Bose and the latter had every reason to believe that his views were the real need of the hour. The outcome of elections had made it clear that the wind of change had gathered momentum and the people had completely rejected Gandhian methodology of leading the national struggle for freedom. The victory, which was in no way less than a revolution in the Indian National Congress Party didn't change the basic approach of Bose. He maintained his calm, mature and graceful composure. Instead of feeling jubilant and celebrating the success, he advised the Congress people to do heart searching and pressed people to work harder for national liberation. Bose declared,
"It is no time for jubilations. On the contrary it is time for heart searching and for preparations for the future. Let us accept the result of the contest in a spirit of humility and deep sense of respect I feel overwhelmed with thoughts about tomorrow, so should everybody feel who voted on my side."6
He added,
"Lest the enemies of Iridian freedom think that there has been split in the Congress, let me make it perfectly clear that the Congress can be united as ever before. Congressmen may have differences in certain matters but where fight against imperialism is concerned, they are all one."1
At a public meeting in Calcutta, which was organised to felicitate him, he remarked,
"We should not be so selfish as to accept the verdict of delegates in a spirit of elation or jubilation. On the contrary} we should accept it in a spirit of humility and with a deep sense of responsibility. In this hour of victory, do not utter a word or do anything which may hurt the feeling of anybody or cast reflection on any person."8
Though Bose was aware of the fact that Gandhi had been instrumental in necessitating the contested election and spearheading the campaign against him, (yet) he, as a statesman, nursed no ill will against the latter and his comrades. On the contrary, in a bid to earnestly try to maintain unity, Bose took a very far-sighted and statesman like stand by stating,
"It will always be my aim and object to try and win his confidence for the simple reason that it will be tragic step for me if I succeed in winning the confidence of other people but fail to win the confidence of India's greatest man."9
In this way, Bose, in spite of having defeated all old horses single handedly, (maintained) a graceful and humble poise and as a mature and grown-up statesman, tried to befriend and win over his political adversaries. Understanding or compromise is a two way process. Unfortunately the other side i.e. the rightists were not in a mood to settle the issue. They did not take the defeat in a democratic and sportsman spirit. Even Mahatma Gandhi, in his statement dated 31.1.39, from Bardoli, said,
"Mr. Subhash Babu has achieved a decisive victory over his opponent Dr. Pattabhai Sitaramaya. I must confess that from the very beginning I was decidedly against his re-election for reasons into' which I need not go. I do not subscribe to his facts or the arguments in his manifesto. I think that his references to his colleagues were unjustified and unworthy. Nevertheless, I am glad of his victory and since I was instrumental in inducing Dr. Pauabhai, not to withdraw his name as a candidate when Maulana Sahib withdrew, the defeat is more mine than his. And I am nothing if I do not represent definite principles and policy. Therefore it is plain to me that the delegates do not approve of the principles and policy for which I stand. I rejoice in their defeat. "10
From this statement it is quite clear that Mahatma Gandhi took this election issue as an issue of personal prestige and on losing it, thought that his personal image had been damaged, and his policies and programmes had been rejected by the people. He found that the work of 20 years was undone in a day. He had to accept the shocking reality that the people no more approved of his ways and means. His remark, "I rejoice in this defeat" is full of sarcasm. In reality he was all in depression, frustration, disappointment and dis-illusionment. Since he had been believing himself to be the god-father, uncrowned king, undisputed dictator and absolute master of the Congress, in the very first and only effective challenge to his position, he found his feet missing the ground. The extent of his frustration is absolutely clear from the latter part of the above quoted statement in which he raised the bogey of bogus voters. To quote him,
"There is one thing common between the majority and minority viz. insistence on internal purity of the Congress organisation. My writings in the Harijan have shown that the Congress is fast becoming a corrupt organisation in the sense that it., registers contain a very large number of bogus members. I have been suggesting for the past many months the overhauling of these registers. I have no doubt that many of the delegates who have been elected on strength of these bogus voters, would be unseated on scrutiny. But I suggest no such drastic step. It will be enough if the registers are purged of all bogus voters and are made fool proof for the future."l1
Well, on critical analysis, what does this part of statement reflect? Gandhi had not accepted his defeat in principle though he had actually lost and fallen flat squarely. What could be the idea of raising the issue of bogus voters after the declaration of result? Did he raise the issue just before the election process started? Did he write to the Congress General Secretary to check and purge the list of bogus voters before the day of polling? If he had done so, he should not have agreed to field his candidate till the list was thoroughly rectified. If he had not done that, then why should have he raised this issue after his candidate lost the election. Doesn't it amount to a bid to reduce the significance of the victory of Subhash and taking wind out of his sails? To me it appears that Mahatma Gandhi worked in most undemocratic manner in the hour of defeat. What is more pitiable is that he failed to disguise his real feelings. In the very first acid test, he gave sufficient evidence of the fact that he placed himself above all persons, organisation, principles and norms. He appeared to be believing that he was law unto himself and his authority was as supreme as the will of God in everything that related to the Indian politics. Had it not been so, he would not have said in the same statement,
"After all Subhash Babu is not an enemy of his country."12
One fails to understand why did he give this left handed compliment to the democratically elected President of the party to which Gandhi himself owed his status and image? Why couldn't he gather the moral courage to hail the success of a young man whom he later claimed to be just like one of his sons? Why couldn't he describe Bose as a great hero, fighting, inspiring and valiant leader, and the rising star of Indian politics? Mahatma Gandhi appeared to be so deeply stung by his defeat that the oozing of venom didn't stop here. He said,
"The minority can only wish it all success. If they cannot keep pace with it, they must come out of the Congress Those, therefore, who feel uncomfortable in being in Congress, may come out, not in a spirit of ill will, but the deliberate purpose of rendering more effective service."l3
This was a clarion call inviting doom for the party and nation. He made it crystal clear that he was prepared to let the Congress party be divided on this issue. Can such expression come out of goodwill? How could it render "Effective Service"? I fail to understand which tenet of any code of political or social ethics Gandhi had in mind while attaching such fair motives to the most unfair, undemocratic and hypocritical gesture and statement. Since no other leader had hinted at leaving the Congress, it was Gandhi who threw not just a feeler, rather provided clear-cut guidelines through this statement for revolt in the party. He had already made it clear that he was against the re-election of Bose and he disagreed with his manifesto.
If Mahatma Gandhi found himself uncomfortable under the circumstances, how could his followers feel otherwise. He had felt and realised that his very political existence had been seriously threatened. He couldn't help but confessingly stated,
"And I am nothing if I do not represent definite principles and policy."14
Gandhi was less worried about political struggle against Britishers and more worried about his personal existence. As he wanted others to follow him blindly, it SO seems as if he were blind to himself also. He could never realise that what was of paramount importance, was not his principles and personal beliefs, but the cause of national freedom struggle. It was not the question of following principles and policies, for one's personal life or gain, but for the national struggle. He ought to have realised that the principles and policies, and even persons were to be for the nation, and not the other way round. It is unfortunate that he let the nation drown itself in the little cup of his personal griefs and defeat It was absolutely unjustified, unfair and unethical on the part of person like Gandhi that on losing the election and conceding the defeat, he should start planning and precipitating the split in the party. Gandhi and his followers ought to have given Bose a fair chance to try his ideas, implement his policies and run the national struggle in accordance with his own programmes. Instead of giving a call for a split in the party, he ought to have advised and instructed his followers to extend complete co-operation to the new programmes in the same spirit in which he himself wanted the cooperation of others. It is shameful and humiliating to point out that instead of advising restrain, as a senior leader, to his followers in the hour of defeat, he spearheaded the disintegration within the party. The call to leave the party in the face of defeat, was not at all justifiable and in the democratic spirit. He failed to do justice to his image of 'Bapu'.
On the other hand Bose, though younger in age, very responsibly proclaimed on 4.2.39:
"The leftists will not take the responsibility of creating a split within the Congress. If a split does come, it will come not because of them, but in spite of them."15
Subhash tried everything possible to avoid ill will and confrontation within the party but unfortunately he didn't succeed. At a time when he needed maximum good health, he fell seriously ill. The political atmosphere had been heavily surcharged because of the frustrated activities of the camp of old guards. Though Mahatma Gandhi had, through his statements, taken the crisis to the extreme, still Bose maintained his cool and tried to heal the injured feelings. Reacting to the statement of Mahatma Gandhi, he said on 4.2.1939,
"I have read the statement of Mahatma Gandhi on the recent presidential election with all the attention it deserves. It gives me pain to find that Mahatma Gandhi had taken it as personal defeat. I would respectfully differ from him on this point. The voters, that is the delegates, were not called upon to vote for or against Mahatma Gandhi. Consequently, the result of the contest does not in my view and in the view of most people affect him personally. "16
This was an effort to remove the misunderstandings and cool down the heated atmosphere. It also amounted to making Gandhi understand that Bose had not anything against Gandhi. The verdict was also not a result of the election between Gandhi and Bose. In order to further assure Gandhi about the policies, he stated,
"That there will be violent break with the past in the parliamentary or in the extra-parliamentary sphere...and we shall, of course, act in accordance with the principles and policy of the Indian National Congress. "17
Isn't it strange and paradoxical that even the President of the party had to state that he will follow the principles and policy of the Congress. It had to be done because the rival group had created such an environment in which the people started feeling as if Bose and his people would change the very fundamentals of Congress party. About the causes of his differences with Gandhi and his attitude towards the latter, Bose said,
"In this connection I should also like to say that I have on some occasions felt constrained to differ from Mahatma Gandhi on public questions, but I yield to none in my respect for his personality. If I have understood him correctly, he too would like to see people think for themselves even though they may not always agree with him. I do not know what sort of opinion Mahatmaji has of me. But whatever his view may be, it will always be my aim and object to try and win his confidence for the simple reason that it will be tragic thing for me if I succeed in winning the confidence of other people but fail to win the confidence of India's greatest man. "18
What more could be stated by Bose to clarify his stand and attitude towards Gandhi but inspite of all these gestures, the old guards thought of withdrawing from the Working Committee. Maulana and others expressed their desire to come out of the Working Committee. Rajan Babu also wanted to withdraw. The purpose was to embarrass the position of Bose and not to let him work smoothly. Gandhi realised all this but he did not intervene to ease the situation. It may not be out of context here to say that it was not appropriate for Bose to expect any supporting gesture from Gandhi and his coterie. Instead of expecting some help of any type from Gandhi he ought to have planned his strategy independently. If he had not indulged in the process of winning over the vanquished, he would have been in a better position to tide over the problem.
Since Bose was too simple, straightforward, statesman like and did not believe in the cunning political intrigues, he approached Mahatma Gandhi on 15th Feb. with a view to remove the misapprehensions and misgivings in the latter's mind, but failed. The failure was not because Bose was not prepared to concede something reasonable but due to the 'closed mind' approach of Mahatma Gandhi. After long deliberations it was resolved that a meeting of the Working Committee be held on 22nd Feb. It was an irony of fate that his ill health which had been disturbing him since quite many years, once again overpowered him and made him unfit to perform his duties. He couldn't go to attend the meeting of the Committee and sent the following telegram to S. Patel:
"Kindly see my telegram to Mahatmaji. Regretfully feel Working Committee must be postponed till Congress. Please consult colleagues and wire opinion. "19
To this genuine request of Bose, the stalwarts, instead of sending their opinion, responded with the resignation of twelve following members of the Working Committee viz., S. Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Babu Rajindra Prasad, Sarojini Naidu, Bhullabhai Mehtab, Acharya Kriplani, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, Jai Ram Dass, Jamuna Lal Bazaz. J.L. Nehru, though he did not resign yet he gave the feeling of being with the dissidents. He tried to defuse the situation but failed. The failure was due to the fact that the compromise formula of Nehru appeared to be biased against Bose and favourable to the old guards. The old guards, after having suffered the humiliation and crushing defeat, were all out to take revenge of their defeat. The resignations had to be accepted as it was claimed that these had been tendered after mature deliberations.
Tripuri Congress was held on March 8, 1939. Bose was not keeping a good health. Rather he was in a critical condition and it was not advisable for him to ignore the medical opinion. On 27th Feb. Dr. Sir Nitrattan Sircar, who examined Bose, issued a health bulletin about him. It stated,
"He has had a serious attack of broncho-pneumonia and intestinal infection and it is highly advisable for him to remain undisturbed in bed at least for another fortnight. I am afraid any attempt to undertake active work within the next fortnight may be fraught with positive danger. There may be either physical collapse or fresh and aggravated attack of acute infection."2O
At a time when the doctors held such an opinion about his health, some responsible and senior leaders of the Congress tried to spread the impression that in the guise of illness, Bose was trying to evade the session. Besides physical strain, there was this additional strain of mudslinging by the political enemies. Bose had resolved not to give any chance to the enemies and decided to attend the session even if it cost his life. He was brought to the Pandal in the ambulance car and was taken on a stretcher to the dias, amidst loud shouts of 'Rashtrapati Ki Jai'. The tension which prevailed all around further aggravated and worsened his condition.
Since the President was in such a critical condition, some of the things could have been postponed. On humanitarian grounds even, certain contentious matters could have been dropped but the old guards had been so much enraged that they had lost all sense of responsibility. In spite of knowing all the things, about the health of their President. G.B. Pant, proposed to move a resolution signed by 160 members of AICC. A detailed and heated discussion took place to decide whether the resolution should be allowed to be moved or not. After the discussion and taking into consideration the constitutional point of view. Bose ruled that the resolution was out of order. It resulted in noisy scenes and both the sides demonstrated in the Pandal. Bose had to adjourn the house for half an hour, and after consultations, allowed the resolution to be moved. Pant then got up and read the following text of the resolution,
"In view of various misunderstandings that have arisen in the Congress and the country on account of the controversies in connection with the Presidential election and after, it is desirable that the Congress should clarify the position and declare its general policy.
"This congress declares its firm adherence to the fundamental policies which have governed its programme in the past years under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi and is definitely of opinion that there should be no break in these policies and they should continue to govern the Congress programme in future. This Congress expresses its confidence in the work of the Working Committee which functioned during the last year and regrets that any aspersions should have been cast against any of its members.
"In view of the critical situation that may develop during the coming year and in view of the fact that Mahatma Gandhi alone can lead the Congress and the country to victory during such crisis, the Congress regards it as imperative that they the Congress executive should command his implicit confidence and requests the President to nominate the Working Committee in accordance with the wishes of Gandhiji."21
This resolution was unfair and unprincipled both in letter and spirit. When the resolution was being discussed, some amendments were proposed but Patel and others were not prepared to concede even the most minor change in the resolution proposed by them.
The Gandhiites carried the day. The resolution was passed. The rightists had the feeling that they had avenged the defeat of the Presidential election. They were not much concerned about how much has the nation gained or lost through this resolution. They were happy to see that Abhimanyu had been seriously injured. Dr. Hennry, Civil Surgeon of Jabbalpur, who examined Bose said that there was a thick patch of broncho-pneumonia, and there were distinct signs of the right lung been affected. Bose was advised to be removed to the Civil Hospital, Jabbalpur. Dr. Gilder, who also examined Bose, declared,
"The right lung is involved in broncho-pneumonia process. He is unfit for any work, mental or physical. I would advise removing him to hospital or a nursing home."22
To this, Bose responded in a very bold and committed manner. Anybody else might have surrendered but Bose said,
"I have not come here to go to Hospital in Jabbalpur. I would much rather die here than removed elsewhere before the session is over."23
Because of such a physical condition he could not join the most spectacular and colossal procession which was taken out in his honour. His large photograph was placed on the chariot which was driven by 52 decorated elephants. The advocates of non-violence couldn't feel the pain caused to the ailing leader by their violent pangs. Such an unsympathetic and inconsiderate stand of the old guards should give an idea to the readers how warm or callous the old guards were about the serious illness of the President of their party. It won't be an exaggeration to say that the old guards were prepared to press their resolution even if it would have claimed the life of the President of their party. Such was the practical demonstration of the principle of non-violence by the exponents of the principle.
Apparently this was a simple affair of moving a resolution, discussing it and passing it but there was something much deeper in this case which we can understand only after critically analysing the implications and effects of the resolution. There were many things in this resolution which were not only unwanted but also completely unjustified. Since Bose had already reposed his faith in the policies and programmes of the Congress and promised to continue the same, there was no need to put this thing in the resolution that there should be no break in the policies of the Congress. Insistence on continuing old policies was just to exhibit their strength and humiliate Bose. Since the term of the Working Committee had been over, there was no need for the 'vote of confidence' on the work of the Working Committee in the past twelve months. Such a vote of confidence could have been needed only if the same Working Committee had to continue working in the coming twelve months also. If it were not so, as twelve of the fifteen members had already resigned, what was the need to have such a vote of confidence. It appears that instead of moving a resolution of no-confidence in Bose, they preferred to move a vote of confidence in the old executive, most of which had resigned. Something which the old guards couldn't accomplish through the delegates in election, they tried to achieve through the Working Committee. Another thing referred to in this resolution was 'Critical situation that may develop during the coming years'. How strange! These very old guards had resisted and opposed the re-election of Bose because they believed that no critical situation was likely to arise and hence there was no need for the re-election of Bose. All of a sudden they found that such a critical situation was very much in sight. What an about-turn! The matter did not end there. The resolution added, "Mahatma Gandhi alone can lead the Congress and the country to victory during such a crisis."
If this was to be accepted, then where was the necessity of Congress President or the Working Committee. Why should have the elections been held at all? Why Pant didn't propose explicitly that Bose should resign and Mahatma Gandhi should be enthroned as President? And if Mahatma Gandhi was not prepared to accept the Presidentship of Congress party under the circumstances and under the existing constitution, then the whole constitution should have been shelved and Mahatma Gandhi enthroned as the undisputed and absolute dictator of Congress Party. Why did Mahatma Gandhi not accept the direct responsibility of steering the national struggle? Why did Mahatma Gandhi want to use others' shoulders to fire his own gun? It appears that Mahatma Gandhi very meticulously manoeuvered for himself the role of a kingmaker, getting all the credit for the virtues of the king but no responsibility for the sins. The resolution further added that,
"The executive authority of the Congress should command his implicit confidence, and requests the President to dominate the Working Committee for the ensuing year in accordance with the wishes of Gandhiji".24
Now the question arises, whose confidence the executive should have? Should it have the confidence of the Congress or somebody else, who-so-ever the person may be? What did the constitution of Congress say about it? If it was for the President to nominate his Working Committee, then why to fetter his liberty with this resolution? If it was so essential that the Working Committee should be in accordance with the wishes of Mahatma Gandhi, and the resolution could be passed to this effect, then why no amendment was made to the constitution of the Congress Party? It could have been made even mandatory for all the future Presidents of Congress. It is manifestly clear that Pant and others played a very shrewd game. Since they couldn't gather courage to have a straight confrontation with Bose, they pitched him against Mahatma Gandhi. For Bose it became difficult, because of his earlier stands and respect of Mahatma Gandhi, to oppose the suggestion that he should take the advice of Mahatma Gandhi. Through this move they could not only absolve themselves of all the sins and responsibilities in future, but also put Mahatma Gandhi in an extremely difficult situation.
Once the situation reached this point, Mahatma Gandhi also found himself in a ~ very awkward position. He didn't appear to be prepared for this situation and he didn't f have the solution for the problem in which he was caught. It is not clear who in fact was the exponent of the Pant resolution and also whether or not the exponent had secured the prior consent of Mahatma Gandhi but it is a fact that Gandhi felt extremely embarrassed because of his inability to abide by the spirit or instructions of the resolution. On 5th May, 1939, Anand Babu, put some question to Mahatma Gandhi. He asked.
"Some people are under the impression that you are not in favour of Pant Resolution?"
To this Gandhi responded,
"I had said even at Wardha that if they had the courage they should bring the motion of no confidence against Subhash Babu, it would have been a straight" forward thing to do... How could I announce any name under these conditions? It would be subjecting Subhash Babu to coercion. Can the ship of nation sail smoothly if I subject Subhash Babu to coercion? It would be like sinking it the more I think of resolution, the more I dislike it, I can serve the nation according to the terms of that resolution. However much anyone may insist, I cannot chose names for the Working Committee. My doing so would be coercion against Subhash Babu, and coercion is violence"25
This was something which transpired at a later date. Earlier, bound by the resolution, Bose tried to execute the Pant resolution by requesting Mahatma Gandhi to help and guide in the selection of Working Committee. Bose proposed that half of the members of the Working Committee might be recommended by S. Patel and the other half by Bose himself. He proposed many formulae about the formation of Working Committee. While giving these suggestions he was guided by the spirit that in spite of all that had happened, it was still possible for all the groups in the Congress to work together and patch up the differences. On the other hand Mahatma Gandhi could not decide what he should do. In a letter which he wrote to Bose on 24.3.39,
"I saw the resolution for the first time in Allahabad. It seems to me to be quite clear. The initiative lies with you. I do not know how far you are fit to attend the national work. If you are not, I think you should adopt the only constitutional course open to you."26
From this letter it is quite clear what Mahatma Gandhi wanted Bose to do. He wanted him to resign on grounds of illness. It is strange that instead of extending help or helping him in the formation of the Working Committee he advised him to tender resignation. Bose did not welcome this suggestion of Gandhi and wrote back:
"I have not the slightest desire to stick to office. But I do not see reason for resigning because I am ill. No President resigned when he was in prison, for instance. I may tell you that great pressure is being brought to bear on me to resign. I am resisting because my resignation will mean a new phase in Congress politics which I want to avoid till the last."27
In seems that whereas Bose tried his level best to defuse the situation by adopting a compromising stand, Mahatma Gandhi and others tried their level best to defeat his efforts by sticking to an uncompromising and irrational attitude.
From the study of the correspondence between Gandhi and Bose it can be inferred that there were fundamental differences between the two about the perception of the existing political situation. Bose suspected that the Rightists were not sincere in their opposition to Federation and whenever they got the slightest opportunity, they would compromise on this fundamental point. Another point of difference was that Mahatma Gandhi felt that the situation was not ripe for issuing an ultimatum whereas Bose, on account of his anticipation of a major world crisis, particularly in Europe, in which Britain will be caught on the wrong foot, wanted to avail the golden opportunity against the enemy. He felt that such a chance was not likely to come again in the lifetime and it must not be missed at any cost. In his letter to Mahatma Gandhi, dated 31.3.39, Bose wrote,
"For months I have been telling friends that there would be a crisis in Europe in spring which would continue till summer. The international situation as well as our own position at home convinced me nearly eight months ago that the time had come for us to force the issue of Puma Swaraj. Unfortunately for us and for the country, you do not share our optimism. You are obsessed with the idea of corruption within the Congress. Moreover, the bogey of violence alarms you... I am so confident and so optimistic on this point that I feel that if we take courage in both hands, and go ahead, we shall have Swaraj inside of 18 months at the most... I fell so strongly on this point that I am prepared to make any sacrifice in this connection. If you take up the struggle, I shall most gladly help you to the best of my ability. If you feel that the Congress will be able to fight better with another President, I shall gladly step aside. If you feel that the Congress will be able to fight more effectively with a Working Committee of your choice, I shall gladly fall in line with your wishes. All that I want is that you and the Congress should in this critical hour stand up and resume that struggle for Swaraj. If self-effacement will further the national cause, I assure you most solemnly that I am prepared to efface myself completely. I think I love my country sufficiently to be able to do this."28
What more could have been offered by Subhash for constructive and respectable compromise? What more was required from Subhash to prove his sincerity to the commitment of fighting for the liberation of Motherland? He was prepared for his complete physical and political effacement. If his offers could have been taken in a positive light, the most vexed problem of Congress would have been solved within no time but the old guards were not interested in the solution of the problem, they were interested in the liquidation of their adversary in Subhash. What was of paramount importance for Gandhi was not the liberation of Motherland, but the recognition and establishment of his group as the real liberators of India. They could not bear the thought of anybody else acting as liberator of India. It was with such intentions that he failed to recognise the success of Bose in the spirit in which he should have done it. He took the success of Subhash in a different light and wrote to Bose,
"I have been told at Segaon that your election was not as much confidence in you as censure of the old horses, specially the Sardar My prestige does not count. It has an independent value of its own. When my motive is suspected or my policy or programme rejected by the country, the prestige must go.... In these circumstances I see no atmosphere of non-violence mass action. An ultimatum without effective sanction is worse than useless. But as I have told you, I am an old man, perhaps growing timid and over cautious and you have youth before you and reckless optimism born of youth. I hope you are right, I am wrong. I have the firm belief that the Congress as it is today cannot deliver the goods, cannot offer civil disobedience worth the name. Therefore if your prognosis is right, I am a back number and played out as the general-Issimo of Satyagraha."29
In this statement Gandhi made it quite clear that he was not prepared for co-existence in freedom struggle. He was not prepared to cooperate and accommodate Bose in any way and at any cost. Because of the debacle., Gandhi had lost faith not only in himself but also in others. So shattering was the effect of defeat on him that he ignored all the principles while trying to humiliate and depose Subhash who had masterminded the dismantling of the pseudo-image of Gandhi.
In spite of his best possible efforts, Subhash failed to secure the cooperation and confidence of Gandhi. He requested the latter to clarify some of the points which are as follows,
"You have not said anything as to the merits of the Pant resolution. Do you approve of it? Do you regard this resolution as one of no confidence in me? If so, I shall resign at once and that too unconditionally."30
To this Mahauna Gandhi replied in his letter dated 10.4.39,
"Pt. Pant's resolution I cannot interpret. The more I study it, the more I dislike it. The framers meant well. But it does not answer the present difficulty. You should, therefore, give it your own interpretation and act accordingly without the slightest hesitation."31
In this way Gandhi, after securing the position of arbitrator kept himself aloof from the controversy and didn't express himself explicitly and commitedly. Neither he owned the responsibility nor he disowned. In fact this has been the modus operandi of Mahauna. Whenever the situation demanded any clear-cut decision or action, he I opted to be non-committed or underwent hybernation in the name of one or other excuse.
Subhash was very clear in his approach. He made it very clear that though he had great regards for Mahatma, yet he didn't have the same attitude towards the other old I guards. He wrote to Mahatma,
"You know very well that I do not follow you blindly in all that you say or believe as so many of my countrymen do."32
He appealed to Mahatma that if he wanted that the old guard should dominate Congress,
"I would beg of you to come back to active politics, become a four anna Congress member and assume direct charge of the Working Committee. Pardon me for saying so and I say this without meaning offence to anybody-there is world of difference between yourself and your lieutenants, even your chosen lieutenants. There are people who will do anything for you, but not for them."33
Bose suspected the old guards more than Gandhi. Believing that the old guards had played a very clever and mischievous game in pitting him against Gandhi, he wrote to him,
"At Tripuri, the old guard cleverly dropped out of the picture and more cleverly pitted me against you."34
He had no objection if Mahatma Gandhi himself took over the lead of the movement. He suggested,
"Please resume the national struggle for Independence as we have been demanding and begin by delivering the ultimatum to the British Govt. In that event we shall all gladly retire from our official positions. If you so desire, we shall gladly hand over these positions to whom-so-ever you like or trust. But only on one condition, the fight for Independence must be resumed. People like myself feel that today we have an opportunity which is rare in the lifetime of nation. For that reason, we are prepared to make any sacrifice that will help the resumption of fight."35
Mahatma Gandhi didn't agree to all this. He neither agreed to support the ultimatum nor took the direct responsibility of leading the movement. He wrote to Bose,
"I repeat that I breathe violence in the air. I see no atmosphere for non-violent action... How can we meet on the political platform. Let's agree to differ there and let's meet on the social, moral and municipal platforms."36
This way Mahatma Gandhi made it clear that he was not prepared to work with anyone in the political field. By raising the bogey of 'Violence in the air' he tried to evade the issue of ultimatum and launching of national struggle for freedom. At that moment Mahauna Gandhi was not in a position to himself take over the leadership nor did he want anybody else to lead the national struggle during his life time.
The most important issue raised by the resolution was the appointment of Working Committee. Mahauna Gandhi refused to perform his duty desired by the Pant resolution. He wrote to Bose,
"The gulf is too wide, suspicions too deep. I see no way of closing the ranks. The only way seems to me to recognise the differences and each group work in its own manner."
He added,
"My conviction is that working along our lines in our own way we shall serve the country better than by the different groups seeking to work a common policy and common programme forced out of irreconciliable elements. "37
Bose had to take some initiatives keeping in view the spirit of the Pant resolution but he didn't receive favourable response from Gandhi. He wanted and tried his level best to patch up the differences. On 13.4.39, he wrote to Gandhi,
"This is the time for us to broaden our national front and should we commence doing so by constituting our National Executive-the Working Committee--on a narrow party basis?"
He added,
"Your letter of the 10th inst. has just come in and I have to make a few observations on it. I regret to say that your replies to most of the points are disappointing to me. The whole letter breathes the spirit of pessimism which I cannot possibly share. I am afraid also that you have laid too much stress on personal issue. You should have sufficient faith in our patriotism to hope that we shall be able to transcend such issues when a national emergency has arisen. If we cannot restore unity within the Congress, how can we hope for unity in the country."
While strongly pleading for unity, he further stressed,
"If today joint action be impossible, it will be impossible for all time. That means that future has in store for us nothing but blank despair. With our youthful and robust optimism and our undying faith in India's future, how can we accept such a proposition?"38
Whatever Subhash stated in these letters, proved prophetically true in the times to come. Since unity within the party couldn't be maintained, the Independence was delayed and the nation also couldn't be kept united.
These strong arguments and convincing reasoning failed to change the mind of Mahatma. Without asking his followers to withdraw the resolution, he advised Bose to 'form cabinet of his unfettered choice and declare his programme'. Since the atmosphere had become so vicious, Bose declined to accept Bapu's advice. He wrote back:
"I am sorry, I cannot implement your advice regarding forming a homogenous Cabinet. Consequently you shall have to accept the responsibility which has devolved on you as a result of the Pant Resolution... If for any reason you decline to form the Working Committee then we shall be in quandary. The matter will have to go before the AICC in an undecided manner."39
In this way the whole correspondence reflects that Gandhi was not prepared to a compromise and losen his monopolistic grip on Congress. Though he tried to maintain his personal relations with Bose, yet politically he refused to cooperate and bless him. He didn't ask Pant and others to publicly disown their resolution and consequently request him in the event of withdrawal of the resolution, Lo form his Working Committee according to his own choice. It appears that Gandhi placed his personal convictions and prejudices above the national interest and honour. Had it not been so, he would have accepted at least one of the proposals of Bose. In fact Gandhi had become very weak and had realised that if a struggle had started at that time, he would have failed to guide and steer it to the final end. He feared that if a struggle was launched at that time, the leadership would slip out of his hands. He wanted that India should be freed through his ways and under his leadership only. He was not prepared to believe that India could be freed in some other way by some other people also.
It is painful to point out that Mahatma Gandhi, inspite of being instrumental in the moving of the Pant resolution, tried to give the impression that he was neither a party to it nor had any prior information about it. He declined both to condemn it publicly or honour it. Whatever opinions he expressed, were too late and didn't make any important change in the whole thing. From all this it can be easily concluded that NUMBER ONE POLITICAL ENEMY OF BOSE WAS MAHATMA GANDHI WHO STABBED HIM AT A TIME WHEN LATTER NEEDED HIS MAXIMUM COOPERATION AND WHEN THE NATION COULD HAVE BEEN BEST SERVED. THE SHORT SIGHTEDNESS AND WEAKNESS OF GANDHI COST THE NATION VERY HEAVILY. It is agonising to say that Congress had become too static, stagnant, feudal and hypocritic to accommodate a sincere person like Bose. Congress, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi did serve the nation in many ways, but it caused the greatest national loss by non-cooperating with the most visionary, dynamic, daring and adventurous leader.
From the whole details, can't it be implied that those, Congress people, who couldn't bear him as Congress President, when India was yet to be free; how could the same team bear the thought of his return to India after independence. They masterminded the expulsion of Bose from Congress and were extremely elated and jubilant at the exit of Bose from the country, and finally wished his exit from the world so that there should be no threat or challenge to their position and prestige. What they did was NOTHING SHORT OF POLITICAL MURDER OF BOSE IN BROAD DAY-LIGHT. VERY FEW PEOPLE COULD UNDERSTAND THIS HARD FACT BECAUSE THEY PRESUMED THAT IT WAS SOME SORT OF HUMAN SACRIFICE BEING MADE BY A SAINT TO PLEASE THE GODDESS MOTHER INDIA. LITTLE DID THEY KNOW THAT, THE SAINT WAS SNATCHING FROM MOTHER INDIA HER MOST LOVED AND INDISPENSABLE SON.
CHAPTER IV
J.L. Nehru and Bose
After studying the role of Mahatma Gandhi, the Bapu, vis-a-vis Bose, we must study the role of the former's favourite heir-son, Nehru, in this context. There are various reasons for continuance of the mystery surrounding the fate of Subhash but none is as important as indifference and apathy of Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, towards his erstwhile friend and comrade, Bose. In order to properly understand the role played by Nehru, it is essential to study the background of their relationship.
Both being youthful, energetic, enthusiastic and comparatively adventurous, had very good personal and political understanding for quite sometime. Both wanted that the pace of struggle should be accelerated and there should be some strong action and aggressive programme to liberate the country from the foreign yoke. This joint aggressive programme commenced at Calcutta Congress, where J.L.Nehru and Bose moved an amendment to Gandhi's resolution on the Nehru (Moti Lal Nehru) Committee Report. The resolution had fixed up dominion status as the goal of the struggle. But the younger group was not satisfied with this aim. They wanted that the Congress should have complete independence as the goal for the ongoing national movement. A very heated and prolonged debate ensued. Realising that the youthful element was too committed and strong to be cowed down just with arguments, Gandhi changed his strategy to tackle the two young leaders. He proposed to withdraw his original resolution and introduce a new one. Both Nehru and Bose abstained from voting when it was put to vote in the subjects committee. Gandhi moved the resolution in the plenary session. When it was being discussed, Bose again moved an amendment to Gandhi's resolution. Nehru also supported Bose. It was with a very great difficulty that Gandhi could carry his resolution through by 1350 to 973 votes. Though the youngsters had lost the battle of votes yet the elderly leaders had realised and were convinced that youngsters were not far from victory.
The growing strength of the youthful elements in the party alarmed Gandhi. He noticed that Nehru also had started talking in a different tone after his return from Europe, towards the end of 1927. Left wing, which was opposed to Gandhi, was already gaining strength and the addition of the youthful element to it, had further endangered Gandhi's position. In order to weaken the challenge of Left Wingers, Gandhi decided to induct and enthrone J.L. Nehru as the President of AICC in the Lahore Session. Gandhi succeeded in his motive but Bose and other Left Wingers felt deceived, annoyed and robbed. Nehru himself was not happy over the nature of developments. While commenting on this election, he wrote in his autobiography,
"It was not that I was not sensible of the honour, for it was a great honour, and I would have rejoiced if I had been elected in the ordinary way. But I did not come to it by the main entrance or even a side entrance, I appeared suddenly by a trap door and bewildered the audience into acceptance. They put a brave face on it, and like a bitter pill, swallowed me. My pride was hurt and almost I felt like handing back the honour. Fortunately I restrained myself from making an exhibition of myself and stole away with a heavy heart."1
This comment reflects initial reactions of Nehru about his election. He was unhappy with the election but he was not in a position to retrace his steps or wriggle out of the trap because doing so would have made the whole thing very embarrassing and uncomfortable for the Congress, Gandhi and his ownself. Very soon, because of the taste of power and guided by the expediency, he changed his attitude. Mahatma Gandhi succeeded in dividing the enemy and adopting a potential strong contender and made him his ally. The alliance was convenient and helpful to both of them. Nehru, in spite of his strong and fundamental differences with Gandhi, stuck to the alliance as he knew it that he would be the privileged beneficiary of this alliance because Gandhi was not to himself enjoy the power. Giving an idea of his state of mind during his tenure as Congress President, in a press statement from Almora on 26th January 1939, Nehru said,
"I have some experience of the Congress Presidentship during trying times and on several occasions I was on the point of resigning, because I felt that I could serve our cause and the Congress better without office."2
Though Nehru was apparently not happy with the role and position as Congress President, he opted to continue and side with Mahatma Gandhi. The reason behind this political alliance between the two was political expendiency and mutual interest. Gandhi needed a trusted follower, and he got the one in Nehru. Nehru needed some elderly veteran and he got one in Gandhi. Gandhi, being already at the helm of affairs, and having already experienced the strength of the onslaughts of Bose at Calcutta and Karachi was able to see writing on the wall. Like the overcautious elder, he opted to play safe. He had no desire to be a king, he wanted to 'be a king-maker and he made up his mind quite in advance to make Nehru the king of future India.
Subhash did not fit into Gandhi's framework. Gandhi wanted to have blind followers but Bose could never be one. On the other hand, Nehru had very well learnt the art of dealing with Gandhi. He first expressed his dissenting opinion, made his presence fell, secured a place for himself and finally under the name of moral pressure or greater considerations would give way. In the case of Gandhi-Irwin Pact, initially Nehru issued a statement disapproving of some of the terms of this historic pact, but later on finding that Gandhi was committed to those terms, Nehru gave his consent. Nehru had found that straightway toeing the line doesn't earn as much weight and importance as is earned by first expressing dissenting views but later owning it. This strategy he followed till the end of his life, though it did not successfully work every time. Motivated by his self-interest, Nehru knitted a very complex net of intrigues out of which he never came out. Because of Nehru's dual policy and intrigues, the gulf between Nehru and Bose went on widening.
Since Bose had made himself quite troublesome for the Britishers in India, consequently most of the time he had to spend in the jail. From the beginning of 1930 to 1937, for one reason or the other, he had to be away to Europe. His absence from India was helpful for both Gandhi and Nehru to consolidate their positions. When Bose returned from Europe, he had gained a considerable political maturity. It was not easy to keep him away from the seats of authority in Congress, and something had to be done to bring him in the fold of old guards. They planned to enchain and silence him by thrusting responsibility on him, making him feel indebted for the favours which they were going to shower on him. They unanimously elected him the President of All India Congress Party in 1938.
Such was the atmosphere and working of the Congress that during the tenure of first Presidentship, Bose found his wings tightly clipped and he found himself handicapped in doing anything worthwhile as Congress President. The whims of Gandhi, the over-bearing attitude of Nehru and other old guards, were extremely suffocating and repulsive to any work of dynamic and adventurous nature. Bose found it extremely difficult to adjust with the attitude of Nehru and tried his level best to bear and swallow the most of the excesses from the latter's source. He felt deeply pained to realise that during his tenure he could not lead the freedom struggle 'in his own independent way and could not accelerate the pace of events in spite of his best efforts. He felt that his failure to do something special was on account of the lack of proper cooperation and understanding from others and their feeling that he owed his position to them. For a dynamic person, it was an uncomfortable experience in an apparently comfortable and privileged position. Bose did not want just to be the President of Congress. He was burning with the passion of working for the earliest liberation of Motherland at all cost. In spite of having a revolutionary fervour in his mind and a zeal to do something visibly concrete, he kept his frustration and disgust under control and didn't let it overflow the banks. Because of this factor the first year of his presidency passed without much heat or light.
With a view to accomplishing his incomplete work and shaping the programme of the Congress in accordance with his plans, he decided to have another opportunity as President of Congress. All the old guards were opposed to his re-election. Nehru very clearly stated,
"...I was equally clear that Subhash Babu should not stand..."3
In spite of the fact that Gandhi actively favoured the candidature of Pattabhai, Nehru did not commit himself for or against any candidate, but he made it quite clear that he was not in favour of re-election of Bose. In his letter of 4.2.1939, Nehru wrote to Subhash,
"As told you, your contested election has done some good and some harm. I recognise the good but I am apprehensive of the harm that will follow. I still think that in the balance it would have been better if this particular conflict had not taken place in this way."4
In the same letter, he added,
"We have had repeated and prolonged discussions and although we have failed to convince each other, we have influenced each other considerably and we have, I believe, understood each other to a large extent... Those letters and talks revealed both our temperamental and fundamental differences as well as many things we have in common."5
He further added,
"Unfortunately in this and other matters you have adopted an entirely passive attitude in the Working Committee although sometimes you have given expression to your views outside. In effect, you have functioned more as a Speaker than a directing President... The AICC office has deteriorated greatly during the past year."6
This reflected Nehru's unfriendly and negative attitude towards Bose. Nehru had very strong differences with Gandhi also, but both of them had mastered the art of mutual adjustment. Such an adjustment could not take place between Nehru and Bose, probably because both were equally young, ambitious and even competitors, if not rivals. Besides this the two had strong convictions that each one was absolutely right and not prepared to concede on a point to which the other didn't agree. Moreover Nehru had smelt the impending danger to his position and political future prospects. He resolved to openly defend his political interests.
The gulf between the two went on widening with the passage of time. Bose was very clear that Nehru was deadly opposed to him politically and expressed his resentment in the letter dated 28.3.1939,
"I find that for sometime past you have developed tremendous dislike for me. I say this because I find that you take up enthusiastically every possible point against me, what could be said in my favour, you ignored. What my political opponents urge against me you concede, while you are almost blind to what could be said against them."7
He added,
"On my side, ever since I came out of internment in 1937, I have been treating you with the utmost regards and consideration, in private life and in public. I have looked upon you as politically an elder brother and leader and have often sought your advice."8
Though publicly Bose maintained a respectful attitude towards Nehru yet the former was not blind to the various unfriendly utterances and activities of the latter. He knew that something was wrong at the bottom and something very important was at stake because of which Nehru was unable to take a rational and impersonal stand towards him. Bose wrote to Nehru,
"As a matter of fact, when I was at Tripuri, several delegates (not my supporters, I may tell you) told me that 'Aspersion Affair' had been practically forgotten until your statements and utterances raised the controversy once again. And in this connection I may tell you that since the Presidential election, you have done more to lower me in the estimation of the public than all the twelve ex-members of the Working Committee put together."9
On another occasion Bose complained,
"At a time when I am being unfairly attacked from several quarters-being hit below the belt, as they say-you do not utter one word of protest-you do not offer me one word of sympathy. But when I say something in self defence, your reaction is, 'such argumentative statements do not help much.' Have you said the same thing of argumentative statements written by my political opponents? Perhaps you gloat over them. "10
Though Bose was a far-sighted statesman and had a crystal clear insight into the minds of his political foes, yet he could not stoop to the level of paying them back in the same coin. He realised his mistake but it was too late. Had he gathered enough courage and taken the initiative at the right moment, he would have saved himself and the nation from many agonising and unfortunate consequences. His repeated efforts and appeals for compromise and desire to take everyone along with him, weakened his position and gave his enemies an effective tool against him. During the hour of victory, Bose didn't behave as a desperate and arrogant victor but tried to act as a leader of the team (which in fact had not been of his choice). The team which he had inherited from the Congress party, was more interested in dislodging its captain than dislodging the alien rulers from the country. Nehru, though apparently maintained a neutral position, did not lag behind in the toppling game but he preferred to act from behind the curtain. We have already seen that Nehru, instead of looking into his own weaknesses and becoming regretful for his motivated abuse of his position, accused Bose of inaction during his first presidential tenure. To this Bose reacted,
"Would it be wrong to say that usually you monopolised most of the time of the Working Committee. If the Working Committee had another member as talkative as yourself, I do not think that we would ever have come to the end of our business. Besides your manners were such that you would almost usurp the functions of the President. I could, of course, have dealt with the situation by pulling you up, but that would have led to an open breach between us. To be brutally frank, you sometimes behaved in the Working Committee like a spoilt child and often lost your temper. Now, in spite of all of your 'Nerviness and Jumpiness', what results did you achieve? You would generally hold forth for hours together and then succumb at the end. S.Patel and others had a clever technique for dealing with you. They would let you talk and talk and they would ultimately finish up by asking you to draft their resolution. Once you were allowed to draft the resolution, you would feci happy, no matter whose resolution it was. Rarely have I found you sticking to your point till the last. "11
Though harsh yet it is very realistic and objective analysis, and description of Nehru's mind and working style. Like a glamour boy, he always wanted to remain in the limelight, irrespective of the situation and the ways which might have to be used for the purpose. He wanted to reserve and preserve the best of all the worlds for himself. For this objective, he could do anything, go to any extent, join hands with anyone and break away from anyone. He could be easily taken in by others.
Nehru was not only an arm-chair philosopher but also a utopian politician. His approach was rarely realistic or practical except in the matters of personal position and prestige. His conclusions and reflexes were generally not as mature, sharp and sure as they should have been. In general, either he didn't decide at all, postponing the decisions, from one point of view or the other, or he jumped to the conclusions and later on found himself to be caught on the wrong foot. Because of the lack of clarity, commitment and self-confidence, he always tried to be in the middle or the road, keeping considerable scope for adjustments on either side while walking. When Bose decided to contest for re-election as President, on the plea that a real anti-federationist should be the President, Nehru very strongly opposed the stand of Bose in the following words,
"Is there a conflict regarding the Federation? I am not aware of it, and the Congress attitude is definite and clear... it seems to me monstrous for any Congressman to think in terms of compromising on Federation."12
Bose was not influenced or swayed by this strong worded explanation and reasoning of Nehru. Bose feared that in spite of having said all this, Nehru, as in the past, would change his stand. Reminding Nehru of the various instances of change in his stands, Bose wrote to him,
"Take your own case. You were against the Gandhi-Irwin Pact-but you submitted to it on the plea of unity. Again, you were against the acceptance of office in the provinces-but when the office acceptance was decided upon, you submitted to it perhaps on the same plea. Supposing for argument's sake that somehow that majority in the Congress agreed to work the Federal Scheme, then the anti-Federationists, in spite of their strong principles, may be tempted by the self-same plea of unity to accept the Federal Scheme against the dictates of their political conscience. Unity in a revolutionary movement is not an end in itself but only a means What would you do, may I ask, if the Congress by a majority resolved to accept the Federal Scheme? Would you abide by that decision or revolt against it?"13
In this way Bose conveyed to Nehru how he had been behaving at different times in different situations. Nehru had not the courage to revolt if the situation so demanded. Another important point of conflict between the two was about the desirability and need of issuing ultimatum to the British Govt. Bose was convinced that the time was ripe for issuing an ultimatum to the British Govt. to free our country. In a speech at Jallianwala Bagh on 1st December, 1938, Subhash Bose had declared,
.,
"The moment has almost arrived in the history of our national movement, when we must present the British Govt. with an ultimatum and fix a time limit-by no means long but say one month; two months or at the most six months-during which period they must fulfil our national demand for
complete independence In the event of our demand not being conceded, we
must be ready for uniform and organised mass action for bringing to a complete standstill the foreign rule in the country and paralysing the governing machinery."14
This was the attitude of Bose towards the British rule but Nehru did not fully agree with Bose. He was not in favour of issuing ultimatum at this stage. In his letter of 4.2.1939, Nehru wrote to Bose,
"Talks are not good enough. They arc vague and often misleading and we have had enough of vagueness already. I should like you to develop your suggestion about giving an ultimatum to the British Govt. How exactly do you wish to proceed about it and what will you do afterwards? As I have told you, I do not appreciate this idea at all but it may be possible that if you develop it, I might be able to understand it better. "15
Nehru did not agree with the idea of ultimatum when it was to be issued under the Presidentship of Subhash. Nehru appeared to have applied different standards about the issuing of ultimatum at different times by different people. The main reason was to rob his competitor of the credit for giving a new programme.
Bose was surprised at the response and attitude of Nehru towards ultimatum tactics because this was an old practice in the Congress. He wrote to Nehru,
"If we mean to fight the British Govt. for our Swaraj, and if we feel that the time is opportune, let us say so clearly and go ahead with our task. You have told me more than once that the idea of an ultimatum does not appeal to you. During the last twenty years Mahatma Gandhi has been repeatedly giving ultimata to the British Govt. It is only through such ultimata and simultaneous preparation to fight if necessary that he has been able to get so much out of the British Govt. I you really believe that the time has come for us to enforce our National Demand, how else can you proceed, except through an ultimatum? The other day Mahatma Gandhi delivered an ultimatum over Rajkot issue. Do you object to the idea of an ultimatum because I have been suggesting it? If so, why not say it clearly and without ambiguity."16
Bose was convinced that Nehru was opposing him with some ulterior motives and not because of some principles or issues. Nehru on the other hand claimed that he opposed the re-election of Bose because it was a clash of personalities and not because of the clash in views on programme. Nehru, in a statement, argued,
"Personally I do not see what principles or programmes are at stake in this election. I do not want it to be said at the end of the contest that a particular programme had been rejected when in fact it was not in issue. Whoever wins, Federation loses... The future is dark with conflict and we shall have to brace ourselves to meet it as a united people with courage and confidence, forgetting persons and remembering principles and our cause. "17
Quite contrary to this, Bose believed that it was a fight of principles and not persons. He had very clearly stated that he was prepared to withdraw from the contest "If a genuine anti-Federationist is accepted as the President." He added,
"This offer, publicly announced will stand till the eve of the election. "18
There was no response from the rightists.
Bose strongly believed that the old guards were against him because they wanted to have a dummy President. They wanted a figure-head, a rubber stamp and not some strong man as the President. They expected him to behave like a submissive, subdued, dependent and caged tiger. He believed that Nehru had always been working against him. On the point of 'Persons or Principles,' Bose wrote to Nehru,
"In your Almora statement you concluded by saying that we should forget persons and remember only principles and our cause. It never struck you that you want us to forget persons only when certain persons are concerned. When it is a case of Subhash Bose standing for re-election, you run down personalities and lionize principles etc... When it is a case of Subhash Bose vs. S.Patel and others, then Subhash Bose must first of all clear up the personal issue. When Sarat Bose complains of certain things at Tripuri ( viz. of the attitude and conduct of those who call themselves orthodox followers of Mahatma Gandhi)--he is, according to you, coming down to personal questions, when he should be confining himself to principles and programmes. I confess that my poor brain is unable to follow your consistency."l9
This exposes the dual attitude of Nehru towards the various persons and principles. Nehru opted to use both these points as per his convenience and against the interest of Bose. The re-election of Bose, as President of Congress, escalated the war of nerves between the two, and surfaced the diametrically opposite under-currents moving in the Congress circles. Bose was a committed person and rarely changed his position. He was an uncompromising person and if at all he ever thought or compromising, the circumstances did not permit him. He was so passionately attached to and in love with the cause which he had adopted that he was always prepared to efface himself completely for it Farsightedness was a great asset with him and he wanted to shape the things accordingly. He had made a forecast about the crisis Le., war, in Europe and wanted that the Congress should avail of this God-sent opportunity. It was not his fault that the other Congress leaders, seniors as well as juniors, were not equally far-sighted and mature. Because of their incapability and inability to perceive the scenario, they misunderstood Bose and went all out for his blood. It was only after sometime when some of them realised their mistake ana recognised the hard reality of the great potentials of Subhash. Even about the prophecy of Subhash, they recognised the truth at a very late stage but by that time very heavy damage had already been done. When the issue of Federation was raised, Nehru described it as monstrous for any member to think that a compromise was possible. But later on the same Nehru wrote to Gandhi,
"There are, however, some unfortunate indirect results also. An atmosphere of approaching compromise pervades the country when, in effect, there is no ground for it. It is enervating and depressing because it does not come out of strength but, in the case of many individuals, from the excessive desire to avoid conflict at all costs, and to get back to the shreds of power which we had previously. Conflict is undesirable but obviously conflict cannot be avoided at all costs, for some times such avoidance itself is a more costly and harmful affair. For the moment, however, there is no immediate question of conflict. The question is of maintaining our position with dignity and hot weakening it in any way. I fear that the impression is widely prevalent in England as well as in India that we are going in no event to have any conflict and therefore we are going to accept such terms as we can get. This kind of impression is demoralising. I have noticed during the last fortnight that even our Congress delegates elections have been influenced by this. Many people who, for fear of possible conflict, were keeping in the background, have now pushed themselves in front again when the possibility of enjoying the plums of office and power seem to dangle again in front of them. The effort of several months to keep undesirables out of the Congress has partly failed because of this sudden change in the Indians atmosphere which led them to believe that the compromise was imminent."20
Whatever had been described as monstrous by Nehru sometimes back, had been accepted by him and that too with greater intensity and resentment. This is just one of the instances where Nehru changed his position like this. In fact he had gone ahead of what Subhash had hinted.
The whole set of such problems appeared to be emanating from the beliefs of the group of leaders, generally called old guards led by Mahatma Gandhi, who presumed themselves to be infallible, indispensable and irreplaceable. They started believing that they themselves were the Congress and had the Divine Right to steer the destiny of the nation. They appeared to have closed the doors of high position in the Congress for the new entrants. This becomes quite clear when one critically studies the statement of Nehru which he made on 4.2.1939,
"It seems to me that many of the so-called leftists are more right than the socalled rightists. Strong language and a capacity to criticise and attack the old Congress leadership is not a test of leftism in politics. It seems to me that one of our chief dangers in the immediate future is the emergence into office and positions of the responsibility of persons who are devoid of any sense of responsibility or any true appreciation of the situation, and are not conspicuous in possessing intelligence of a high order. They will create a situation which is bound to lead to a big reaction and then the real leftists will be swept away."2l
From the tone and terms of this statement, it is clear that Nehru was not prepared to give the prominent position to the young blood other than himself. He had tried to give the feeling that the Leftists had only one quality and one point programme i.e., criticism of the old guards. They were not prepared to properly evaluate the criticism and they wanted to snub the reactions of all types. While making this statement, Nehru forgot that he himself had started his career like that. These utterances had sprouted from those comers of his heart which had mistakingly believed that nation had been mortgaged to them, and none else would ever have the chance to assert any claim on it. This inference has been vindicated from the way the post-independence Indian politics has been dominated by Nehru and his family.
The old guards, because of their prolonged dominance and monopolistic control on the party, had forgotten that it was an ongoing race, open to all, and at all time, and only the fittest would win it. It is an irony of fate that those Indian elders, who were already enthroned and entrenched in power or position of privilege, forecast the doom of all rising stars like Subhash. Nehru, though not as elderly as others were, yet because of some other considerations failed to appreciate the rise of his erstwhile friend and political partner. Netaji was deeply stung by the unjustified onslaughts of Nehru. While responding to such reactions of Nehru, he wrote to him,
"More than once you have referred in your letters to the Adventurist tendencies' in the Congress of today. What exactly do you mean? It strikes me that you have in view certain individuals. Are you against new men and women coming into the Congress and getting prominence? Do you desire that the top leadership in the Congress should be the close preserve of a few individuals... Whatever you might say, we are, in a sense, all adventurers, for life is one long adventure. I should have thought that those who regard themselves as progressive would welcome fresh blood in all ranks of the Congress organisation."22
The re-election of Bose as President was the beginning of the crisis as well as acid test for the Congress leadership. It was to be seen as to how the seniors conducted themselves in difficult position or in the only instance when they were on the losing side. It is only during difficult times that one's commitment to some cause or principles is tested. For the first time Gandhi lost and we have seen his reactions. As already discussed, Subhash, the President, fell seriously ill and the way the old guards behaved, gave ample proof of their pettiness. Nehru, very intelligently could afford to maintain an apparently neutral posture though always siding with the old guards. Whenever the situation became critical, he maintained silence or gave evasive replies, just like his political mentor. Commenting on such type of attitude, Bose wrote to him,
"When a crisis comes, you often do not succeed in making up your mind one way or the other-with the result that to the public you appear as if you are riding two horses."23
It was because of his lack of clarity and absence of permanent stand on the part of Nehru that Bose could not maintain his comradely attitude towards him. When Bose resigned, Nehru made feeble and formal appeal to Bose to withdraw his resignation, but under the circumstances it was not possible for Bose to do so. Nehru had tried to show as if he were sincere in his approach towards Bose yet Bose was not impressed. The experiences which Bose had during his illness, completely rocked his faith in the honesty and fair play of his political comrades. He complained;
"The unkindest cuts came from a quarter where they were least expected."24
The echoes of his aching heart could be heard in his article 'My Strange Illness' in which he wrote,
"As I tossed in my bed at Jamadoha, by day and by night, I began to ask myself again and again what would become of our public life when there was so much pettiness and vindictiveness even in the highest circles. My thoughts naturally turned towards what was my first love in life-the eternal call of the Himalayas. If such was the consummation of our policies-I ask myself--why did I stray from what Aurobindo Ghose would describe as 'The Life Divine."25
This was the extent of his disappointment, frustration and dis-illusionment at the hands of his fellow party men.
CHAPTER V
From Home to Hitler's Den
From the moment of his plunge into politics in 1921 till the time of his resignation from the Presidentship of All India Congress Party in 1939, for most of the time he remained either in the prisons or abroad. Whatever little free time he had in India, he worked so actively, effectively and impressively that he climbed to the highest political positions. The meteoric rise of his popularity and public appeal alarmed the senior Congress leadership as well as the Britishers. Both felt their positions to be seriously threatened by this powerful storm which was daily gaining strength. The Congressmen after compelling him to resign from the Presidentship of Congress party, expelled him from the party. The Britishers, at the earliest opportunity, encaged him in the prison. All these developments could not hamper and dampen the spirit of this adventurous and forward looking young man. He laid the foundation of 'Forward Block'. Through this organisation he wanted to give shape to his political ideas and plans. His main aim was to avail the opportunity which had been presented by the beginning of the Second World War. He organised and addressed hundreds of public rallies to educate the masses about the existing political situation and the various prospects. Through his writings also he tried to spread his views. The public warmly responded to his views and this baffled the Congress as well as the British leadership. They were unable to find any method to checkmate this rising tide. Finally the Britishers decided to do so by putting him in prison.
The chains of the govt. are not strong enough to detain those who are resolved to break the chains binding the Motherland. Since he was convinced that the opportunity in hand was the most golden and rare in the life-time of the nation, he didn't consider it appropriate and wise to languish in prison when the nation was passing through the most crucial stage of the struggle for independence. He felt deeply hurt to see subjugation of India to Britain and pined to sacrifice his all for the liberation of the Motherland. In the political testament he wrote,
"To my countrymen I say... forget not that the greatest curse for a man is to remain a slave. Forget not that the grossest crime is to compromise with injustice and wrong. Remember the eternal law: You must give life, if you want to get it. And remember that the highest virtue is to battle against inequity, no matter what the cost may be."1
The imprisonment can chain the movements of the body but not the flights of the mind. During the imprisonment and the house arrest he thought of the various ways to liberate India. He arrived at the conclusion that it was practically impossible to liberate India without the outside help. To achieve this it was essential to contact some foreign govt. Since the task was very crucial and of strategic nature, some important person had to undertake this hazardous task. He resolved to personally go abroad and do the needful but he was not a free bird to fly according to his own wishes. He was a prisoner. He knew that his detention was unlawful and unjustified. His health had deteriorated considerably in prison but he was not in a mood to surrundcr to the circumsLances. He decided to fight against this unjustified decision of the govt. He wrote,
"For more than two over months, the question has been knocking at the door of my conscience over and over again as to what I should do in such a predicament. Should I submit to the pressure of circumstances and accept whatever comes my way-or should I protest against what to me is unfair, unjust and illegal? After the most mature deliberation I have come to the conclusion that surrender to circumstances is out of the question. It is a more henious crime to submit to a wrong inflicted than to perpetrate that wrong. So, protest I must."2
He resolved to protest and went on hunger strike. He was aware of the fact that under the circumstances and the physical condition which he had while undertaking the hunger strike could be fatal but he did not change his decision. He conveyed to the British Govt.,
"Release me or I shall refuse to live... and it is for me to decide whether choose to live or to die."3
This decision of Bose pushed the British Govt. in a very tight comer and desperate position. The Govt. could neither release him, as it would have embarrassed the position of the Govt. nor could it take the risk of letting him die in the prison. Bose would have gained in both ways. Death would have immortalised him and the threat of death would have made it obligatory for the Govt. to release him. The British Govt. decided to play safe and release him from prison though put him under the house arrest Shifting to the house, though under detention, provided him more conducive atmosphere to concentrate on future planning and gave him an opportunity LO execute one of .the most thrilling and sensational escape in the history. The plan of the escape was kept a very closely guarded secret. Everything was meticulously planned. Only those people who were directly linked with its execution were taken into confidence. It is because of the precautions observed in planning and execution that he could escape successfully. He had taken a very grave risk and staked his life and career. On the fateful night of 15th and 16th January 1941, he slipped out of his house in a car driven by his nephew. The security guards could not detect the disguised Netaji. He left the car after sometime and boarded the train. After passing through many difficult and risky situations he succeeded in reaching Kabul, where Uttam Chand was his host. There they tried to contact different embassies to find some escape route and this process took about two long months. Each day of this uncertain period could bring LO an end the most daring venture of Subhash. Fortunately he succeeded in getting an Italian diplomatic passport in the name of 'Orlando Mazzotta'. From Kabul to Tashkent, he travelled by car as an Italian diplomat. From Tashkent he boarded the train for Moscow. From Moscow he flew to Berlin. In this way the long adventurous journey which began from the cosy lap of the bed in the house, after traversing through many cities, provinces and countries temporarily ended in Berlin. It was such a great, unbelievable and unprecedented long adventure that even Mahatma Gandhi could not help but appreciate the dare devil approach of Netaji.
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad wrote in his book:
"Soon there was one important change in the Indian political situation. Subhash Chandra Bose had, with the outbreak of the war, started a campaign for active opposition to the war effort. His activities led to his imprisonment, but he was released when he undertook a fast. On 26th Jan. 1941, it became known that he had left India. For over a year nothing was heard about him and people were not sure whether he was alive or dead. In March 1942, all doubts were set at rest when he made a speech which was broadcast by the Berlin Radio......
"I also saw that Subhash Bose's escape to Germany had made a great impact on Gandhiji. He had not formerly approved many of Bose's actions, but now I found a change in his outlook. Many of his remarks convinced me that he admired the courage and resourcefulness Subhash Bose had displayed in making his escape from India. His admiration for Subhash Bose unconsciously coloured his views about the whole war situation."4
He was very warmly received in Germany by the German Foreign Office and the Working Group India. The lack of material resources, absence of friends and comrades, complete dependence on strangers and presence in the country ruled by one of the most powerful and ruthless dictators, did not deter him from confidently, enthusiastically and optimistically pursuing his cause. A homeless, injured but spirited tiger had come to the den of another tiger, mighty and at the height of glory. Within a few days of his arrival in Germany, he submitted a memorandum to the German Govt In the memorandum he tried to explain to the Germans that for their success, it was essential that India should be liberated from the British control. India's liberation was essential because Britain was depending on her for men, money and material. It was not an easy task for a person like Subhash to present the things like this to the Germans. In those days, India being slave to England, did not have any standing in the community of the nations and India was nowhere in the priority list of Germany. Besides this, Hitler did not have good opinion of the Indian masses and the Indian leadership. While commenting about the Indian masses and the leaders in his book 'Meinkamph' he wrote,
"It just happens to be impossible to overwhelm with a coalition of cripples a powerful state that is determined to stake, if necessary, its last drop of blood for its existence. As a folkishman, who appraises the value of men on a racial basis, I am prevented by mere knowledge of the racial inferiority of these so called 'Oppressed nations' from linking the destiny of my own people with theirs."5
Moreover Hitler, because of his racial theory, preferred to have Britishers to anybody else ruling India. He had realised that at no stage it would be possible for Germany to control India. In fact he had warned Britain that she would lose India 'Either if her own administrative machinery falls a prey to racial decomposition or she is worsted by the sword of a powerful enemy. He added that the Indian agitators would never achieve this. He realised that Russia or Japan at some stage would be in a position to rule over India. It was because of such reasons that Hiller !>ad approbated the British rule over India.
When the ruler of the nation, from which one expects some help, thinks like this about one's country, then the response to the request for help is not likely to be very warm. This made the task of Subhash all the more difficult. He had not only to explain his policy and programmes to the German Govt. but also give sufficient evidence to them to prove that the Indians were not as inferior as Hitler had thought them to be. It was just like walking on a very tightly held metallic wire. It is highly creditable on the part of Subhash that he succeeded in winning the confidence of the German leadership and secured a large number of concessions, facilities and privileges for the organisations which he had established. For fulfilling his objective he very intelligently availed the services of the Gennan Foreign Office, and the Working Group India. He secured permission not only to establish Free India Centre and the Indian Legions, but also to broadcast on radio.
Bose was aware of the fact that in international politics it wen~ the interests which were permanent and not the friends. International politics is indeed a very complex and intricate game. No body helps other without serving one's own interest. Hence in order to secure the help of the Germans, it was essential that Germans were convinced about the fact that helping India would advance their own cause as well. Subhash knew that England was the number one enemy of Germany as also of India. Working on the principle that enemy's enemy is friend, he expected help from Germany. Besides this India was the most precious and valuable jewel in the crown of England. The continued control of India by England had increased the latter's fighting capacity. It had a negative effect also. The Britishers got easy money, wealth and immeasurable resources which caused deterioration and degradation in moral, scientific and industrial standards of England. The Britishers were losing their hold on India and they were finding it difficult to retain the hold. There was frustration and dissatisfaction among the Indians, particularly Indians in the British Indian Army. If the frustration and disappointment in them could be utilised to uproot the Britishers from India, it would be very convenient. In fact during his stay in India between September 1939 to June 1940, he had addressed more than one thousand public rallies in which he had appealed to the people not to cooperate with England in her war efforts because the war was not being fought for India's cause. On the contrary, the success of England would further perpetuate her rule in India. Because of the propaganda conducted by him, the war preparation of England in India suffered a serious setback. During the first world war, Britain had succeeded in recruiting more than fifteen lakh Indian soldiers but this time during the first fifteen months, the Britishers could not recruit more than one lakh soldiers. It is in spite of the fact that the moderates were not opposed to the British war efforts. If they had also join{'~ hands with Subhash in resisting the Govt efforts, England would definitely had been in a much more precarious condition. These facts impressed the Gennan leadership. He revealed to the Germans that with just fifty thousand soldiers he would be in a position to defeat the British Anny in India. Since he was an internationally recognised revolutionary, the possibility of his success in inciting and leading a revolution, was considered very favourably and optimistically. It was because of his magnetic and charismatic personality, that he could secure a favourable breakthrough in spite of the considerably adverse atmosphere prevailing there.
It must be pointed out here that though the Germans gave him quite many concessions and facilities yet they were reluctant in meeting all his requirements. In fact the top leadership avoided meeting him for as long as possible. When he met the German Foreign Minister Mr. Ribbentrop on 29.11.1941, he tried to persuade him to grant recognition to the Provisional Govt. of free India in exile. In spite of his best possible efforts he could not achieve it. It was not because of the lack of faith on the part of Govt of Germany in Netaji that the recognition was not granted. On the contrary the Germans withheld it on account of their realisation that the time was not yet ripe for such a declaration. They were not interested in taking any step which they might have to take in a hurry and then retrace it. Though he was not convinced about the idea of not granting of recognition yet he felt the necessity of organising propaganda at international level for the liberation of India. For this purpose the finances were made available liberally to him and many diplomatic immunities were also granted. He was allowed to use the Radio for broadcasting. When he learnt that Cripps had initiated some move to appease the Congress leadership, he initiated an intensive and aggressive campaign against it. Through his broadcasts he appealed to his countrymen and the Congress leadership not to be entrapped by the cunning Britishers. Subhash felt greatly satisfied to learn that the Congress leadership rejected the Cripps' proposal. Germans believed that it was the result of the efforts of Subhash who motivated or convinced and compelled the Congress leadership to reject the Cripps' proposal. This added to the stature of Subhash.
With the passage of time the Germans developed greater faith in Bose and gave him increasingly more support and facilities. Bose had made it clear that whatever help, in money or material form, was received by him or his organisation, was to be treated as a loan from one govt. to another and was to be returned after the independence of the country. In fact Netaji had offers from other countries also. Mussolini, the Dictator of Italy had volunteered to let Bose operate from Italy. He was prepared to give more facilities and concessions to Subhash but the latter refused to accept the offer because he knew that Germany was greater and stronger internationally and militarily. He found it politically more expedient to be associated with such a power even if it caused greater inconvenience. Till the beginning of German assault on Russia, Bose was very optimistic about the success of his adventure in Germany. He was not happy with German invasion of Russia. In fact he was able to fore-see the defeat of Germany, after the invasion of Russia. Still the long penetration of Germany into Russia inspired great hope in him and at one time it seemed imminent that the Germans would be able to advance deeper in Russia and that it would provide a land route to India. Though he was convinced that Germany would lose the war and England would win yet he was hopeful that even a victorious England would not be able to retain India.
The disillusioning feature of his stay in Germany was that Hitler did not give him an early appointment. Most of the critics infer that Hitler did not give him an early appointment because he was not serious about helping the Indian cause. Though Hitler might not have been committed to the cause of India's independence yet we can't say that he was non-serious towards Indian cause. Hitler in fact avoided meeting Bose because the former was not in a position to make any pragmatic commitment to Bose. When they finally met on 29.5.42, Bose tried to persuade Hitler to recognise the Provisional Govt. of Azad Hind. Hitler declined to oblige on the plea that German armies were very far away from the Indian borders and in the absence of the possibility of any concrete action, such a recognition would have appeared to be illegitimate. Hilter was of the view, 'The power of the country could only be exercised within the range of its sword.' During the meeting Bose asked Hitler to clarify his remarks about the Indians in the 'Meinkamph'. Hilter had written in it,
"All efforts of the Indians to rebel against the British yoke will most likely never succeed. It is only when Britain will be defeated by the military power of a more powerful enemy that India can expect to be free. Stales which are politically and militarily weak can never be in a position to overcome the political and military power of a well organised nation."6
Hilter is believed to have conveyed to Bose that his remarks were not related to Indians in particular and were against certain tendencies in the people of subject nations.
The debacle of Germans in Europe and Russia having made possibility of their reaching the Indian borders very remote, Bose planned to shift the field of his activities to South East Asia where Japan was registering lightning successes and had almost reached the threshold of India. Hitler approved his plan and promised every type of help. When Bose suggested to try the air route, Hilter warned him against it and commented that he (Subhash) was too important a personality to risk his life like that. Hilter was very keenly interested in the safe transportation of Bose to South East Asia. He is reported to have personally explained the sea route to be followed. This shows his involvement and concern for Netaji and his efforts. Some historians have disproportionately highlighted and overplayed Hitler's not giving an appointment to Netaji. They ignored the fact that in those days Hiller was under very heavy strain of the extended war front and had more important priorities than the problem of India. If Hilter had any intention of simply ruling out Subhash, he could have done it in clear cut words. Since Hiller remained non-committed for so long, shows that he was marking time to take appropriate decision. When he became clear that it was no longer possible to help Subhash, he extended his help in the way and form in which Subhash needed. Hitler had, without meeting Bose made an assessment of his personality and leadership qualities and he was not willing to send him to Italy or Japan. He wanted to get the credit and benefit of helping India, through Bose, in getting her independence.
On the other hand, Japan, who had already registered startling victories in East Asia, wanted to extend their sphere of influence to India. Mr Tojo, the Prime Minister of Japan had already given an idea about the 'Co-Prosperity Zone'. He knew that without rebellion from within it could not he possible for the Japanese to oust Britishers from India and finally from Asia. For this purpose they needed a leader of outstanding qualities. They couldn't find anybody else except S.C. Bose for the materialisation of their plan. So they sent a request to Germany to help in the transportation of Netaji to Japan. Germany had already decided to send Netaji to Japan.
Before describing his departure from Germany to Japan it is worthwhile to sum up the tremendous and unprecedented gains which he made in Germany. He could secure all diplomatic immunities, secure all the financial assistance without any restraints. Indian prisoners of war were brought to Germany and out of them Subhash recruited the members of Indian Legion. Proper arrangement for the training and the arming of the Indian Legion was made. Besides this a special Indian commando group was organised to create disturbances and organise sabotage activities in Afghanistan. It is a tribute to Netaji's personality and his capability to involve others in his task that even after his departure from Germany, the Indian Legion was retained in full and proper form till the end of war. The broadcasting facilities were of immense value to the cause of India. It is heartening to note that the programmes in seven Indian languages were broadcast from Radio.
About Netaji it is known that he was non-compromising when it was a question of his principles. According to the German law every unit of army, with foreign allegiance had to take oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler. Subhash Chandra Bose could not agree to it. He succeeded in securing the addition of qualifying phrase to the oath to the effect that the Legion would loyally and obediently follow all commands given in pursuance of the struggle for India's independence led by Netaji S.C. Bose. The following oath was to be taken,
"I swear by God this holy oath, that I will obey the leader of the German State and people, Adolf Hitler as Commander of the German Armed Forces, in the fight for the freedom of India, in which fight our leader is Subhash Chandra Bose, and that as a brave soldier, I am willing to lay down my life for this oath."7
This oath assured that the blood of the Indians will not be shed for any other country. It shows how particular was he about the fundamentals. Though he was dependent in all respects on the German Govt. yet he didn't agree to any dishonourable terms. In fact the terms proposed by him appeared to be exaggerated to the Germans. To cut Bose to size and try to over-awe and horrify him, an S.S.Colonel visited him. Subhash told him,
"Sir, I have heard a lot about your Gestapo. Probably the Gentleman here is a representative of that body. But believe me, the British C.I.D. in India is no less efficient and ruthless. And if I have foiled them and escaped, I shall do the same here. I have not come here to live the life of an exile. Gentlemen, I think we shall leave it at that."8
The officer who was neither prepared nor accustomed to such a reply, got stunned. Such incidents made the Germans believe that his nerves were made of steel.
The movement in Germany was formally conducted i~ the name of Free India Centre. The national anthem' Jan Gan Man' tricolour with a springing tiger as flag, 'Jai Hind' as salutation, and the title 'Netaji, were adopted there. This set the stage for greater action in the times to come. In the meanwhile preparations were made to shift him South East Asia. Before his departure from Germany, while addressing a distinguished independence day gathering, he said,
"In this struggle which for India is a life and death struggle for vindication of justice and truth, there will be only one end our victory... and our freedom."9
Accompanied by Abid Hassan he left Germany on 8.2.1943. It is unfortunate that he couldn't leave for South East Asia earlier because of some misunderstanding between Germany and Japan. This delay caused irrepairable and everlasting damage to the cause of India's independence. Had he been shifted earlier to South East Asia, he would have availed the opportunity in better manner and make more appropriate use of the I.N.A. His departure was kept a closely guarded secret. In fact in order to camouflage his departure from Germany, a few of his speeches were recorded which were broad cast later on at regular intervals. After 93 days of hazardous journey, Netaji landed in Sabang island. (More about it in the following chapters) To the Britishers it must have been a nerve-breaking news that once again their arch enemy had ditched them and reached a point from where he could pounce upon them with drastic consequences.
CHAPTER VI
Clouded Sky Awaited the Sun of India in 'The Land of Rising Sun'
The beginning of the second world war and the initial trends of the war provided the golden opportunity and promised ray of hope to the freedom-loving. Indians to accelerate their efforts for the liberation of their Motherland from the clutches of the British Empire. Since it was a war which was to be waged against an empire on which the sun never set, Indians everywhere under the sun had to pool their strength to meet this apparently invincible and super strong dragonian giant. Indians settled in America, Europe, Africa and Asia organised themselves under various names and contributed as much as possible to the fight for the Nation's liberation. The Indians in the East Asia, perhaps on account of the circumstances in which they were placed, played the most vital and valuable role in the armed and aggressive struggle waged for India's Independence.
The process of organising the revolutionary and nationalistic Indians was initiated in Japan and South East Asia by Sh. Rash Bihari Bose, the fire-brand Indian revolutionary, who after hurling a hand-grenade on the Viceroy and remaining underground for quite sometime, escaped to Japan. There also, for a considerable period, he remained under ground, and it was only after he married the daughter of an influential Japanese that he surfaced overground and openly conducted his activities of organising the Indian revolutionaries there. The outbreak of second world war followed by the unbelievable victories of Hitler and above all the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour stimulated, inspired and encouraged the Indian revolutionaries to more optimistically and aggressively work for their aim. In the East Asia, so fast was the rate of success of the Japanese that the Allies were completely baffled, uprooted and demoralised. The magnified, glorified and mystified image of the great empire was completely dashed to the ground. The over-confidence, complacency and highheadedness of the Britishers got lost in the sky like smoke. Because of the humiliating defeat of France, England was already finding it hard to save her face. The arch enemy of all the Indian nationalist" was England. In the adversity of England they found the best guarantee for India's prosperity. The mass surrender of the British Indian Army in Malaya made the Indians believe that the Britishers were only paper tigers. Not only this, Japan, which was really becoming super power, had expressed her willingness, rather eagerness to help the cause of freeing India by helping the Indians in waging a war against England. Through such a policy Japan wanted not only to weaken England but also to expel the Europeans from Asia. The slogan of the Japanese was' Asia for the Asians'. Japan planned a psychological warfare and wanted to involve the people of Indian origin in her mission of expelling Britishers from India. For this purpose the Govt. of Japan deputed Fuziwara to run the affairs of F.Kikan.
Maj. Fuziwara met two revolutionaries S. Pritam Singh and S. Amar Singh. These revolutionaries were the members of the Indian Independence League. They explained to Fuziwara that the mission of their lives was to live, work and die for the cause of the nation. Fuziwara, who was an intelligent, efficient and tactful officer, assured complete cooperation in the pursuance of their mission. The Indians who desperately needed the help of some powerful ally, were elated at this offer but they were not sure of the extent of sincerity and the motives behind this profferred help. Since they were very cautious in their approach, they stressed the need of signing a memorandum permitting the organisation of an army by the Indian Independence League. Japan was asked to clarify that she would nurse no ambition over India's geographical territory. The League with a view to infusing a new life in its own work wanted that Netaji S.C. Bose should be brought from Germany to Japan. It was believed that because of his multi-dimensional experiences and highly exalted personality, he would be able to infuse dynamism and great spirit in the revolutionary movement. From the letter and spirit of memorandum it was quite clear that the organisers of Indian Revolutionary Movement were not prepared to have blind faith in the Japanese. Though it is always wise to move cautiously in the matter of political alliances yet it must be conceded that in this case the suspicion was to a great extent because of the anti-Japanese propaganda unleashed by the Britishers.
The Indian soldiers of the British Army who had surrendered to the Japanese, provided a golden opportunity for the organisers of the revolutionary movement to try for raising an army of Indians to fight for the cause of India. It was with a view to recruit and involve the Indian soldiers of British Indian Army that Maj. Fuziwara met Capt. Mohan Singh in a village house after the latter had been separated from his unit. In many respects the meeting between Maj. Fuziwara and Capt. Mohan Singh proved to be of a great historical and strategic importance. S. Pritam Singh had accompanied Maj. Fuziwara when they went to see Capt. Mohan Singh. They discussed the possibility and plans for the recruitment and involvement of the British Indian soldiers who had surrendered to the Japanese Army. Capt. Mohan Singh, after analysing the various aspects of the issue, decided to join hands with them. Maj. Fuziwara was also very optimistic and enthusiastic about it. In the scheme of the things, the Indian Independence League was supposed to act as a parent body and political wing of I.N.A. Because of the conducive atmosphere which could be developed with the joint efforts of Japanese and Indian Independence League, the people responded warmly and in large numbers.
With the joining of hands by Cap L.Mohan Singh the process of the formation of I.N.A. had started. People responded in large numbers and with the passage of each day the number of I.N.A. Personnel went on increasing. It encouraged the organisers and Maj. Fuziwara gained more confidence. Consequently he gave greater latitude to Capt. Mohan Singh who was promoted to the rank of the General. In the history of the army there must not have been faster promotion than was the case of Capt. Mohan Singh. This made him more ambitious and arrogant. He started taking for granted most of the things and stopped taking into confidence Sh. Rash Bihari Bose and S. Pritam Singh. On the one hand the organisation of I.N.A. was the beginning of golden chapter in the history of independence struggle, and on the other hand the development of such tendencies was the beginning of one of the darkest chapters in the history of I.N.A.
Many a time, even the greatest movements have suffered on account of the miscalculations and the blunders of the originators of the movement. Unfortunately it is true about the first phase of the I.N.A. movement also. Sh. Rash Bihari Bose and S. Pritam Singh who had been watching the change in the altitude of Gen. Mohan Singh, became suspicious about his sincerity and real motives. They had been in the revolutionary movement since very long and Gen. Mohan Singh was a new entrant in the movement. Basically he was an officer of the British Indian Army and owed his allegiance to the British Indian Govt The change in situation had provided him an opportunity to serve the nation in a different capacity but surprisingly he started suspecting the sincerity of persons like S. Pritam Singh and Sh. Rash Bihari Bose. He went to the extent of describing them as Japanese puppets. Many of the senior army officers objected to his dictatorial conduct and preferred to keep themselves aloof from the movement.
In order to discuss and decide the strategy of the Indian Independence League, a conference was held at Tokyo. This conference was attended by many delegates from different countries, and it took many far-reaching decisions. It appealed to the Govt. of Japan for help in the active pursuance of the goal of India's independence. Many issues were discussed but since it was a preparatory meeting, it was decided to discuss the remaining issues in the Bangkok Conference to be held on 15.5.42. Netaji was also scheduled to attend this conference but because of the unavoidable and compelling reasons he could not attend. He sent an inspiring message which was as follows,
"The experience I have gained during the last eighteen months has convinced me that in our fight against British Imperialism, the Tripartite Powers are our best friends and allies outside India... But the emancipation of India must be the work primarily of Indians themselves... We, who form the vanguard of the national army, feel however that the time will soon come when it will be necessary to take up arms in the final stage of the struggle......
"India's liberation will mean the expulsion of Anglo-American Imperialism, the goal of the victorious Japanese Army. It is now time to link up Indian nationalists all over the world in one all-embracing organisation. I wish all success to your conference and I ardently hope and trust that it will prove to be a further milestone in our march towards victory." 1
This conference discussed most of the points related to the I.I.L. and I.N.A. movements and passed a very ambitious and hyperbolic charter of demands which was presented to the Govt. of Japan. It contained the demand for the recognition of the Provisional Govt. of India and granting to the Indian National Army the status equal to the Japanese Army. It demanded loan from the Japanese Govt. and besides many other things, appealed her to bring Netaji S.C.. Bose to East Asia from Germany. The demands of the Charter were so exaggerated that on receiving it the Govt. of Japan felt, highly offended and infuriated. The Govt. of Japan believed that so far the atmosphere was not good enough for recognition to be granted and that it was not practically advisable to give the I.N.A. a status equivalent to the Japanese Army.
On the other hand Gen. Mohan Singh who had been pampered by the Japanese, had started behaving in an increasingly arrogant and dictatorial manner. Because of the faith reposed in him by the Japanese, he started overestimating himself and acting independently without taking the League in confidence. With a view to gaining strength and winning the confidence of the Japanese, he enthusiastically went out of the way to toe their line. He believed that he would be able to out manoeuver the Japanese but shrewd Japanese were able to see through his game. When he realised that he was unable to secure more favours from them, he tried to take a complete about turn. In fact without taking any part in the war, without winning a single battle, without having any practical experience of the politics, he started dreaming to be one of the chief architects of India's independence. When one goes through his book 'Soldiers Contribution To India's Independence', one gets the impression that he placed himself even above Netaji S.C. Bose. While commenting about Netaji, he wrote,
"As regards the question of accepting him as my leader in India as well, when he had gone there, I told him frankly that I could not do so at that stage. Pt. JL Nehru had been my hero since my youth. I had read his 'Glimpses of the World History', his autobiography, his speeches and practically all that ever appeared in print regarding him. I worshipped him as my hero and I could not change overnight and abruptly banish from my mind such a deep regard and respect for him. I had yet to work with Netaji and understand him."2
On another occasion while commenting about the over-confidence of Netaji, he wrote,
"He wildly believed that the huge army being raised by Lord Wavell in India would not fight against him. He considered that army as his own... I was really amazed at his self-confidence, his wild hopes of revolt in the Indian Army and their desertion to his side, his over estimation of the weight and" power of the magic of his name, which would be instrumental in galvanizing' and stirring the entire Indian nation to a spasmodic militant action against the British.."3
In this way we see that Capt. Mohan Sihgh, the so-called General Mohan Singh had become so high-headed that he could use the expressions like 'wildly believed' for a person like Netaji. Even if it is an after-thought, still it is a deep and true reflection of his mental make-up. The Japanese, who are basically more intelligent and had the capability of better understanding and forecasting the things, perhaps could very accurately look into the working of the mind of Gen. Mohan Singh and very cautiously dealt with him. He desperately tried to get some settlement from the Japanese Govt. which might provide the necessary political legitimacy to his activities and organisation. At that time perhaps he could not understand that in order to secure political legitimacy, there was a need for some political leader of high standing.
Japanese were in no mood to oblige Gen. Mohan Singh or the Indian Independence League. To the League the Japanese Govt. sent a non-committal reply. Towards Gen. Mohan Singh they became all the more suspicious. The Japanese Govt. did not overlook the mistake of their own army officers who gave Indians more latitude than was required or desirable from the Japanese point of view. There was a plan to shift some of the I.N.A. recruits to Burma for some operation. The ships were also brought for the transportation of the I.N.A. soldiers. Gen. Mohan Singh was adamant on getting some special favourable announcement before despatching the soldiers. On the other hand the I.I.L. was not much interested in any such announcement because they had lost complete faith in Gen. Mohan Singh. The activities of Col. N. S. Gill, a very close associate and confidant of Gen. Mohan Singh were being watched by the Japanese who suspected him of spying for the Britishers. Finally they were arrested by the Japanese. The Indian Independence League sacked Gen. Mohan Singh who in turn disbanded the I.N.A. In this way the first I.N.A. which was founded with such a fanfare and had aroused such great expectations, became the victim of its own founders. It was just like the mother snake swallowing its progeny.
If India had been invaded at that time, the results would have been very fruitful because the international situation was most favourable. Such an opportunity was lost because of the blunders of over-ambitious and self-centred persons like S. Mohan Singh. The irresponsible conduct had not only damaged whatever had already been achieved but also set very bad precedents for similar attempts in future. Japanese had lost faith in the Indians and started believing that they were not dependable, particularly the army men. It was because of this mishap that many problems were faced when Netaji was brought to East Asia. They feared that Rash Bihari Bose and Subhash Chandra Bose may not be able to work hand in hand. That is why the Govt. of Japan conveyed a message through their Ambassador to Berlin that he would have to act under the leadership of Rash Bihari Bose. Japanese had feared that Netaji would refuse to accept this condition and were surprised 10 hear that Netaji .was prepared to work under anybody for the liberation of his country. Even after Netaji's arrival in Tokyo, the concerned Japanese officer took sometime to arrange the meeting between Rash Bihari Bose and Netaji. So much was the tension and the sky clouded that the organisers heaved a sigh of relief when they found that both the Indians had met very warmly.
S. Mohan Singh whom the post-independence Indians know as the founder of I.N.A., in fact was the main villain also. In his ego and with a view to magnify his image he tried to underrate everyone else including Netaji. While summing up his meeting with Netaji, he wrote,
"Thus after four hours of frank and heart to heart discussions we parted as friends. He understood me to a considerable extent and so did I. We sympathised with each other's stand but remained as we were, both being unconvinced and enlightened by each other's argument."4
From this it is absolutely clear where he ranked himself. Instead of looking into his own weaknesses, repenting for the blunders which he had committed and correcting himself, he said about the timing of his meeting with Netaji,
"It was my misfortune that I had met him at a time when he was saturated with glory and had not yet seen any devastating setbacks, which awaited him on the Indo-Burma border. Lifted upto the pinnacle of his glory and riding on the waves of the high tide of popularity, it was difficult for him to see things in their true perspective. "5
In this way we see that S, Mohan Singh, the founder as well as the destroyer of first I.N.A. created and left behind him a very polluted atmosphere which had to be cleared by Netaji S.C. Bose on his arrival in East Asia. It was because of such an atmosphere that Mr. Tojo, the then Prime Minister of Japan, took so long" to meet him. It is really very creditable and highly commendable for Netaji that in spite of the unfavourable international situation, and the decline in the morale and position of the Axis powers, he managed to get whatever he wanted from the Japanese Govt.
CHAPTER VII
'Subhash Moves to His Karam Bhoomi'
The
beginning of the second world war had set on fire such huge stores of piled
fare-works that the whole sky was overcast with so dark clouds that visibility
was reduced very considerably. Under such circumstances Netaji, with the flame
of patriotism strongly burning in his heart and carrying the torch of India's
freedom, flew from one end of the horizon to the other to transmit some rays of
hope for his Motherland but the clouds in the sky were so dark and dense that
the flame in his heart looked just like a sparkle trying to put the ocean on
fire. Because of the overwhelmingly heavy odds, the outcome of the venture
appeared to be written on the wall but like the eccentric, passionate and
devoted lovers, hoping against hope and trying to defy even the death, this sparkle
resolved to risk everything by diving through the deepest waters of the world
to reach 'The Land of Rising Sun' in the hope of finding the 'Sun of India' by
piercing through the clouds of darkness, despair, disappointment and
destruction. The international situation at that time was not very favourable.
In fact the countries whom he considered to be friendly or helpful, had already
reached their climax and unfortunately for India, in fact their decline had
started. Hitler, who had successfully pierced through the impregnable security
rings of France and crushed it, penetrated more than one thousand kilometres
deep into Russia. Thereafter he had to have second thoughts about his campaign
which in fact was the reversal of the trend of second world war. In the East,
Japan, which had surprised even Hitler with her lightning successes, had also
gone very far and was about to cut main arteries of the heart of the British
Empire when physical limitations compelled her to halt her march just on the
threshold of India. In the case of both these countries their leaders were so
much hard pressed by Global considerations that to them the case of India
appeared to be just a 'small fry' in their huge frying pan. If their
involvement had to be secured on priority basis for the cause of India, this
'small fry', had to be presented to them in a magnified form and that too in
such a way that it should appear to be golden fry holding magic wand, assuring
the solution of their problems. It was with the help of this magic wand i.e.,
convincing the Axis powers that India's independence was the best guarantee for
their ultimate success, that the Axis powers fell in line with him and assured
help to him in the accomplishment of his mission.
When he
left Germany, it was very clear to him that he was undertaking a very risky and
dangerous journey. A message from Tokyo conveyed:
"The
Ambassador is requested to tell the passenger that they will be travelling at
their own risk and unconditionally."1
For
Netaji, no risk was too heavy to be taken for the independence of the
Motherland. His voyage in the submarine throughout the Atlantic ocean,
particularly during its journey near England, was full of dangers. His safety
lay only in the utmost secrecy of the plan and enemy's failure to detect the
submarine at any stage. Had it been detected, there would have been no way to
protect it from the attacks of the enemy. On the way it had to refuel itself.
Fortunately everything went quite smoothly and as per plans. At some points
there was very narrow escape. In one instance the top of the submarine grazed
against the bottom of a cargo ship. But for the fast lowering of the submarine,
managed by the alert Captain, the submarine would have met with the accident
and the entire mission would have ended there itself. The whole journey from
Germany to the Indian Ocean near Madagascar went on smoothly and the German
submarine reached in time. Japanese submarine had arrived ten hours in advance.
After sighting the German submarine and exchanging the signals, they could
confirm the identity of each other. It appeared that on having a revolutionary
in its lap, the ocean also got stimulated and excited and became stormy. The
disturbed weather made the shifting of Netaji from the German submarine to the
Japanese one extremely difficult and risky. After waiting for a considerable
period for the weather to settle down, and realising the sensitive nature of
the mission, on the morning of 28th April the two German mariners jumped into
the turbulent sea and swam to the Japanese submarine. They tied both the
vessels with rope and prepared a rope-way for the transhipment of Netaji and
his aide. The process of such shifting was really full of positive dangers and
required great courage and will-power to undergo such an experience in the
turbulent ocean. Many a time the strong waves struck them and sharks were seen
rushing towards their probable preys. After the exchange, both the vessels bade
good-bye and proceeded towards their respective destination.
During
the period of journey from Kiel to near Madagascar, Netaji availed of the
opportunity to concentrate on planning the details of his mission in East Asia.
He was a true war hero in the sense that he was not disturbed by the sounds of
shellings or the roars of the waves. In fact he appears to have derived
inspiration from the turbulent ocean and his determination to fight must have
gained strength from the untiring and evergrowing mighty waves of the ocean. He
thought of all the possible eventualities in future and of their solutions. It
is because of this that on reaching Tokyo, after landing at Sabang, nothing
surprised him. There was hardly a situation which he had not anticipated and
not applied his mind to. As a result of it, he was prepared for all the
surprises, shocks, jubilations, journeys, encounters, marches, sleepless nights
and what not He was so well prepared for the worst as well as the best that
those who had to deal with him found themselves at a loss, what to do now? When
he reached Sabang on 6th May 1943, the Japanese officials dealing with him,
presuming that he must be tired after 93 days of long hazardous journey,
advised him to take rest but little did they know that during all those days of
journey, such powerful storm had built up in his mind that he needed an
earliest opportunity for providing an outlet to this storm. He had to wait
there for six days for the aeroplane and those six days appeared to him just
like six long years of imprisonment in some dark cell of some prison on some
remote island.
He
reached Tokyo on 11th May, 1943. He set the ball rolling immediately. He
aspired for action, immediate and effective. Many important functionaries of
the Japanese govt. including the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Navy and the
chief of the Army Staff met him and held detailed discussions. The only person
who avoided seeing him at the earliest was the Prime Minister Mr. Tojo. Some of
the observers, political analysts and the historians have given the view that
Tojo wanted to avoid him because of the former's lack of faith in the latter,
but I am of the opinion that Tojo was caught up in a very difficult situation.
Perhaps he could apprehend that there might be some questions which he might
not find easy or convenient to answer. Besides this, through his ministers and
army officers, he might have learnt that Netaji would ask for some categorical
answers to certain basic questions.
Finally
Tojo met him on 10th June. It was a free, frank and meaningful discussion. Tojo
appeared to have been highly impressed by the meeting and desired to see him on
14th June. In this meeting Netaji asked him if Japan would invade India. Once
again the reply was not clear and complete but Tojo appeared to be completely
overwhelmed and fascinated by the personality and arguments of Netaji. After
the meeting Tojo told his Foreign Minister,
"He
is a great Indian, fully qualified to command the I.N.A."2
In this
way we see that just within four days, from a reluctant patron he became a
spirited, enthusiastic and optimistic admirer. In fact he accelerated the pace
of developments, as if subconsciously trying to make up the loss of earlier
time, and invited him to the Japanese parliament, Diet In the Diet he
announced,
"We
are indignant about the fact that India is still under the relentless
suppression of Britain and are in full sympathy with the desperate struggle for
independence. We are determined to extend every possible assistance to the
cause of India's independence. It is our belief that the day is not far off
when India will enjoy freedom and prosperity after winning independence."3
It is
quite clear from the details of the developments since Netaji's first meeting
with the Prime Minister Tojo that the pace of developments was very fast and
there is no justification in the opinions expressed by some critics that Tojo
wanted to ignore him by delaying the meeting. Tojo was not a minor in politics
who could be so easily swayed of his feet by Netaji.The former must have felt
the sincerity of purpose of Netaji, and recognised the dynamic elements in his
personality. At times it appeared as if Netaji was able to hypnotise Tojo.
Though the Japanese had volunteered their complete cooperation and assistance
in the accomplishment of the ideal of India's independence yet Netaji was of
the view that only minimum help should be accepted and the Indians must
themselves pay for their liberty. In the first press conference which he held
in Tokyo on 19th June 1943 and which was attended by about 60 journalists, he
stated,
"It
is our duty to pay for our liberty with our own blood. The freedom that we
shall win, through our own sacrifice and exertions, we shall be able to
preserve with our strength. The enemy must be fought with the sword... Since
the enemy fights with his swords, we too should fight with the sword. The
non-violent struggle should transform itself into a violent one. Only if a
large number of Indians undergo this baptism of fire can they win the race and
get the reward of freedom."4
He
announced in one of the broadcasts to Indians in South East Asia,
"To
my countrymen and friends: Let's carry on the fight for liberty inside I, India
and outside India, with all our strength and vigour. In this struggle, there is
no going back, and there can be no faltering. We must march onward and forward
till victory is achieved and freedom won:"5
On 23rd
June, while addressing the compatriots, he said,
"If
Singapore, which had been built in 20 years as a military base, was to be lost
in a week's time, then how many days will it take for the British supreme
commander, who is always on the run or his successor, to withdraw from the
frontier strongholds?"6
He was
aware of the fact that some of his fellow countrymen in India, who were
educated and brought up in the English institutions, were overawed by the English
propaganda. Addressing to such people, he said,
"I
would ask those countrymen to put their trust in me, for the powerful British
Govt. that has persecuted me all my life and has imprisoned me II times, has
not been able to demoralise me."7
He thundered,
"No
power on earth can hope to do so and if the willy, cunning and resourceful
British politicians have failed to cajole and corrupt me, nothing else can do
so."8
On 21st
June 1943, in a broadcast, he told his countrymen,
"You
know, as well as I do, that when this war broke out, some of our friends
thought that the British Govt would soon find itself in serious difficulties
and that it would naturally be constrained to sue for peace with the party that
controlled the cabinets in the majority of provinces in British India."9
He was so
much convinced about the dishonesty and lack of the sincerity of the Britishers
that he never expected them to leave until they were thrown out of the country.
In the same broadcast he said,
"A
year passed by but there was no evidence of any change of heart on the part of
the British tyrants... Even the fall of Singapore, the worst disaster in
British Military History, according to Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt
and the loss of Burma, could not bring about any appreciable change. British
Imperialism remains inexorable. Men may come and men may go, empires may come
and empires may go, but British Imperialism goes on for ever that is, what our
rulers continue to think... Therefore according to Imperialistic logic,
whatever may be the outcome of this war, it would be their endeavour to retain
that hard grip over India. Consequently, no Indian should ever cherish, the
illusion that one day England will be induced to recognise India's
independence. "10
He was
aware of the significance of India for England and clearly stated that Britain
would never lose India. becansc it meant Empire for them. He said,
"The
British Empire has grown out of India. The British people know no matter to
which political party they belong, that they need to reap all the resources of
India. To them the Empire today means India. They are now fighting madder to
preserve that Empire. The cost of recognising India's independence might amount
to winning the war, but losing the Empire. "11
In this way
since India was of such a great strategic importance to England the latter
could not afford to lose the former and Indians should not have expected her to
go away on her own. It is because of such deep rooted beliefs that Netaji felt
the necessity of raising an army and waging struggle against the Britishers.
After
doing his job in Tokyo, Netaji moved to Singapore on 2nd July 1943. On 4th July
he formally took over the leadership of the Freedom Movement and became
President of the Indian Independence League in East Asia. Sh. Rash Bihari Bose,
from whom Netaji had taken the charge, while addressing the people gathered to
welcome Netaji, said,
"Friends
and Comrades in Arms! You might now ask me what I did in Tokyo for our cause,
what present I have brought for you. Well, I have brought for you this present
(turning to Subhash). Srijut Subhash Chandra Bose needs no introduction to you,
to India or to the world. He symbolises all that is best, noblest, the most
daring and the most dynamic in the youth of India. "12
The
Japanese Premier Tojo in a special message for the occasion wrote,
"The
sincere wish of Japan for the fulfillment of 'India's long cherished ambition
of 'India for Indians' has been proved beyond doubt by the repeated
declarations of the Govt of Nippon. Nippon is inflexibly determined to exhaust
all her means to help India in achieving her independence which is the earnest
desire of Indians...:. Traditionally Nippon is a country which invariably keeps
faith where friends trust each other, and so is India.
I
sincerely wish that Indians will not be deceived by Anlo-American intrigues and
miss the God-sent opportunity to win their freedom. I trust that Indians. with
firm faith in the victory of Japan, Germany and Italy, will fight for justice
and righteousness, shoulder to shoulder with us. I firmly believe that this is
the only way that Indians can hasten-the glorious day of their freedom. and I
sincerely wish them every success in their brave fight. "13
After
many important leaders and Lieutenant Col. J.K. Bhonsle had welcomed him, S.C.
Bose addressed the huge gathering. It was a very thrilling and exciting ~
speech, explaining in detail the reasons for his leaving homeland, undertaking
various! adventures during the period, an analysis of the international
situation and attitude of i the Japanese and Axis powers towards the cause of
India. He exposed the intrigues of the cunning Britishers and their American
allies, and explained in detail the various. things which he proposed to do in
the immediate future to achieve his aim of winning freedom for India. Taking
the people into confidence he said,
".....If
you were to hear my experiences--at home and abroad--since the outbreak of the
present war, you would feel, as I do, that the hand of Providence has been
protecting us from harm and has been guiding our efforts along the path leading
to victory and freedom. This has increased my optimism and self-confidence a
hundredfold.
....Those
of you who have studied the history of freedom movements in other lands--as I
have done--must have observed that for the achievement of independence, two
conditions are essential--firstly, a favourable international situation and
secondly, necessary sacrifice and effort. The first condition has been already
fulfilled. If India had to fight single handed with the British Empire, our
task would have been exceedingly difficult The Tripartite Powers are determined
to carryon the war, until Anglo-American Imperialism is overthrown.
....In
order to mobilise all our forces effectively, I intend organising a Provisional
Govt. of Free India. It will be the task of this Provisional Govt. to lead the
Indian Revolution to a successful conclusion... When the revolution succeeds
and Anglo-American Imperialism is expelled from India, the task of the
Provisional Govt. will be over. It will then make room for a permanent Govt. to
be set up inside India, in accordance with the will of the Indian people.
When all
our preparations for the last struggle are complete, it will be possible to
bring the Indian struggle into line with the common struggle of the Tripartite
Powers against the common foe. By participating in this common fight, we shall
be qualifying for our freedom. By shedding our blood in a sacred cause we shall
be paying the price of liberty and, at the same time we shall be laying the
only enduring foundation for our national unity. And last but not the least, by
winning freedom through our own efforts and sacrifice we shall be acquiring the
strength whereby we shall preserve our liberty for all time.
....We
have a grim fight ahead of us--for the enemy is at once powerful, unscrupulous
and ruthless. In this final march to freedom you will have to face hunger,
thirst, privation, forced-marches and death. Only when you pass this test, will
freedom be yours. I am confident that you will do so and thereby bring freedom
and prosperity to your enslaved and impoverished land. "14
In this
way he gave the detailed description of his plans and tried to involve the
masses.
Clad in
the army uniform, on 5th July he took the salute of the I.N.A. rank and file in
the grounds opposite Singapore Municipal Office. His presence inspired the
soldiers and it appeared that the marching soldiers not only inspired but also
assured his expectations and fired his imagination. Since long he had desired
that there should have been an army of Indians to fight the Britishers and
throw them out of our sacred land. He told them that Delhi is their destination
and Red Fort there would be the venue of the victory parade of the I.N.A. His
study of the revolutions in various countries had convinced him that without
the help of arms, it was not possible to liberate India. He pleaded,
"Throughout
my public career, I have always felt that, though India is otherwise ripe for independence
in every way, she has lacked one thing; namely, an army of liberation. George
Washington of America could fight and win freedom, because he had his army.
Garibaldi could liberate Italy, because he had his own armed volunteers behind
him. It is your privilege and honour to be the first to come forward and
organise India's National Army. By doing so, you have removed the last obstacle
in your path to freedom. Be happy and proud that you are the pioneers--the
vanguard--in such a noble cause. "15
He
exhorted them to rise to the occasion, sacrifice their all and fulfil the
aspirations of their countrymen. He himself felt great pride and honour on
taking up the charge of I.N.A. because it was the first real revolutionary army
of India.
Mr. Tojo,
the Japanese Premier, had very enthusiastically supported the cause of India's
freedom movement at each stage and it encouraged and inspired those who had
been working for her liberation. But for the spirited help of the Japanese
Govt., Indian National Army would not have come into existence and perhaps
India might not have achieved freedom in 1947. In other words, we can say that
but for the role played by I.N.A., the freedom of India might have been delayed
considerably. To encourage and reassure the Indian leadership and the soldiers
of I.N.A., Tojo opted to witness a parade of I.N.A. on 6th July, 1943. This
happening immediately after Netaji's taking over the charge and Tojo having
sent a very promising message, carried very important signals to all those who
were spearheading the Indian Independence Movement in South East Asia. Netaji
welcomed and assured Prime Minister Tojo in the following words,
"Your
Excellency, on behalf of the Indian National Army, I have great pleasure in
offering Your Excellency a most hearty welcome this morning. I desire to
express our profound appreciation of the great honour Your Excellency has done
us by spending so much of your valuable time in order to review our army. This
day will ever remain a red letter day in the history of the newly organised
Army of Free India. Your Excellency's presence among our soldiers today,
immediately after sending an inspiring message to the Indian Independence
League Conference yesterday, has given a powerful impetus to our revolutionary
struggle.
The Army
that stands before Your Excellency today knows that it will have to fight for
India's liberty. It is also conscious of the many difficulties that still beset
the path to victory and freedom. But this army is determined to achieve India's
liberty at the cost of any sacrifice. In this task the Army has the active
support of all Indians in East Asia, whose enthusiasm knows no bounds."16
This
shows that with the arrival of Netaji and his taking over the charge,
everything looked electrified and revolutionised. To those members of the
League and of I.N.A., who had lost some faith in the Japanese because of the
misunderstandings resulting in the disbanding of I.N.A. organised by Capt.
Mohan Singh, the presence of Mr. Tojo at the time of the inaugural parade of
the I.N.A., was a great morale booster and assurance. It also reflects the
quickness in the responses of the Japanese after Netaji's arrival. It added to
the stature, image, self-confidence and dynamism of Netaji. After taking over
the organisation, he started working for building up an atmosphere in which
each individual would feel involved in the freedom struggle and get ready for
making every possible sacrifice for the national cause.
He was
aware of the fact that in order to make it a mass movement and infuse new life
in it, he should involve the women also in it. On 12th July 1943, while
addressing the meeting of women section of the I.I.L. at Singapore, he
emphasised the significance of the role played by the Indian women in the
freedom struggle. In order to build up the confidence of the women and arouse
them for making some sacrifice, he reminded them about the sacrifices made by
the Indian women in the past. He believed that it was only through the ~tal
mobilisation of all the resources that India could be freed. He planned to
involve women also in the army. While addressing them he said,
"Sisters,
we had at one time conservative men amongst us who thought that women had
nothing to do with the national struggle, and that it was entirely a man's
affair. I hope that there are no such men in our midst today. On the contrary,
I am convinced that until and unless Indian women play their due part in the
national struggle, India can never hope to be free. And if I am so optimistic
today of our speedy emancipation, it is, because I am equally optimistic of the
part that Indian women will play in the coming struggle. "17
After
spending sometime on the organisation work, he left Singapore on 23rd July for
participating in the Independence day celebrations of Burma at Rangoon. Netaji
knew that he would have to launch his final assault on India through Burma.
Hence he made it a point to make the best use of this opportunity. While
addressing on the occasion of Burma's independence on 1st August, 1943, he said,
"The
independence of Burma in this momentus crisis has a twofold significance for
us. It shows, in the first place what a nation can achieve if it knows how to
seize an opportunity which history has offered. Secondly, just as the conquest
of India supplied the British with a jumping off ground for their attack on
Burma in the 19th century, similarly, the emancipation of Burma has supplied
the Indian Independence Movement in East Asia with a spring board for its
attack on Britain's army of occupation in India during the 20th century. "18
On his
way back from Rangoon, he visited Saigon on 9th August. There he conferred with
the Japanese Ambassador and army officers. He discussed the possibility of
launching an attack on India and tried to convince Field Marshal Terauchi about
the necessity of I.N.A. participation in the Indian campaign. Netaji believed
that without paying the price in blood, Indians would not deserve and earn the
right to claim independence. He wanted that the first drop of blood to be shed
on Indian soil must be that of a soldier of the I.N.A. On 26th August Maj. Gen.
T. Kuno Mura, Chief of Staff of Fifteenth Army, accompanied by Fuziwara visited
him. They shared with him the plan for Imphal operations. He felt very
enthusiastic about it and while talking, just dreamt of the scenes of the
battlefield. Those, who were present there, felt that he talked as if he were
already in the battlefield.
Though
the Japanese, on account of their fears and apprehensions, were not much
interested to involve I.N.A. in war operations yet Netaji insisted that
whatever scheme was formulated, I.N.A. must play its due role. He went to
Penang. He addressed 15,000 Indians and spoke to them for quite many hours. The
people there felt so much involved and moved that they donated two million
dollars. He kept on moving from one place to another, encouraging and inspiring
people for the cause of the nation, collecting men, money and material for his
mission. He didn't miss any opportunity which could help him in arousing nationalistic
feelings among his countrymen. In September 1943, he again visited Burma and
visited Rangoon specially with an idea of paying his homage to the last Indian
king Bahadhur Shah Zafar. He visited the Tomb of Bahadhur Shah Zafar and laid a
wreath. He described Bahadhur Shah Zafar as a symbol of India's resistance to
the Britishers in India. He donated a symbolic amount of Rs. 2.5 lakhs to the
President of Burma. He addressed the people assembled at the Tomb and concluded
by quoting the English translation of a couplet of Bahadhur Shah Zafar which is
as follows,
"As
long as the last particle of faith exists in souls of India's freedom fighters,
the sword of India shall continue to penetrate the heart of London."19
In this
way he availed of each opportunity and exploited each symbol of sacrifice for
India's freedom struggle.
Finally
he announced the formation of Provisional Govt. of Azad Hind. On 21st October
1943, Indians from all over Malaya and East Asia thronged Cathay Hall of
Singapore in thousands. It was an auspicious occasion emotionally surcharged by
the formation of the Govt. Netaji had to take the oath of allegiance to India
in the name of God. For a person who had been running from one end of the earth
to the other. the one who had burnt his youth to give warmth to his Motherland.
the one who had left his parents, brothers and sisters, wife and daughter, the
one who had been playing hide and seek with death for more than a decade, it
was the beginning of a new life and realisation of a dream. He knew how heavy
were the responsibilities entrusted by this oath. Inspite of his best efforts,
while taking the oath he could not retain and restrain the tears in his eyes.
Surcharged with emotions, he proceeded,
"In
the name of God, I take this sacred oath that to liberate India and the thirty
eight crores of my countrymen I, Subhash Chandra Bose, will continue this
sacred war of freedom till the last breath of my life.
I shall
remain always a servant of India and to look after the welfare of thirty eight
crores of my Indian brothers and sisters shall be for me my highest duty.
Even
after winning freedom, I will always be prepared to shed even the last drop of
my blood for the preservation of India's freedom."20
From the
oath taking ceremony it becomes quit clear how deeply he had taken each word of
the oath and how committed he was to his cause. After the oath taking ceremony,
while addressing the gathering, Netaji said,
"For
the first time in recent history, Indians abroad have also been politically roused
and united in one organisation. They are not only thinking and feeling in tune
with their countrymen at home, but are also marching in step with them, along
the path of Freedom....
It will
be the task of the Provisional Govt. to launch and to conduct the struggle that
will bring about the expulsion of the British and of their allies from the soil
of India. It will then be the task of the Provisional Govt. to bring about the
establishment of a permanent National Govt. of Azad Hind constituted in accordance
with the will of the Indian people and enjoying their confidence... The
Provisional Govt is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every
Indian. It guarantees religious liberty, as well as equal rights and equal
opportunities to all its citizens.....
In the
name of God, in the name of bygone generations who have welded the Indian
people into one nation and in the name of the dead heroes, who have bequeathed
to us a tradition of heroism and self-sacrifice-we call upon the Indian people
to rally round our banner and to strike for India's freedom. We call upon them
to launch the final struggle against the British and all their allies in India
and to prosecute that struggle with valour and perseverance and with full faith
in final victory-until the enemy is expelled from Indian soil and Indian people
are once again a Free Nation."21
On 23rd
October the Japanese Govt recognised the Provisional Govt of Azad Hind. Five
minutes past mid-night on 24th October, Provisional Govt. of Azad Hind declared
war on Britain and America. In a public meeting held in the ground opposite
Municipal building of Singapore, to a cheering crowd of more than 50,000
Indians, Netaji announced,
"We
have declared war because our strength has increased a hundred fold. I want you
to demonstrate to the world that you are resolved as one man to follow up this
declaration with action that will show to the world that you mean bloody war
when you declare war. The British know very well that I say what I mean and
that I mean what I say. So when I say war, I mean WAR-war to the finish-a war
that can only end in the freedom of India. "22
The war
having thus been declared, the preparation on war-footings had to be started.
He talked to the masses, to the soldiers, army officers, ladies and children to
contribute their share in this gigantic war. He had a very magnetic and
charming personality. Even his critics like Hugh Toye couldn't help admitting,
"His
personal charm, his vitality, his authority and his world view won him the real
allegiance of the Indian people in Asia. He swept people off their feet, there
were few who could stand back and consider whether he was taking them in the
direction and by means which their leaders in India would have approved. Nor
was that any longer an issue. He proclaimed his authority and they acclaimed
it"23
His
influence and appeal was not confined only to the young men but also the girls.
A large number of girls joined the Rani Jhansi Regiment and most of them
belonged to well to do families in the South East Asia. These girls had been
prepared for. very adventurous jobs. It is unfortunate that these brave and
death-defying daughters of Mother India did not get the opportunity to
sacrifice themselves at the altar of the Motherland. If even a few of them had
died in the war operations and their bodies fallen into the hands of advancing
Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army, it might have had a great
heart-changing effect on the Indian army soldiers and a few dead bodies of the
girls might have defeated the great army of British India.
At a time
when Netaji was busy In mobilising resources for his struggle, Tojo planned a
Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo on 5th and 6th November, 1943.
Accompanied by Gen. Chatterji and Mr. Bhonsle, his ministers, Netaji attended
Tokyo Conference. He attended this conference as a visitor because India was
not considered a part of Greater East Asia.These nations had assembled to
discuss their mutual problems and to work on a common strategy for the
upliftment of all the East Asian countries. Dr. Ba Maw, the President of Burma,
while addressing the august gathering, said,
"And
we must all be glad to know that Mr. S.C. Bose is now with us, prepared to
carry on the same struggle and not isolated but with a thousand million East
Asiatics behind him. I will emphasize the fact that there cannot be a Free Asia
without a Free India. I am speaking quite literally. For a hundred years Great
Britain pursued her colonial policy in Asia with Indian strength, with Indian
resources even in the West upto Singapore and Hong Kong in the East. It was
with the Indian man-power, Indian resources, Indian wealth that Great Britain
built her great, vast predatory empire."24
This was
the spirit in which the other countries were responding to the efforts and
appeals of Netaji. After this Netaji spoke and thanked all the East Asian
countries, particularly Japan which had done so much for the Asian resurgence.
He lauded the role of this Conference because its aim was to work for the
emancipation of the Asian people and not sharing the spoils of the war. He
spoke so impressively that every member of the Conference had to listen
attentively to his every word. After talking about the international, East
Asian and global issues, he commented about the struggle which he had
initiated. He said,
"I,
therefore, want to assure Your Excellencies, that come what may, no matter how
long and hard the struggle may be, no matter what the suffering and the
sacrifice involved may prove to be, we are determined to fight to the bitter
end, being fully confident of our final victory. But I have no illusions about
the magnitude of the task that awaits us. I do not minimise the strength of the
enemy. I claim to know the British people intimately and at first hand. I have
known them since I was a child of 5 and, knowing them so intimately, knowing
the strength and the weakness of the enemy in India, and knowing also our own
strength and weakness, I feel fully confident of our ultimate victory."25
Prime
Minister Tojo, after the speech of Bose, in very clear cut words announced his
determination to help the Indian Independence Movement. He said,
"Japan's
offer to give all help and support to India in her long cherished ambition to
achieve independence is already made clear in many declarations. And now that
we see that the Provisional Govt. of Free India has quickly established itself
and that the spirit of common purpose has united them so rapidly, Japan has
decided as a first step, to return in the near future the Indian territory of
Andaman and Nicobar islands, at present occupied by Japan to the Provisional
Govt. of Free India."26
In this
way during the conference Netaji could gain something quite substantial.
He had a
very busy schedule in Tokyo, ,always busy in meeting the people, the army
officers, political leadership and His Excellency, the Emperor, for giving him
such a great honour. After this Netaji visited many places, saw the industrial
growth and other activities in Japan which inspired and assured him about the possible
success of Japan in the war.
On 17th
November Netaji left Tokyo for Nanking where he stayed for four days. He had a
very busy schedule there as well. He attended many functions organised in his
honour and addressed the Indians there. He was able to motivate and inspire
many Indians to join the Indian National Army. After having a successful stay
in China, he proceeded to Manila, the capital of the Philippines on 22nd
November. He tried to raise funds there also but due to the meagre resources of
the Indians settled there, he didn't get much response. While addressing a
dinner party hosted in his honour by the President of the Philippines, he said,
"British
Imperialism is dead; however the United States is succeeding and replacing it
in all its mercilessness and injustice The world
must choose between the perpetuation of this Imperialism or establishment of a
new world based on justice and equality... To compromise with British
Imperialism is to compromise with slavery because it always oppressed people
economically, politically and socially."27
On his
way back from Manila to Singapore on 24th November 1943 he visited Saigon.
There, besides attending some formal functions, he met some senior army
officers and addressed a mass rally of Indian residents there.
He
realised that for the achievement of independence there was a need for total
mobilisation and immediately on his return to Singapore on 25th November, he
started his campaign. He called the meeting of the Indian merchants there and
appealed to them to make maximum contribution to the cause of Indian freedom
struggle. He tried to arouse their emotions, appealed to their conscience and
secured their enthusiastic voluntary support. He was a clear, straight-forward
leader who could give anything and who could demand anything. While addressing
to the Merchants he said,
"Legally
speaking there is no private property when a country is in a state of war. The
Govt. has absolute right over the lives and properties of its people during
such emergencies. We too are a free people with a free govt. If you think that
your wealth and possessions are your own, you are living in delusion. Every
life and every property belongs to the nation when it is involved in a war.
Your lives and your properties do not now belong to you; they belong to India
and India alone."28
The task
at hand was so important that he did not want any uncertainty or ambiguity
about it. He told them,
"I
have to liberate India and I shall make India independent by all means and at
any cost and I would appeal to you to realise that it is your duty too to
shoulder the burden whether it pleases you or not. If you want to evade the
issue, say plainly that you do not want independence, then as I have already
told you, a different path lies ahead of you.....
I assure
you, friends, I am not one who is accustomed to tall talking or making empty
threats. Whatever I say, I say after the fullest consideration and I mean what
I say. Even my enemies know that I seldom say what I do not mean. I have said
that: we have to get Indian Independence by all means and at any cost and that
we have to carry out Total Mobilisation voluntarily if possible, by compulsion
if necessary. And I would reiterate to you that I mean what I said. "29
He was
not in favour of keeping a middle course. He told them,
"You
could either be a friend or a foe. Do not think that only the Britishers are
our enemies. Everyone who helps the Britishers, everyone who refuses to help
our cause, is also our enemy because we are engaged in a life and death
struggle today. "30
As it
always happens most of the financially rich people are in the habit of evading
their responsibilities. They take maximum share of the economic prosperity and
try to discharge minimum responsibilities. He told such people that the
question of making sacrifice for the nation was not optional. Those who wanted
to share the prosperity in free India, would have to share the cost of
achieving that prosperity.
Wherever
he went, he got very enthusiastic response. In his collection campaigns in
Malaya he received about Rs. 5 crores, in Burma Rs. 15 crores and in Thailand
about Rs.l.5 crores. Whosoever listened to his passionate appeal, couldn't help
contributing one's maximum to the war funds of Azad Hind Govt. There were some
individuals who excelled in their contributions. Mr. Habib, a Muslim
millionaire of Rangoon donated all his property, estate and wealth which was
worth more than Rs. 1 crore in those days. Smt. Betai, a citizen of Rangoon
gave her jewellery and cash which was worth more than Rs. 50 lakhs in those
days. Besides these people many people from Bangkok, Saigon, Singapore and
Kuala Lumpur contributed Rs. 5 lakhs to Rs.l0 Lakhs each. This was not all. The
flower garlands presented to Netaji were auctioned. The auction of each of
these garlands fetched from Rs. l Lakh to Rs.7 Lakhs. In one case, a very
interesting and touching thing happened. When one of the garlands was being
auctioned, a Punjabi youth started the bid with Rs. l Lakh. This bid rose to
Rs. 7 Lakhs. On finding that he was going to lose the bid, trembling with
emotions, in a surcharged voice he shouted,
"I
give all my wealth--all that I have every pie that lawn. "31
Netaji
felt so much impressed that he held the young boy with both of his hands and
said
"Done--the
garland is yours. Patriotic men like you deserve the crown of glory, our force
shall win.' '32
The above
details are only about the people who were financially rich and who could
afford to make financial contributions. There were many instances where
emotionally surcharged and nationalistically saturated people sacrificed their
families at the altar of Motherland. In one such case Dr. Punnia of Perak,
offered his services as a doctor to the biggest civilian training centre in
East Asia at Tanjong Rambutan and gave all his medical equipment and medicines
to the hospital. The stock of their medicines was so big that it did not
exhaust even long after the surrender in 1945. The great doctor died while
serving the Motherland. His wife acted as a nurse, his daughter joined the Rani
of Jhansi Regiment and his son joined the I.N.A. as a second lieutenant. In
this way there are many glorious examples of those who sacrificed their all for
the Motherland at the call of Netaji. On 10th December Netaji visited
Indonesia. There he visited Djakarta, Sura-baya, Borneo and Sumatra. At all
these places, as usual he tried to involve the people of Indian origin in the
task of freedom struggle.
On
returning from there he proceeded to Andaman and Nicobar Islands for formally
taking over the charge of those islands. He appointed Lt. Col. A.D. Longanadhan
as Chief Commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Though the area of
those Islands was not big yet it was of a great symbolic importance for the
Indians. It was of special importance because these Islands were being used as
the centres of prison for Indian revolutionaries. The liberation of these
islands marked a symbolic end of the British tyranny and oppression. Moreover
for any govt. in exile, to have a control on even a small piece of land is of a
great moral and legal importance. Besides this, it was an evidence of the fact
that the Japanese would keep their promise of handing over the liberated
territories to the Indians.
After
hoisting the Indian Tri-colour on the liberated islands of Andaman and Nicobar,
he proceeded to Burma on 7th Jan. 1944. Burma was to act as the springboard for
the army operations in India. The headquarters of the Provisional Govt. of Free
India and the supreme command of the Indian National Army were shifted to
Burma. The preparations for the offence were .in full swing. The I.N.A. ranks
and the leadership of Azad Hind was bubbling with enthusiasm for action. The
presence of Netaji so near to the boundaries of India was of special importance
for the Indians. Mr. S.A. Ayer, the Minister of pPublicity and Propaganda
commented about the situation,
"Netaji
now stands at the Eastern gate of India at the head of I.N.A. This Army of
Liberation impatiently awaits his word of command to fire the shot that will
open the campaign; the report of that shot will echo and re-echo throughout the
length and breadth of free India and that will be the signal for an India-wide
uprising against the British; only the unimaginative British can be blind to
their present perilous position in India.' '33
He worked
day and night to build the morale of the Indian masses and I.N.A. soldiers. He
always kept his engagements and for that he could bear any hardship. Japanese
in fact analysed his personality through his activities. An officer Maj.
Takahashi, sent the following report to his govt.,
"The
Indian leader appeared to me to be a superman. During the three weeks of an
inspection tour, we had to replace three A.D.C. 's. They were all overcome with
exhaustion. S.C. Bose worked 24 hours of the day without rest. meeting local
Indians and inspecting troops and facilities. No normal person could share his
workload."34
In this
way he prepared his men for the decisive war against the British Indian Govt.
for the liberation of his Motherland. After more than two decades of dreaming,
he found himself just on the threshold of most dynamic action for the
achievement of India's Independence. He had not to wait for long for action.
I.N.A., hand in hand with the Japanese army, was to invade India soon.
CHAPTER VIII
Offence, Retreat and Venture into Unknown
The year
1944 was the most eventful and action packed year of I.N.A. and Netaji's life.
The stage was set for action. I.N.A. soldiers had been trained for the war and
mentally prepared to make the sacrifice for nation's independence, a lot of
money had been collected for the war purposes, and an atmosphere had been
created in which all the Indians in South East Asia were bubbling with
enthusiasm and fired with the spirit of adventure and optimism. Netaji
discussed the plan of I.N.A. participation on the war operations. Though
numerically I.N.A. was much smaller than the Japanese army yet its
participation was of a great symbolic and strategic value. The I.N.A.'s first
division had three brigades-Subhash Brigade under Colonel Shah Nawaz; Gandhi
Brigade under Colonel I.J. Giani; and Azad Brigade under Colonel Gulzara Singh.
He kept on very frequently meeting his soldiers and officers to boost their
morale. While bidding them farewell for the front on 4th February, 1944, Netaji
said,
"There,
there in the distance-beyond the river, beyond those hills, lies the promised
land, the soil from which we sprang-the land to which we shall now return.
Hark, India is calling, India's metropolis is calling, three hundred and eighty
million of our countrymen are calling. Blood is calling to blood.
Get up,
we have no time to lose. Take up your arms. There, in front of you, is the road
that our pioneers have built. We shall march along that road. We shall march
our way through the enemy's rank or if God wills, we shall die a martyr's
death. And in our last sleep we shall kiss the road that will bring our Army to
Delhi. The road to Delhi is the road to freedom-Chalo Dilli. "1
The
Japanese were very well prepared and Lt. Gen. Mutaguchi was so confident of the
success of army that while bidding ,farewell to his soldiers, he said,
"See
you again in Imphal at the celebration of the Emperor's birthday on 29.4.1944.
"2
Netaji
had two pronged strategy i.e. invasion from outside and creating revolt within
the ranks of the British Indian Army. He kept on issuing appeals to the Indians
to come to the help of I.N.A. and desert the British Indian Army. In one of
such appeals., he said,
"Sisters
and brothers in India! This is the golden opportunity for you to fulfil your
long-cherished aspiration for freedom. If you rise to the occasion and do your
duty, freedom will be yours before long. In this momentous crisis, India
expects everyone to do his or her duty. "3
In another
appeal, he said,
"We
call upon all patriotic Indian men, women and children, our brothers and
sisters in India, to throw themselves whole-heartedly into this fight for
India's independence. We call upon every Indian to destroy the AngloAmerican
war effort in India by systematic sabotage, and thereby hasten the successful
conclusion of the war for our country's freedom.
We call
upon our brothers, Indian soldiers and officers in Britain's army to refuse to
fight any longer for their despotic rulers, and to come and actively join our
ranks. We call upon Indians working in various departments of the British
service to render all possible help to us in this sacred fight.' '4
On 4th
Feb., 1944 the campaign started on Arakan fronts and on 15th March, 1944 campaign
started on the Kohima-Imphal fronts. Initially the joint operation of the
I.N.A. and Japanese Army was very successful. Both the armies marched forward
at a very fast speed. On 18th March, 1944 the I.N.A. crossed the Indo-Burma
border to enter the Indian soil. For any revolutionary army with its
headquarter in exile there couldn't be a more important and solemn occasion
than the liberation of a part of the homeland by paying the price of blood.
Quite a large number of the enemy troops were killed or captured. A large
number of vehicles and huge stock of arms were also captured. By 6th April 1944
Kohima had been captured. The Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued the
following communique on 6th April;
"Japanese
troops, fighting side by side with the Indian National Army captured Kohima
early on 6th April."5
After the
fall of Kohima, Imphal was the centre of attack. The fifteenth division of
Japanese Army was advancing from North, the thirty-third division was advancing
from East. In order to have better coordination of the troops on front and to
boost their morale, Netaji shifted his headquarters to Maymya near Mandlay. A
very fierce battle was fought for Imphal. It appeared almost imminent to both
the Japanese as well as the British forces that Patel aerodrome of Imphal would
be taken over by the I.N.A. and the Japanese. In fact for some time a part of
it had been occupied by the I.N.A. and Japanese.To the Allied also it appeared
to be a question of life and death. They made it their Stalingrad. Lord Mountbatten
was horrified to see the fast deteriorating situation. Because of an injury in
his eye it was bandaged. He felt so heavily strained that he almost ordered the
doctor to remove the bandage. Lord Mountbatten described the situation in the
following words:
"The
accident could hardly have come at a worse time. I had to spend five days in
the American Forward Hospital, with both eyes bandaged, in complete blindness.
And just at that moment the Japanese attacked again. They quickly cut off our
IV Corps in the Imphal plain, and a very serious situation developed. I
persuaded the doctor to unbandage my eyes, and let me out of hospital. I
immediately flew to Army Air Headquarters, and there took one of the most
serious decisions of my whole time as Supreme Commander."6
In fact
Mountbatten had taken a great risk of employing the American aircrafts without
the permission of the President Roosevelt. To quote the things in his own
words,
"On
my own responsibility, I took 30 American transport aircraft off the China
supply routes, and use them to fly an infantry division into Imphal. This was
dead against President Roosevelt's explicit instructions, and although the
division was vitally important in the battle of Imphal, it was even more
important not to lose the President's trust. So this time I was really sticking
my neck out. But Roosevelt was a man of vision and he accepted the situation.
"7
Though
the Japanese were very well prepared for all the eventualities yet they had not
anticipated that the Allied would be able to manage any large scale air-lift.
But for this adventurous air-lift of the British troops to Imphal, the fate not
only of this battle but also of the whole war might have been different. At a
time when everything was going so well though tough, the monsoon started on 1st
June 1944. These rains marred and sealed the fate of I.N.A. and Japanese
success in Imphal. The roads were washed away, the supply lines failed
miserably, the malaria intensified, the condition appeared to be chaotic, the
enemy received additional supply and the condition of the Japanese and I.N.A.
became miserable. Without food to eat, medicines to cure the disease and the
failure of communication made the condition so horrible that the seige of
Imphal had to be lifted and retreat from the advance position. It was one of
the most heroically fought battles but the results were most disastrous for the
Japanese and the Indians. The Indian National Army soldiers fought extremely
well. Those Japanese generals, who were reluctant to involve the I.N.A. in
operations, were surprised to see the excellent and gallant performance of the
soldiers of the I.N.A. The role of the I.N.A. on Imphal front before the
retreat has been summed up by Shah Nawaz Khan in the following words,
"During
this period the I.N.A. with much inferior equipment and an extremely poor
supply system was able to advance as much as 150 miles into the Indian
territory. While the I.N.A. was on the offensive, there was not a single
occasion on which our forces were defeated on the battle-field, and there was
never an occasion when the enemy despite their overwhelming superiority in men
and material, was able to capture any post held by the I.N.A. On the other hand
there were very few cases where the I.N.A. attacked British posts and failed to
capture them."8
In spite
of the grim situation on the battle-field, in order to keep the morale high and
create more resources for the war purposes, 'Netaji week' was celebrated in
Rangoon. Many festivities were organised. The Japanese after having suffered
heavy losses had resolved to withdraw on 8th July. The I.N.A. was also asked to
withdraw but the soldiers of I.N.A. were not prepared to withdraw. When asked
to do so by the Japanese, they replied,
"The
Japanese can retreat because Tokyo lies that way; our goal... Red Fort,
Dclhi... 1ies ahead of us. We have orders to go to Delhi. There is no going
back for us."9
Netaji
was also not in a mood to retreat. He wanted that they should fight to the last
man. Many historians and Military strategists and political commentators have
questioned Netaji's wisdom in letting his people die for want of orders to
withdraw. They did not understand that Netaji's army was a revolutionary army
and the revolutionary armies every where have the similar means and almost
identical end. On 10th July 1944, while complimenting the spirit of his army,
he said,
"Revolutionary
armies every where in the world have to fight under conditions similar to ours,
but they, nevertheless, triumph at the end. Their strength does not come from
beer and rum, tinned pork and bully beef but from faith and sacrifice, heroism
and fortitude. "10
Japanese
suffered a heavy casualty. Out of 2 lakh 20 thousand troops sent for the Indian
campaign, not more than 70 thousand survived. Japanese were suffering losses on
all the fronts. The Saipan island was completely annihilated on 17th July 1944
and this resulted in the resignation of Premier Tojo. At this time, ten days
after the Japanese withdrawal, the withdrawal of I.N.A. started. The study of
the geography of Burma reveals how difficult it is to retreat in the rainy
season. The whole area becomes a big marshy land with knee deep slush on the
roads. With no food, no means of transporting the men, and heavy rain, malaria
and dysentery, no medicines, no hope of victory or life, dragging their tired
and blistered feet through the forests of Burma, presented the most ghastly
sight and to those, who had to undergo these experiences, it was virtually
burning themselves alive in the fire and passion of patriotism. Many soldiers
were washed away by the flooded rivers, many got stuck in the knee deep
slushing roads and died there. Those who fell ill, exhausted from all sides,
died on the way. Many, who survived, at times had to eat grass and dead horses
to keep themselves alive. It is really remarkable that many of the soldiers of
I.N.A., instead of surrendering, opted to meet painful and torturous deaths.
All men
are never alike and so were the soldiers of I.N.A. Unfortunately some of them
deserted at the most crucial hours and that caused I.N.A. very heavy losses in
terms of moral strength and war results. Though the first battle was lost, yet
the war had not been lost. Netaji in fact believed 'Only that army is defeated
which thinks it has been defeated'. Japanese had not changed their attitude
towards the I.N.A. in spite of the miserable failure. Even the new Prime
Minister Mr Koiso gave Netaji assurance of complete help in future. So much so
that in October 1944 Japan decided to confer the highest honour 'The first
Order of the Rising Sun' on Netaji but he turned down this offer saying,
"I
would like to accept it together with my men when we have won
independence."11
On 1st
November 1944, Netaji accompanied by Col. Giani, Col. Chatterji and Cot. Habibur
Rehman visited Tokyo. He was very warmly received in Japan. The newspapers gave
his visit very wide coverage. He was described as the light-house for the
Indians. Even his critics like Hugh Toye in his book 'The Springing Tiger'
wrote,
"Everywhere
his presence was welcomed, for there was about this dedicated man an awe under
a passionate sincerity which could inspire devotion and love. "12
With the
passage of time the position of Japanese army went on deteriorating. The
British Indian Army was advancing menacingly. The I.N.A. was playing a gallant
role in checking the advance of British Indian troops in Burma. Many of the
I.N.A. soldiers had given such exemplary performance as stunned and surprised
the Japanese also. Unfortunately I.N.A. also had many dark horses which damaged
its image and cost it heavily. When Netaji learnt about the treachery of five
staff officers of the second division of the I.N.A., he was completely shocked
and didn't meet anyone for quite many days.
By 28th
April, 1945 the situation had so much deteriorated that Japanese decided to
withdraw from Burma. Since Burma was acting as the spring board of I.N.A.
action, Netaji was not interested to withdraw from there. He wanted to stay as
close to the Indian border as possible. The Ministers of Azad Hind Govt.,
senior officers of I.N.A. and the Japanese officers prevailed upon him to
retreat so that another attack might be organised at some appropriate occasion.
He was left with no option but to withdraw. Before leaving Burma, he addressed
the compatriots in the following words:
"It
is with a heavy heart that I am leaving Burma, the scene of many heroic battles
you have fought since February 1944 and are still fighting. In Imphal and Burma
we have lost the first round of our fight for independence. But if is only the
first round. We have many more rounds to fight I am a born optimist and I shall
not admit defeat under any circumstances. Your brave deeds in the battles
against the enemy on the plains of Imphal, the hills and jungles of Arakan and
the oil field area and other localities in Burma will live in the history of
our struggle for independence for all time... My unshakable faith in India's
liberation remains unaltered. I am leaving in your safe hands our national
tricolour and the best traditions of India warriors. I have no doubt whatsoever
that you, the vanguard of India's liberation, will sacrifice everything, even
life itself, to uphold India's national honour so that your comrades who will
continue to fight elsewhere may have before them your shining example to
inspire them at all times.
If I had
my own way, I would have preferred to stay with you in adversity and share with
you the sorrows of temporary defeat. But on the advice of my ministers and high
ranking officers, I have to leave Burma in order to continue the struggle for
emancipation.
.... I
appeal to you, in conclusion to cherish the same optimism as myself and to
believe, like myself, that the darkest hour always precedes the dawn. India
shall be free and before long..."12(a)
After
giving this inspiring message to his compatriots, he had to undertake the
humiliating and painful retreat. He left the charge of I.N.A. personnel in
Burma with Maj. Gen. Logandhan. Some girls of Rani Jhansi Regiment were still
in Burma. Netaji decided to personally accompany them till they reach safe
place. He, along with some officers and men of I.N.A. and the girls of Rani
Jhansi Regiment, left in four cars and twelve trucks from Rangoon on 24th
April. Their first halt was at Pegu. When they were nearing it, they heard a
series of explosions. It appeared as if Pegu had already fallen to the
Britishers. To ascertain the exact position, an advance party was sent. On
learning that everything was O.K. for the time being, the caravan moved ahead. It
was a very adventurous and death defying movement. The enemy aeroplanes were
hovering allover and bombing their targets. They reached Moulmein road on 25th
April. The delay of just one more day would have sealed their fate as the very
next day the area was captured by the Britishers.
Most of
the movements had to be done in the night because of the danger from the air
attacks. When the caravan was on the move, Netaji's car fell into a trench
about 8 ft. deep but fortunately he was not hurt The journey was resumed
immediately and the caravan reached Waw a little after the midnight. On
reaching the river, arrangements were made to cross the vehicles across it but
since large size ferries were not available, only some of the vehicles could be
taken across. Everybody wanted Netaji to be the first to cross the river, but
he was the last to do so. He personally supervised most of this work. The rains
had damaged the roads which not only slowed down the speed but also made the
travelling very hazardous. Some of the trucks and cars go~ stuck in the mud and
had to be abandoned. Because of it, the remaining journey had to be covered on
fool Along with the girls of Rani Jhansi Regiment and some I.N.A. officers, he
walked 16 km. up to the bank of the river Sittang. The Japanese had put up a
very strong defence across the river and it would have been comparatively very
secure across the river. On this river also they had to abandon some of their
vehicles. They had to resume the journey on fool and each one of them had to cany
a load of 20 kg. They had to walk a distance of 24 kms and on 1.5.1945, they
reached Moulmein. In spite of physical exhaustion and blistered feet, he did
not sleep for more than two hours a day. He believed in inspiring confidence
through self-suffering and sharing the difficulties of his soldiers. Mr. S.A.
Ayer, who accompanied Netaji during these days, expressed his observations in
the following words :
"I
witness during that three week' perilous but memorable retreat in the jungles
of Burmese-Thai border, the true greatness of Netajinthat magnifIcent greatneSS
which took within the sweep of his personality, a soldier, a statesman, a born
leader, and most important of all the highest qualities of a humanist
man."13
On
feeling assured about the safety of girls, from Moulmein he arranged to send
them to Bangkok by train. Unfortunately because of some problems the train had
to be abandoned and the girls were to walk another 25 km to reach Bangkok.
While at Moulmein he received the news of Germany's surrender. It had worsening
effect on him. Though the effect of the repeated debacle and crisis had its
effect on his mind still he did not let them get reflected on his face. He
maintained his morale quite high and responsibly performed all his duties. At
each halt he moved among his people, talked to them, looked after them and
tried to inspire confidence in them.
Though
the I.N.A. had to withdraw from Burma because of the heavy pressure of
advancing Allied Army, yet Netaji had left behind quite many spirited and
inspired Indians who gave the Britishers a little taste of the atmosphere which
Netaji had successfully built in South East Asian countries. When the
victorious British Indian soldiers entered Rangoon, they were greeted with the
slogans of 'Netaji Zinda bad' , . Azad Hind Zindabad'. Not only this the girls
of the Rani Jhansi Regiment behaved with still greater courage and
determination during interrogation. The interrogating officers wanted that
these girls should not salute the photograph of Netaji but they refused to
oblige. The interrogating officers tried to persuade them to say that they were
forced to join I.N.A., but they refused to say so. The attitude and conduct of
these girls gave an idea to the Britishers of the impact which Netaji's personality
had left on the Indians there.
After the
retreat from Burma, Netaji kept on thinking and planning the course of action
which might have to be followed in the future. By this time it had become
absolutely clear that in the near future it would not be possible for the
I.N.A. to try to liberate India through Burma. The various schemes of trying
through China and Russia were considered. It was planned to have some basis in
China and operate from there. Efforts were made to contact the Russians also
and try through them. In the meanwhile the situation deteriorated very fast and
the dropping of Atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6th and 9th August 1945
respectively, struck the last blows to Netaji's hopes. It was around 2 P.M. on
13th August, 1945 that Dr. Lakshmayya and Sh. Ganapathi brought a very nerve
breaking and sensational information of Japanese decision to surrender. Since
Netaji was completely and absolutely dependent on the Japanese for his mission
and activities, this' news should have completely rocked him and caused
irrecoverable depression and frustration to him. The idea of ultimate defeat
for a person, who had staked his everything, life, family and career, and was
very far away from his Motherland, could have proved fatal and suicidal. The person
like Adolf Hitler, one of the strongest, most ambitious and victorious
dictators, cracked under the strain of defeat and along with his wife committed
suicide. So far as Netaji is concemd, this news did not adversely affect him in
any way. It appears that he had already foreseen the catastrophe and prepared
himself for the occasion. Mr. S.A. Ayer, one of the Ministers of Netaji's
cabinet, who was present at the time of receiving the news, has reported that
Netaji could manage to smilingly receive this information and commented,
"So
that is that. Now what next. "14
It is an
irony of fate that such strong people as steer the destinies of the nation, are
normally alone and they are not generally fortunate to have the company of such
people as should provide him with the strength to face such like hard
situations. They have to gather strength to bear not only their own strain but
also that of the fellow persons. At times such people are supposed to command
even from the grave. There are instances in the history when in the war, the
news of the death of the commander and king was not communicated to the
soldiers so that they might not get demoralised. Netaji was cautious of the
role which he was required to play and with a view to reducing the strain of the
people around him, said,
"Well,
don't -you see that we are the only people who have not surrendered. "15
Standing
in the ruins of his dreamland, he was thinking of his next step. Since long
this dreamer had the dream of attempting to liberate India through Russia. In
fact during his third visit to Tokyo he had tried 10 contact the Russian
Ambassador. He had requested the Japanese Govt. to help him in contacting the
Govt. of Russia but the Govt. of Japan had refused to oblige him.
At a time
when he was busy in chalking out the strategy for future, trying to trace some
silver lining in the dark clouds, a special Japanese envoy Mr. Negishi came to
him with a letter from Japanese Govt. conveying him the Japanese terms of
surrender. He was appealed to reach Saigon at the earliest possible so that he
might be evacuated to a comparatively safer place. He was not willing to leave
his soldiers at their own or at the mercy of comparatively less responsible
people. He insisted on staying back and sharing the fate of his soldiers but
the senior officers of the army and ministers prevailed on him to accept the
offer so that he may be able to keep the movement alive and keep burning the
torch of India's freedom struggle. He agreed to convey to the Japanese Govt.
the following message,
"Along
with the trusted persons of my cabinet, I would like to go to the Soviet Union.
If it is necessary I shall enter the Soviet Union alone. In that case, I
request the Japanese Govt. to allow any of my cabinet members to take charge.
"16
From this
communication to the Govt. of Japan, it is absolutely clear that his only ray
of hope under the circumstances, was Russia. After receiving the Japanese
decision to surrender, hectic activities and consultations took place at
Singapore. Detailed discussions were held in the round-the-clock meetings of
the ministers and senior military officers. It was decided to discharge all the
civilians and I.N.A. personnel. All the discharged persons were given amount
equal to their six months salary. He had to work hard to prevail on the Ranis
of Rani Jhansi Regiment to go back to their families. Besides this, another
important issue had to be decided before leaving Singapore. Thousands of I.N.A.
soldiers had laid down their lives in the battle-field and there were thousands
others who had donated their everything to the war efforts of I.N.A. Netaji
planned to leave behind a befitting war memorial for the I.N.A. Cot. C,J.
Strancey came to Netaji on 15th August and presented to him the different
proposed designs of the Shaheed Smark. Netaji approved one of the blue prints
and told him that it should be completed before the Allied armies enter
Singapore. In the meanwhile some emmissaries had been sent to China and Vietnam
to find the possibility of seeking a sanctuary. Somehow no message came from
these places. The delay in his departure worried the people at Saigon and they
sent Mr. Hachia and Lt. Gen. lsoda, the head of Hikari Kikan to Singapore.
During the discussion with Netaji Gen. Isoda warned him against the danger of
his not being properly treated by the Russians and even of the positive dangers
to his life but he, the one who had been undertaking the risks all his life,
this warning did not affect in any way. He told Gen. lsoda,
"I
have no illusions and I am prepared to face the worst, execution and
imprisonment, by the Russians. I wish to go and take a chance even if there is
the slightest possibility. I request the Japanese Govt. to assist me." 17
Without
waiting for the reply from the Japanese High Command, on 16th August 1945,
after leaving Singapore under the charge of Gen. Bhonsle, along with Cot.
Habibur Rehman, Cot. Pritam Singh, Sh. S.A. Ayer and Mr. Negishi, a Japanese
interpreter, they reached Bangkok on the same day at 15.30 hours. Deliberations
and discussions with the senior army and Govt. officers continued throughout
the night. Along with Cot. Habibur Rehman, Maj Abid Hasan, Cot. Pritam Singh,
Cot. Gulzara Singh, Mr. S.A. Ayer, Mr. Deb Nath Das, Gen. Isoda, Mr. Hachiya
and Mr. Nigeshi, he left in two planes on 17th August 1945 at 07-30 hours. Oil
rcaching Saigon at 10.45 hours they learnt that there was no arrangement for
the further transportation of this party to its destination. Efforts were made
to contact Field Marshal Terauchi. He was having very good friendly relations
with Netaji. In spite of the instructions of the Japanese High Command to the
contrary, he agreed to let Netaji go to Russia. Since no aeroplane was
available to carry Netaji and his party, a seat was offered in a bomber which was
proceeding to Manchuria. Netaji declined to go alone. On being pressurised and
pursuaded, another seat was offered. It was decided to accept the offer. Netaji
decided to take Cot. Habibur Rehman with him.
The plane
is reported to have left Saigon at 17.15 hours and reached Tourane at 19.45
hours. The tearn had its stay at Tourane and next morning it is claimed to have
left for Taihoku. It is reported to have reached there at 2 P.M. and left about
half an hour later. This is the alleged place and time where an accident, nay
an incident, to be more true a drama took place which has remained a mystery
till today. It has remained a mystery because sufficient sincere efforts were
not made to solve this mystery. The efforts were not made because those who had
to make the efforts did not want to solve this mystery. Who were those persons,
what were their motives, is discussed in detail in the following chapters.
CHAPTER IX
Indian National Army On Trial
William
Cullen Bryant wrote:
"Oh
Freedom, thou are not as poets dream
A fair
young girl with light and delicate limbs
and wavy
tresses. A bearded man
Armed to
the teeth art thou.
One
mailed hand
Grasps
the broad shield and
one the
sword; Thy brow
Glorious
in beauty though it be, is scarred
With
tokens of old wars... "1
For most
of the time the Indian freedom struggle was conducted by those who believed
that freedom could be won without shedding blood but towards the end of the
struggle, another chapter was opened by Netaji who believed that without paying
the price in blood, freedom cannot be won. Mr. K.K.V. Casey once opined,
"Wars
frequently begin ten years before the first shot is fired."2
Same
appears to be true about I.N.A. also. Since long Netaji had nursed this belief
that for the liberation of India, an armed struggle is essential. It was with
this idea in his mind that he had organised Indian National Army. His slogan
was 'Onwards to Delhi'. Even after having lost the last 'battle and with almost
no hope after the surrender of Japan, he had the courage to say,
"The
roads to Delhi arc many and Delhi still remains our goal. The sacrifices of
your immortal comrades and yourselves will certainly achieve their fulfilment.
There is no power on earth that can keep India enslaved. India shall be free
before long."3
Netaji's
dream came true. His I.N.A. reached Delhi though not in the form and the way in
which Netaji wanted it to reach but still it reached. The Britishers who had
stopped the armed invasion of I.N.A., themselves brought I.N.A. to its
destination i.e. Red Fort in New Delhi. What Netaji could not himself do, was
done by the Britishers. The Britishers were extremely hostile to the I.N.A. and
wanted to take strict action against them. The Govt. decided to try these
people for their offences against the British Indian Govt The Govt. decided to
divide them into three categories: White, Grey and Black. Those who had joined
the I.N.A. with the intention of deserting it or sabotaging it, were classed as
White and restored to their former positions. Those who joined I.N.A. because
of pressure or misguidance, were described as 'Grey' and were to be treated
with mercy and generosity. They were to be summarily tried, dismissed and
released. The Black were those who had consciously joined the I.N.A. They had
to be tried, dismissed and in most of the cases their death penalty was to be
commuted for short term imprisonments. The Britishers decided to try these
I.N.A. soldiers in Red Fort. Through these trials, the Britishers wanted to
subdue the Indians and show to the world that Britain had the strength to
cripple any revolutionary tendencies or armed rebellion against their
authority. Fortunately for India and unfortunately for the Britishers, they
took too long to realise that they had committed the most serious blunder of
their ruling period in India.
They
picked up three I.N.A. officers Maj Gen. Shah Nawaz Khan, Lt. Col. P.K. Sehgal
and Lt. Col. G.S. Dhillon for the trial. A charge sheet was prepared against
them and the date of trial was fixed for 5th November, 1945. Before the arrival
of I.N.A. prisoners in India, the Indian masses were completely ignorant about
the organisation and existence of I.N.A. In fact the Indian leaders who had
information about the activities of I.N.A. opted to maintain silence and this silence
proved very costly to the nation. It was not a simple matter that the Indian
masses were unaware of the sacrifices which were being made by their fellow
countrymen in the battlefields of Kohima, Imphal and elsewhere. A detailed
account of the reasons behind the silence of leadership and ignorance of the
masses will be discussed in the following chapters. For the time being let us
return to I.N.A. trials. The credit for highlighting the role, played by I.N.A.
goes to the press which gave wide publicity to the arrival of I.N.A. prisoners
in India. When the Indian masses learnt about the role played by I.N.A., they
warmly responded to the call for defending the I.N.A. soldiers. The latter were
treated as heroes and their adventures and accomplishments were magnified and
glorified. The public response was so warm, in fact heated and enthusiastic,
that the Congress leadership, which had opted to sleep over the matter, was
left with no option but to come out of the hybernation. The Congress decided to
defend the I.N.A. soldiers in the trial and appointed a Defence Committee. The
team of advocates was to be headed by Sh. Bhulabhai Desai, the leading advocate
of the country. Besides him there were many distinguished barristers on the
panel. They included the persons like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Pt. J.L. Nehru.
According to Col. P.K. Sehgal, one of the undertrials, Mr. Btiulabhai Desai was
not appointed by the Congress Committee and added that the Congress adopted him
after he had been engaged by former's father.
The
charge sheet against the accused was waging war against the king and committing
civil offences of murder and abetment to murder. These were really serious
offences and there had to be heavy punishment for these. The defence counsels
worked very hard to prepare a strong defence and in order to prove that the
actions of the accused were justified, the counsels contended that the Govt. of
Azad Hind was a duly organised, established and recognised Govt. It had all the
prerequisites to be a legitimate govt. It had an area of 15000 sq. miles under
its direct control. This govt. had resources of its own and the people had
donated more than Rs. 20 crores to this govt. It had civil and army gazette of
its own. Mr. Desai contended,
"Having
regard to the condition in which this Free Govt. of India had been formed and
was functioning, it was entitled to make war and it did make war for the
purpose of liberating this country. That is the first and the main issue before
the Court. The Court is trying civil offences under the Indian Penal Code, and
there are two ways of looking at this question. One is that when two States
declare a war and I may assume for the purpose of this argument, because. I
cannot do more than place evidence before this Court for its acceptance, that
the condition in which the new Indian state found itself, it was in a position
to declare war and having declared war, in so far as any acts in the
prosecution of that war are concerned, they are outside the pale of Municipal
Law.'"
Besides
this the actions of the accused were legitimate and justified even in
accordance with the international law. There are certain acts which are not
permissible in the Municipal law but are permissible under the International
law provided the acts are in pursuance of the execution of orders of a
legitimate authority. About the legitimacy and nature of Azad Hind Govt., Mr.
K.N. Katju wrote,
"On
the arrival of Sri S.C. Bose in Singapore in July 1943, the Indian National
Movement took a definite concrete shape. There was immense enthusiasm and
support of Indians of all communities behind S.C. Bose. By common consent a new
Indian National State was formed. Subhash Chandra Bose was by common consent
elected to be its Head. He owed allegiance to this State. He had a government
consisting of many Ministers, and again all swore allegiance to the newly
formed State. Provisional Free Govt. of India, was formed. An army, the I.N.A.,
was organised, equipped and trained in strict accordance with Military Law as
obtaining in other countries in Europe and America. This new State declared war
on Britain and America. It was recognised as an Independent State by many
powers who were then fighting the British and it" Allies... The
Provisional Govt has its own funds and resources, and subsequently acquired its
own territories. From 1944 it engaged in active war-like operations against the
British. It took part in the Arakan Campaign in 1944; it fought in Burma in
1945."5
In this
way first of all it was established that I.N.A. was a duly formed army working
under a unified command having its own flag, insignia, rules of conduct and
everything which was required to enable it to enjoy the immunities granted by
International Law. International Law extends even to the civil wars and the
group of those people who fight under a unified command and for some definite
objectives. In the case of I.N.A. the problem was that the British Govt.
treated them as rebels of the British Indian Army. The charge against them was
that they had violated the oath of allegiance towards the king. The defence
counsels argued that the Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army had dual
allegiance. The choice before them was whether or not to place their allegiance
for their Motherland above the allegiance for the foreign rulers. The Indians
were justified in breaking their oath of allegiance for the British king when
the question of allegiance for India's independence was involved. Mr. Winston
Churchill, the former Prime Minister of England, had also justified the right
to rebel. In a speech given in the British Parliament on 14th April 1937, he
had said,
"When
I hear my Right Hon. friend opposite speak of rebels, I must remind him that,
sitting there as he does in the seat of the Wings, he is departing from Wing
principles. The sacred right of rebellion was one of their first doctrines. In
regard to liberal statesman, there the Right Hon. Gentleman sits, the successor
to Mr. Gladstone, striving to uphold the great principles for which his party
stands. But what was Mr. Gladstone's record? He was a strong supporter of
rebels. He was a strong supporter of the rebels in the war of American
secession. There, we had a civil war in which the rebels were not only rebels
but were slave owners... Therefore, before one takes the view that rebels are
like mad dogs to be put down and shot at sight we should remember these
things... If we search the history of the 19th century we shall find many cases
where British Govt. have actually espoused the cause of rebels. The Hon. Member
(Mr. Maxton) leader of the Clydeside Party, with. the customary candour and
frankness, made no bones about supporting rebels. He declared that the question
was whether or not they were rebelling for the thing you wanted."6
In this
way we see that the civilized world permits the right to rebel. Even if the
acts of I.N.A. were in violation of the oath of allegiance, it were justified
because all the acts of I.N.A. were aimed at the liberation of India under the
commands ora duly formed Govt. All the speeches of Netaji and all the orders of
the I.N.A. make it absolutely clear !hat everything was done with the aim of
winning independence for the country. In one of the special orders of the day,
Netaji S.C.. Bose, the Supreme Commander of the Indian National Army, conveyed,
"I
regard myself as the servant of 38 crore of my countrymen, who profess
different religious faiths. I am determined to discharge my duties in such a
manner that the interests of these 38 croces may be safe in my hands and that
every single Indian will have reason to put complete trust in me. It is only on
the basis of undiluted nationalism and of perfect justice and impartiality that
India's Army of Liberation can be built up.
In the
coming struggle for the emancipation of our Motherland, for the establishment
of Govt. of Free India, based on the goodwill of 38 crores of Indians and for
the creation of a permanent army which will guarantee Indian Independence for
all time, the Azad Hind Fauj has a vital role to play. To fulfil this role, we
must weld ourselves into an army that will have only one goal--namely, the
Freedom of India--and only one will--namely, to do or die in the cause of
India's freedom. When we stand, the Azad Hind Fauj has to be like a wall of
granite; when we march, the Azad Hind Fouz has to be like a steam-roller.
Our task
is not an easy one; the war will be long and hard, but I have complete faith in
the justice and in the invincibility of our cause. 38 crores of human beings
who form about one-fifth of the human race, have a right to be free and they
are now prepared to pay the price of freedom. There is consequently no power on
earth that can deprive us of our birth right of liberty any longer.
Comrades!
Officers and men! With your unstinted support and unflinching loyalty, Azad Hind
Fauj will become the instrument of India's liberation. Ultimate victory will
certainly be ours, I assure you.
Our work
has already begun. With the slogan, "Onward to Delhi"! on our lips,
let us continue to labour and to fight till our National Flag flies over the
Viceroy's House in New Delhi, and the Azad Hind Fauj holds its victory parade
inside the ancient Red Fortress of the India's Metropolis.' '7
This
special order makes it absolutely clear that whatever had been done was done
with the motive of liberating the Motherland, and no other motive could be
attached to the activities of Azad Hind Govt. and Indian National Army. Hence
the charges against the accused were not valid charges.
Another
allegation against the I.N.A. had been that it was acting as a stooge or the
puppet of the Japanese. It was not a puppet in fact and Mr. Desai worked hard
to prove it. He contended:
"I
have attempted to prove and I have established that the I.N.A., though small in
numbers, was fighting as allies of the Japanese Army and there is no ignominy
in admitting that or in doing that, because the objective at that time of both
the armies was undoubtedly to free India from Britain. The objective was no
more and no less than that of the Allies in fighting to free France or Belgium
or any other country, and if in that process there was a unified command or a
single strategy, you, Sirs, will not say with your knowledge of the military
affairs that makes one army the stooge of the other. It is a phrase with which
my learned friend will not be able to walk away if he uses it, and that is why
I want to tie his legs, if I can. If the British and American Army fought under
the command of General Eisenhower, Britain may not be called the stooge of the
Americans, and I hope my learned friend will not descend to the level of
calling the I.N.A. stooges of the Japanese. "8
Not only
this, Mr.Desai further pleaded,
"Where
is the question of being an instrument. If, however, there was any instrument,
it was the Japanese, because it is they who were assisting in liberating India
with a view that the liberated parts of India would be handed back to the
I.N.A."9
In this
way the defence counsels prepared an impregnable defence for the accused. If
the people sitting in the capacity of judges should have acted with judicious
approach, they would have freed the accused of all the charges but since some
of the military officers who had suffered humiliations at the hands of the
accused were on the seats of judges, justice was not done. Universally accepted
laws were sidelined by these people and the accused were held guilty and
punishments were announced.
This
injustice to the tN.A. soldiers was not taken lying down by the Indian people.
Violent demonstrations were organised throughout the country. Threatening
slogans were raised. In many big cities the posters appeared on walls that if
any harm was done to these I.N.A. officers, the British shall have to pay in
the form of blood. Gen. Auchinleck was not prepared to bow to these threats. He
wanted to execute the sentences but the whole atmosphere was so surcharged that
the Govt. of England did not feci it wise and appropriate to go ahead with the
sentences. After prolonged consideration of the pros and cons of executing the
sentences, it was decided not to go ahead with the executions and the accused
were discharged. Wherever these released I.N.A. officers went, they were
treated as heroes. Receptions were organised throughout the country. These
soldiers of I.N.A. became the symbols of revolutionary element in the freedom
struggle and the spokesmen of Netaji.
CHAPTER X
Revolutionaries Revolutionising the Evolutionaries
The
dropping of atom bomb on Nagasaki on 9th August, 1945, sealed the fate of
Japanese in the second world war and they were left with no option but to
surrender. Since the efforts of Netaji were directly linked with the Japanese,
he had also to review his strategy. In spite of such a heavy blow Netaji had
not given up the hope and he planned to continue his struggle. He gave the
following message to his followers before leaving for the unknown destination:
"In
this unprecedented crisis in our history, I have only one word to say. Don't be
depressed by our temporary failure. Be of good cheer and keep up your spirits.
Above all never for a moment falter in your faith in India's destiny. There is
no power on the earth that can keep India enslaved. India shall be free and
before long."1
This
message makes it clear that the born revolutionary with the magnetic
personality still had some cards to play before finally surrendering. Before
leaving he had created a highly surcharged atmosphere which kept on influencing
the events in the future.
Though
they had fought a battle of arms in the foregin lands yet their countrymen were
not aware of their efforts and hardships. With their arrival in India which was
reported by the press around the same time when the alleged air crash involving
Netaji was reported. These reports electrified the political atmosphere in
India and put on fire even the water. The apostles of peace found themselves so
completely uprooted that they had to abandon the principles of non-violence or
defend those who believed in and practised violence. Even Mahatma Gandhi, the
god-father of non-violence in Indian Political Freedom Struggle, had to defend
I.N.A. in a letter dated 29.10.1945, addressed to Sir E. Jenkins. Here is the
letter:
"Dear
Sir Evan,
This I
write in fear and trembing, lest I may be overstepping my limit.
I am
watching the progress of the trial of the members of the corps raised by or
under Shri Subhash Babu. Though I have nothing in common with any defence by
force of arms, I have never been blind to the valour and patriotism often
displayed by persons in arms, as seems to be the case here. And can the
government afford to ignore the almost if not the wholly unanimous opinion of
Indians of all shades of opinion? India adores these men who are on their
trial. No doubt the government had overwhelming might on their side. But it
will be a misuse of that power if it is used in the teeth of universal Indian
opposition. It is not for me to say what should be done except that what is
being done is not the way. Let His Excellency decide what is best in the
circumstances.
Your sincerely,
M.K.Gandhi"2
In this
way we see that even Mahatma Gandhi, in spite of having strong reservations and
differences on some fundamental principles, was left with no option but to
defend the I.N.A. actions. Here it may be added that he is the same Mahatma
who, fifteen years back, had declined to intervene in favour of Bhagat Singh,
Raj Guru and Sukhdev on the plea that these people had resorted to methods
which did not go with the principle of non-violence. Were the actions of Bhagat
Singh and comrades more violent than the actions of I.N.A.? J.L. Nehru, who was
the political successor of Mahatma Gandhi and a renowned spokesman of
non-violence, said on 27th October, 1945:
"A
revolution is inevitable. It is only a question of the time when it comes. Then
we will be tested again."3
In the
same speech he warned,
"These
British and Indian officials who have wanted to write off the Congress and
employed every means to crush it during the last three years will live to see
their wish entombed with an imperialism which is now taking its last few
breaths."4
He not
only talked about revolution but wanted to bring it, if necessary, through
violence. He defended the cult of violence and felt glorified and exalted in
talking about violence and the use of force for the achievement of political
aims. According to one press note dated 2.11.1945:
"I
am proud of the fact that the people of my Province put an end to British Rule
at places, although the duration of this period ranged from 5 to 10 days and
the British army was used to conquer the areas that had been liberated. Our
unarmed people are not to be blamed for their inability to stand against modem
weapons. They could not fight the British army of reconquest with lathis.
"5
From this
statement it is quite clear that Nehru was not opposed, in principle, to the
use of violence, if the resources and circumstances permitted. If he could
appreciate the lathi yielding people from his province, he had no moral
right to oppose and criticise the gun-bearing soldiers of the I.N.A. Reuter
reported from Delhi that Nehru demanded the end of British rule. Speaking at a
public meeting in Bombay, Nehru said:
"India
must not wait for the next move of the Labour Govt... She must depend on her
own people and prepare herself for a mass battle for freedom, which may come
sooner than people expect."6
In one of
election meetings he is reported to have told the audience that it was the duty
of the subject nation to revolt and added that he used the word revolt after
careful thought. He opined that if a country was unprepared for revolution to
free herself, the nation was dead. Congress had never allowed the flag of
revolution to be lowered.
Such
utterances of Nehru badly disturbed British rulers in India and England.
These
despatches from India to London alarmed the rulers about the attitude of Nehru
and other Congress leaders. Lord Wavell in his letter to Lord Pethick-Lawrence
reported:
"There
is no change in the political situation. Nehru continues his intemperate
speeches and statements, and is now on tour in the eastern districts of the
United Provines. It is difficult to explain his conduct and that of the other
Congress leaders except on the assumption that Congress wish to bring about
communal rioting and anti-government disturbances. Nehru is, as usual, taking
an international view--so far as it fits in with his own view--and is much
interested in the rising in Indonesia."1
In
another despatch from Field Marshal Wavell to Lord Pethick-Lawrence dated
9.10.1945, it was reponed:
"Some
people believe that Nehru's plan is to make use of the I.N.A.--Large quantities
of arms are said to have been smuggled into India from the Burma front-both to
train Congress volunteers and as a Congress striking force; and also possibly
to tamper with the Indian army. He is said to have had conversations about the
use of the I.N.A. for subversive purposes during his visit to Lahorc. It is
always difficult to say what Indian politicians really mean, as they use
exaggerated language, but Nehru's uncompromising altitude implies that he is
not opposed to a violent mass movement of some kind. His mind is running on the
'atrocities' alleged to have been commilled by the authorities in 1942, and he
repeated in his Lucknow speech his former threats of reprisals against
officials.' '8
Nehru
appeared to be well set for some violent actions. He appeared to be in search
of some opportunity where he could show is valour. It seemed as if he were
trying to prove that in case of emergency he could act like Netaji, a commander
of an armed revolutionary group of people. In a memorandum dated 6.11.1945
Field Marshal Wavell sent the following report to Lord Pethick-Lawrence:
"Nehru
said a day earlier that 'Revolution is inevitable'. In order to make sure that
there was no misunderstanding I saw Nehru on 3rd Nov, and pointed out to him
the danger of the course he and other leaders were advocating. He made it clear
that he thought violence inevitable, and shortly after our interview delivered
an inflammatory speech of the usual kind. I believe that the Congress are
counting on the I.N.A. as the spearhead of their revolt; they would suborn the
Indian Army if they could, and they hope that their threats will impair the
loyalty and efficiency of the Police.....
"....In
a recent speech Nehru has given special praise to the people of Ballia, a
district in the United Provinces, in which the rioters managed to paralyze the
administration for a few days in 1942; he named and threatened five British
officials who restored order there."9
Whatever
Nehru had said amounts to militancy and extremism. His advocacy of violence
was, surprisingly, defended by Mahatma Gandhi also. Mahatma Gandhi, who loved
non-violence more than his life, wrote in a letter to Sir E. Jenkins:
"I
admit that Pt. Nehru's speeches are hot, if the British rulers do not want to
part with power and hand to the people what is theirs. They are not, if the
British professions are real. It will be wrong to attribute hatred or malice to
him. He undoubtedly speaks strongly against the I.C.S. men. But there he speaks
the people's mind. And he is right. The fine doctrine propounded by His
Excellency of "Forget and Forgive" can only apply to the excesses of
a soldiery in action but surely not to inexcusable butchery, inhumanity,
bribery, corruption and the like. If his statements are wrong, they should be
tested through an open and impartial tribunal. If the government's hands are
clean they have nothing to fear from publicity."10
Perhaps
because of pampering by Mahatma Gandhi and the warm response which Nehru
received from the people for his violent speeches, the latter relied
increasingly more on such an approach. He looked like the most troublesome man
to the British Govt. in India. This earned him a special position in dealing
with the British Indian Govt. Lord Pethick-Lawrence, while commenting about
Nehru, wrote:
"Nehru
is evidently going to be the most difficult element in our problem. I should
judge from your account of the interview that he has pretty well made up his
mind to force the issue without any sort of compromise with Jinnah that it
would be possible for Jinnah to accept, but it still seems to me rather
unlikely that anything of this sort will be deliberately attempted until after
the elections arc over, and some time has been given for the consultations
which we have undertaken to promote. Nehru has a fairly sound sense of
international publicity and I should think he would be careful to play his
cards in such a way as to win the maximum support from outside for such a
campaign, because any sort of conversations in which the Congress were simply
concerned to get themselves on the right side of the world public, would not be
much use for practical purposes. Again, even if I may have rightly gauged
Nehru's intentions, it does not in the least follow that his hand will not be
forced by events before the elections, and the energy which he is working up
for a further contest gets out of control."11
Taking
the cue from the two senior most political bosses of Congress, the others in
line particularly S. Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and G.B. Pant made very
fiery speeches. S. Patel in one of his speeches on 1st Nov. 1945, said:
"The
Congress was not going to sit quiet after the elections and wait on the
convenience and pleasure of the British Govt. The Congress would demand an
immediate and final solution of the Indian problem. If such a
solution was not forthcoming: and if the British Govt. tried to put further
obstacles in the way of India's progress, sure as day follows night there would
be another struggle. "12
Pt. G.B.
Pant also did not lag behind. He aggressively talked about the freedom struggle
and very clearly stated:
"The
country was no longer in a mood to tolerate alien rule. Rebellion had now
become the creed of the people and it would last until freedom was attained.
"13
In
another speech on 3rd Nov. he said:
"We
are rebels and we shall remain rebels until we get what is our birth
right--independence. We do not want our freedom as a gift from the Labour Govt.
We will win it in spite of them. I challenge the British Govt. and its allies
to stop us if they can from achieving our objective. "14
From the
nature of the statement it is pretty clear that the Congress party, which was
basically a non-violent political party, had decided to adopt an aggressive
policy and resolved to take direct action if necessary. Though the atmosphere
for such an action was developing since long yet the arrival of the I.N.A.
prisoners of war had precipitated this revolutionary. transformation.
Subhash
Chandra Bose, during his tenure as President, had advocated an aggressive
policy towards the British Govt. He wanted to give an ultimatum to the British
Govt. and had tried his level best to convince Mahatma Gandhi and his
associates to adopt this policy but unfortunately he failed. In a letter dated
31.3.1939 addressed to Mahatma Gandhi, he wrote:
"I
am so confident and so optimistic on this point that I feel that if we take
courage in both hands and go ahead. we shall have Swaraj inside of 18 months at
the most. I feel so strongly on this point that I am prepared to make any
sacrifice in this connection... If self effacement will further the national
cause, I assure you most solemnly that I am prepared to efface myself
completely."15
Something
which was advocated by Netaji in March 1939 was taken up by the apostles of
peace more than six years later and that too at a time when the Britishers were
placed in a comparatively more comfortable position. It may be added here that
even in 1945 this decision of the Congress was not self-inspired but was the
result of the atmosphere generated by I.N.A. soldiers. The arrival of these
soldiers had such an electrifying effect that even the Congress party passed
the resolution on 22nd September 1945, according to which:
"The
AICC therefore repeats with all emphasis the demand for the with-drawal of the
British power from India... The method of negotiation and conciliation, which
is the key note of peaceful policy can never be abandoned by the Congress no
matter how grave be the provocation, any more than can that of non-cooperation,
complete or modified. Hence the guiding maxim of the Congress must remain:
negotiation and settlement when possible, and non-cooperation and direct action
when necessary. "16
This
resolution was the product of the heat generated by the arrival of I.N.A. in
India. Subhash had believed that if ever the Indian masses would come to know
that an armed attempt -was being made by their fellow-countrymen for the
liberation of the country, the masses would definitely respond positively and
warmly. The Britishers were so much scared and the Congress leadership was so
jealous of Netaji that none dared to talk about I.N.A. issue before the end of
War. The Britishers felt that they committed a serious blunder by keeping the
people in dark about the I.N.A. Lord Wavell in one of his reports to Lord
Pethick-Lawrence, while conceding the mistake, wrote:
"During
the war, and especially while India was threatened with invasion, we decided
for obvious reasons to say as little as possible about the I.N.A. But once
India was out of danger we ought to have begun to feed the Press with correct
information, and some at least of the nationalalist newspapers might have
committed themselves, if not to condemnation of the I.N.A., at least to a more
critical line. "17
This
reflects how much Britishers repented for not divulging the information about
I.N.A. When the press took up the cause of I.N.A. they praised them as true
patriots. The Congress was left with no option but to talk about I.N.A. in the
election meetings. Lord Pethick-Lawrence wrote in one of his letters to Field
Marshal Wavell:
"I
must confess that your letter have only expressed in more somber form thoughts
which were already passing through my mind as a result of reading the reports
of the speeches of Nehru and other Congress leaders. You may rest assured that
while I do not take all Nehru's speeches at their face value and recognise that
much may be set down to the ebullience of electioneering and to the fact that
it is only a few months since he was released from detention, I certainly do
not take your warning lightly. "18
Congress
leadership paid rich tributes to the efforts of I.N.A. Nehru described them as
soldiers of independence. S.Patel declared that the Govt. should make I.N.A.
the nucleus of the New Indian Army. When the masses learnt that I.N.A. soldiers
would be tried in the court and might be sentenced, there were wild,
enthusiastic and violent reactions to that. There were reports that Brigades
may be started at Benares and Allahabad, the latter to be trained by an
ex-lieutenant of I.N.A. Harish Chandra Verma. At Benares some agitators
threatened that if I.N.A. men were sentenced, revenge would be taken on
European soldiers. In Agra, Hindi and English leaflets were said to have been
found in a hotel that if any I.N.A. soldiers were killed, Britishers would be
murdered. On 20.11.1945, the Intelligence Bureau in its report dated 20.11.1
945, conveyed:
"The
situation in respect of Indian National Army is one which warrants disquiet.
There has seldom been a matter which has attracted so much Indian public
interest and, it is safe to say, sympathy. Public feeling is based on
political, racial and sentimental considerations and has been influenced in a
very great extent by the Press and platform writings and speeches of political
leaders and
organisations
The general line of the nationalists case is that the men of the I.N.A. were
actuated by the patriotic motives and the demand is made that none shall be
punished. If there is punishment, the result attending it will be racial
bitterness which will last down through the ages."19
Such
despatches had very serious demoralising effect on the Govt. servants. So much
so that some of them thought of availing the first opportunity to retire if the
Congress propaganda continued unabated. Most of these officers got anxious
about the safety of their wives and families. It was feared that most of them
would become unreliable for dealing with the emergencies. The volcano of public
anger was building up and could erupt at any moment. The Britishers had never
felt alarmed, frightened or bewildered, so long as they could depend on the
support of the army. For the first time they had realised that they were losing
hold on the army. Even in the army there were a large number of people who
wanted to have sympathetic attitude towards the I.N.A. The reports from the
different provinces had made it clear that the I.N.A. personnel were popular
heroes and the charges of treason would make them more popular. The Punjab
Govt. reported,
"The
crux of the matter is that whether Government intends to stand firm in the
event of the death sentences being imposed. If Government intend to carry out
the death sentences, they must be prepared to face unparalleled agitation, more
widespread than in 1919 and 1942, and to use ruthless force to suppress it.
Another 'fast unto death' by Gandhi as a protest must also be taken into
consideration. The agitation which would follow the execution of these three
men and the force which would have to be used to suppress it, would prejudice
any hope of a settlement with India."20
Since the
Britishers were very particular about the peaceful transfer of power and wanted
to retain good relations with India even after independence, the violent
atmosphere looked very dangerous to them. The Hero-Worship of I.N.A. was on the
rise and the celebrations of 'Subhash Bose Day' completely over-shadowed the
'Independence Day' celebrations. This had initiated a new trend in the thinking
and approach of the Congress leadership. J.L. Nehru, who looked like a natural
choice for the office of Prime Minister of independent India, adopted the most
aggressive and non-compromising approach. Through his speeches he electrified
the whole atmosphere and no advice was good enough to dissuade him from
following the path which he had been following. Lord Wavell in a letter to lord
Pethick-Lawrence, wrote:
"Azad
has taken quite a responsible line recently, and I enclose a copy of his latest
statement. Nehru, on the other hand, though advocating restraint for the moment
is using the same sort of language that led to the Calcutta and the Bombay
disturbances and they may have even more serious results in the future. It is
difficult to know what to do about him, and I have no doubt that he embarrasses
the Working Committee almost as much as he does the Govt. I enclose the latest
report of his utterances. You will see that he is practically inciting the
services to mutiny. If he were in Delhi I would sent for him, and tell him what
I think of his speeches; but I gather he will not be here sometime yet, and is
apparently going to Malaya this month. If an opportunity occurs, I will ask
Azad whether the Working Committee cannot control him more closely but I am not
at all sure that they can do it.21
Since the
British appeared to be giving way to the pressure exerted by the violent
speeches of Nehru and others, Nehru went on becoming increasingly explosive in
his approach. He fired another powerful shot at Allahabad on 4.3.46, according
to which:
"If
the British Cabinet mission fails to solve the pressing problems which clamour
for solution, a political earthquake of devastating intensity will sweep the
entire country.
We have
put severe restraint on ourselves for long but now no one can say how long this
self-imposed restraint will continue.
The whole
country is in the throes of serious discontent. We are sitting on the edge of a
volcano which may errupt at any moment. A spark set ablaze Bombay, Calcutta and
Karachi. These prestorm conditions are not limited to big cities but are found
even in the remotest villages.
The truth
is the people are tired of foreign domination and want to end it immediately.
We would talk to the Cabinet mission as the free people of one country take to
the people of another free country... But what I wish to make abundantly clear
is that the Congress is not prepared to withdraw an inch from its demand for
complete independence."22
While
referring to the Naval strike in Bombay, Pt. Nehru said,
"This
strike is of great political importance. Our boys in their zeal might have done
things with which we may disagree, but that cannot minimise its importance or
wash away the powerful reactions which this event has created in the country.
It has demonstrated how the mind of Indian Army is working. It has also shown
that the iron wall which the British created between. the Indian Army and the
Indian people has collapsed and that Indian soldiers, who mostly hail from the
peasant class, are. as sensitive to political and economic exploitation as
their brethren in fields and factories."23
In this
way we see that the Congress party which believed in peaceful and non-violent
means of struggle, resorted to violent and aggressive methods of struggle. This
transformation was brought about primarily by the Indian National Army trials.
The I.N.A. trials awakened the Indian leadership about the effectiveness of
revolutionary methods and in this way I.N.A. revolutionised the evolutionaries.
CHAPTER XI
Panicky Commander-in-Chief and the British Govt.
Since
independence the nation has been believing and singing:
"Le
Di Harne Azadi Bina Shankh Bina Dhal,
Sabarmati
Ke Sant Tune Kar Dia Kamal."
i.e. 'you
got us independence without any weapon, 0 saint of Sabarmati you have done the
wonderful.'
Such
types of beliefs have completely overshadowed the role of revolutionaries and
armed struggle in the liberation of India. Because of the I.N.A. trials, the
Britishers had lost faith in the Indian army. There was a virtual panic in the
British army circles. They could not decide what to do. Neither they could
afford to say that they had lost faith in the Indian troops nor could they
depend on them. There was so much strain of the adverse developments due to the
trials that the British cabinet in its meeting on 28th Nov. 1945 advised the
authorities in India that they should reduce the period of trial to the minimum
possible so that there were minimum effects of these trials on the Indian army.
They conceded that it was a first class blunder to try these I.N.A. soldiers in
India because it was almost impossible to convict and execute the sentences to
these I.N.A. officials. It was not only the agitations or protests of the
Congress which forced the Britishers to speedily leave India with bag and
baggage. In fact it were the threats to the very physical existence of the
Britishers in India that compelled them to leave much earlier than they had
planned. The reports of the Intelligence were so alarming that the Britishers
thought of making emergency arrangements to face the revolt in the army or
other security forces. Since the number of British officers in India was quite
small, they thought of bringing more British Army to India. In the various
provinces an assessment was made of the presence of British officers and
reports were sent to the Governor General. The Governor of Central Provinces in
a despatch to Field. Marshal Wavell reported:
"At
present, in this Province, I have three European Commissioners, five Deputy Commissioners,
no Sessions Judges, no Asstt. Commissioners and seven District Superintendents
of Police. Altogether I have available seventeen European I.C.S. officers,
including three Judicial officers, and ninteen European members of the Indian
Police. These figures exclude people serving in the Govt. of India but include
people on leave. This handful of Europeans has to deal with a population of 18
or more millions over an area of 100,000 sq. miles. It will be readily
appreciated how difficult it will be for the administration if the present
'hymn of hate' leads to the retirement of any substantial proportion of this
handful of officers.
This is
the case of just one of the provinces but it shows on what lines the Britishers
in India had started thinking. They had lost complete faith in the Indian army.
Whatever
outward postures they had been trying to maintain, were out of helplessness.
Internally they were complete wreck. We can gauge the real internal position of
the Britishers from the letter which Gen. Auchinleck wrote to Lord Wavell:
"I
know from my long experience of Indian troops how hard it is even for the best
and most sympathetic British officer to gauge the inner feelings of the Indian
soldier, and history supports me in this view. I do not think any senior
British Officers today knows what is the real feeling among the Indian ranks
regarding the I.N.A. I myself feel, from my own instinct largely, but also from
the information I have had from various sources, that there is a growing
feeling of sympathy for the I.N.A. and an increasing tendency to disregard the
brutalities committed by some of its members as well as the forswearing by all
of them of their original allegiance. It is impossible to apply our standards
of ethics to this problem or to shape our policy as we would, had the I.N.A.
been men of our own ways... I may add that I have set up a special organisation
in G.H.Q. with the sole object of trying to find out the real feeling of Indian
ranks on this subject ''2
The loss
of faith in the Indian troops compelled the British to plan to bring British
army to India but in doing so they did not want to give the feeling that they
have lost faith in the Indian troops. Hence they decided to have a cover plan
so that the Indian troops should not suspect the motives behind such a move.
The Britishers were seriously concerned about their long term interest in
India. They did not want to do anything which might harm their interest. With
the passage of each day the tension went on mounting and the senior military,
civil and political Britishers started anticipating a full fledged revolution.
The Commander-in-Chief on 1st December, 1945 observed:
"We
must be prepared to deal with well organised revolution next Spring, and the
possibility of a serious, but less well organised rising at any time during the
coming winter... The situation in India is, therefore, extremely delicate. If
there is a widespread revolt against the Govt. everything will depend upon the
reliability of the Indian Armed Forces."3
Before concluding
his report, the--Commander-in-Chief added:
"Should
the situation so deteriorate that we cannot rely upon the Indian Armed Forces,
I may have to ask His Majesty's Govt. to send to India as many British
formations as can be made available. In these circumstances very early despatch
would be essential, as, to be effective, these reinforcements would have to
arrive before the forces of violence gain control.''4
This
shows the gravity of the situation and how particular the Commander-in-Chief
was about maintaining the secrecy because any leakage of this information might
have seriously aggravated the existing delicate situation. The passage of each
day added to the tension. The Commander-in-Chief was becoming increasingly
nervous and indecisive. He was unable to send definite views to the Chief of
Staff. In a despatch dated 22nd Dec.1945, he wrote to the Chief of Staff:
"...
3) I find these questions very difficult to answer. My present plans are based
on the assumption that the bulk of Indian Armed Forces remain reliable but that
there is wide-spread civil disturbance throughout the country in both
industrial and rural districts. This is the firm basis upon which I can make
definite plans as I consider that any intermediate stage is so indeterminate as
to make it impossible to assess its scope both numerically and geographically.
4) ... Indian officers who are mostly Nationalists are spread throughout the
Indian Armed Forces except in Gorkha units. Similarly the large numbers of
better educated and politically conscious men referred to in my appreciation
are spread throughout the technical and administrative branches of all the
three services and comprise men of all castes and creeds.
5)... Congress praise of men of so-called Indian National Army as the true
patriots and extravagant anti-govt. abuse are reaching men through civilian
contacts if not also directly. Almost all units wherever stationed in India
report that men are becoming aware of this propaganda. The uneducated and
ignorant are bewildered or at best indifferent. The more intelligent are
beginning to wonder where their interests lie. So far there are no, repeat no
real indications that troops intend to abandon their allegiance to Govt. or
would disobey orders given by their officers. If however morale were to
deteriorate gravely owing to continued propaganda and some units mutinied news
would spread rapidly and mutiny might ~come general even if in some cases half
hearted."5
This
observation reflects how horrified and panicky the British Military officers
had become. They were acting and planning as if mutiny were as sure as death.
Gen. Auchinleck wanted to bring at the earliest British troops to India to meet
the crisis but he had to exercise restraint. He reported to the Chiefs of
Staff:
"Gradual
introduction now of British infantry and possibly artillery units would
certainly be a logical sequel to Government's declared intention to support its
loyal servants, and apparent changed attitude of Congress may create favourable
opportunity. But we are not dealing with logic so much as with ill-will of
political leaders who are prepared to discard truth for political ends and who
have means of spreading propaganda verbally by agents. This is very difficult
to counter amongst largely illiterate people by (preparation?) (? presentation)
of truth in Press even if Press were willing to help by giving necessary
publicity. If, for example, Congress took line that arrival of British troops
was due to distrust of Indian units and British troops were intended to disarm
Indian troops and coerce Indian people we should precipitate trouble rather
than prevent it.''6
In this
way the Commander-in-Chief expressed his apprehensions of the fall out of
bringing the British troops in India. Since it was unavoidable to bring the
troops, he wanted, as already stated, to do under some deception plan. He
recommended:
"If
British troops are sent before disturbances begin they must be preceded by
thorough deception plan. I should welcome visit by deception expert but must
emphasise that plan must be political rather than military and must be
acceptable to Indian Armed Forces and Indian people. Possible line might be
that British troops were enroute to NEI to relieve Indian troops and were
halting in India for equipment, training and acclimatisation. Such a plan
could, however, be effective for limited period only and would in the long run
probably produce greater results if it were reality rather than
deception.'"
It shows
how badly the Britishers were gripped by the fear of large-scale reaction by
the Indian Army. For the first time the Britishers had to act without the
support and loyalty of the Indians and we see how difficult they were finding
it to meet the situation. Lord Wavell reported to Lord Pethick-Lawrence about
the difficult:
"It
would certainly not be wise to try the Indian Army too highly in the
suppression of their own people. As time goes on, the loyalty of the Indian
officials, the Indian Army and the police might become problematical. A large
number of British officials will probably take the first opportunity to
retire.''8
It
reflects that the Britishers had lost faith not only in the Indians but also in
their own officers. I.N.A. was the root cause behind all this.
At a time
when the political atmosphere within the country had become explosive and
situation was ready for a decisive struggle against the Britishers, the latter
tried to make the Congress leaders understand that they were taking the things
too far off and the Congress might itself be routed in the surcharged political
atmosphere. It appears that the Britishers succeeded in convincing the Congress
leadership that their decision to defend the I.N.A. was not wise. The Congress
leadership started giving second thoughts to their stance and policies. At a
time when a few more heavy blows would have brought an end to British authority
in India, the Congress leadership failed to avail the opportunity. The
Commander-in-Chief in his review on internal situation in India, noted on 1st
December, 1945: .
"Anti-Government
disorder on a large scale is unlikely until after the elections, that is before
April, since this would not be in the interests of Congress. Moreover, most of
the political leaders and big businessmen seem at present to be opposed to
violent methods. It is possible that Congress may excite popular feeling over
some issue such as that of the I.N.A. to such an extent that they may lose
control. On the other hand, their most recent utterances might be held to show
that they realise this danger. Congress methods may, however, force government
to take action, such as the arrest of leaders, which might precipitate
widespread disorder. In either event it is doubtful if Congress preparations to
stage effective widespread disturbance are sufftciently advanced at present
though they will undoubtedly steadily improve as time goes on, if the present
violent agitation continues... After elections Congress way take part in the
constitution making assembly which would give a breathing space of unpredictable
length, or they may demand transference of power and proceed to direct action
if refused. If Congress intend to take direct action in any event we must
assume that they will between now and April perfect plans for widespread
simultaneous antigovernment action.''9
At a time
when the Britishers felt that the Congress was in the most advantageous
position to start the agitation, the Congress leadership failed to avail the
opportunity and let the chance slip out of it~ hands. It is only in such crucial
and decisive moments that the leadership qualities are tested. Many times the
leaders were able to. create an atmosphere to generate the required momentum
and when everything was ready, they failed to strike. The British
Commander-in-Chief because of the difficult situation in which he was caught,
might have overestimated the strength of the Congress but it is a fact that the
Congress leaders, in spite of the overwhelmingly favourable political
atmosphere, failed to rise to the occasion and serve the nation. HAD NETAJI
BEEN IN INDIA AT THAT TIME, HE WOULD HAVE CREATED SUCH CONDITIONS THAT THE
BRITlSHERS WOULD HAVE STRUGGLED TO SAVE THEIR LIVES AND FLEE INDIA AFTER
LEAVlNG EVERYTHING HERE. There is no exaggeration in this observation because
at some later stage Gen. Auchinleck, in a confidential note to Anny commander,
clearly stated:
.. There
are two alternative ways of meeting this common desire,
a) that
we should arrange to get out,
b) that
we should wait to be driven out"l0
Many
people in those days wanted Congress to adopt more extreme and aggressive
approach towards the British Govt. In an article in the National Herald, dated
4.12.1945, Shri Sampurna Nand wrote:
"We
want peace and security, but peace and security, law and order reign supreme in
the grave. We do not want such peace in the country. Where patriotism is a
crime and faithlessness to one's country a meritorious deed, where thought and
speech are regimented, where children are not permitted to play at soldiering
with dummy wooden rifles lest the foundations of the state should be shaken,
where school boys are rusticated for listening to a casual speech of a national
leader, where students are encouraged to act as spies against one another an~
the facts of history are tortured to bring about denationalisation of the
people, where millions die of starvation and disease it is hypocritical to talk
of peace and progress. The peace that reduces a whole people to a mass of
soulless, voiceless mummies must be broken at all costs and those who seek to
impose it branded as a gang of criminals."11
Such an
approach would have considerably advanced the date of India's independence.
Keeping
in view the mounting tension in India, the British Cabinet held the meeting on
11th Jan.
1946. It was presided by Mr. Attlee, the Prime Minister of England. According
to the minutes of this meeting,
.. Lord
Pethick-Lawrence said that he was very much concerned about the future in
India. Things were comparatively quiet just now, but this was merely because
the parties who hoped to create trouble were saving up their energies. It would
be most unsafe to assume that there would not be considerable disorder in the
spring or summer, and it was essential that we should have enough British
troops to nip the disorder in the bud. Otherwise, the results might be
catastrophic. "12
The
British Govt. decided to make efforts to win the loyalty and goodwill of the
Indian soldiers. In order to appease and please the Indian soldiers, large
scale and lavish public receptions were organised for welcoming of the troops
returning from the battlefields. Not only this even the sentences of all those
I.N.A. men who were convicted by the court were remitted by the
Commander-in-Chief. Great caution was observed in issuing statements related to
the already tense situation. The Govt. dropped the plans of sending Indian
troops to Burma or any other place. The British senior officers and political
leadership worked very hard to keep high the morale of their officers and the
rank and file.
Gen.
Auchinleck made a detailed analysis of the I.N.A. trials in the Indian army and
circulated it to all the. commanders. This analysis was necessitated by the
releasing of three I.N.A. officers after their conviction. In his report he
made it absolutely clear that the masses considered I.N.A. to be an army of
patriots and masses wanted to defend them at all cost. He observed that in most
of the cases though loyalty of the Indian soldiers was to their immediate
officers and not to the king or Govt. He pointed out that the sagregation of
the Indian officers, the differential treatment in respect of pay and terms of
service were also responsible for the dissatisfaction of the Indian troops.
Though he did not feel it proper yet he supported the policy of lenient
attitude towards I.N.A. Gen. Auchinleck, in a secret and confidential note to
the army commanders, while explaining the effects of taking action against
I.N.A., dated 12.2.1946, wrote the following things,
.. It is
most important that we should study and analyse carefully these effects, as
they may influence very greatly our ability to maintain the solidarity and
reliability of the Indian Army in the difficult times which undoubtedly lie
ahead of us. It is for this reason that I am writing this letter to you. I have
considered the desirability of making a personal public statement in
explanation of my action in commuting the sentences of transportation passed by
the Court on the first three accused, but I have decided that this would not be
in the best interests of discipline or maintenance of my influence and
authority as Commander-in-Chief."13
In the
same letter he continued,
.. In
taking the decision to show clemency, the whole circumstances, past, present
and future, had to be considered and was so considered most carefully and over
a long period. The over-riding object is to maintain the stability, reliability
and efficiency of the Indian Army so that it may remain in the future a
trustworthy weapon for use in the defence of India and, we hope, of the
Commonwealth as a whole."14
He did
not want the people to know that these views were his views because it would
have adversely affected the morale of the soldiers. It appears that though he
wanted his commanders to follow his advice but he never wanted to make the
people feel that the Commander-in-Chief was also so much panicky. He added in
the same letter,
"You
should not, in explaining the matter to your officers, quote me as
Commander-in-Chief but should use the material I have tried to give you in this
letter in any way you think suitable to the purpose as if it came from
yourself."15
All this
reveals that how tense and critical the situation was. England did not want to
leave India in a bad and unpleasant mood. A parliamentary delegation from'
England visited India. It had come to assess and analyse the political
situation in the country. One of its members Mr. Richards wrote in his notes,
"The
most definite impression on his mind was the urgency of reaching a solution,
due to the increasing bitterness, almost hatred, towards the British, both the
Muslim League and Congress are united on one point that they wish the British
to get out of India. "16
Since it
had become quite clear to the British that their days in India were numbered,
they had started making arrangements to secure their safe transfer and
transportation from India. England being the nation of businessmen, had to take
care of their economic interest which were at stake in India. After crushing
the Indian people for so long, they decided to change their strategy towards
the end and win over the confidence of the Indians. It was with such intentions
that Lord Pethick-Lawrence in a telegramme, dated 18.12.1945, gave a valuable
piece of advice to Lord Wavell in the following words,
"It
is because 1946 will be a crucial year in India's age-long history that I felt
I should like to speak to you personally today. I want you to realise that I
myself, the British Government recently returned to power with an overwhelming
majority-and, I believe, the whole British people, earnestly wish to see India
rise quickly to the full and free status of an equal partnership in the British
Commonwealth. We present no obstacles to Indian's attaining that position.
There is no longer any need for denunciation or organised pressure to secure
recognition of India's due position in the world. If there ever was a time when
there was cause for that it is no longer. The problem now is a practical one.
It is to work out a rational and acceptable plan of action. It must be a plan
under which authority can be transferred to Indian control under forms of
government which will be willingly accepted by the broad mass of India's people
so that the new India will not be tom and rent by internal strife and
dissensions. This is essential for India's welfare. It is also essential to the
life of the world. The world organisation needs members who are strong and
determined in the cause of world peace. They can only be so if they have
internal harmony and cohesion, "17
In this
way we see that the Britishers, who all the time, had been treating India as
slave and did not consider it worth anything, all of a sudden realised that
India had to be strong in order to make her contribution to the world peace.
There is an indication that England desired India to be united. After having
sowed the seeds of dissension and nursed the plant of division for so long, it
looked paradoxical to find them talking about the unity of India. In the same
telegramme Lord Pethick-Lawrence added,
"To
attainment of this practical objective Lord Wavell and I and the whole British
Govt. will apply ourselves in the coming year to the best of our ability. We
believe that what is so widely desired can be achieved but we must have active
help of leading Indians in every community and of every 'way of thought. It is
only through moderation and compromise that great political problems can be
solved. Every Indian should use his influence whether it is small or great to
further this inspiring cause during the coming year. But it is not only in the
political field that I earnestly desire partnership between the peoples of
India and Great Britain to be fruitful. I am deeply conscious of India's
contribution to the mental, cultural and spiritual life of mankind and I want
for my country the opportunity of sharing in your rich heritage and of gaining
continued inspiration from your great men and women. If we all bend our minds
and wills to this high endeavour we can do something in 1946 for the greatness
of India and for the future peace and prosperity of Asia and of the world.
"18
What a
dramatic transformation in the attitude of the Britishers! Only a few years
back the same people were telling the whole world that God had sent them, the
Superiors, to rule over the Indians, the Inferiors, because the latter were
unfit to rule themselves. And now, when the power appeared to be slipping out
of their hands, they became 'conscious' and that too deeply about the
contribution of India to the mental, cultural and spiritual life of mankind.
Lord Pethick-Lawrence, expressed his keen desire of sharing the rich heritage
of India and gaining inspiration from the great men and women of our country.
He expressed his desire to 'bend our minds and wills' to cause the upliftment
of the Indian people and for the improvement of the political set up of India.
Those aristocratic and imperialistic minded people, who called Indians as dogs
and felt pride in writing 'Dogs and Indians not allowed', felt the necessity of
getting inspiration from the lives of our great men and women.
In this
way we see that the masters of the world i.e. the Britishers became so
desperate in India that they had to plan for their safe escape from India.
Though I.N.A. lost the battles in Kohima and Imphal, and in the planes of Burma
yet it won the battle in the Red Fort. Britishers, who all the time posed to
the world that God had sent them to rule over the Indians because the latter
were unfit to rule themselves, towards the end of their regime realised that
India was culturally much advanced and they had to learn valuable lessons and
get inspiration from the lives of Great Indian men and women. Those who want to
know about the real impact of I.N.A. should critically study the post I.N.A.
trial developments. If Netaji would have come to India marching at the head of
Indian National Army, one can imagine what would have been the response of the
Indian masses to him and what would have been the impact, of his coming like
that, on the political situation in the country.
CHAPTER XII
Nehru: Congress: INA
It is
said 'Everything is fair in love and war' - it may be love for power or war of
politics. Right from the time of Mahabharta and Ramayana the aspirants of
political power have concentrated more on the ends than on the means. In the
name of expediency pragmatism or political strategy, even the highest
moral-ethical values and principles are not only shelved but also destroyed.
Had it been the case of the ordinary people, it would not have been
mind-boggling but when such means are practised by the embodiments of 'truth
and ethics' it becomes difficult to make out what is right and what is wrong.
If, in the good old days, Abhimanyu could be killed in the most unprincipled
manner, if Guru Dronacharya could be beheaded through deception involving a person
like Yudhishtra, then anything and everything can be done in the present age in
the war of political interests.
Even up
to now Indian National Congress Party is considered to be the main vanguard of
freedom struggle against the British. The nation has been made to believe that
we won freedom through the effort<; of the Congress Party. The Congress
claimed that it believed in the policy of truth and non-violence and it could
be implied that India got Independence through truth and non-violence only. This
impression has prevailed because firstly the nature and scope of role played by
the Congress Party in the pre-independence days was very wide and secondly the
Congress Party was able to establish that only she has been able to win freedom
and none else had made any contribution to this task. Not only this but what is
more serious is that the Congress considered it her privilege to monopolise the
benefits and gains of the freedom.
Though
during the continuation of the freedom struggle the people did not know about
the existence of the Indian National Army organised by Netaji and the role
played by it, yet after the end of the Second World War, the people had come to
know about its role. It is a historical fact that thousands soldiers of the
I.N.A., in colIaboration with the Japanese Armed Forces. had fought for the
liberation of India and sacrificed their lives for the cause of India's
Independenee. It is regretting and unfortunate that during the campaign of
I.N.A., because of lack of knowledge about the campaign, the people of India
could not make their contribution to the efforts of I.N.A. The alI-important
question is why did the people of India not know anything about the role played
by I.N.A. during the prosecution of war ? Since Congress was spearheading the
movement against the Britishers, it was for this party to keep a track of all
the evenls which helped in any way, directly or indirectly in the pursuance of
freedom struggle. Since the efforts of I.N.A. were also aimed at winning
Independence for the country, it was for the Congress to colIcet information
about I.N.A. operations and appraise the nation of the developments of that
front. Netaji, while in Germany and in Japan, addressed many speeches to the
people and Congress leaders in India. Many of these speeches reached Indian
leaders. If the leadership had not been aware of the developments abroad, its
silence would have been understandable. But if the Congress leadership, in
spite of its knowledge about I.N.A. movement, kept silent, then it was a serious
offence against the nation and a betrayal of the blood of the martyrs of I.N.A.
It is a fact that J.L.Nehru, one of the most outstanding leaders of the freedom
struggle was aware of the activities of I.N.A. Since he knew about it, it can
be presumed that the Congress leadership was aware of the activities of I.N.A.
During about two years of I.N.A. activities in South East Asia, the Congress
leadership maintained absolute silence. Why?
Did the
Congress feel that the activities of I.N.A. were anti-national? If no, why did
Congress not support the efforts of I.N.A.? So far as Nehru is concerned, it
appears, nay he was sure that I.N.A. was a puppet in the hands of the Japanese
and also that Netaji had wrongly decided to depend on Japanese for help in the liberation
of India. One fails to understand whether this view of Nehru was his personal
view or the policy of the Congress Party. The question arises: Was the issue of
supporting or not supporting I.N.A. ever discussed in the meeting of Congress
Party? Should it be presumed that the other prominent leaders of the Congress
Party were unaware of the things relating to I.N.A. ? If it should be true,
then why did not Nehru share the information with other senior and responsible
colleagues? If he had shared this information with his colleagues, was this
issue ever formally discussed by them? If yes, was any decision taken and did
they authorise Nehru to speak or act on behalf of the Congress Party? If no
such meeting was held and no such authorisation was made, in which capacity did
he think his opinion to be the opinion of the Congress? Had he started feeling
and believing that he (Nehru) was Congress and Congress was Nehru; and also
that Congress was India and India was Congress'? If it was not true, why the Congress
Party did not feel the necessity of discussing the issue of Netaji and I.N.A.?
It is a fact that even before independence, Congress had been maintaining an
international approach and taking keen interest in the developments in
different parts of the world. When China was rocked by earthquake, a delegation
of the Congress Party was sent there and even a team of doctors along with
medicines was sent to China to help the affected people. If the Congress Party
could think of responding to the developments related to a neighboring country,
why could not it feel necessary, to spare time and discuss something which now
appears to be one of the most strategic and decisive developments in the
history of Indian freedom struggle? The reason behind all this appears to be
absolutely clear, i.e. Congress leadership never wanted that anybody else, in
any capacity, should endeavour to successfully spearhead efforts for India's
liberation and get the credit for liberating India. They thought that whatever
may happen, whenever it may happen, by whomsoever it may be done, must be
accomplished under the banner of Indian National Congress. Netaji was aware of
such tendencies of his former colleagues. They could afford to delay but could
not think of someone else clinching Independence for India.
It is
because of Netaji's knowledge of such facts that he had clearly offered that
after winning Independence he and his comrades will gladly hand over the seats
of authority to the leadership which is fighting within India. In his address
to Mahatma Gandhi from South East Asia, he had said,
"I
can assure you, Mahatmaji, that I and all those who are working with me, regard
themselves as the servants of the Indian people. The only reward that we desire
for our efforts, for our sufferings and for our sacrifice, is the freedom of
our Motherland. There are many among us who would like to retire from the
political field once India is Free. The remainder will be contend to take up
any position in Free India, however humble it may be. The spirit that animate
all of us today is that it is more honourable "to be even a sweeper in
free India than to have highest position under the British rule. We all know
that there are hundreds of thousands of able men and women at home to whom
India's destiny could be entrusted once freedom is achieved." 1
He was
fully aware of the propaganda which his enemies were carrying on against him.
He was clear and confident about the righteousness of the decisions taken by
him. In his same address to Gandhi, he asserted,
"One
who has stood for national self-respect and honour all his life and has
suffered considerably in vindicating it would be the last person in this world
to give in to any other foreign power. Moreover, I have nothing to gain
personally at the hands of a foreign power. Having received the highest honour
possible for an Indian at the hands of my countrymen, what is there for me to
receive from a foreign power? Only that man can be a puppet who has either no
sense of honour and self-respect or desires to build up a position for himself
through the influence of others."2
It was
because of such deep rooted knowledge about his former colleagues that he tried
his level best to explain his point of view to them, but unfortunately they had
closed their eyes to the realities, plugged their ears to block the entry of
any wiser thoughts in their minds and locked the doors of their brains so that
it might not reason against them. In order to convince the leaders at home he
tried to explain in detail the reasons for his setting out of the country and
seeking foreign help for the liberation of the country. In his address to
Gandhiji, he stated:
"Before
I finally made up my mind to leave home and homeland, I had to decide whether
it was right for me to take help from abroad. I had previously studied the
history of revolutions all over the world in order to discover the methods
which had enabled other nations to obtain freedom. But I had not found a single
instance in which an enslaved people had won freedom without foreign help of
any sort. In 1940, I read my history once again and once again I came to the
conclusion that history did not furnish a single instance where freedom had
been won without help of some sort from abroad. As for the moral question
whether it was right to take the help, I told myself that in public, as in
private life, one can always take help as a loan and repay that loan later on.
Moreover, if a powerful empire like the British empire, could go round the
world with begging bowl, what objection could there be to enslave disarmed
people like ourselves taking help as a loan from abroad?"3
The fact
is that it was safest and most expedient for him to stay in India and wait for
his turn and the opportune moment. But he was so sure of his analysis of the turning
events ~at he had concluded, 'Such a golden opportunity would not come within
another century'. His analysis and forecasting was very accurate. It is a fact
that if Hitler's army, through its onslaughts would not have weakened England,
India might, even forty five years after 1947 would have been slave. Mahatma
Gandhi and the group of his followers had unfortunately started believing that
nobody will protect the national interest as they could. Misled by such beliefs
they misled the country and in the process caused irrepairable damage to the
national interest. Their actions not only delayed India's freedom but also
denied many great freedom fighters, their due place in the struggle for India's
independence. It is also a fact that because of their misdeeds, the
independence which we got was not as pleasant and peaceful as it ought and
could have been. The freedom which should have come to us like most beautiful,
captivating and fragrating morning rose bud, came to us in the form of a
paralysed new born baby soaked in blood. It was neither the blood nor the
bullets of enemy which pierced through the heart and body of Mother India,
rather it were the bullets of our brethres countrymen and the blood was also
that of the sons of the Motherland. It is extremely unfortunate that those
responsible for all this never realised, confessed and owned the responsibility
for the crimes which could be committed just because of their inefficient
handling of the situation.
Reverting
to the point of the attitude of the Congress leadership towards the I.N.A., it
may be added that all those people who were at the helm of affairs in Congress
were very well aware of the capabilities, potentialities and smartness of
Netaji. In fact all of them had tasted the fruits of their confrontation with
him. They appeared to be afraid of the fact that if at any stage, during the
I.N.A. operations, people learnt about I.N.A. efforts, the whole nation might
have responded to Netaji's clarion call. It is very much possible that a
positive response from within the country might have completely uprooted the
mighty British Oak tree from the Indian soil and the nation would have been
liberated from the British yoke. So they did not think it wise and safe to
refer to I.N.A. and Netaji in their public speeches. Their main aim was not
just independence for nation but they wanted independence under their own
stewardship. All of them claimed themselves to be the apostles of non-violence
and they did not want Indian blood to be shed for India's independence. Those
people who appeared to be so scared of shedding blood for India's cause, did
not effectively resist the flowing of Indian blood in distant lands of Africa
and Europe for the freedom and democracy of others. Lakhs of Indians were made
to join the British Indian Army and were sent to different countries to fight
against the Axis powers during the Second World War. Initially Congress tried
to convince them that it was not in favour of the recruitment of Indian
soldiers for fighting abroad, but this resistance was very mild. In fact they
did not mean what they said. They had performed a ceremony of lodging their
protest. Mahatma Gandhi, who because of the killings of a few British Police
Officers, could suspend the nation-wide movement and on slightest provocation,
could resort to fast unto death, did not do much to check the slaughtering of
the sons of Mother India in the remotest comers of the world. They did not
protest when thousands of soldiers of the British Indian Army were
irresponsibly surrendered like a herd of animals to the Japanese. On the other
hand they could not digest the thought of the sons of India, under the banner
of Indian National Army, shedding blood for the Motherland. The hard fact is
that it was not the question of violence or non-violence which decided the
attitude of Congress Party, it were some other considerations. This is quite
clear from the letter which was written by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to Lord
Wavell on 7th November .1945. He wrote,
"Soon
after my release, I was interviewed by a representative of the Statesman,
Calcutta. He drew my attention to the repeated Govt. declaration since 1942,
that there could be 110 understanding with the Congress, so long as the
Congress thought in terms of a mass movement during the period of war, and
asked what our attitude would be, if the Simla Conference failed. My reply was
that there should not be a mass movement in the war period. Here, there was a
clear indication of our desire not to embarrass the Govt. during the
continuation of the war, and I fail to understand how this can in any way
justify the absence of goodwill on the part of the Govt.
....
Asked about Congress attitude towards violence and non-violence, I made it
clear that the Congress would depend only on non-violent mass movement for
achieving its ends, but in any case, there should not in my opinion, be any
such movement during the period of the war. If, however, the aim of
independence cannot be realised through negotiations and settlement, Congress
must face the task and take steps to strengthen the masses for any future
contingency after the war. Surely no body can expect Indians to declare that
whatever be the situation in future, they will never initiate or join a
struggle for achieving their freedom."4
These
views, expressed by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, before the Second World War came
to an end were reported in the Amrita Bazar Patrika dated 27.4.45. From this it
is absolutely clear that it was not the question of violence and non-violence,
rather it was the question of the approach of the Congress Party towards the
British Govt. It is clear that the Congress did not want to embarrass the
position of the British Govt. during the war. Why? Was there any clear cut
assurance or promise from Britishers about India's independence? If no, why no
embarrassment to the enemy? Had it been the decision of the Congress Party that
come what may Congress would not resort to violence, it would have been a
different matter. From the statement of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad it is clear
that Congress could think of resorting to violence if it was essential for the
freedom of the country. About the scale and time of using the violence, they
had to decide as and when required. We can imply from it that what was of the
greatest importance about the methods to be used was not whether or not to use
a particular method, violent or non-violent, but by whom was the method to be
used. It won't be an exaggeration to say that the senior Congress leaders had
started believing themselves to be law unto themseves and they were guided by
their own whims. Left to them, and in case the chance had permitted them and
they had the potential, they would not have hesitated to use even the most
violent means. This is quite clear from what these leaders stated after or
during the I.N.A. trials.
Even
otherwise if they had been so true to the cause of non-violence, they would not
have taken up the cause of I.N.A. in the court. Something which was
untouchable, unprincipled, undesirable, unjustified and unwanted before the end
of the war for the Congressmen, how did it become the most sacred duty of any
soldier in the service of Motherland after the war for the same people. It
appears that after debacle in the war field, the I.N.A. on return to India was
cleared of all its sins in violence. What was it which compelled the Congress
to change its stand? Apparently there does not appear to be any material change
in the situation or the nature of role played by I.N.A. which could urge the
Congress to change the stand towards I.N.A.
The
dividing line was 18th August, 1945 when the alleged accident is reported to
have taken place, the information of which was given to the world on 23rd
August, 1945. Nehru, who had observed a calculated silence about the role of
I.N.A. through out the I.N.A. operations, all of a sudden found that I.N.A.
people were the liberators of India. Congress Party described them as . Armed
Liberators of Motherland'. The motives and intentions of the Congress party
were neither honest nor fair. If Congress had sincerely, selflessly and
honestly defended I.N.A., it would have been a great service to the cause of
nationalism. The adoption of the deeds and even the misdeeds (if intended for
national cause), of those who sacrificed their everything for the cause of
Motherland, would have set great traditions of adopting the sons of the soil.
Congress took up the cause of I.N.A. as a matter of expediency and as an
election issue. The Congress leadership at heart was not in favour of defending
I.N.A. It is the law of nature that even the most evil minded and evil
intentioned people, the cleverest and expert thieves leave behind some clues
which prove their misdeeds in the times to come. In this case also an evidence
is available about the intentions of the Congress leadership. Sir E. Jenkins in
a communication to Mr. Turnbull conveyed an important account of an interview
between Capt. Hari Badwar, a returned prisoner of war and Mr. Asaf Ali a member
of the Congress Working Committee. Following is the information which was
conveyed:
"Enclosure
to No. 160
SECRET
D.D.M.I.(s)
Captain
BADHWAR'S name NOT to be disclosed.
Captain
HARI BADHWAR, 3 cav., returned P.W., informs me that on 18 Oct 45 he had a 31/2
hours' conversation with ASAF ALI, member of the Congress Working Committee,
and that he gave the latter a full account of the I.N.A. and their brutal
treatment of loyal Indian P.W. He opened the conversation by asking A.A. what
the Congress expected of the Services when a National Govt. assumes power i.e.
did they intend to promote faction and communal feeling. A.A. replied that they
expected patriotism in the Services but intended to keep them free of politics.
2 HARI
BADHWAR then proceeded to give the true story of the I.N.A., from the point of
view of one of those who had suffered. A.A. listend with close interest and at
the end, in general conversation, he stated:-
(i) Congress leaders had realised that those who joined the I.N.A.
were far from innocent; that NEHRU'S speeches and statements on the subject
always included a qualifying phrase or sentence to this effect, e.g.
"Whatever errors and mistakes they had committed..." and
"misguided men", etc.
(ii) Before committing themselves to public statements, Congress leaders
had however asked him (Asaf Ali) to tour the country and find out public
feeling. He had done so, from South to North and found, as he moved North,
opinion stronger and stronger that the I.N.A. must not be punished for their
actions, but should be released. This inflamed feeling forced Congress to take
the line it did.
(iii)
In the light of information now available, however, if Congress was in power it
would have no hesitation in removing all I.N.A. from the Services and even in
putting some of them on trial, and when they eventually did assume power they
would certainly remove any remaining.
(iv) That if Govt. now postponed trials Congress would be prepared to put
leaders on trial when in power. When asked if Congress leaders would announce
this officially, ASAF ALI said they could not do so though there was no
objection to H.E., the C.-I.-C. being informed.
3 HARI
BADHW AR then asked ASAF ALI if, now that Congress knew the true facts, the
leaders could not repudiate their championship of the I.N.A.; that they could
well withdraw as they were not in a position to know these facts earlier. To
this ASAF ALI admitted that they dare not take this line as they would lose
much ground in the country. (Comment in other words, the present policy is one
of political expediency which is, I think, well known. T.W.B.)
4 On the
19th October, HARI BADHWAR endeavoured to see NEHRU but the latter's
engagement.., including his interview with the accused in the Red Fon, were
heavy. When he eventually did go to NEHRU'S residence he found a crowd outside,
including, he- was told, some discharged members of the I.N.A. As he was in
uniform he did not wish to risk a scene, so came away.
T.W.BOYCE,
Brigadier,
DDMI(S)
22 Oct'45
From this
information, it is quite clear that Congress had adopted the cause of I.N.A.
out of compulsion and it was also prepared to try the I.N.A. officers when it
came to power. It won't be an exaggeration to say that the Congress leaders
planned to construct Bungalows on the graves of martyrs of freedom struggle.
The precedents set by the founding fathers are being religiously followed by
the present day successors of those leaders. Incidentally in those days, the
popularity of I.N.A. had gone so far that the Congress leaders felt alarmed
over it. They started finding ways to get rid of this phantom of I.N.A.
Initially the British leaders repeatedly advised and warned the Congress
leaders not to idolise I.N.A. beyond reasonable limits but in their zeal to
make maximum capital out of I.N.A. issue, they went ahead and even after
realising that the work of sixty years through non-violence had been overtaken
by the work of sixty days talk of violence, they wanted to take the complete
about turn in order to set the things on the old position, but it had become
too late. Events had been moving at such a fast pace that they got not even a
single moment to begin the about turn, not to talk of taking the about turn.
The warnings of Lord Wavell and others proved futile and the Congress was
caught in its own dragnet. Even Mahatma Gandhi, who earlier had failed to
gather courage to defend S. Bhagat Singh and his comrades, could not gather
courage to utter even a single word against I.N.A. because the storm of I.N.A.
was so strong that if he had tried to stand in the way, he along with his
principal spokesmen and followers would have been completely uprooted. The
principle of non-violence and the leaders of non-violence, both might have been
blown by the storm of I.N.A. into the Bay of Bengal and drowned them for ever.
Those who
did not get a chance to go through the details of the defence of I.N.A. trials,
might be stunned to learn that even during the trials the Congress had dropped
the name of Netaji. It was so scared of using his name that during the
long defence speeches whereas -the names of very junior officers had been
referred to time and again, the name of Netaji was used on the most minimum
occasions. They wanted him to be 'out of sight and out of mind'. Even during
the proceedings of the trial, only the reference to organisation was made and
the references to the heroic deeds of the I.N.A. soldiers was kept in the
background. The Congress leaders felt that if just the name of the I.N.A. could
create such a storm in the country, what would have happened if the people had
learnt about the nature of sacrifices made by the soldiers of I.N.A. at proper
time.
It won't
be too much to say that if the full story of I.N.A. had been narrated to the
people in that surcharged atmosphere, the people would have forcibly liberated
the soldiers of I.N.A., arrested the Britishers at most of the places and put
them instead on trial. If there had been any strong man to channelise the
emotional outburst of the Indian masses, the Britishers would not have found
even a remote foot-path to run out of our country even in the darkest nights.
But, alas, how could the history of India change. India had to suffer in the
past because of her Jai Chands and India had to suffer again because of the
black hearted persons clad in white dresses of Khadi. Before referring to the
role of Congress persons it is essential to give a detailed account of the
panic and demoralisation in which the Britishers found themselves. The details
are in the following chapters.
CHAPTER XIII
Air Crash
- How Far
True or
False?
The human
mind is very inventive and it can think of the unthinkable and after making
impossible things possible, it starts thinking of more impossibles. Some myths
are so overmagnified, amplified and glorified that they are made to look truer
than even the Truth, and some vital aspects are so completely ignored,
misrepresented, distorted and even so badly and completely destroyed that it
becomes impossible for a sincere votary of such ideas to prove plain truth as
truth. Exactly same is the case with the alleged air crash which is almost
universally believed to have killed Netaji. An information which was conveyed
to the world with a different motive, i.e. camouflaging the escape of Netaji,
has been used for completely opposite motive, i.e. proving the death of Netaji.
On 23.8.1945, the Tokyo radio reported about an air crash which has remained
mystery tin today. According to this broadcast from Tokyo radio,
"Mr.
Subhash Chandra Bose died in a Japanese hospital from injuries received in an
air crash. Mr.Bose, Head of the Provisional Govt. of Azad Hind, left Singapore
on August 16 by air for Tokyo for talks with the Japanese Govt. He was
seriously injured when his plane crashed at Taihoku airfield at 14.00 hours on
August 18. He was given treatment in the hospital in Japan where he died at
midnight. Lt Gen. Tsunamasa Shidei was instantly killed and Col. Habibur
Rehman, Bose's Adjutant, and four others were injured in the crash. "1
This
important news was broadcast five days after the alleged accident is said to.
have taken place. The delay in the broadcasting of such an important news
appeared to be intentional, unusual and mischievous. Even if it is presumed
that it was a war like situation and because of this there was delay in the
communication of news, the facts reveal that the communication system was not
in such a bad condition as should have made it difficult the expedient
communication of news to Tokyo. The news had already reached Saigon on 19th August.
Though the news might have reached earlier yet we can safely conclude that it
had reached there on 19th August because Mr. S.A. Aiyer, the Propaganda
Minister of Azad Hind Govt. accompanied by Col. Tada,was flown from Saigon on
20th August with the assurance that he was being taken to Tokyo to meet Netaji
S.C. Bose. But on the way he was told that Netaji died in an air crash at
Taihoku airport. He told the Col.,
"Look,
Colonel, I want to be frank with you. Not a single Indian in India or East Asia
will believe this story unless you produce conclusive proofs. You say Colonel
Habib is alive. All right. You must now take me at once to Taihoku. I must see
Netaji's body with my own eyes. I must meet Habib. Don't tell me afterwards
that Netaji's body has been disposed of, and don't tell me that Habib is not in
condition to be seen. Whatever happens, I must be taken to Taihoku."2
The plane
landed at Taichu and not at Taihoku. It shocked Aiyer when he learnt that the
Japanese will not take him to Taihoku. He told Col.Tada,
"Colonel
T., I suppose you can imagine my mental agony just now. If we are not in
Taihoku now, we must reach Taihoku somehow and that too pretty quick. If, as
you say, Netaji is no more, I must see his body, and if, as you say, Colonel
Habib is still alive, I must meet him, talk to him, and see in what way I can
be of use to him in his present condition. Mark my words and remember my
warning: No Indian in India or East Asia is going to believe your story of
Netaji's plane crash."3
All this
had no effect on the Japanese and he was not given assurance of being taken to
Taihoku. He expressed his mental agony in the following words,
"I
was very angry with them for persisting in this unpardonable folly of not
taking me to Taihoku; once I reached Japan, they dare not fly me back to
Taihoku. Even if they wish to, they cannot; it would be far too late by then.
Perhaps, the Americans may be landing on Japanese soil any moment. Is it, after
all, possible that they have no ulterior motive behind their avoiding Taihoku ?
Is it possible that someone in the Imperial Headquarters (Japanese Supreme
Command) blundered in good faith and told Saigon to send the bomber direct to
Tokyo without breaking journey at Taihoku? Perhaps they are too nervous to take
any bomber to Taihoku for fear of sabotage by hostile Formosans. Then, why on
earth am I being taken to Japan?"4
This is
what Mr. Aiyer felt when he learnt about the information of the alleged death
of Netaji in the air crash. The experiences narrated by him clearly showed that
something was seriously surreptitious.
If the
news could reach Saigon on 19th August, why not Tokyo also on the same day, if
not before that day. In fact evidence is available which clearly shows that
Tokyo had the information much before 23rd August, the date of broadcast.
According to one telegraphic message received from Tokyo, Netaji's dead body
was to be flown there for funeral rites. If the message about the programme of
cremation of the Netaji's mortal remains was sent from Tokyo, one can safely
conclude that the news of his death had definitely reached Tokyo. Under normal
circumstances, the news should have been broadcast without delay, but it was
not to be. What was wrong, may be genuineness of the tragedy connected with the
crash was a subject of controversy. Whatever the reason, it is simply
undeniable that 'Something was being definitely hatched'. Another serious
lacuna in this news is that out of the alleged 13 persons aboard the plane,
only 7-two dead and five injured. are referred. The news was silent about the
remaining six persons. Why so ? Are we expected to believe that there were only
7 persons in the aeroplane when it crashed.
The other
report which the world received was from the only Daily of Taihoku 'Taiwan Shin
Poo' which reported on 25th August, seven days after alleged accident, that,
"The
Chief of Independence Movement of Free India, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose,
desirous of a discussion with the Japanese authorities, took the plane from Cho
Nun (Singapore) en route Tokyo on August 16. The plane crashed in the vicinity
of Taihoku (Taipei) airport at 2 o'clock in the afternoon on August 18. Mr.
Bose had sustained severe injuries and was sent to the local hospital for
treatment. He died at 0 (zero) or the 24th hour-the junction of August 18 and
19. On the same plane, there were Col. Habibur Rehman, a senior aide, also
badly burnt, Lt.Gen.Shidei, a Japanese Military Officer, who died on the spot
and four other officers who were either severely or slightly injured. "5
Doesn't
it sound strange that a local Daily newspaper took seven days to publish such
an important news which involved Netaji S.C.Bose, the Head of Provisional Govt.
of Azad Hind and Gen. Shidei, one of the seniormost Japanese Army Generals.
According to this news also two persons had died and five others had been
injured. A very serious contradiction in these two news reports is that, the
Tokyo radio claimed that Netaji died in a hospital in Japan whereas the said
newspaper claimed that Netaji died in a hospital at Taihoku. How strange! A man
died on the same day at the same time but at two different places, hundreds
miles apart from each other. If it would have been the case of the twin cities,
if the name of two cities would have been identical, the discrepancy could have
been ignored, but here in the present case, it is absurd to overlook the
discrepancy. This is the beginning of the controversy surrounding one of the
most crucial but doubtful air-crashes in the history of the world. In both
these news reports, the time of alleged death is mid-night or zero hour of the
18th and 19th August but Col. Habibur Rehman, the only Indian aide accompanying
Netaji, in his written and signed statement on 24th August 1945, claimed,
"Nippon
Medical Authorities did all they could in his treatment but he unfortunately
expired at 21.00 hours (T.T.) the same day.''6
The
difference in the time of death, that too, so soon after the incident, smacks
of intentional misstatement of facts. It is not possible that the radio and
newspaper on the one hand and Habibur Rehman on the other, should have been so
much uncertain about the time of death, that too within a week of the
occurrence.
The
suspicion about the truthfulness of the news started from the manner in which
the news
was given out to the world. Friends or foes, none accepted the news to be
correct. Lord Wavell, the Viceroy of India, after listening to the news of
Netaji's death in the crash, noted in his diary on 23rd August, 1945,
"I
wonder if the Japanese announcement that Subhash Chandra Bose's death in an air
crash is true. I suspect very much. It is just what would be given out if he
wanted to go underground."7
Lord
Mountbatten was also sceptical about the death story of Netaji. The British
Govt. had an office of Military Intelligence at Chunking in China. The Director
of Military Intelligence (D.M I.) posted in China, telegraphically informed the
headquarters on 17th October 1945,
"When
Bose was preparing to leave Burma with his family by plane, Chinese intercepted
Japanese message ordering Bose to separate from his family and remain in Burma.
DM.I's supposition is that though Bose's family were in the plane that crashed,
Bose was not there and he subsequently escaped into Thailand. DM.I. has no
evidence other than the intercept but is still convinced that he is correct.''8
The
advancing British Army, while in Thailand, captured some documents which
appeared to be secret signals. These signals appeared to be left behind
intentionally and with some special motives. On the basis of these signals, the
British Intelligence conveyed the following information to Lord Mountbatten:
"For
three reasons it appears that the report on Bose's death in air crash was
cooked up:
(1) In
this connection all papers at Bangkok and Saigon had been destroyed
by the
Japanese and they have left only one file and in that file only four signals
were found;
(2) The
Japanese General Isoda, it appears deliberately spread the news of Bose's
departure among the Indian staff and the Indians were prepared in advance about
the news of Bose's death; and
(3)
Japanese once said that Bose died in Formosa and then again say Bose died in
Japan, these two reports cannot be simultaneously true.''9
Since the
British did not believe him to be dead, their Intelligence further reported,
"It
appears that the whole thing is suspicious. It has been said that only two
seats were available in the plane. It is natural that any important person like
Bose should have been allowed to move in a special plane.
The
description of the funeral is more suspicious. The secret signals say that Bose
was flown to Tokyo. The news that was broadcast by the Domei Agency said that
Bose died in Japan and his body was cremated there. Again Habibur Rehman says
that Bose died at Taihoku (Taipei) and his body was cremated there. Such
contradictions are suspicious. It can be said that Bose definitely left Saigon.
Perhaps the air crash was cooked up at Taihoku. Possibly after that Bose
escaped somewhere."10
From all
this information it is absolutely clear that the British Intelligence did not
accept the story of Netaji's death in the alleged air crash.
Not only
the Britishers, even the Indian leadership and the officers and men of I.N.A.
did not accept this story. In December 1945, Mahatma Gandhi, while addressing
some people in Dumdum Jail said,
"I
believe Netaji is alive. If someone shows me ashes, even then I will not
believe that Subhas is not alive."11
On
January 2nd, 1946, Gandhi said at a worker's meeting in West Bengal,
"I
believe Subhas Bose is still alive and is hiding somewhere."12
Earlier
in the All India Congress Party session held in Bombay on 21st September, 1945,
while presiding, Maulana Azad told the delegates,
"The
circumstances in which the news of death of Bose has reached us and the sources
responsible for the announcement do not make certain that Bose is in fact dead.
Therefore, his name should not appear in the list of those who died since the
last session of AlCC."13
Even Pt.
J.L. Nehru did not accept the death story. On 11th September, 1945 he told a
reporter of API at Jhansi,
"I
have received a number of reports which have raised grave doubts in me, and I
disbelieve the authenticity of the news."14
The
officers and men of the I.N.A. did not accept the news to be true. Most of them
even before the announcement of the news were expecting some such news. They
believed that this news was given to camouflage the escape of Netaji. After
talking to some senior officers of I.N.A. like Cot. P.K. Sehgal, Cot. Mrs.
Lakshmi, Col. G.S. Dhillon, S. Gulzara Singh, a minister in Netaji's Govt. and
many others, I could conclude that none accepted the story when they heard it
in the first instance. Since the Allies also had not accepted the story, they
sent Intelligence Teams from different places. One team was dispatched from the
headquarters of Gen Mac Arthur. Another team was sent by Lord Wavell, (the then
Viceroy of India), headed by M/s Finney and Davis, the Intelligence officers.
Still another team was sent by Lord Mountbatten from his headquarters in South
East Asia. All these Intelligence agencies submitted their report to their
respective headquarters but these reports were not made public instantaneously.
Even now, 47 years after the event, all the reports have not been made public.
The manner in which the news was given to the world and the suppression of such
important documents, create grave doubts about the truthfulness of the whole
story. Not only this, the statements given. by the various persons, who claimed
to be eye-witnesses, are so contradictory that it becomes difficult to accept
them as eyewitnesses of the same accident. After studying the discrepancies,
one starts feeling that either they were not the eye-witnesses or they were
witnesses to different incidents. If all the discrepancies should be discussed
in detail, many volumes can be written on the subject but keeping in view the
space problem and the convenience of the readers, only a few discrepancies are
being discussed here.
Type and
Condition of Aeroplane
First of
all let's find out what these witnesses say about the type of the aeroplane.
Lt. Gen. Isoda, a Japanese, claimed that the fighter was a brand new aeroplane.
Another officer Lt. Col. Nonogaki asserted that it was an old aircraft. Gen
lsamiya, the Chief of Japanese Army in Formosa, claimed that the engine of the
aeroplane was in a very bad condition. All these people were the army officers
and were supposed to have a good workable knowledge of the nature of aircraft.
Minor discrepancies in the versions could have been ignored but diametrically
opposite versions cannot be overlooked.
Site of
Crash
The next
important point is where did the plane actually crash? A Japanese military
officer Lt. Col. Nonogaki asserted, "The plane crashed on the concrete
runway." Lt. Col. Sakai claimed, "The plane fell about 20 to 30
metres away from the runway." Mr. Nakamura, the ground engineer stated,
''The plane crashed about 100 metres away from the runway." Col.Habibur
Rehman, the only Indian accompanying Netaji said, "The plane crash took
place one or two miles outside the aerodrome." All these people, quoted
above, claimed to be the eye-witnesses. So far as the question of approximate
distance from- the runway is concerned, some differences can be accepted but
when one says that the plane crashed one or two miles outside the aerodrome and
others claimed it to be near or around the runway, it is difficult to believe
that all these people were witnesses to the same crash. Even if considerable
concession is given to the failure of memory, due to the lapse of time, even
physically blind cannot be given so much concession as is perhaps needed if the
version of Habibur Rehman, in the light of the versions of other eye-witnesses,
is to be accepted to be true. It is regrettable to complain that Shah Nawaz
Committee and Khosla Commission ignored such incongruities. Moreover, the
Japanese Govt. had supplied three photographs of the alleged crashed aeroplane.
These photographs, if true, may not help in fixing the exact point of crashed
aeroplane yet it can be definitely established whether the plane crashed on the
runway or outside the aerodrome. The above referred enquiry commissions did not
say with any definiteness as to where the plane crashed.
Position
of Plane After The Crash
If
somehow it is accepted, for the sake of discussion, that the aeroplane actually
crashed, let us see what was the position of the wreckage? Lt.Col. Nonogaki and
Mr. Tarakono, both the survivors of the alleged accident, told,
"On
crashing on the ground the plane broke into two and split parts went in
different directions on the ground."
Mr.
Nakamura, the ground engineer, about whom the Shah Nawaz Committee held that he
had the best view of the accident, told Khosla Commission,
"He
was positive that the plane was intact and its body was not broken."
Mr.
Takahashi, another survivor, claimed,
"The
plane crashed and stood in normal position."
Col.
Habibur Rehamn, in his written statement submitted to Shah Nawaz Committee,
stated,
"Immediately
the plane crashed on the ground and caught fire on both the front and the
rear."
Well,
these are a few of the versions of the survivors of the alleged air crash. One
fails to understand how a plane which is claimed by one eye-witness to have
split into two, can be seen by another eye-witness as standing intact or a
plane seen by one eyewitness as standing intact, can be seen by another
eye-witness as split into parts. The claim of Habibur Rehman that the plane was
burning both in the front and in the rear, does not collate with the versions
of other witnesses.
Here it
may be added that whatever is being quoted, is not from some isolated
statements of these people. In fact these are parts of the full statements made
by these people. For instance Lt. Col. Nonogaki, who claimed that the plane was
split into 'two, added,
"I
came out walking down because the plane broke into two parts exactly at the
place where I was sitting."
It is all
the more important that whatever they have said, they have said so in clear and
confident manner and not in a vague and doubtful manner. To give just another
instance, Mr. Nakamura told Shah Nawaz Committee,
"No,
no, I am positive that the plane was intact." These contradictions pose a
serious problem. Who speaks the truth? IL is difficult to decide. Or, not to pin-point
a particular witness as indulging in inexactitude, the whole plethora or
evidence on this issue is concoction and as such unreliable.
Netaji
After Crash
The most important question is what happened to Netaji after the crash? Col.
Habibur Rehman in his signed statement of 24.8.1945, gave the following
description:
"Netaji
got out of the plane from the left side from the front. I followed him. We had
to pass through the fire in doing so. As soon as I got out, I saw that Netaji's
clothes were on fire from head to foot. I rushed to help him to remove the
clothes. By the time his clothes were removed he had sustained severe bums on
his body in addition to serious head injuries received during the crash. "15
The very
same Col. in his statement before Shah Nawaz Committee said,
"Netaji
got out through the fire; actually he rushed through the fire. I followed him
through the same flames. The moment I got out, I saw him about ten yards ahead
of me, standing, looking in the opposite direction to mine towards the West.
His clothes were on fire. I rushed and I experienced great difficulty in
unfastening his bush-shirt-belt. His trousers were not so much on fire and it
was not necessary to take them off. He was not wearing the sweater. He was
wearing Khakhi drill. I laid him down on the ground and noticed a very deep cut
on his head, probably on the left side. His face had been scorched by heat and
his hair had also caught fire and singed. The cut in his head was a long one,
about four inch. I tried to stop his bleeding by handkerchief. As for myself,
both my hands were badly burnt. As I came through the fire, the right side of
my face was burnt and I noticed I have received a cut in the forehead which was
bleeding and the right side of my right knee was also bleeding profusely as it
had hit some hard substance. The head cut was caused by hitting the floor as
the plane crashed. My clothes did not catch fire. My hands were burnt very
badly in the attempt to take off Netaji's clothes. Both my hands up to the wrist
show mass of deep burning even after the lapse of more than ten years. Later on
even my nails came off. The nail of the left thumb has not come up
properly........
When I
laid Netaji on the ground, I myself laid by his side. I was feeling acute pain
and felt exhausted. I saw a Japanese passenger about 20 yards away bleeding
profusely and moaning. Just then, Netaji enquired from me in Hindustani: Aap ko
ziada to nahi lagi ? I replied, "I feel that I will be all right."
About himself he said-He felt that he would not survive. I replied, "Oh
No, God will spare you. I am sure you will be all right. He said, "No, I
don't think so."16
The above
mentioned two statements by the same person reveal that initially he had
claimed that Netaji's clothes were on fire from head to foot Later on, in his
statement to Shah Nawaz Committee, he claimed that Netaji's trousers were not
on fire and it was not necessary to take off. Besides he claimed that he also
followed him through the same flames. If it were true, he should have been
considerably affected by those flames. He has claimed that he put out the fire
on Netaji's body with his hands. It is strange that though some parts of his
hands were burnt by the flames, yet the palms of his hands remained completely
unharmed. Normally the fire is extinguished with the palms, hence the palm
should also have been affected. He has claimed that after the fire, Netaji was
standing and he had laid him on the ground. Is it possible to believe that
Netaji, who was so expert in most of the things and who could foresee most of
the developments beforehand and plan accordingly, did not know or took care to
observe the most common remedy when the clothes were on fire? Any normal
person, having an average common sense, would not have kept standing in spite
of one's clothes being on fire. It appears that Habibur Rehman intentionally
gave confusing statements so as to leave a snag in the story. He has claimed
that when he came out of the plane, Netaji was standing ten yards ahead of him
and was on fire. From the details given by Habibur Rehman it appears that he
followed Netaji immediately. It is not understandable as to how Netaji got ten
yards ahead of him? Normally a person on fire is slow in his movements.
After
reading such a detailed version of Habibur Rehman, one gets stunned to learn
from Nakamura, the ground engineer, that it was he who rescued the passengers
from the burning plane and specially Netaji. He added that it was he who
stripped off Netaji's clothes from his body. Well, it could have been possible
that both of them helped in putting out the fire on the body of Netaji but
unfortunately they claim to have done it independently of each other.
Obviously, either of the two can be correct, both cannot. Their exclusive claim
of putting out the fire can be explained, in a way, as an attempt to corner the
credit. But how to explain the divergencies in the other parts of the account
rendered by them? Lack of consistency in this respect is bound to put in shade
the veracity of their statement on other points.
Quite
opposed to the above mentioned two versions, Lt. Col. Nonogaki claimed,
"I
did not see any fire on the body of Nelaji."
The
readers can themselves assess the authenticity of various versions and may find
themselves at a loss to decide whether or not they were real witnesses, and if
they were witnesses, did their eye-sight and memory serve them right? If they
really were the witnesses and their eye-sight was normal at that time, I wish
there could have been a medical checkup report of these eye-witnesses which
could have confirmed that whether they were dead drunk or not? Though it may
sound to be discourteous and disgraceful yet I can't resist saying that either
air crash had so badly rocked their minds that they lost the presence and balance
of their minds or they had seen some phantom or ghost like (Ghatotkach) the son
of Bhim, with some super-natural powers who could change his shape and place
from time to time.
Medical
Treatment or Injured Netaji
Well if
it is presumed that the aeroplane carrying Netaji did crash and he got fatally
injured, let us see what happened after it ? According to Col. Habibur Rehman's
statement signed on 24th August, 1945,
"Within
15 minutes we were rushed to the nearest Nippon Army Hospital. It was about
15.00 hours at the time. I also received serious head and body injuries in
addition to bums on the face and the body."
"Netaji
was given immediate medical attention but his condition was very serious.
Nippon Medical Authorities did all they could in his treatment but he
unfortunately expired at 21.00 hours (T.T.) the same day. Prior to his death he
was in his senses and was quite calm." 17
After
reaching the hospital Dr.Yoshimi and Dr. T. Suruta claimed to have treated
Netaji. Dr. Yoshimi, who was the incharge of the hospital was thrice questioned
and every time he gave a different version. When he was questioned by the
Allied Intelligence in 1946, he told that on 18th August Bose with six or seven
persons, was brought to the hospital. He claimed that he personally cleaned the
injuries of Bose with oil and dressed them. He told that Bose was suffering
from extensive bums over the whole body-so much so that very little was left
for his identification. He told the Allied Intelligence that Netaji remained
unconscious, remained in a coma for sometime and died at 11 P.M. He claimed
that he was by the side of Netaji all the time till his death.
The same
doctor Yoshimi told Shah Nawaz Committee that on August 18 at about 2 P.M., he
received a telephonic message from the airport informing him about the news of
air crash and within 20 minutes of the message, 13 or 14 people were brought to
the hospital. He told this committee that Dr. T. Surula applied white ointment
to Netaji's bums and bandaged him. He added that Netaji's body turned greyish
and even his heart was burnt. He described the bums as third degree bums and
added that the body temperature of Netaji was as high as 39°C. He told this
committee that Bose expired a little after 8 p.m. The efforts to give
artificial respiration did not bear fruit. Though he had not told Allied
Intelligence anything about the blood transfusion yet he told Shah Nawaz
Committee that he himself had let out 200 c.c. of blood and transfused 400 c.c.
fresh blood to Netaji.
When Dr
Yoshimi deposed before Khosla Commission he told that before noon he received a
telephonic call from the airport and seven persons, including two Indians
arrived at the hospital at about] 2.30 p.m. He added that he treated the burns
of Netaji all over his body and bandaged them after applying plaster. Netaji is
reported 10 have remained conscious for seven or eight hours and survived in
the hospital for 12 hours. He died in his presence. Surprisingly he told Khosla
Commission that no blood transfusion was given to him.
From this
whole narration it can be seen how inconsistent and contradictory is the report
of the doctors who claimed to have treated Netaji. Dr. Yoshimi has given the
details of the treatment which was given to Netaji. According to him, initially
Netaji's burns were dressed by Dr.T. Suruta who applied a white ointment and
bandaged him all over. In order to resuscitate Netaji's heart, Dr Yoshimi gave,
one after the other, four injections of Vita-Camphor and two injections of
Dijitamine. He gave him three intravenous injections of ringer solution, 500
c.c. each. Dr.Yoshimi has stated that 400 c.c. of blood had to be given and 200
c.c. had to be let out. Dr. Yoshimi remembered that this blood was obtained
from a Japanese soldier in the Nanmon Military hospital and it was given
between 4 and 5 p.m. on that day. To prevent infection, Sulfonamide injection
was given to Netaji. The initial response to this treatment was favourable.
Col. Habibur Rehman's injuries were also treated with ointment and disinfectant
and bandaged. Thereafter Dr. Yoshimi left, to attend to the Japanese injured
officers, with instructions to Dr.T. Suruta to look after Netaji and give him
vita-camphor injection at 30 minutes intervals.
Here
again we rind more of inconsistency and contradiction in the report of a doctor
who claim to have treated Netaji. Dr.Yoshimi had given the details of the
treatment which was given to Netaji. At times Dr. Yoshimi claimed that he
himself cleaned the wounds and put the ointment on it-whereas on other occasions
he held that Dr.T. Suruta did all this. The details of the treatment given to
him make it quite clear that the doctors remembered each and every detail of
the treatment given to Netaji. If they could so well and accurately remember
the details of the treatment, they could as well remember other details. There
was no question of any confusion of the blood having been given or not. These
contradictions make the whole story look quite doubtful. Moreover, quite
contrary to all this, whatever Harin Shah quoted in his book makes the doctor's
version look as plain fraud. The conversation which he had with the sister
nurse Tsan, who claimed 10 have looked after Netaji in the hospital is very
important and revealing in nature. The conversation is as follows:
"Sister,
please tell me what time you remember Chandra Bose was brought to the hospital.
What were the injuries and what time he died?"
"Chandre
Bose had received injuries from burning. He was burnt as a result of the air
crash which took place at the Taihoku airport just before he was brought to the
hospital. It was about the noon time on August 18th, 1945 that he was brought
to the hospital. He was very severely burnt. He died the same night at
11."
"Sister
Tsan, he was severely burnt and you were looking after him. What treatment did
you give him?"
"I
told you he was very seriously burnt. I was instructed to apply olive oil all
over his body and that I did."
"You
might have given him some injections to stimulate his heart conditions,
Sister?"
"Oh!
He was so severely burnt. There was no place to give any glucose or celine or
other injection."18
When one
makes analysis of the statements of the medical staff it becomes extremely
difficult to make out who is right and who is wrong. Doctors do not agree on
the vital point of blood transfusion. One doctor is sure of the quantity of
blood given, the person from whom the blood was taken and even about the time
of giving the blood, but strangely the other doctor expresses his complete
unawareness about the issue of blood transfusion. On one side the doctor is
giving detailed information about the injection and other treatment which was
given to Netaji, but the nurse who is claimed to have looked after Netaji and
stayed with him till the last moment, claimed that the body was so severely
burnt that there was no unburnt place on the body where injection could have
been given. Under the circumstances it is difficult even to say what was the
real condition of Netaji after the alleged air crash. In this way we find that
there is no unanimity about what followed after the crash, such as the physical
condition of Netaji, the treatment given to him and such other things like the
time of death.
What
Happened After Death
Everyone
is aware of what follows death. Cremation, of course. Let us see what do the
eye-witnesses say about this pan. According to the Shah Nawaz Committee,
"Immediately
after Netaji passed away, the Japanese present stood up and paid respects to
his body by saluting. Col.Habibur Rehman was one of Netaji's most trusted
officers, and had been especially chosen by Netaji to accompany him on this
journey. Habibur Rehman was deeply affected by Netaji's death. The Interpreter,
Nakamura who was present at the death bed, has graphically described how Col.
Rehman prayed for the dead. At first he came and knelt by Netaji's bed, and
prayed for five or six minutes. Then he opened the window and, looking at the
sky, prayed for a longer time, and then slowly came to his bed and lay down.
All present in the room were affected. Dr. Yoshimi says that tears were rolling
down Col. Rehman's eyes. The nurses were crying loudly. Everybody present in
the room was crying. In fact describing this poignant scene before the
Committee, Dr. Yoshimi himself broke down and sobbed audibly. Thereafter, Dr.
Yoshimi, informed the Military Headquarters of the sad event Maj. Nagatomo was
sent down from the Headquarters. He came and saw Netaji's body lying on the
hospital bed swathed in bandages. The body was removed to one comer of the
room, and a screen was put around it, and according to Japanese custom, flowers
and candles were placed by its side. The changed position is shown in the
sketches of the hospital furnished by Dr. Yoshimi and Col. Habibur Rehman.
Major Nagatomo posted soldiers to guard the body."19
Let us
critically examine the various versions as reported by Shah Nawaz Committee.
Dr. Yoshimi has stated that the nurses were crying loudly. First of all the
nurses were not supposed to have any knowledge about the identity of Netaji
because even in the higher circles he was referred to as T, his code name. Even
in the secret wireless message from the Southern High Command, the code name
was T. The Intelligence team which was sent from India to enquire into the
plane crash recovered the following telegram which was sent from the Chief of
Staff, Southern Army to O.C.Hikari Kikan,
"To
O.C.Kikan
From
Chief of Staff, Southern ARMY, Staff II. Signal 66, 20th August
'TOP
SECRET'
'T',
while on his way to the capital, as a result of an accident to his air crash at
Taihoku at 14.00 hours on the 18th was seriously injured and died at midnight
on the same date. His body has been flown to Tokyo by the Formosan
Army."20
(Mr. T as
already stated was code name for Netaji.)
If even
in the secret wireless message, the code name was used, it is not believable
that his identity would have been disclosed to the staff nurses. Since they
were ignorant about the identity of the person, they were not supposed to cry
aloud at the death of a patient who was stranger to them. Even otherwise Netaji
was not known to them and there was no reason of emotional outburst because the
profession of nurses is such that dying of patients in their presence is not
unusual. Hence the statement that nurses also broke down is an effort to make
the scene dramatic. It has been stated in the report that Dr. Yoshimi also
broke down while narrating the details. Anybody who has even some elementary
knowledge of practical human psychology, knows that except in case of very
close personal relations, that too if emotional involvement is there, people do
not break down while narrating any incident relating to some patient. Dr. Y
oshimi was not the personal physician of Netaji and he was not even attached to
him in any way before the treatment under reference. There is no available
evidence of his old association with Netaji. Under the circumstances, he had no
reason to break down while narrating the incident and that too after the lapse
of considerable time. This melancholic conduct is unnatural and makes the story
all the more suspicious.
Dr.
Yoshimi is claimed to have informed the Military Headquarters and Major
Nagatomo is reported to have been sent by the Army Headquarters to look into
the whole matter. It is stated that the body was removed to the comer of the
room and a screen put around it. Well, it is a matter of common knowledge where
the dead bodies are kept. Question arises why was Netaji's dead body kept in
the room and why was it not shifted to the Morgue. Justice Khosla in his report
has written about his witness no. 207, Chang Chuen, of Taiwan,
"Chang
Chuen was ordered to go to the hospital and stand guard on Bose's coffin on
which was written the name of Chandra Bose. He also saw some injured persons
there. On the following day a truck came and carried the body to the
crematorium."21
On the
one hand Netaji's--code name was being used in the top secret telegram and on
the other hand his full name Chandra Bose was written on the coffin which was
lying in a room where other patients were present. Why was the name written on
the coffin if secrecy had to be maintained? If the body was not shifted to the
proper place and the name of the dead was written on the coffin, what does it
show? Does it indicate that efforts were made to maintain secrecy or efforts
were made to show it to the people that somebody had died and name of the
person was written on the coffin. Even otherwise the name of the deceased is
not written on the coffin unless and untill there are a large number of
coffins. Why was this extra-ordinary care taken to write the name on the
coffin? The purpose is quite clear. They wanted to publicise that S.C. Bose had
died.
Now let
us see how the body was taken to crematorium. According to Shah Nawaz Committee
report,
"In
one or two trucks the body was carried to crematorium and Col. Habibur Rehman,
Maj. Nagatomo, J.Nakamura (interpreter) a Buddhist priest and the crematorium
attendant Mr. Chu Tsan were present''22
Harin
Shah claimed that Chu Tsan was the person who cremated Netaji's body. To the
question who were present at the funeral, Chu Tsan replied,
"There
was that tall Indian! And there were seven or eight Japanese officers. "23
On being
asked, "Did you see the body?" He replied,
"I
dare not see it. Big bosses were there. I had only to act according to orders.
I only saw that it was wrapped in cloth."24
The
persons who were responsible for issuing the cremation permit also considered
that they were not allowed to see the body though technically they were
required to see it before issuing the permit. Even Habibur Rehman had not seen
the dead body of Netaji. Mr. B.C. Chakraborti, the member of the Indian Police
Force deputed by the war department of the Govt. of India to interrogate Mr.
Habibur Rehman, and a number of other officers, asked from Habibur Rehman,
"Was
it not your duty as the second-in-command of the I.N.A. to accompany the dead
(Netaji) to the furnace?"25
He jumped
to his feet and shouted,
"I
can say with Koran in hand that I was not allowed to accompany the dead from
the operation table to the furnace.''26
From this
it is quite clear that even Habibur Rehman had not seen the body of Netaji
before cremation. Now the question arises what was the necessity of maintaining
so much secrecy about the identity of the dead body. The matter doesn't end
here. When !he body is to be put in the furnace for burning, normally the body
is taken out of the coffin and put in the furnace, but in this case, strangely
the whole coffin was put inside the furnace.
Well,
maintaining so much secrecy for a person to be smuggled out alive is
understandable but when it is a question of dealing with the dead body at the
time of cremation, in the crematorium, there is no need for such a security
.and that too just before the cremation. First of all no enemy agent was
present. Secondly even if the enemy agents had been there, they would not have
been able to harm the dead body anymore. Moreover what did the enemy want? They
wanted to have Netaji dead or alive? Even if they should have got hold of the
dead body, they would also have performed the cremation, nothing more could
have been done. In fact if the Allied agencies had even got the confirmed
information of Netaji's death, their purpose would have been served. The
Japanese by concealing the information at such a crucial time could also not
have served Netaji's interest in anyway. The dead Netaji could not have been of
any help and use to the Japanese or I.N.A. I fail to find if any purpose might
have been served by concealing the information about Netaji's death or
cremation.
Hence,
there is no reason to believe that Netaji actually died and that his ashes are
being kept in Renkoji Temple of Japan. The ashes are not that of Netaji because
he did not die in the alleged air crash. He did not die because the air crash
did not take place. The air crash did not take place because there is no
evidence to that effect. If there is no evidence of Netaji's BEING ALIVE
ANYWHERE, WHERE IS THE EVIDENCE OF HIS HAVING DIED?
CHAPTER XIV
Air Crash
Did Not Take Place Because....
The whole
controversy surrounding Netaji's mysterious disappearance is based on the
presumption that Netaji died in the aeroplane which is alleged to have crashed
at the Taihoku airport on 18th August, 1945. The story of air crash has been so
much publicised, so often repeated in and never challenged effectively, makes
everyone believe that Netaji died in the air crash. Those who do not believe
him to be dead, also feel that the aeroplane crashed but somehow he didn't die
in it and escaped. It is surprising to learn and point out that even those
people who claim themselves to be the best informed and authorities on this
issue, when confronted with the most fundamental questions related to the air
crash, are found to be completely blank about them. All this I am writing on
the basis of my personal experiences which I had during my research work. I
have the privilege of meeting Col. G.S. Dhillon, Col. P.K. Sehgal, Col.
Mrs. Lakshmi Sehgal, Col. Gulzara Singh, Capt. S.S. Yadav and many other senior
othcers ot I.N.A., Mr.Chitt Basu, General Secretary All India Forward Bloc, and
many other veteran persons claiming to be closely associated with Netaji and
his organizations. I asked for some documents like the report of Shah Nawaz
Committee and Khosla Commission. Surprisingly none of them had a copy of these
documents. Even Prof. Samar Guha, who was the Chairman of Parliamentary
Committee on Netaji, could not give us a copy of the report of Khosla
Commission. Most of these people accepted the story as was presented to them
and those, like Prof. Samar Guha, who made efforts to find the truth, could not
go as far as it was required to establish the truth. Our countrymen, including
the followers, companions and even relatives of Netaji, directly or indirectly,
accepted the story as the press presented; and the press presented what the
govt. or some people presented to it. Even those who called this news to be
absurd and baseless became the messengers of the news which they never belived.
They didn't take care to put up a strong and authenticated defence against it.
As a result of it, in spite of being the followers of Netaji, they served the
interest of his enemies. Now let me prove that the said air crash did not take
place. If it had taken. place, some or all of the following would also have
happened:
1. If the
air crash would have taken place, there should have been some record of the
accident at the airport of Taihoku where the alleged accident is said to have
taken place. Till today no record of any accident having taken place at that
airport, on that day or even in that month, is available. Is it advisable on
the pan of any mature and rational man to think of an air crash taking place at
an airport itself and remaining unrecorded ?
2. If an
aeroplane crashed, some debris of the crashed aeroplane should have been there
and it would have provided the much needed dependable and confirmatory
evidence. The Intelligence Teams deputed by the different headquarters would
have been able to easily locate the debris and confirmed the air crash. Since
the Allied forces occupied Taiwan in the very near future after the accident,
there would not have been much difficulty in locating the debris. Since no
evidence of the debris, except some molten gold, claimed to be a part of
Netaji's treasure, is available, it is difficult to believe that the plane did
crash. It is not possible to believe that the whole luggage and everything
being taken by Netaji or others was completely reduced to ashes. If something
might have been left, the people, particularly the survivors would definitely
have brought some of the things as an evidence. Unfortunately no such evidence,
from the debris of the crashed plane, is available. Why?
From the
details of the account given by the survivors of the crash it appears that they
were conscious of the fact that a V.I.P. of the stature of the Head of a State
was accompanying them. If the survivors of the crash were really conscious of
this fact, they would have observed atleast the most minimum formalities which
could be observed under the given circumstances. For example, the arrival and
departure of the flight and the time of accident would have been noted in the
records of the aerodrome. Even the details of the casualties and the list of
the injured persons would have been noted in the records. If there was staff
necessary to regulate the flights and the flights were indeed regulated, such
vital information as the time of arrival and departure which are otherwise a
matter of routine, would have been noted in the records. Since no such
information is available, it is not far-fetched to believe that nothing of the
sort, deserving to be recorded, happened.
3. The
Japanese Govt. had supplied five photographs related to this accident. Three
photographs were that of the crashed aeroplane, one was that of the covered
object alleged to be Netaji's dead body and the fifth was that of Habibur
Rehman sitting by an urn, said to be containing Netaji's ashes. The fact that
the photographs were taken, proves that a camera was there. Besides this it
reflects that the people there were conscious of the fact that the photographs
were needed for evidence purposes. Though the photographs had been taken yet
unfortunately all the five photographs failed to serve the required purpose.
The photographs of the crashed plane failed to provide any evidence proving
that these are of the plane carrying Netaji. Moreover, a critical examination
of the geographical background of the crashed plane shows certain lacunas. It
shows that the photographs, instead of being the three different photographs of
the same plane crash, are the photographs of more than one different air
crashes. The photograph of the object covered with white sheet fails to prove
that the covered object was Netaji's dead body. The photograph in which Col.
Habibur Rehman is shown to be sitting near the alleged ashes of Netaji in an
urn, also does not serve the purpose.
Isn't it
disappointing, strange and even mischievous to see that though the photographs
were taken yet they did not serve the desired purpose? Even Khosla Commission
refused to consider these photographs as relevant because these photographs did
not provide direct evidence as claimed. If now we can see and understand that
these photographs do not serve the required purpose, then even those who had
supplied these photographes after the lapse of considerable time of the alleged
accident, also must have known it that these photographs would not serve any
purpose. If the photographs were not to serve the purpose of evidence, then why
were the photographs taken and supplied at all ? The photographs were supplied
with a deliberate attempt to confound the confusion. Otherwise there was no
necessity to supply them. Govt. of Japan, which supplied these photographs,
could have conveyed that no photograph was available since none was taken.
There was no difficulty to the Japanese Govt. to say so because none of
so-called eye-witnesses had said that the photographs had been taken.
In the
case of photographing of the accident site, even in the case of minor
accidents, some such close-ups of the scattered objects are taken as may prove
that the photographs are of the same accident. In this case none of the
photographs give the closer view, and prove that the photograph is of the alleged
accident only. In fact THESE PHOTOGRAPHS, INSTEAD OF PROVING THE ACCIDENT,
DISPROVE IT.
4. It is
claimed that after the accident Netaji, along with others, were taken to the
hospital. Normally whenever a patient is admitted to the hospital, all his
particulars such as the time of admission, nature of injuries, cause of
injuries, time of death (in case it happens) etc., are recorded. Unfortunately
no such record relating to Netaji is available in the hospital. What to talk of
any entry in his real name, even in his secret name 'T', there is no entry in
the records of the hospital. There could be two reasons for it. Firstly the
entries might have been intentionally left unrecorded with a view to concealing
the identity of the patient, if his security necessitated it. If the patient
had died, there was no justification in concealing the identity of the patient
because the worst had already happened. The second reason could be that it was
an omission on the part of the persons concerned who were supposed to make
these entries. Even this is not possible because it is a matter of common
practice that the arrival of patients is recorded, particularly of the indoor
patients. In the case of death of the patient, the entry becomes all the more
essential. Since no entries are available, it shows that either there was most
serious negligence on the part of the officers on duty or the patient in
question i.e. Netaji, never came to the hospital. The registration of a patient
is such a fundamental thing that there cannot be an irregularity about it Hence
it is safe to conclude that no entry was made because no patient was admitted.
5. It is
reported by the attending doctors in the hospital that he was having third
degree bums and the best possible treatment under the circumstances was given.
The details of the treatment have already been given in the preceding chapter.
Well, two doctors are said to have attended him. Both the doctors have made
some contradictory statements. Though they remembered the details of the treatment,
names of the medicines injected, timing of the injections, fluctuations in the
condition of Netaji and many other things in exact and precise manner, yet they
have differed on many points such as on the issue of blood transfusion. One
doctor claimed that 400 c.c. blood was given to Netaji and he had let out 200
c.c. blood. He even remembered the identity of the person who donated the
blood. But contrary to this, the other doctor says that no blood was given to
Netaji. Quite opposite to the doctors statements, the staff nurse claimed that
Netaji was so badly burnt that no injection could possibly be given to him.
Well, if the treatment had actually been given, the doctors would not have been
so much confused or uncertain about such an important part of the treatment.
One presumption can be that the doctors forgot some of the things and the
second can be, that since no treatment was actually given, lack of unanimity in
the versions about the treatment given to Netaji is but to be expected.
Surprisingly, the blood group was not mentioned. Perhaps all this was done to
mislead the investigating agencies so that they may find it difficult to arrive
at some definite conclusion.
6. When
the body of a person is on fire, the situation cannot vary from one viewer to
the other. The versions given by different eye-witnesses about the actual
condition of Netaji are contradictory and confusing and hence not dependable.
Some people say that he was on fire from head to foot, whereas some others say
that only the upper part of his body was on fire. What is more, one eye-witness
claims that all of Netaji's clothes had to be stripped off whereas another says
that the trousers were not taken off. Just mark the difference between these
two versions. Habibur Rehman claimed that there was a four inches cut on
Netaji's head but the doctor who is claimed to have given the treatment,
asserted that there was no bleeding injury on Netaji's body. If the difference
should have been about some internal injury or some internal disease, the
difference might have been overlooked because of Col. Habibur Rehman or some
others being non-medicoes. But in commenting on the aspects discussed above, no
expert medical knowledge was required. Hence there is no reason that such
differences should be lost sight of. Since the differences are not explicable,
it can be concluded that either the different witnesses were talking of some
different persons or whatever they talked was sheer nonsense and a part of well
planned conspiracy.
7. All
those people who claimed to be eye-witnesses were educated and were holding
responsible positions in the disciplined forces. They were not supposed to give
incoherent, irresponsible, irrational, self-defeating, contradictory and
indefensible statements. Moreover, whatever statements are given by them, they
are supposed to maintain a record of that, and whenever they had to make
statements on the same issue, they were supposed to consult their previous
statements. It is all the more essential when the people know that they are
making their statements in response to some questions from investigating
agencies or the enquiry commissions.
The
manner in which Col. Habibur Rehman, the only Indian accompanying Netaji, made
contradictory and different statements at different times about the same
incident compels one to suspect the motives and truthfulness of the statements.
He claimed to be with Netaji from the time of departure from Saigon till the
time of alleged cremation. About the alleged cremation he thrice changed the
date of cremation within forty-two days. Surprisingly the enquiry committee and
commissions opted to overlook the discrepancy. Shah Nawaz Committee in its
report about the discrepancy has written,
"So,
not withstanding discrepancies and variations, which are only too likely after
the lapse of so many years, the statements of witnesses must be taken as worthy
of credit. "1
The
committee had already apparently resolved to overlook and condone many of the
discrepancies because it was enquiring into an incident which had taken place
eleven years back. If the principle of lapse of time had to be considered, then
any discrepancy could have been given the benefit of doubt. Unfortunately this
committee overlooked even those discrepancies which were clearly visible in the
statements made immediately after the alleged accident. This is all the more
important and serious when the statements are of the person like Col. Habibur
Rehman, whose versions carry maximum weight.
About the
alleged cremation, Col. Habibur Rehman in the written and signed statement on
24th August, 1945, claimed that the body was cremated on. 22nd August. On 8th
Sept. 1945 he met Mr. S.A. Aiyer and' told him that the body was cremated on
20th August. On 29th September 1945, while deposing before the Counter Intelligence
Corps, he said,
"On
August 19, 1945 Bose was removed from the Hospital--Maj. Nagatomo, a Japanese
Staff Officer, informed Rehman on August 21, ]945 that the body be cremated...
On August 22, 1945, the ashes were removed, by Nakamura and Maj. Nagatomo."2
The above
three statements which were made within 42 days of the alleged accident, if
analysed objectively and critically, clearly expose the untruth behind the
whole thing. Shah Nawaz's contention that the lapse of time might have affected
the memory does not hold water. Is it possible and advisable to accept that a
person like Col. Habibur Rehman, who is claimed to be so closely, intimately
and deeply attached to Netaji, could have changed thrice his version in such a
short span of time. Keeping in view the nature of relationship between Col.
Habibur Rehman and Netaji, it can be presumed that during those 42 days at
least his mind would have been so completely overwhelmed with the incident that
he should have remembered the developments of not only of every day, every hour
but also of each minute. It won't be wrong to say that in those days just by
closing his eyes, Habibur Rehman should have been in a position to recapitulate
the whole story. The changes "in his statements clearly indicate that he
was concealing the truth, and that too intentionally. There are reasons for him
to behave like this. What those reasons are will be discussed in detail in the
succeeding chapter.
It is not
only the frequent changes in the statements of Habibur Rehman which mattered;
the statement of Gen. Isoda, the head of Hikari Kikan, is also of great
importance. In the second week of September] 945 he claimed that the body of
Netaji was flown to Japan and cremated there on August 20. Gen. lsoda was a
very senior officer and his version cannot be brushed aside as a figment of
imagination. Moreover, why should have he told such a lie? He would not have
gained anything out of it. The argument that his version was an isolated one
does in no way disprove his point. Though it is true that he has no evidence to
support his version yet it is also true that the others also do not have any
evidence. Their only advantage over him is that they are numerically more.
Since both Col. Habibur Rehman and Gen. Isoda, are supposed to be very
responsible persons, such a great difference between their versions cannot be
just because of some genuine mistake. Even unintentionally these people cannot
commit such blunders as could disprove the whole story, but the fact is that
they gave extremely opposite versions just to provide an indication to the
followers of Netaji that the accident story was a plot to provide an escape to
him. If the cremation would have actually taken place then it should not have
been at two places in Taiwan as well as in Japan.
8. Col.
Habibur Rehman was the only Indian accompanying Netaji and it was clear to all
that without his evidence people would not accept Netaji's death story. He was
to act as a 'link' between Netaji and the Indian history. He was conscious of
the fact that his each word was to be critically analysed by his colleagues,
countrymen and the historians all over the world. Keeping in view this fact he
was supposed to be extremely careful about each word stated by him. The way he
changed his versions, makes one feel as if he were not conscious of the
significance of the words uttered by him. It is really unfortunate that at that
time the masses, particularly the I.N.A. people did not confront him as
aggressively and vigorously as they should have done to extract the truth from
him. Instead of bycotting him, publicly humiliating him and calling him a
traitor, he was given a V.I.P. treatment by the public at large. The fact that
he was with Netaji during the last few hours of Netaji's **** known life,
became his credentials. Everybody from the P.M. of the country to the man in
street was interested to know about the views of Col.. Habibur Rehman. Why? It
is not because he had invented overnight something or he had attained some
divine light, but it was because of the fact that he was believed to be the
only Indian as eye-witness to the last known moments of Netaji's life. Though
the people did not accept whatever he told about the alleged air crash yet he
had realised that there were many, specially the prominent national leaders,
who were not interested in knowing the truth or finding out what the truth was.
He had performed his initial duty by narrating the incident in such a manner as
could have convinced even the ordinary vigilant or critical person that the
story was the false story, but he must have been surprised to see that there
were almost none who could confront him with searching through inconvenient
questions. Not only this, Pt. Nehru, after coming to power said it on more than
one occasions that for all practical purposes Netaji had died in the air crash
because Col.. Habibur Rehman, the only eye-witness of Indian origin, had
confirmed it. Habibur Rehman, just by telling a lie, made a place for himself
in political history. People ask, 'why Cot. Habibur Rehman, such a trusted man
of Netaji to a lie?' The answer is that Netaji himself wanted him to tell a lie
because it was a part of the plot. According to Col.. Gulzara Singh, one of the
members of Netaji's cabinet and the one who accompanied him upto Saigon, 'Only
one person was taken with Netaji because it was easy to keep the secrecy with
one person than with many.' Col.. Habibur Rehman did what he was instructed to
do by Netaji. People ask, 'why did not he speak the truth afterwards ?' The
answer is that he was not given instruction about the period of time after
which he was supposed to speak the truth. The plan was that Netaji would escape
to some safe place, Col.. Habibur Rehman would give some story to the world to
mislead the Britishers and other allies. Habibur Rehman played the role which
was assigned to him. Neither he spoke the truth nor he concealed that he was
telling a lie. He managed to give such versions as convinced the enemy that
something had happened to Netaji and at the same time the details of the
incident given by him were so contradictory and confusing that their
Intelligence Agencies were at a loss for quite sometime to find the truth. He
succeeded as is quite evident from the reports submitted by the various
intelligence agencies to their respective headquarters. Lord Wavell, Lord
Mountbatten, Gen Mac Arthur and many prominent leaders did not believe this
story to be true because it was narrated in a very intelligent manner.
The other
part of the plan was that Netaji would reach some safe place, establish himself
and as per his own convenience make the necessary announcements at the
appropriate time. Unfortunately this time Netaji could not succeed in
materialising his dreams and fell in some such hands, as are known to the
history to be one of the most cruel, inhuman and ruthless. Netaji was playing
with a double edged sword, playing with fire-works in hand, and trying to walk
on a tight rope at a considerable height with cobras and hungry lions waiting
for the rope walker to fall and make a meal of him. NETAJI FELL INTO WRONG
HANDS, COULDN'T ESCAPE FROM THERE AND FAILED TO SEND ANY SIGNAL OR MESSAGE FROM
THERE HABIBUR REHMAN NEITHER HAD ANY INSTRUCTION NOR GOT ANY LATER HENCE HE HAD
NO REASON TO REVEAL THE TRUTH. He was not strong enough to dedicate his life to
trace the person whom he had bade good-bye. Besides this, perhaps, Habibur
Rehman was not a staunch and committed Hindustani. Unfortunately he had some
unpleasant experiences in India after his return from South East Asia. Perhaps
because of this, after partition, he not only shifted to Pakistan but also
fought against India. He actively participated in the construction of Karakoram
road. Since his sentiments for India, for whatsoever reasons, had died and he
had started thinking in terms of Anti-India postures, he might have put a final
end to his loyalty for Netaji. If this appears to be an injustice to a person
on whom Netaji had such deep faith, we can say that he was caught up in such
circumstances as compelled him to not to reveal the truth.
I regret
to write that after having met a large number of soldiers, officers and
political comrades of Netaji, I have come to believe that none of them was
committed, daring and adventurous enough to stake his life or career for
tracing Netaji. If Habibur Rehman also didn't do the needful, it is no
surprise. Habibur Rehman couldn't speak the truth because neither he had the
courage to speak it nor there were people who could protect him if he spoke it.
Besides this even if he would have spoken it, in the absence of evidence,
people would have disbelieved even his saying 'Netaji didn't die in the air
crash.' As people did not believe the news of death of Netaji given by him,
similarly people would hot have believed the news of Netaji not having died in
the air crash. Hence it is not wise to accept the air crash story just because
Habibur Rehman had confirmed it. The motives of Habibur Rehman were different.
9. At the
time of cremation, only a few selected people were there. Besides Col. Habibur
Rehman some Japanese were there. Maj.Nagatomo, who claims to have attended the
funeral on behalf of the Formosan Army Command, told Shah Nawaz that Gen. Endo,
Commander of the Formosan Army, went to the hospital to see Netaji and also
attended his funeral. But Gen. Isayama, the Chief of the General Staff of the
Formosan Army, denied that Gen. Endo or he himself had visited the hospital or
crematorium. If the cremation would have been attended by hundreds or thousands
of people and a large number of V.I.P.'s, there could have been some scope of
misunderstanding about the presence or absence of any individual, but since
only a handful of persons were there, and the number of officers was still
fewer, and definitely not more than five or six, in such a situation there was
no scope of misunderstanding about the presence or absence of any senior
officers. If the visiting officers were of lower rank, it was possible that
Maj. Nagatomo could have some confusion about them but since it was the
question of such a senior military officer, Maj.Nagatomo could not have any
doubt about it. The confusion about the people attending the funeral in fact is
a part of the plan to confuse the investigating agencies. In fact there was
neither any death nor any funeral. Hence there was no question of anybody's
attending it. Therefore it is immaterial who says and what?
10. The
people all over the world know that before cremation the body is taken out of
coffin. This is more true particularly about the people belonging to Hindu
Religion and others who bum their dead bodies. In this case the body was not
taken out of the coffin. It is strange that the whole coffin was put inside the
furnace. It has also been stated by one of the witnesses that since the opening
of the furnace was small and the coffin could not be put inside the furnace.
the opening of the furnace was broken to widen it and the coffin was placed
inside the furnace.
If Col.
Habibur Rehman or for that matter any other person of Indian origin would not
have been there, then believing that Japanese did not have much information or
knowledge about the Indian customs, could have been presumed to be unaware of
the Indian traditions and might have been given the benefit of doubt about
cremating the body with coffin. But in this case since Habibur Rehman was
there, this concession could not be granted. The drama of putting the coffin in
the furnace was enacted just to perform the formality of having performed the
cremation. It is also possible that empty coffin might have been put inside the
furnace. It is alleged that Japanese are guilty of not paying due regards to
the dead body of Netaji. Well, since no dead body was there, Japanese could
not. have been expected to show due courtesy to the empty coffin. Hence I would
like to assert that only a few, comparatively lower ranking officers, attended
the so-called funeral. All the norms were not observed because norms need not
be observed when the person for whom the norms had to be observed was not
there. Whatever was said or done is a part of conspiracy or plan to provide an
escape to Netaji.
11. Shah
Nawaz Committee in its report has stated,
"A
person of the status of Netaji as Head of a State that was not only recognised
by Japan, but was helped materially in every way by Japan, and vice-versa, was
not given the requisite facility, and honour due to him from the very start,
viz, by providing a separate plane or seats for him and for all his associates;
treatment in a small hospital with a junior medical officer--a Captain; manner
of cremation; disposal of ashes; etc, all without due honour and respect, viz,
full military funeral, body placed on a gun carriage with full military
honours, etc."3
From the
above report of the Shah Nawaz Committee it is clear that whatever was presumed
to be due to Netaji was not given by the Japanese. In order to prove the real
intentions of Japanese we should have circumstantial and substantial evidence
to prove that the Japanese did not really give him the regards which they
should have given. The past history doesn't support the conclusions of the Shah
Nawaz Committee. Permitting Netaji to escape even without the formal approval
of the Japanese High Command, speaks of the respect which the Field Staff had
for Netaji. Shah Nawaz Committee has complained that Japanese did not provide
him a separate aeroplane. Well it is possible that the plane might not have
been intentionally provided as a part of the strategy to help him in escaping.
Moreover, the planes in which Netaji and his party had come from Singapore to
Saigon, could have been allowed to carry on the journey. Why was Netaji not
allowed to continue his journey in the previous plane? Why was not the other
plane accompanying Netaji's plane allowed to go ahead with the journey? There
is no definite information about it. Besides Netaji, Habibur Rehman and eleven
others were in the plane in which they were finally permitted to fly. Were all
of them going on such important missions that none of them could have been left
behind to accommodate another person from Netaji's group? If a lot of weapons
were unloaded to accommodate Netaji and Habibur Rehman, was it really
impossible to unload more luggage to accommodate one more person. FOR A PERSON
OF TERAUCHI'S RANK IT WAS NOT AT ALL DIFFICULT TO SEND EVEN THE WHOLE TEAM,
EVEN UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT A TEAM WAS NOT SENT INTENTIONALLY BECAUSE
GOING OF MORE PERSONS WOULD HAVE MADE IT DIFFICULT TO KEEP THE SECRECY OF THE
PLAN. SINCE IT WAS ADVISABLE TO TAKE ONLY ONE PERSON, HENCE ONLY ONE PERSON WAS
ALLOWED. The Shah Nawaz Committee is right in its observation that a separate
plane should have been provided to the team of Netaji but since it did not fit
into the plan, it was not provided. It has been complained that at that time
many aeroplanes were not available, hence the team which was to follow was not
provided another aeroplane to follow him. But surprisingly, on 20th August,
some members of the team left behind, including Col. Gulzara Singh, were
provided a plane to go to Hanoi. If the plane could be provided for going to
Hanoi, why could it not be provided for Taihoku or Tokyo? THE REASON IS THE
SECRET PLAN. NETAJI WAS TO BE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE TIME TO SAFELY MOVE OUT OF THE
DANGER ZONE BEFORE THE WORLD CAME TO KNOW ABOUT THE REALITY . THAT IS WHY MOST
OF THE COURTESIES WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN OBSERVED IN DEALING WITH NETAJI WERE
IN FACT NOT OBSERVED.
12.
Suppose the accident should have taken place, could it have been difficult to
collect the evidence and that too in a place like Taihoku in Formosa. Do you
know that the area of the country is hardly 13,807 sq. miles. In 1940 its
population was hardly 55 lakh, less than half of the population of present
Delhi. Taihoku, presently Taipeh, capital of the country, though a big city yet
was not like a metropolitan city of these days. At such a place it was not
difficult for the Intelligence Agencies to find conclusive, direct and
convincing evidence which could prove that an air crash had taken place. But
unfortunately all the Intelligence Agencies failed to give to the world any
reliable and conclusive evidence. THEY CAN BE PRESUMED TO HAVE FAILED BECAUSE
IF THEY HAD SUCCEEDED, THEY WOULD HAVE MADE PUBLIC ALL THE EVIDENCE COLLECTED
BY THEM WHICH WOULD HAVE SETTLED THE CONTROVERSY FOR EVER. EVEN THE GOVT. OF
INDIA, HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER PT. NEHRU, WHO WAS VERY ENTHUSIASTIC AND KEEN
TO PROVE THE DEATH OF NETAJI, WOULD HAVE PAID ANY PRICE, UNDERTAKEN ANY RISK
AND GONE TO ANY EXTENT TO COLLECT EVEN A DISTANTLY AND INDIRECTLY RELATED
EVIDENCE TO PROVE TO THE WORLD THAT NETAJI WAS NO MORE. Not only this, after
proving him to be dead, they would have brought to India the alleged ashes of
Netaji, constructed a huge memorial for him, and the person whom they had
expelled from their party and not given him even .001% support when he needed
it most, would have paid him the richest tributes and made maximum capital out
of his ventures and sacrifices. But unfortunately Nehru was not so lucky 10 be
in a position 10 pay tributes to him. In fact he was most reluctant to refer
publicly to him. From the study of all the independence day speeches made by
Pt. Nehru from the Red Fort, I have learnt that he did not refer to Netaji even
once. It is so surprising that a political party whose so-called greatest Prime
Minister did not even once refer to the greatest revolutionary of the Indian
Freedom struggle, thought of honouring him with Bharat Ratna after forty five
years of India's Independence. A party took forty seven years since Netaji's
disappearance to bestow on him the nation's highest award. They have conferred
the award posthumously. How has this govt. conferred the award posthumously?
Has the Parliament ever passed a resolution accepting him to be dead? If no,
what latest evidence has come to its notice which enabled it to announce the
award posthumously. I believe Netaji did not die in the alleged air crash. I
wish he were alive today but I fear that this govt. might have received a
secret signal indicating that since Netaji has died, let him be given the
highest award. The persons in the power had been and have been afraid of even
the shadows and the ghost of those who can challenge their position. Hence
Nehru and others were scared of his return. They destroyed all the relevant
records and helped in establishing the truthfulness of the air crash story
which in fact never took place.
13. It is
claimed by the people who were with Netaji at the time of death that he had
given his last message. Col. Habibur Rehman claimed that the following message
was given by Netaji:
"I
have fought to the last for India's Independence and now am giving my life in
the same attempt. Countrymen! Continue the Independence fight. Before long
India will be free. Long live Azad Hind."4
On the
other hand sister Tsan, the nurse who was attending Netaji, claimed that the
last words of Netaji were,
"Quiet
Death. I am dying peacefully."5
Contrary
to both these versions Mr.Tara Kuno, one of the survivors of the crash claimed
that the last words of Netaji were,
"Please
give my best regards to our comrades in Saigon."6
Tatsuo
Hayashida in his book 'Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose' has claimed that, Mr.
Nakamura told him that Netaji spoke four times.
"The
First time he said, 'My men are following me and they should be taken care of
when they come to Formosa.' The second time he asked. 'What happened to Gen.
Shidei l' The third time he said, 'My blood is rushing to the head. Please give
me treatment for that.' The fourth time he said, 'I want to sleep'."7
Well
there are four different versions of the four eye-witnesses about the last
words of Netaji. Is it possible to believe that these people should have been
confused about the last words of Netaji. He definitely did not die four times.
Hence there could not be four statements which can be claimed to be his last
words. These four statements are not identical and hence there cannot be any
confusion about their meaning or contents. All the four witnesses have
expressed their views in clear-cut words leaving no scope for any ambiguity in
their interpretations. Since the person was so important and the people
attached to him were conscious of the importance of whatever they said, they
could not have given contradictory statements unintentionally. Whatever has
been said is a part of planned conspiracy. No statement in fact was made by
Netaji because he was not in the hospital.
14. Since
it is the case of a person meeting death in a remote island under the
suspicious circumstances, anybody would have realised that people would not
easily accept the story narrated by anyone if there were not sufficient
supporting evidences. In the whole story what is of the greatest importance is
the statements of Col. Habibur Rehman. As a responsible officer and faithful
follower, he must have known even at that time that his words alone will not be
sufficient to convince the people about the truthfulness of the story. By the
way what has been produced by Col. Habibur Rehman as an evidence of the death
of Netaji ? Why could not he produce even a small piece of the personal
belongings of Netaji which could have confirmed his death. Is it appropriate to
accept and believe that whatever was there on the body of Netaji at the time of
crash, was completely burnt to ashes? There must have been some metallic things
on the body and in the luggage of Netaji at the time of crash. Even if the
clothes were completely burnt, the metallic things could not have. Even a small
button of the dress of Netaji, some buckle of the belt, some medals, some pen
or anything of this sort could have been recovered from the site of accident
and served the purpose. If nothing else, even some half burnt piece of cloth of
Netaji's uniform could have been brought and produced as an evidence of
Netaji's having met with a fatal accident in the alleged air crash. But since
nothing of this sort was produced, it is difficult to believe that Netaji was
involved in any crash. Even if not for the sake of evidence, one likes to
retain some such things as souvenir of such great persons as Netaji. But
surprisingly and unfortunately Habibur Rehman did not bring anything. Netaji
must have been wearing shoes at the time of accident. It is not possible to
believe that the shoes burnt completely. Even the production of his shoes could
have confirmed the identity of the deceased. It appears that though it was
possible and feasible for Habibur Rehman to bring some such evidence, yet
keeping in view the fact that he didn't bring it, helps us in concluding that
since nothing had actually happened, nothing could be brought.
15. It is
claimed that Netaji was carrying some gold with him and a part of it was
recovered from the site of the alleged accident. The gold which is reported to
have been recovered from the site of the alleged accident, was not more than
15% of what was being actually carried by Netaji. What about the remaining
gold? If the accident had taken place at some ~emote place, it could have been
believed that some gold got misplaced, but since the site of accident was the
aerodrome itself, it could not. Besides this what is the guarantee that the gold
produced as an evidence was the same as was being carried by Netaji. Like all
other evidences, the production of gold as evidence disproves the alleged story
of air crash. If the lost gold would have been about 15% of what was being
carried by Netaji, it was understandable; the loss of 85% of the gold is
inexplicable. Most of the gold could not be recovered because the crash had not
taken place.
CHAPTER XV
Indian
Enquiry Commissions: A Critical Appraisal
After the
end of the second world war it was on 23rd August 1945 that the world was
informed about an alleged air crash which was alleged to have Netaji S.C. Bose
in it. It was reported that Netaji S.C. Bose died in this air crash. Since the
news was broadcast in a suspicious manner, the people did not believe the
truthfulness of the news. The Indian Political Leadership of those days also
did not believe and accept the crash story. In spite of their suspicions, even
after independence, the Govt. did not appear to be interested in holding
enquiry and investigation into the alleged air crash. From time to time, in
Public as well as in Parliament, demands were made for the appointment of some
enquiry commission to investigate into the circumstances leading to the
disappearance of Netaji S.C.. Bose. None of these demands was positively
responded by the Govt. There was no question of the Govt. taking any initiative
at its own. In fact it outrightly rejected the demands for the appointment of
any enquiry committee. Pt. J.L. Nehru himself on September 29, 1955, while
rejecting such a demand in the Lok Sabha, said,
"In
a matter of this kind, the only enquiry that is to a satisfactory manner, that
can be made can be made by the Govt. of Japan. The matter is in Japan, the
whole thing is there. We cannot impose ourselves or an enquiry committee on the
Japanese Govt. Of course, if they chose to enquire, we will gladly cooperate
and give such help as we can. But we cannot simply enquire into their territory
and more specially also where all the possible witnesses are probably either
Japanese Govt. officials or others connected with their Govt. And, as I said,
the initiative must come from the Japanese Govt. in this matter. "1
After
giving such a cold response to a demand for enquiry, he learnt that some
prominent citizens of Calcutta were thinking of appointing an independent
nonofficial enquiry committee under the chairmanship of internationally reputed
jurist Dr. Radha Benode Pal. This move so badly disturbed Pt. Nehru that just
64 days after making this announcement in the Lok Sabha, he changed his stand
and again announced in the Parliament on 3rd December 1955 that an official
committee will be appointed to look into the matter. Shri Shah Nawaz Khan, one
of the I.N.A. heroes of Red Fort trial and a member of Parliament; Shri Suresh
Chandra Bose, elder brother of Netaji S.C. Bose; and Shri S.N. Maitra, I.C.S.,
were the members of the enquiry committee. The terms of reference of the
committee were:
"To
enquire into and to report to the Govt. of India on the circumstances
concerning the departure of Netaji S.C.. Bose from Bangkok about 16th August
1945, his alleged death as a result of an aircraft accident and subsequent
developments connected therewith."2
What a
transformation? After refusing to take the initiative, he decided to appoint
the enquiry committee and posed to the world as if he were keenly and seriously
interested in finding facts about Netaji. This committee started its work in
April and finished it by the end of July. It enquired from those people who
were involved in the crash or in any way related to the accident. Without
visiting the site of the accident, rather without visiting even the country in
which the accident had taken place, overlooking all the contradictions in the
statements and versions of the various witnesses, the committee concluded:
"Whether
Netaji met his death as a result of this accident. The witnesses support this
story. There is no reason why they should be disbelieved. After a lapse of
about ten years, these witnesses who belong to different walks of life and to
different nationalities-Habib, an Indian and subsequently a Pakistani, and the
others, who are Japanese, who are mostly unconnected with one another and no
longer in the service of their Govt., and Japan not being a totalitarian state
would not be expected to state what was not true."3
How
strange! An enquiry committee basing its conclusions on such grounds as 'People
belonging to different nationalities would not be expected to state what was
not true.' Without finding the facts which could confirm the death of Netaji,
the committee based its judgement on the statements given by the people who
claimed to be eyewitnesses. What is the guarantee that they were the witnesses?
If they really had been the witnesses, why should there had been so serious
contradictions in their versions? No conclusive and direct evidence was
presented before this committee. The committee did not visit the site of
accident or the country in which the accident had taken place. Without visiting
the site of accident or getting any conclusive evidence, the Shah Nawaz
Committee declared Netaji to be dead.
The
report of this committee failed to satisfy anyone as a result of which demands
for fresh enquiries continued to be made at different times. Prof. Samar Guha,
in 1967, in his 45 minutes maiden speech in Lok Sabha, raised this issue. This
speech generated such an atmosphere as inspired 350 members of Parliament to
sign the memorandum seeking the appointment of National Committee on Netaji. As
a result of his efforts the Govt. of India was left with no option but to
announce the setting up of a 'one man judicial commission to enquire into
disappearance of Netaji S.C. Bose.' Earlier some people felt that since the
enquiry was not conducted by some judge, it's reporting was not convincing and
satisfactory. This time it was decided to appoint a judge to probe into the
matter. It is presumed and believed that the judges are in a better position to
do justice to such enquiries. It is keeping in view the nature of duties to be
performed by the judges that they are supposed to live an isolated and
non-controversial life. Such people as want to taste the fruits of a glamorous,
controversial and active public life should refrain from accepting the judicial
assignment. Mr. G.D. Khosla, a retired Chief Justice of Punjab High Court, was
appointed chairman of the one man judicial commission. From the study of
Justice Khosla's book 'Last Days of Netaji' it appears that he was a highly
ambitious and glamour seeking person. Because of this it appears that he was
unfit for such an assignment of enquiring into an issue which involved
wide-ranging political implications. While accepting this assignment he was
conscious of the fact that its acceptance will magnify and glorify his own image.
He was fascinated by this offer. He wrote in his book:
"I
pondered over the matter. An enquiry into the disappearance of this
extraordinary dynamic and volatile man, who had almost succeeded in winning the
battle for India, should be a fascinated pursuit."5
Though he
was fascinated by the offer yet he was double-minded about accepting it. He
claims that Mr. Srinivasavaradan, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Home
Affairs, rang him. The former clarified some of the ambiguities and explained
the nature of work which was involved in this assignment. The former added,
"Some
of the evidence has to be taken in India and your visits abroad can be fixed at
your own convenience."6
The word
'abroad' had the desired effect. While commenting on it, Justice Khosla wrote,
"Mention
of visits abroad was obviously intended to perform the function of the
proverbial carrot. 'Abroad' is the glorious heaven-on-earth that almost every
Indian yearns to visit. Japan was a country I had long wanted to see, and I
gathered from Srinivasavardhan that several witnesses possessing first hand
knowledge of events relating to Bose's disappearance were available there.
Constraints of 'P' form and the foreign currency regulations had prevented me
from realizing my desire, and now the hand of God was ready to remove these
impediments. But, looking back I observed that the prospect of a visit to Japan
was only one of many factors which helped me to make a decision. The enquiry
held the promise of a fascinating experience. It would demand persistence and
imagination tempered by my long judicial experience in regarding all matters
objectively and unemotionally. It would provide me with a psychological study
of a large cross section of people. Suddenly, the Bose problem became a
challenge, a kind of compulsion that left me no choice."7
The views
expressed in the above paragraph have serious contradictions. He started with
referring to the allurement of visit to abroad, then talked about the
professional satisfaction which he was likely to get in the assignment and
finally he talked about Bose problem as a challenge. It is not clear that how
Bose problem became a challenge for him. It appears that by saying so he tried
to camouflage his baser intentions which he had expressed in the earlier part of
the statement. Such views or feelings indicate that he was succeptible to
allurement or even unfair practices. This fails the very purpose of appointing
judicial enquiry commission. Justice Khosla in his book 'Last Days of Netaji'
wrote:
"This
is the real reason why public confidence, in our law courts and judges,
persists and there are frequent demands for a judicial enquiry in to the
matters of controversy. It is not the personality of a judge or his reputation
for integrity and impartiality which prompts these demands, for judges are
human and can make mistakes, but because a judge has to state the reasons for
his findings, and these reasons must be sound enough to stand the stress of
public glare."8
It is
really unfortunate that Justice Khosla himself could neither come up to the
standards fixed by him nor give a satisfactory and convincing report. A
critical study of his book reveals that he could perform his duties neither
objectively nor unemotionally, as desired by him. This becomes quite clear from
the comments which he gave about the various witnesses who appeared before him.
Those witnesses who supported the theory of air crash were described by him as
intelligent and dependable people, whereas those who opposed this theory were
described as day-dreamers, joke crackers and the people with the vested
interests aiming at self-glorification and trying to win cheap popularity and
undue importance. It is regretted to point out that Justice Khosla appears to
have taken on himself the task of defending Pt. Nehru in the court of history.
Whatever went against Pt. Nehru was either not accepted by him or he tried to
prove that all that was wrong. Some of the witnesses who appeared before him
alleged that Nehru was not having friendly relations or attitude towards Netaji
and this factor was responsible for the lack of efforts on the part of Nehru
Govt. to find facts about the whereabouts of Netaji. Some witnesses pointed out
that Nehru, in a statement, had asserted that he will not let Netaji enter
India if he was coming under Japanese auspices. To this Justice Khosla reacted:
"No
evidence was produced before me to prove the remark attributed to Nehru that he
would oppose Bose with the force of arms. Mr. Dwijendra Nath Bose said that
Nehru had expressed this sentiment when he was told that Bose might invade
India with the help of Japanese forces. If this remark were indeed made by
Nehru, it did not indicate any hostility towards Bose. All that Nehru must have
meant was that he would have opposed Japanese domination of India as he had
opposed British domination. Bose entering India with Japanese assistance would
only mean one thing for Nehru that India would become a colony of Japan, and to
this Nehru was sternly opposed. "9
First of
all Justice Khosla unnecessarily suspected the authenticity of the claims made
by Mr. Dwijendra Nath Bose about the statement of Nehru. The fact is that, Pt.
Nehru, in an interview to the press at Srinagar, on 19th August 1945, had
stated:
"Three
years ago I was asked in Calcutta what 1 will do if Subhas Bose led an army
into India on the plea of liberating India. I replied them that I wouldn't
hesitate to resist this invasion, even though I did not doubt that Subhas Bose
and the Indian colleagues and followers were motivated by the desire to free
India, and were in no way mere tools of the Japanese. Nevertheless, they had
put themselves on the wrong side, and functioned under the auspices of the
Japanese. No person could come to India in this manner or under such foreign
auspices. Therefore, whatever the motives of these people, they had to be
resisted in India or outside. "10
It is
clear that the comments of Justice Khosla about the version given by Mr. D.N.
Bose, were not justified. It is all the more strange that Justice Khosla, at
his own, tried to explain what Pt. Nehru could have meant. Though each
statement is subject to different interpretations yet there can't be any doubt
about the implication of Nehru's attitude towards Netaji from this statement
Moreover, how could Pt. Nehru resist the entry of Netaji in India? Did Pt.
Nehru have an army of his own? Was it possible, during the British regime, to
organise an army? If it was not possible then the only way in which Pt. Nehru
could resist the invasion of Netaji was with the help of the British anny. If
Nehru had taken the help of the Britishers, there couldn't be worse thing than
that. Moreover, resisting Netaji with the help of Britishers would have
perpetuated the British regime in India? Besides this were the British lesser
enemy of India than anybody else in the world? How and why did Justice Khosla
try to explain and justify the stand taken by Pt. Nehru? Normally a judge is
not expected to do so. It appears that he had some ulterior motives behind it.
If he had no motive, he could have asked why should Pt. Nehru talk of resisting
the efforts of Netaji? Instead of raising such questions, he tried to defend
Nehru and even claimed,
"There
is no reason for believing that relation between Nehru and Bose were anything
but friendly on personal basis."1l
While
making this observation, Justice Khosla was either ignorant or opted to
overlook the real nature of relationship between Netaji and Nehru. The fact is
that in one of the letters Netaji had written to Mr. Amiya Nath Bose,
"Nobody
has done more harm to me personally and to our cause in this crisis than Pandit
Nehru. "12 (Detailed analysis of the relationship between Nehru and Bose
have been made in the preceding chapters.)
Justice
Khosla did not abandon his efforts here to defend Nehru. He has written about
the meeting between Pt. Nehru and Lord Mountbatten,
"He
met Mountbatten in Singapore but the meeting was a chance encounter."13
It is not
clear as to what did Justice Khosla mean from the chance factor. Normally it
should be presumed that they had not to meet and just by chance they happened
to be together. Perhaps Justice Khosla thought it expedient to ignore the
background of the meeting and the consequences which followed this meeting. It
is a hard fact that the British army was not happy over Nehru's visit to Burma
and Malaya because I.N.A. had fought against the British. Nehru had gone there
with a view to look into and solve the problems of I.N.A. and had a programme
to lay wreath on the I.N.A. war memorial. The programme of laying wreath on the
war memorial annoyed the British Army officers. They had declined to make
arrangements for the visit of Nehru. When Mountbatten learnt about it, he
personally intervened and told the army officers that if they shall not make
arrangements for Pt. Nehru's visit, he shall lend his own car for him. This
left no option for the army but to make arrangements for Pt. Nehru's visit. An
official reception was given to Pt Nehru which was followed by a formal dinner.
This dinner played a very vital role in the political developments in India.
Mountbatten advised Pt. Nehru not to visit the I.N.A. memorial and the latter
obliged. After going through all the details, can we say that it was a 'chance
meeting'?
Since
Justice Khosla had based his conclusions on the presumption that there was no
hostility on the part of Nehru towards I.N.A. or Bose, he has written that
though Nehru didn't lay wreath on I.N.A. war memorial yet he went there and
brought a marble slab which he later presented to Shah Nawaz Khan. One fails to
understand what did Justice Khosla'intend to convey from it? Anybody can very
well understand that what does it mean to not to lay the wreath while visiting
a war memorial. It is not only becoming discourteous, disrespectful and
uncivilised but also unpatriotic. What was the idea of bringing a marble slab,
if at all it was brought, if he had not laid a wreath on the war memorial. This
slab must have been brought for its sentimental value for the patriotic I.N.A.
people. If he had real regards for the sacrifices of the I.N.A. people, he
should have laid the wreath on the war memorial. I feel that Justice Khosla,
before absolving Pt. Nehru of any unfriendly intentions towards Bose, should
have analysed the point more critically and rationally. It is unfortunate that
Justice Khosla, in his passionate efforts to justify whatever was done by Pt.
Nehru, went out of the way though still he failed to protect him. In doing so
he did a great injustice not only to the cause of justice but also to the
interests of the nation.
Whereas
Justice Khosla went out of the way in defending Nehru, he left no efforts to
invent arguments against Netaji. In his book, he wrote:
"All
the evidence points to the fact that the Japanese neither had complete
confidence in Bose's ability to lead a large army and secure victories over the
Allied forces, nor did they fully trust him. They, nevertheless, had
considerable respect for him because they saw that he was a man of remarkable courage
and unquestioned patriotism. "14
I do not
know from which incident or accident could Justice Khosla imply or derive that
Japanese didn't trust Netaji. The fact is that they trusted him more than they
trusted any other foreign leader. This is quite clear from the pace of
developments which took place after his arrival in Japan. Ignoring all the
positive points and the warmth which marked the relationship between the
Japanese and Netaji, Justice Khosla observed:
"It
mattered little to them what happened to Chandra Bose, as they called Bose, and
his I.N.A. The I.N.A. was a useful enough organization when the war was still
being waged, but now it was a superfluity, a bothersome redundancy that had no
business to make demands of material help or advice upon a people utterly
defeated, demoralized and wallowing in self-pity."15
He
further added:
"Their
respect for Bose began and ended with his usefulness to them. After their
surrender Bose could be of no assistance to them. They deprived him of the
personal aircraft which they had placed at his disposal. They showed little
respect to him. Field Marshal Terauchi did not condescend to admit Bose's
emissary to a personal interview. The war had come to an end and so had Bose's
usefulness to the Japanese. They paid certain amount of lip service to Bose and
offered him an asylum in Japan. They were willing to give some little help in
providing him with a means of escape, but beyond this they were not willing to
do anything. "16
These
comments of Justice Khosla clearly reflect how much prejudiced was he against
Netaji. He laboured hard to prove that Japanese didn't respect Netaji. How much
regards Japanese gave to Netaji has already been discussed in detail in the
earlier chapters. In spite of all the difficulties and the worst humiliations,
Japanese did for Netaji and I.NA whatever was humanly possible for them under
the circumstances. When Netaji requested the Govt. of Japan to help him in
going to Japan, much before the war concluded, the Govt of Japan sent the following
telegramme:
"Nippon
Govt. desires that Your Excellency would endeavour in bringing our active
combined operations to a successful issue in spite of present difficulty of war
situations through good understanding of Nippon's intentions. "17
This
shows how much regards Japanese gave to Netaji. Justice Khosla had no reason
and justification in inventing the facts which tried to portray Netaji as a
weakling. When a judge holds such opinions in his mind, one is unable to do
justice. Justice Khosla himself wrote in the already referred book, while
commenting about Samar Guha's passionate hunt for disproving the death story of
Netaji,
"Indeed,
it almost seemed as if Mr. Guha's pursuit of truth was a predatory hunt in
which the objectives were the findings of the Shah Nawaz Khan Committee and the
story of Bose's death caused by an air crash. This was regrettable, because he
who seeks the truth does not set out with a prepossessed notion of disproving a
hypothesis or a theory. The impartial, unprejudiced mind has no blot on its
copy book which must be erased before a new score can be set down. Mr. Guha's
passionate anxiety to disprove Bose's death made him interpret every piece of
evidence, every rumour, every conjecture only in accordance with his personal
pre-possessions."18
Whatever
Justice Khosla has said about Prof. Samar Guha, applies to his own self also.
As Prof. Samar Guha appears to be trying to disprove the death story, similarly
Justice Khosla appeared to be bent upon proving the story to be true. Instead
of critically analysing and giving due weightage to the different versions of
the different witnesses, he commented,
"Slight
differences in the versions narrated by different witnesses are exactly what
one would expect in the circumstances. Indeed, had the witnesses presented a
wholly consistent story with identical incidents and unvarying subsidiary
details, I should have been disinclined to accept what the witnesses said, and
would have suspected an act of subornation."19
We see
that Justice Khosla intentionally overlooked the differences to which he
described as 'slight differences'. Unfortunately even the most glaring
contradictions in the versions of different witnesses, as already discussed in
the previous chapters, did not appear to him worth consideration. Instead of
entertaining the possibility of conspiracy behind Netaji's escape, he
concluded,
"Once
the bogey of a carefully planned conspiracy about a fictitious air crash is
laid low, the rest falls into a natural and acceptable pattern. The other criticisms
are then blunted, and they leave unimpaired the story narrated by independent,
disinterested witnesses who were themselves involved in the crash. The
discrepancies and contradictions in their statements are seen to be the result
of the long passage of time across which the events were viewed and related.
"20
In this
way after irresponsibly and without explanation dropping the most fundamental
things about the controversy, he ignored the differences in the versions of
witnesses and concluded that Netaji died in the alleged air crash. Justice
Khosla, in order to weaken the case of those who believed that Netaji didn't
die, tried to highlight those witnesses whose arguments were most unconvincing.
He has tried to prove that the supporters of the theory of 'Netaji being alive'
were irresponsible persons. He has not been able to give even a single
evidence, acceptable to any court of law, proving the death of Netaji. On the
other hand he based his conclusions on very flimsy and unconvincing grounds. Justice
Khosla, while concluding his book, has written,
"Nearly
thirty years have rolled by and Bose, the restless and dynamic patriot, the man
of indomitable courage and uncompromising love for his countrymen, has not made
an appearance. A person fired with so much energy and motive power cannot
remain in hiding. Inactivity was foreign to his nature. We must accept the fact
of his death, and console ourselves with the thought that he died rendering
active service to his country. "21
From the
above remarks it is clear that his failure to appear is also taken as an
evidence of his being no more. Unfortunately Justice Khosla did not consider
the possibility of Netaji having been detained somewhere, for any motive
whatsoever. Right from the moment of accepting the assignment 'till the
submission of report, Justice Khosla appeared to have worked in a motivated
manner, trying to establish his pre-possessed notions.
It is
because of the inability of Justice Khosla to present a convincing report, that
the Parliament rejected this report: This report having been rejected by
Parliament, it is essential that another high powered enquiry commission should
be appointed to look into the circumstances leading to the disappearance of
Netaji and the involvement of the people who failed to take timely action to
establish the ultimate truth about the whole thing related to Netaji's
disappearance.
CHAPTER XVI
Nehru and
INA in Post Independent India
About a
decade back I read in a book that Hitler's uniform, which had got damaged in
the bomb blast in the bunker, was burnt by the Allied forces. At that time I
had failed to understand why it was so essential for Hitler's enemies to
destroy even his damaged uniform but now I understand why it was done. Hitler
had a magnetic personality and he could capture the imagination of anyone.
Though he had done quite many inhumane things yet his positive achievements
were so large and unbelievable that these could have easily influenced his
countrymen, particularly the young people, even decades after his death. Hence
the Allied thought it essential to destroy all possible remnants of Hitler.
Perhaps somewhat similar was the case of Netaji in India. Like me, most of the
people, particularly the young people are at a loss to understand why certain
things were done and why certain things were not done about Netaji by the
post-independence political leadership of India.
The
leader, who held the most important position in the post-independent India, was
Pt. J.L. Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India. A critical study of his life
and dealings with Subhas Chandra Bose reveal that he was instrumental in the
resignation of Netaji from the President of All india Congress Party, his
expulsion from the Congress Party, his criticism for joining hands with the
Fascist forces, resistance to the I.N.A. efforts to liberate India with the
help of Japanese, Congress championing the cause of I.N.A. in the Red Fort
trials and later on agreeing to abandon his programme of laying wreath on
I.N.A. War Memorial at Singapore and as Prime Minister handling the issue of
I.N.A. in a cunning, deceitful and insincere manner. Before commenting on the
post-independence attitude of Nehru towards I.N.A., let us see what approach he
had before the independence.
Though
politics is the other name of opportunism yet our politicians appear to be
expert in pouncing and grabbing anything valuable which comes across them, and
Nehru was no exception. So long as I.N.A. was in the process of formation and
active in the battlefield, he maintained a calculated absolute silence about
it. The moment war came to an end and the news of Netaji's alleged air crash
was received, he posed himself as the guardian of I.N.A. and thrust his
sympathies on I.N.A. people. Since this change of trend was very unexpected and
startling, people asked him about this change. While replying such queries and
clarifying his position, he stated:
"Sensing
all this I made my first public reference to the I.N.A. and followed this up
with subsequent references. It did not strike me at all at the time that
political advantage could be taken of this affair. Then a strange and
surprising thing happened, not strange in itself but very surprising because of
its depth and extent. Though I had sensed the mood of the Indian people, I had
not fully realised how far it went in this direction. Within a few weeks the
story of I.N.A. had percolated to the remotest villages in India and everywhere
there was admiration for them and apprehension as to their possible fate. No
political organisation, however strong and efficient, could have produced this
enormous reaction in India. It was one of those rare things which just fit into
the mood of the people, reflect, as it were, and provide an opportunity for the
public to give expression to that mood. The reason of this was obvious.
Individuals were not known nor were many facts known to the public. The story
as it developed seemed to the people just another aspect of India's struggle
for independence and the individuals concerned became symbols in the public
mind. Whether one agrees with this or not, one should at least understand how
things happen and what forces lie behind them. The widespread popular
enthusiasm was surprising enough, but even more surprising was a similar
reaction of a very large number of regular Indian army officers and men.
Something had touched them deeply. This kind of thing is not done and cannot be
done by politicians or agitators or the like."1
A
critical analysis of this statement reveals that Nehru had realized that I.N.A.
had touched the hearts of the people. He was convinced that no other factor
could have aroused the people to the extent I.N.A. could. Most important part
of the statement is the confession that to the people I.N.A. effort appeared to
be 'Just another aspect of Indian struggle for independence.' The only thing
which he missed was to own responsibility for not awakening the people about
this another aspect of freedom struggle. Question arises, 'Why were people
ignorant about I.N.A. movement and its activities?' Britishers were definitely
not interested in making the people aware of the fact that some armed struggle
was being waged by the Indians against the authority of Britishers in India.
Britishers knew that if Indian masses came to know about such an effort, there
shall be an alarming unrest, non-cooperation and even an open revolt against
their authority. Hence they thought it expedient and advisable to suppress all
the information about I.N.A. The role of Britishers is understandable but one
fails to understand why the Indian leadership played a deceitful role in the
suppression of information about I.N.A. Suppression of information could be
intentional or unintentional. It could have been presumed to be unintentional
if the leadership really had no information about the happenings on the Burma
front. Since there is evidence which proves that the Congress leadership had
information about the developments on the Burma front, suppression appears to
be intentional. Question arises why did not they share the information with the
nation? One can imply that either Congress leadership wanted to fail I.N.A.
effort which would have definitely resulted in the prolongation and
perpetuation of the British regime in India; or they wanted that the nation,
whenever it is freed should be liberated through them only. They appeared to
have started believing that none else was capable of liberating India, hence
they thought it to be their moral duty to not to let anyone grow to such
heights as may threaten not only the British authority but also the position of
Congress Party. There is a veiled confession of the failure of the Congress
Party to organise movement having such a mass public appeal. The fact that
Nehru tried to clarify his position reflects that even in those days people
strongly suspected his motives behind undertaking the cause of I.N.A.
The lack
of response and reaction from the Indian masses was an important cause of the
failure of I.N.A. and its Netaji, in achieving their aims. In the scheme of
things which Netaji had planned, reaction and response of the Indian masses
carried very strategic importance. On 9th July, 1943, in a speech Netaji had
clearly stated,
"The
time has come when I can openly tell the whole world, including our enemies, as
to how it is proposed to bring about our the national liberation. Indians
outside India-particularly, Indians in East Asia-are going to organise a
fighting force which will be powerful enough to attack the British Army in
India. When we do so, a revolution will break out, not only among the civil
population at home, but also among the Indian Army which is now standing under
the British flag. When the British Govt. is thus attacked from both sides-from
inside India and from outside-it will collapse and the Indian people will then
regain their liberty. According to my plan, therefore, it is not even necessary
to bother about the attitude of the Axis Powers towards India. If Indians
outside and inside India will do their duty, it is possible for the Indian
people to throw the British out of India and liberate 388 millions of their
countryrnen.''2
From this
extract of Netaji's speech one can understand how heavily the I.N.A. depended
on response within the country for its success. The people within India could,
rather would have reacted enthusiastically and spiritedly if they were aware of
the fact that an effort was being made from across the border. It was shocking
for Netaji to learn and see that people from within the country had not
responded to his repeated calls. Liule did he know that his fears about the
Indian Congress leadership were literally true. The Indian leadership of those
days instead of acting as channels for communicating the plan and programmes of
Netaji, helped the British Govt. in suppressing the information. It is not an
exaggeration to say that if I.N.A. had received a favourable response from
within the country, the nation would have got liberated much earlier than 1947.
The people did respond to Netaji's call though it was belated one.
The
indifference and silence of Nehru and the Congress leadership was not on
account of their doubts about the leadership qualities of Netaji. On the
contrary it was because of their fear of being dominated by Netaji, in case of
latter's success. Pt. Nehru in his message, sent for one of the Netaji birthday
celebration meetings, conveyed,
"
Netaji Subhash has set an example of courage and passionate devotion to the
cause of Indian freedom, which will live long in India's history. Equally
important is the way in which he has demonstrated how to weld the different
communities in a common unity."3
These
leaders were not blind to the great leadership qualities of Netaji, rather they
were more awakened about it. They were scared of the consequences and effects
of his return to India. Nehru's adoption of I.N.A. was not out of conviction
but because of convenience. To one of the questions which someone asked him,
'Why do you praise the I.N.A. if you feel non-violent action is best suited to
India at present?' Nehru responded,
"One
of the potent reasons why I say non-violence is best suited to India is because
of the I.N.A. ... It is one thing to praise those who have fought gallantly,
violently or non-violently, for the freedom of India, and it is a totally
different thing to consider the problem of India in its present context. The
I.N.A. used violence and it failed. But if it had succeeded, the questioner
might have advanced the argument that violence had failed. The I.N.A. failed,
not because of its violence or non-violence, but because of external forces.
The I.N.A. was arrayed against greater forces in the world situations.''4
This
statement makes it crystal clear that though Nehru publicly defended I.N.A. in
the court yet he had reservations about the principles which I.N.A. had adopted.
One problem with the apostles of non-violence had been that they never
recognised that violence had in any way helped their non-violent efforts. The
fact is that if there would have not been any violence, if the revolutionaries
had not given the Britishers the necessary shocks at the various stages, the
Britishers would not have left India so soon. In fact the Britishers had been
able to perpetuate and prolong their rule in India only through the loyalty of
the Indians. The Britishers constituted a negligible part of the administrative
machinery. So long as they had faith in the Indian army and police, they never
cared for the mass demonstrations and such other protests. The organisation of
I.N.A. proved that the Indians were capable of organising an armed rebellion
also. Unfortunately, Gandhi and his followers, inspite of their repeated
failures, believed that they were always right and those who differed with
them, were always wrong. While commenting about Netaji, Nehru said,
"He
was not only brave but had deep love for freedom. He believed, rightly or
wrongly, that whatever he did was for the independence of India."5
Wrongly?
Why wrongly? What was wrong in Netaji's claim that all his activities were
aimed at liberating Motherland? It is lamentable that Pt. Nehru, who always
presumed himself to be self-appointed Prime Minister even before the attainment
of independence, suspected the motives of the persons like Netaji. If all the
sacrifices made by Netaji were insufficient to convince Nehru about the commitment
of Netaji to the cause of freedom, then what else should have been done by any
Indian to satisfy and convince Pt. Nehru about one's dedication and commitment
to the cause. In spite of his best possible effort" he could not conceal
his motives behind defending the I.N.A. personnel in the Red Fort trials. On
learning that his motives were being suspected, he tried to defend his conduct
in the following words, .
"It
is sometime said that we have exploited this I.N.A. situation for political
purposes. Almost everything in India fits in somewhere into the political
picture because the fact of India's subjection dominates life here. But I can
say with some confidence that there was no desire or even thought of exploiting
the I.N.A. issue for political purposes when this matter first came before the
public. I believe I was the first person to mention it in public. The sole
thought before me was that thousands of my countrymen whom I believe to be
patriotic, were in grave danger. I did not know the full story of the I.N.A.
but knowing my countrymen fairly well I could understand how they must have
felt in a difficult situation."6
In this
way Nehru tried to explain that he had no intention to exploit I.N.A.
Indirectly it is a confession of the fact that I.N.A. had such a rich potential
as could be exploited by even the person like Nehru. Besides this, though he
defended I.N.A. yet he had the feeling that he was committing a mistake by
defending I.N.A. Lord Wavell, the Viceroy of India, after having a long conversation
with Pt Nehru, recorded,
"We
then had a longish talk about the I.N.A. He said that while most people now
realised that they had gone too far in their glorification of the I.N.A., and
the tendency was now swinging the other way, they were an element which had to
be considered, since all parties were now angling to use them; and it was
important to provide employment for them and thus keep them out of the hands of
the more extreme elements. I said that I appreciated this, but that mass enlistment
into the police was not a move which could be justified.''7
Whatever
doubts there might have been about the motives of Nehru towards I.N.A. have
been clarified through these comments of Lord Wavell. For the Britishers it was
a necessity that all these people who joined I.N.A. or supported it in any way
should be humiliated, discouraged and discarded. Britishers wanted that they
should get it done through some Indian. They needed some one who could be a
handy but effective tool. They couldn't find a better person than Pt. Nehru to
serve their purpose. The subsequent events showed that he spared no effort in
justifying the selection of the Britishers. In his letter dated 25.12.1946 to
S. Baldev Singh, the prominent Sikh Leader, he wrote,
"I
am writing to you especially about I.N.A. men still in prison. I know that
Commander-in-Chief feels rather strongly about this matter... You will remember
that the matter came up (in) a resolution before the Central Legislative
Assembly. Both the Congress members and the Muslim League members, as well as
others would, normally speaking, have unanimously passed the resolution asking
for their release. It was only because of the Commander-in-Chief's wishes in
the matter that we got the resolution postponed. Naturally, in any such matter
we have to give full weight to what the Commander-in-Chief feels and we do not
want to go against any decision of his. He represents the Army and the Army
discipline has to be maintained. On the other hand, it is exceedingly difficult
for us to ignore a widespread public sentiment... You must have seen reports of
a growing agitation in the Punjab among I.N.A. men demanding the release of
persons in jail. I have tried my utmost to prevent any such agitation
developing, but I do not know if I shall succeed. Once any such thing happens,
public attention will be drawn to it all over the country and it will be quite
impossible for the Central Assembly to ignore this. The consequences will be
bad for both the army and the public."8
This
letter leaves no doubt about the real motives of Nehru. Instead of working to
build up the movement for the release of I.N.A. soldiers, he tried to prevent
public agitation against the British Govt. He was more concerned about the
opinion of the British Commander-in-Chief and less about the unanimous opinion
of the Central Legislative Assembly. Though every reasonable man would like to
see that the discipline of the army should be maintained at all cost and
nothing should be done to disturb it in any way, yet the same principle cannot
be applied to the role played by I.N.A. If thousands of soldiers could be
released on the ground that whatever they had done was due to their greater
loyalty and allegiance to the Motherland as compared to the Britishers, if
thousands soldiers could lay down their lives at the altar of Motherland to
oust the Britishers from the sacred soil of our country, then how shameful it
appears on the part of Pt.Nehru to say,
"It
was only because of the Commander-in-Chief's wishes in the matter that we got
the resolution postponed.''9
The
Commander-in-Chief represented the British interest in India. The Indian
interests were diagonally opposed to the British interests. No Indian,
irrespective of his status or position, had any moral or legal right to do anything
amounting to compromising nation's honour or interest, just to please or uphold
the wishes of a person having foreign allegiance. The stand of Pt. Nehru was
completely opposed to the spirit of freedom struggle. IT HAD BEEN THE STRUGGLE
FOR FREEDOM. HOW IS IT THAT THE COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP STARTED BETWEEN
THOSE WHO HAD BEEN RULING AND EXPLOITING THE NATION AND THOSE WHO AIMED AT
LIBERATING IT. Pt. Nehru had absolutely no justification in writing to S.
Baldev Singh, 'I have tried my utmost to prevent any such agitation developing,
but I do not know that if I can succeed.' On the one hand Nehru pleaded the
case of I.N.A. and on the other defended the interest of the Britishers against
I.N.A. It appears that at heart he believed that whatever had been done by
Netaji and his I.N.A., was completely justified and the need of the hour but
his personal interest, commanded him to outwardly behave in a different way. If
he would not have been convinced about the desirability of the actions of
Netaji and I.N.A. he would not have said,
"I
do not know even today what I would have myself done at a time of crisis like
that. For that reason I cannot judge anybody else. One thing however is clear.
No Indian can withhold his praise for the countrymen who fought bravely. The
manner in which Netaji faced the crisis inspires admiration. Perhaps I might
,have done the same thing if I were in his position."10
This
statement exposes Nehru and makes clear the double standards which he observed
in analysing and evaluating the role played by Netaji and his I.N.A. Like the
shrewd politicians, he maintained a position in which he could adjust himself
as per his convenience. Though initially he wanted to not only defend but
promote the interests of I.N.A. yet on finding that his such actions would
damage his political prospects in the post-independence period, he deserted it.
He not only identified the national interest with his own interest but also
made the national interest subservient to the personal interest.
Since
Nehru had been venting both pro and anti I.N.A. feelings during the
preindependence days, his real attitude can be learnt by the study of his
attitude towards I.N.A. in the post-independence period. We have already seen
that initially Nehru was committed to defending the I.N.A. and he was prepared
to overlook their mistakes also. To quote him,
"Whatever
their feelings and mistakes may have been in the past, and these were serious,
there can be no doubt that they are a fine body of young men taken as a
whole-fine officers and fine rank and file-and that their dominating motive was
love for India's freedom. At any time it would have been wrong to treat them
too harshly, but at this time when it is said that big changes are impending in
India, it would be a very grave mistake leading to far-reaching consequences,
if they were treated just as ordinary rebels. The punishment given to them
would, in effect, be a punishment for all India and all Indians, and a deep
wound would be created in millions of hearts. "11
With such
type of impressions in his mind, after the independence, he announced that the
Govt.'s attitude towards I.N.A. will change. In 1948 as Prime Minister he
announced that the stigma attached to I.N.A. would be removed. Even this
announcement of removing the stigma, though negative in nature, was taken very
enthusiastically by the simple and innocent I.N.A. officers. They were made to
believe that their service in I.N.A. would be taken as service to the nation
and all of them would be compensated for such a great sacrifice made by them.
Some of them might have been inspired and encouraged to think hopefully and
optimistically about the attitude of Pt. Nehru who had once said,
"Another
achievement of the I.N.A. is that it was able to forge a complete communal unity
and harmony in its ranks. The standard of their fighting is admittedly very
high. It is possible they will be acceptable to the future army of free
India."12
Unfortunately
they were disappointed. Little did they know that a person who had declined to
lay wreath on the I.N.A. war memorial, could not really honour them. It was
only because of political expediency that Pt. Nehru and Congress had adopted
I.N.A. They in fact wanted to starve, suffocate and annihilate it. It was just
like destroying the damaged shirt of Adolf Hitler. In India, in the case of
I.N.A. the danger was all the more because I.N.A. men were living fiery
representatives of Netaji who could not only just carry his message but also
deliver his message in every comer of the country. If these people would have
been in a position to speak out their minds or they would have been helped to
be in a position from where they could tell the truth, perhaps the Congress
Govt. also, like the Britishers, would have found it difficult to stay in power
and might have had to abdicate~. The best way of controlling this latent storm
was to make I.N.A. people so helpless, dependent and demoralised that they
should have no option but to depend on the Govt. for their physical existence
and bare necessities. Nehru administration did not give I.N.A. people what was
due to them. It followed a policy for giving most minimum or subsistence
assistance to those people who could fall in their line. Consequently some of
the senior officers of I.N.A. and ministers of the provisional Govt. of Azad
Hind were given what was minimum required to satisfy their needs under the
circumstances. It helped him in silencing and subduing some of the senior-most
officers and leaders of I.N.A. Those self-respecting and non-compromising officers
and soldiers who refused to bow, were also treated like Blacks by the Govt. of
India which had otherwise removed the stigma from them. Isn't it strange and
surprising that though the stigma was removed yet the I.N.A. people were not
considered to be good to join the army? What a nation we are! We welcomed
I.N.A. personnel as patriots and freedom fighters but later on declared our
freedom fighters to be unfit for the army. Why this indifference? Aristocrats
and feudal lords of the past always controlled the revolutionaries or radicals
by denying the most minimum rights to the potential sources of danger. They
always tried to keep weak, depressed and deprived persons in the same position
so that none of them could ever dare to raise their voice against the
established authority. Pt. Nehru also belonged to the same class of people. He
was guilty of torture, starvation and even murdering of those I.N.A. soldiers
who died because they did not get minimum subsistence help from the Govt. of
Independent India. Even after removing the stigma, nothing positive was done to
ameliorate the state of I.N.A. soldiers. Let us see what was the first
announcement of Pt. Nehru as Prime Minister about the I.N.A. He announced,
"The
Govt. have given earnest consideration to the cases of ex-I.N.A. personnel,
both offices and other ranks. These cases were considered by the previous Govt
over two years ago. It was then decided that I.N.A. personnel should be divided
into three categories: White, Grey and Black and that certain steps should be
taken in regard to the three categories. 'Whites' were permitted to remain in
service, 'Greys' were discharged, and the 'Blacks' dismissed and or convicted.
The New Govt. brought a fresh view-point to bear on the whole question so that no
stigma should attach to anyone by virtue of the fact that he was a member of
the I.N.A. ... They have come to the conclusion that orders of dismissal passed
on I.N.A. personnel should be set aside and replaced by orders of discharge
from the army so that no stigma should attach to the members of the I.N.A. ...
The question of the reinstatement in the army of the I.N.A. personnel is full
of difficulty... At a time when the army has been exposed to considerable
stresses and strains, consequent on the re-organisation after partition, the
unity of the army, which is so essential, might be affected. Govt. have
therefore come to the conclusion that ex-I.N.A. officers and men should not be
reinstated in the army."13
What a
way of removing the 'Stigma' from the 'soldiers of India's Independence'! The
subsequent events showed that Nehru administration did not do almost anything
for the benefit of the I.N.A. people. Gen. Mohan Singh, the founder of first
I.N.A. and Member of Parliament, known to be very close to Pt. J.L. Nehru, in
his statement related to the I.N.A. personnel in the Rajya Sabha, on 18th
February 1964, said,
"The
recent announcement by the Govt. to grant some financial relief to the I.N.A.
has created misunderstanding in the country. People think that perhaps our
Govt. is doing quite a lot for the I.N.A. This is not the fact. In sanctioning
this grant in a fit of generosity, our Govt. has done a great insult to the
I.N.A. people and no self-respecting I.N.A. person would like to accept this
grant. We had never asked for any relief or any grant or any dole from our
Govt. What we wanted were our own, our own money, our own arrears of pay which
were confiscated by the Govt. as a punishment given to us for joining the
I.N.A. to fight the British and liberate India. Now the Govt. has sanctioned us
a grant. We wanted our own arrears......
Now with this background I think the House will be in a better position to
understand what the I.N.A. did for the country and how our national Govt. our
benign Govt. has so far rewarded and is further going to reward them by
enacting this great drama of a relief being sanctioned to the I.N.A. It is an
eye wash, it is farce, it is an insult to us.......
And this Govt. I do not know why, they have suddenly become so generous that
they have thrown a few lakhs of rupees which is only 20% of the interest that
they have earned upon our money. And they call it relief. Kindly do not insult
us by calling this amount a financial relief to the I.N.A. personnel. The money
is our due. The Govt. owes a debt to the I.N.A. They should pay us and if they
are good enough and generous, they should pay us with interest. But they have
further humiliated us. It is a shame for us to accept this amount. No
self-respecting person would like to accept it."l4
In this
way we see that even 16 years after the announcement of Pt. Nehru, even the
comparatively better placed ~nd financially well off personnel of I.N.A. felt
that justice was not done to them. It is painful to point out that during the
regime of Pt. Nehru no special benefit was given to the I.N.A. people. Well, if
Rajiv Gandhi or any person like him, after another fifteen years might have
failed to do full justice to the I.N.A., it was understandable to some extent
because they could be presumed to be unaware of the sacrifices made by I.N.A.
but such an indifference was not expected from Pt. Nehru. In fact we cannot
call it indifference. If he had been indifferent, he would have completely
ignored it. The people's reaction to the I.N.A. trials had made him conscious
of the potential strength of I.N.A. Hence he wanted neither to own it nor
disown it. He wanted to use it to suit his personal convenience. If he had so
desired there was no problem to him in restoring all the benefits to I.N.A.
Arrears could be paid and they could have been specially honoured for their
sacrifices. They could be inducted into army or any other specially organised
force. These people were the torch bearers of a revolutionary struggle for
India's Independence. One fails to understand why the Govt. of Independent
India gave step-motherly treatment to these torchbearers.
On 10th
August, ] 966, a half-an-hour discussion took place in Lok Sabha about I.N.A.
In this discussion Shri H.V. Kamath, the veteran Parliamentarian made the
following statement in Lok Sabha:
"The
I.N.A. had hastened India's day of deliverance. But for them the country would
not have become free in 1947. But the Govt. had not treated those people well.
They still suffered from the hang-over of the bad old days of the British
regime. The Government deserved congratulation for their decision taken in 1948
according to which those civilian employees of the British Govt. in India, who
were dismissed from service or who left service to join the Indian National
Movement, were given entitlement to their seniority, to their re-employment and
certain other benefits.
In 1961, the Government had issued another notification to the effect that
those ex-I.N.A. personnel would be treated by the Govt. of India at par with
those who had participated in the national movement in India. But now those
members of I.N.A. who had remained in Japanese captivity and who had not joined
the Indian National Army were paid their full pay and allowances for the period
for captivity in the hands of the Japanese and those who preferred to join the
Indian National Army were denied their pay and allowances even today, the
scheme for their re-employment were only schemes on paper.
The new Govt. had brought a fresh view-point to bear on the whole question so
that no stigma should attach to anyone by virtue of the fact that he was a
member of the I.N.A. But the Defence Minister had stated in March 1966 that no
arrears of pay were due to be paid to the personnel referred to viz., ex-Indian
Army personnel who had joined the I.N.A. during the last World War and who were
classified as 'Black' and 'Grey'.
According
to a notification, the circular regarding treating ex-I.N.A. personnel at par
with those who had participated in the National Movement, applied only to the
civil employees in the I.N.A. and not to the I.N.A. Armed Personnel. It was a
sordid story of discriminatory treatment meted out to our brave patriots who
had joined the I.N.A. at a grave risk to their own lives."15
The views
expressed by Gen. Mohan Singh and Mr. Kamath tell the sad story of I.N.A.
personnel in the post-independent India. Even after this, i.e. debates in the
Parliament, the I.N.A. people didn't gain as much as they should have. Till now
all those people who served in I.N.A. or Indian Independence League have not
received the benefits which other categories of the freedom fighters got. This
is very clear from the letter which Capt. S.S. Yadav, Gen. Secretary of All
India I.N.A. Committee, wrote to the Prime Minister of India on 14.1.1991. He
wrote in this letter,
"There
is a great resentment among the ex-members of Indian Independence League and
Indian National Army who joined the Armed Struggle under the leadership of
Netaji S.C.. Bose, that the New Guinea Prisoners of War who were neither in the
I.N.A. nor were penalised by the British Indian Govt. have been granted S.S.S.
Pension without suffering detention/imprisonment for six months or loss of
military or civil job. Whereas the civilian members of I.N.A. and I.I.L. who
joined the National Movement and suffered extreme hardships and starvation
besides the loss of their means of livelihood, Civil Government/Semi-Government
and Private Jobs, are still required to suffer detention for six months which
is a clear discrimination against the Armed Struggle (I.I.L./I.N.A.) Freedom
Fighters.
Perhaps in our country, while all the citizens are, according to constitution,
equal, New Guinea Prisoners of War are more equal, than Freedom Fighters.
Justice demands that the same yardstick may be applied to all the freedom
fighters of Armed Struggle (I.N.A.) and the pending few hundred cases of
exI.I.L./I.N.A. personnel may be admitted by Swatantarta Sainik Samman Pension
Scheme, 1980, in relaxation of the existing requirement of minimum suffering of
six months detention/imprisonment."16
In this
way we see that the policy of discrimination against I.N.A., which was
initiated by Pt. Nehru right from the time of independence, is being faithfully
followed by his successors till today. Since most of the I.N.A. personnel have
expired and those who are left are counting the last days of their lives, we
can conclude that I.N.A. shall go in the history as an army of liberators which
suffered at the hands of those for whom they had sacrificed their lives and
everything. Such treatment to those, who wanted to shed the last drop of their
blood for the nation, is a deterrent for the coming generations to sacrifice
and suffer for the nation. The founding fathers of any nation should not treat
her liberators like this and if someone treats like this, one must not escape
the wrath of the posterity.
CHAPTER XVII
British
Approach to Air Crash Story
Britain
was the number one enemy of Netaji and Netaji in turn was number one enemy of
Britain, if not at the global level, must have been so from India. They
definitely wanted to catch hold of him dead or alive. They wanted to be sure
that he could never harm them in future. The news of the alleged death of
Netaji, which was broadcast on 23rd August, 1945 by Tokyo radio, should have
been the most welcomed and eagerly awaited news. It should have thrilled and
jubilated them but it did not. Reason-their suspicion about the truthfulness of
the news. Lord Wavell, the then Viceroy of India, after listening to the news
recorded in his diary,
"I
wonder if the Japanese announcement that Subhas Chandra Bose's death in an air
crash is true. I suspect it very much. It is just what would be given out if he
wanted to go underground."1
On the
same day Mr. R.F. Mudie, the Home Member, in a letter to Mr. Jenkins, while
suggesting various possible ways of treating Bose, if the latter surrenders,
gave the following suggestions:
"One
.of the most difficult questions that will confront Home Department in the near
future is the treatment of Subhash Chandra Bose.....
3) As
regards the treatment of Bose, there are the following possibilities:
a) bring
him back to India and try him either for waging war or under the Enemy Agents'
Ordinance;
b) have
him tried by a Court in Burma or Malaya for waging war against the king in that
country;
c) have
him tried by a military court outside India,
d) intern
him in India;
e) intern
him in some other British possession e.g. Seychelles Islands;
f) leave
him where he is and don't ask for his surrender."2
After
discussing these possibilities, he explained in detail that it was not possible
to try him in India, Burma or any other place because in each case some very
serious complications, like agitation for his release, would arise. He was not
in favour of interning Bose in India because it would lead only to an agitation
to let him out and to release him after a short time. He apprehended that
Netaji might escape to Russia as he did in 1940. In the para 9 of the same
enclosure, Mr. Mudie recommended,
"In
many ways the easiest course would be to leave him where he is and not ask for
his release. He might, of course, in certain circumstances be welcomed by the
Russians. The course would raise fewest immediate political difficulties, but the
security authorities consider that in certain circumstances his presence in
Russia would be so dangerous as to rule it out altogether."3
Not only
this, even after 23rd August the uncertainty about the alleged air crash and
suspicion about Netaji's death continued.
The
British Government and the Military Intelligence continued taking interest in
Bose's affair. The Military Intelligence in one of its fortnightly security
Intelligence summary dated 14th September, 1945 sent a detailed report about
possibilities of Netaji going underground, the dangers from his underground
activities, people's reaction to any action taken against him, and problems
related to dealing with him in case of his arrest. One baffling thing about
this Military Intelligence Report is that in the Transfer of Power Volume VI,
the first five points have not been given and the details from the point No.6
onwards have been given. According to this report,
"6)
The Japanese report of Bose's death is also a matter of considerable importance
not only in the political arena but also to those concerned with security; the
continued existence of "Netaji", possibly underground, would
undoubtedly maintain the fervour of the many Jifs, Military and Civilian, who
came under what was almost a spell, while the confirmed end of their leader
would probably have something of an opposite effect.
7) The
report of Bose's death was received in most quarters in India with sympathy and
regret expressed by meetings and hartals, but scepticism widely persists. Reactions
in Bengal particularly are of interest. It is generally believed there that the
news has been faked with Japanese connivance and that Bose has gone underground
to reappear at the correct psychological moment, which may be provided by the
installation of National Govt. or by a decision by the existing Govt. to take a
very lenient view of the treachery of Bose and the I.N.A. Political circles in
the province have been greatly interested in the recent news item which alleged
that Bose has been seen alive in Saigon after the aircraft accident.
8) Where
the report has been generally accepted there is a feeling of disappointment
that Bose will now be unable to return to his homeland to take his 'rightful
place'; that he would have been forgiven by Govt. is taken almost for granted,
particularly in view of the delicate political situation. Bose's case i!; of
course inextricably bound with the future of captured members of the I.N.A.
Press comments in relation to both betray readiness to minimize their offence and
to emphasise the patriotic though misguided motives and, in respect of the
I.N.A., the extremity and violence of enemy pressure, from which these offences
are alleged to have sprung. There is, further, in some papers an undercurrent
of malicious satisfaction that Bose and his men found opportunity for this
misguided activity. Jawahar Lal Nehru, as was to be expected, has aired his
views freely on the subject, in mischievous terms. While recognising the
'English Approach' to this question he stresses the importance! of 'Indian
Approach'.
9) Bose's
established death would solve the difficult problem of dealing with him but his
patriotism and activities, even though from the wrong side of the fence, are
likely to hold an important place in the Nationalist mind, particularly that of
the young Bengali; one politician even declared that his 'legend will continue
to inspire the people and steel them in their determination to free India and
Asia from Imperialism'."4
From the
contents of this note of the Military Intelligence, it is quite clear that the
British Intelligence even up to 14th September had not finally accepted the
truthfulness of the alleged air crash story. It is also clear that they were
scared of the consequences of Netaji's return to India. The press and the
Congress leaders like Pt. Nehru had realised the real strength and public
appeal of the I.N.A. and Netaji, and had found that it was not possible for
them to ignore these revolutionary forces.
On 24th
October 1945 the Secretary of State for India in his memorandum related to the
treatment of Indian and Burmese renegades and collaborators with the enemy,
wrote,
"Apart
from Subhas Bose if he is alive, few of those on the list are at present well
known in India. The advantage of trying them will be small and would give them
fictitious importance."5
From this
report of the Secretary of State for India it is more than clear that the
British Govt. had not accepted the death story of Netaji. Here it may be added
that by this time the Intelligence Officers of the British Military as well as
the Intelligence Officers of other Allies had already interrogated Habibur
Rehman about the details of the alleged air crash. In a meeting held at 10,
Downing Street, on 25th October 1945, under the chairmanship of Prime Minister
Mr. Attlee and attended by Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Miss
Ellen Wilkinson and few others, the treatment of Indian civilian renegades was
discussed. One of the various points raised there was,
"It
was generally agreed that the only civilian renegade of importance was Subhas
Chandra Bose."6
From this
information it is quite clear that the most important and responsible organ of
the British Govt. even upto 25th October, had not accepted the genuineness of
the air crash story. Though there is no direct reference to Netaji's death or
his being alive, yet the very fact that they had been considering the ways and
means to try him even 67 days after the alleged air crash, proves it beyond
doubt that they had not accepted him to be dead otherwise there was no
justification for the Govt. to consider this question. This cabinet committee
after discussing the various cases falling under category of Civil Offenders,
arrived at the following conclusions about the Indian civilian renegades:
"1) It
was agreed to accept the view of the Govt. of India that offenders rounded up
in Europe should not be repatriated but, having served a period of
imprisonment, should be released in the countries where they now are.
2) As
regards civilian offenders rounded up in South East Asia as elsewhere, the
Secretary of State for India was invited to consider whether it would not be
appropriate to try them on the spot by Military Court Martial on the lines
followed in Western Europe.''7
In this
conclusion though there is no direct reference to the trial of Subhas Chandra
Bose yet there is indirect reference that it will be appropriate to try the
civilian renegades wherever they are arrested. So basically the Govt. of
England was not prepared to bring Netaji to India or to any South East Asian
country for the purpose of trial.
In a
telegram, dated 30th October, 1945, from the Indian Office to the Secretary of
State, while suggesting the ways of treating the civilian and military
renegades, it was written:
"The
same policy would generally apply to those in South East Asia, including the
Civilians who joined the I.N.A. Clearly the only civilian renegade there of
first importance is Subhas Bose, if he is still alive. If in respect of any
others (of paragraphs 3 & 4 of your 8951) you consider that prosecution
should be undertaken it is suggested that in place of bringing them to India
for trial you should consider the alternative of trial on the spot before
either Military or Civil Courts.''8
In this
telegram also which was sent exactly 73 days after the alleged accident and
sixty eight days after the report was made public by Tokyo radio, the Home
Department and the Indian Office continued to nurse the idea that the best way
of dealing with the civilian renegades was to try them wherever they were
arrested. It was not considered advisable and appropriate to bring them to
India and try them here. Though it is not directly mentioned yet it can be
implied that the British Govt. had definite information about the whereabouts
of Sub has Chandra Bose. As is quite clear from the Memorandum submitted on
23.8.1945 by Mr. Mudie, it was apprehended that he might go to Russia and his
presence even there was not considered to be safe from the British point of
view. It is clear that the Britishers wanted 'TO LEAVE HIM WHERE HE WAS AND NOT
TO ASK FOR HIS RELEASE.' IT CAN BE IMPLIED THAT THE BRITISHERS AFTER GETTING
THE INFORMATION ABOUT HIS WHEREABOUTS USED THEIR INFLUENCE TO KEEP HIM WHERE HE
WAS. The motives behind this arrangement are discussed in the following
chapters.
Though
there are no more references in the Transfer of Power Volumes to the actions
taken by the British Govt. to pursue Netaji's issue yet if the Top Secret
documents of the British Govt. relating to this issue are sought and become
available, the exact information about Netaji's whereabouts can be obtained. IT
IS THE DISINTERESTEDNESS AND INDIFFERENT ATTITUDE OF THE GOVT. OF INDIA TOWARDS
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF NETAJI WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF THE
MYSTRY, OTHERWISE THERE ARE MANY SOURCES, WHICH IF TAPPED, WILL GIVE THE EXACT
INFORMATION ABOUT THE REAL FATE OF NETAJI.
CHAPTER XVIII
Mountbatten:
A Crusader, A Benefactor or A Conspirator?
When one
goes through the last phase of India's freedom struggle and the Transfer of
Power days, the name of a Britisher which shines most distinctly and
prominently, is that of Lord Mountbatten. He had a very charismatic, magnetic
and dominating personality. He had wide ranging experiences and his association
with the Royal family was an additional asset. He was blessed with the company
of an elegant, intelligent, charming, inspiring and supporting lady Edwina, his
wife. They were complementary and supplementary to each other. Mountbatten
played the most important and strategic role in the Transfer of Power to India.
Since independence was the most eventful development of the twentieth century
in India, Mountbatten became the pivot around which the whole history of
granting of independence revolved. Most of our political leaders, who were
glory seekers and fond of psychophency, were themselves psychophents. They
tried to surpass each other in showering greatness and honour on those who
could dominate, cripple and even squeeze them. During the farewell to
Mountbattens Pt. Nehru said,
"And
so the people of India, realising that Lord and Lady Mountbatten undoubtedly
were friendly to India and the Indian people, undoubtedly were serving them,
gave them their affection and love."1
In the
same farewell address, while addressed to Lady Mountbatten, in the following
words:
"To
you also, Madam, I should like to address myself. The gods or some good fairy
gave you beauty and high intelligence, and grace and charm and vitality, great
gifts, and she who possesses them is a great lady wherever she goes.....
Wherever you have gone, you have brought solace, you have brought hope and
encouragement Is it surprising, therefore, that the people of India should love
you and look up to you as one of themselves and should grieve that you are
going."2
It may
sound unpleasant but it is a fact that the feelings expressed by Nehru in the
name of nation were in fact his personal reverence, affection and regards for
them. He added,
"You
came here, Sir, with a high reputation, but many a reputation has foundered in
India. You lived here during a period of great difficulty and crisis and yet
your reputation has not foundered. That is a remarkable feat. Many of us who
came in contact with you from day to day in these days of crisis learnt much
from you, we gathered confidence when sometimes we were rather shaken, and I
have no doubt that the many lessons we have learnt from you will endure and
will help us in our work in the future."3
Certain
courtesies and remarks on the farewell occasion are of customary nature and
have to be made as a part of ceremonious performance but if those remarks
become or appear to be the deep rooted beliefs and feelings that the persons
like Nehru, then these have to be analysed critically and impartially. Before
it is done let us trace the roots of the relationship between these persons
belonging to the royal families of the two nations, separated from each other
by thousands miles of land and sea. The story goes back to Feb. 1946 when Rear
Admiral Lord Mountbauen visited Delhi. At that time he had come to have some
consultations with Lord Wavell, the then Viceroy of India. There was a great
difference between the attitude and life style of Lord Wavell and Lord
Mountbauen. Nehru, through his violent speeches, had been able to earn greater
nuisance value. Wavell tried to restrain him through pieces of advice and
reasoning, but had not achieved any success. He had learnt that Nehru was going
to visit Malaya in March 1946. Lord Wavell knew that Lord Mountbatten was a
shrewd, tactful and more diplomatic person than himself. He requested
Mountbatten to try to develop rapport with Nehru and try to persuade him to
give up the aggressive policy which Nehru had adopted on the I.N.A. issue. Lord
Mountbatten decided to help the Viceroy of India and tried to win over Nehru.
At that time neither Lord Mountbatten himself nor anybody else had any idea
that this relationship will be of such a great historical importance from the
point of view of the nations and themselves.
When the
military officers in Malaya learnt about the visit of Nehru, they were not in a
mood to welcome him or give any type of help to make his visit convenient,
colourful and successful. They were aware of his stand on I.N.A. and his
programme to lay wreath on the I.N.A. war memorial. I.N.A. had been supported
by Japanese and many British officers had suffered very heavily at the hands of
the I.N.A. The British Army officers were not in a mood to show any regards to
the persons whom they considered to be their enemy. Lord Mountbatten, when on
his return to Singapore from the field, learnt about such an approach of the
Army officials, at once initiated efforts to bring a favourable change in the
atmosphere. He told them that the necessary arrangements for the visit of Nehru
had to be made and all courtesies had to be shown to him. He further told them
that if they were not prepared to provide a car for him, he would lent his own.
When the
Military officials learnt that Mountbatten was so serious about it, the
atmosphere at Singapore and other places underwent a change. The official
machinery was set in motion to give a rousing welcome to Nehru. Official trucks
were placed at the disposal of Indians so that the people of Indian origin from
the surrounding areas could be brought to Singapore. As a result of these
efforts, thousands of Indians, including a large number of ex-I.N.A. soldiers
were brought to Singapore and all of them lined the streets of the city. At the
time of Nehru's visit, the high ranking officers on learning that Mountbatten
was planning to drive through the streets along with Nehru, rallied around him
and pressed him not to commit such a blunder. They felt that it amounted to
giving undue importance to the visitor and also invited a danger of attempt on
the life of Lord Mountbatten. Mountbatten patiently listened to all of them but
refused to change his decision. Not only this, to the surprise and shock of all
the British officers, he resolved that he would escort Nehru to the memorial
for the I.N.A. All these appeared to be unprecedented and unbelievable. While
giving the details of the visit, Mountbattcn wrote:
"In
that same month (July 1946) we had another important arrival. Pandit Nehru, the
most distinguished figure in the Indian Interim Government, came to Singapore to
study the conditions of the large Indian, community there and meet the Indian
forces.
It would
be hard to think of a more fateful meeting. It could easily have gone terribly
wrong. Nehru had just been in prison for opposing our war effort; one of the
things in his programme was to lay a wreath on the memorial to the Indian
National Army who had fought against the Allies.
In fact,
his whole visit could have developed into a vast anti-British demonstration.
That was not very nice to think about, when you considered that the bulk of our
forces in Singapore and Malaya were Indian. And yet if the original plans made
by the local authorities--in my absence--had been followed I feel sure this was
exactly what would have happened.
The local
authorities wanted to cold-shoulder Nehru, to hamper his movements, and to
restrict his contacts with the Indian community. I thought this would be
disastrous. This man was clearly going to be Prime Minister of India. How fatal
for future Anglo-Indian relations to treat him like that!
The local
authorities had not even arranged to let Nehru have a car, so I lent him mine.
We brought hundreds of Indians into Singapore in Army trucks in order to be
able to see him. I received him immediately at Govt. House, and then drove with
him through the streets, where he had a fantastic welcome."4
In this
way through his diplomatic move, Lord Mountbatten converted a rebel into a
reliable friend. The introduction between Nehru and Mountbauen was really very
unusual and very extra-ordinary from the historical point of view. Mountbattens
had played a very cunning diplomatic move having far-reaching consequences. He
was able to fore-see that the Britain should not annoy the person who was going
to be the Prime Minister of India. After having day's engagements, Nehru dined
with Mountbattens. They had a very long conversation which formed the basis of
a very strong friendship of far-reaching importance. Both Lady and Lord
Mountbauen developed almost a complete and perfect understanding with Pt. Nehru.
II was motivated. The motive becomes clear when we learnt that in spite of
having agreed to escort Nehru to the war memorial, Mountbauen succeeded in
persuading Nehru not to lay the wreath. In the words of Lord Mounlbatten,
"At
the Indian' Red Cross Recreation Centre Edwina was waiting to meet him. The
enthusiasm inside was so overwhelming that Edwina was knocked over in the rush
and Nehru and I had to rescue her together. That night I invited him to dinner
with us; it was a very happy liule party. I was able to persuade him not to lay
the wreath on the pro-Japanese Indian National Army Memorial and in fact his
whole nine-day visit passed off very well, without any unpleasantness of any
description, or any disturbances.
This was
really a stroke of fate; it was the beginning of a deep friendship between
Jawahar Lal Nehru and Edwina and myself. How important this was going to be, of
course, I couldn't possibly guess, but the value of establishing this link was
obvious enough.
It was not merely of value as a matter of British Policy--it was valuable to
Nehru too. It helped to prevent him adopting extreme attitudes which could not
have failed to make things difficult for him later as Prime Minister. It helped
to wipe out the bitterness of the past But what I value above all is the
lasting friendship we formed."5
Though
the .version given by Mountbatten may be a little exaggerated from any point of
view yet it is a fair reflection of the developments which took place in
Malaya. In the previous chapters we have seen that Nehru had not listened to
the advice of anyone on I.N.A. issue. In spite of the cautions and warnings, he
had become increasingly more aggressive. Isn't it strange that what couldn't be
accomplished by Lord Wavell and his colleagues through their repeated efforts,
was accomplished by Mountbatten over just one dinner. The question arises what
could have inspired, encouraged or convinced Nehru to take this about turn from
I.N.A. ? What was so strong, powerful and irresistible as would compel him to
agree to not to lay a wreath on the war memorial of I.N.A. ? Since no official
or personal record of conversation by the persons concerned is available,
whatever transpired between them can only be presumed, guessed or speculated.
It can be believed that Mountbatten must have revealed something irresistible
or sensational arguments to persuade Nehru to go ahead with wreath laying part
of his programme. One of the arguments could be that since British Indian Army
had strong reservations about I.N.A., it was not advisable for Nehru to lay the
wreath. About this argument nothing was new as Nehru knew it before hand. It
was already known to him that the British Commander-in Chief was badly opposed
to I.N.A. being given any undue importance. Lord Wavell had advised him to
exercise restraint but he had not paid any attention to his views. In this way
we see that there could be hardly anything new which might have brought about
this sudden change in his mind. The other reason might have been that any undue
glorification of I.N.A. would demoralise the British Indian Army and encourage
indiscipline in the Army even after India's independence. Nehru had been
cautioned about it earlier but he refused to cool down on the point of I.N.A.
issue. Still another factor might have been that the growing popularity of
I.N.A. might harm Nehru's own political interest in the long run. Nehru was
already aware of the extent to which I.N.A.'s glorification and popularity had
gone. It had surpassed his own calculations and he had started apprehending
some sort of problem and even challenge to his own position because of it. He
was aware of the fact that I.N.A. had the potential to become a strong
political force. In spite of knowing all these things he had taken a calculated
risk. So there was nothing new for Nehru in these arguments which Could
dissuade him from falling a line which he followed. All the above things were
already in the mind of Nehru and if he had realised at his own that all these
things could ever harm his interest, he would have disassociated himself from
I.N.A. and might not have initiated the idea of visiting Malaya. The visit to
Malaya was not only to help the I.N.A. and Indian settlers there, but also with
a view to exploit the I.N.A. exploits for the political motives.
Since
there was nothing else which could be conveyed to Nehru and change his outlook
and stand, there could be only one thing i.e., some confidential information
about Netaji. Mountbatten, because of the position which he held and because of
the reports which he received from his Intelligence Agencies, must have some
confidential and reliable information about Netaji. Though the news was more
than seven months old yet the people had not believed it Nehru also had not
believed it though he didn't have reliable information to believe or disbelieve
it. Mountbatten must have informed Nehru that since there was no evidence of
Netaji's alleged death in the alleged air crash, hence most probably he is
alive somewhere. If the information would have been about the confirmation of
the death of Netaji, there was nothing in it which could dissuade him from
taking interest in I.N.A., because his advocacy of I.N.A. had glorified not
only the I.N.A. but also his own image. In fact his advocacy had strengthened
his bargaining position in dealing with the Britishers. In fact if the
information would have been about the confirmed death of Netaji, Nehru wouldn't
have hesitated to use the name and deeds of Netaji, for strengthening his own
position and adding more dynamic and revolutionary fervour in the freedom
movement. When Nehru learnt that Bose, the architect and soul of I.N.A.
movement was alive somewhere, he had to give second thoughts to his stand
towards I.N.A. He had realised that any further glorification of I.N.A. would
amount to strengthening the hands of Netaji if he ever returned. Since no other
factor could have been strong enough to persuade Nehru to desert and abandon
the cause of I.N.A., it can be easily believed that it was the fear of the
return of Bose, who was threat to his predominant position, which made him
change his stand.
For most
of us, it is beyond even our wildest dreams to think that such an allegation
against Nehru can be true. This belief is on account of the fact that such an
exalted image of Nehru has been portrayed before us that such allegations, on
the face of it, appear to be baseless. Those who know and understand the inner
working of the political forces would agree that nothing is unfair or
impossible in the game of politics. Politics being what it is and politicians
being what they are, nothing can be ruled out just on the ground that such a
thing ought not have happened or must have happened. Machiavelli, the great
political philosopher, once said,
"Politics
have no relation to morals. "6
Abrahim
Lincoln, one of the greatest Presidents of America, while commenting on the
politicians, said,
"Politicians
are a set of men who have interests aside from the interest of the people and
who, to say the most of them, are, taken as a mass, at least one step removed
from honest men. "7
Though
none of these quotes can be said to be the perfect expression for the
politicians, yet these are considerably true in most of the cases.
From the
critical analysis of the above details, it becomes quite clear that Mountbatten
and Nehru were opposed to Netaji. Mountbatten had suffered in the battle-field
at the hands of Netaji. In fact he could have suffered much more, but for the
timely deployment of air force. Netaji had a very poor impression of
Mountbauen. In one of his speeches, delivered on 5th September, 1943, Netaji
said,
"Friends!
the Anglo-Americans have found out now a new Napoleon. According to the
Anglo-Americans, Lord Louis Mountbatten is amphibious. He is a master in land
and sea operations. Well, what is the career of this amphibious monster? He is
the hero of Dieppe. Dieppe was an attempt by the British Army to land in France
and to expel the Germans from that part. Within 24 hours they were completely
wiped out and there ended all the heroic exploit'; of Lord Louis Mountbatten.
Because of his achievement at Dieppe he has been made Commander-in-Chief of the
South East Asia Command. I challenge you to show me one country in the world
today where promotions are made not for success, not for victories, but for
defeats. It is a unique achievement of the British Army and its Govt. in this
war. I can assure Lord Louis Mountbatten that a much bigger and greater victory
is waiting for him in East Asia."8
This was
the attitude of Netaji towards Lord Mountbatten. One can very well see the
difference in the attitudes of Pt. Nehru and Netaji towards Mountbatten.
Many a
time some minor factors prove to be so crucial and decisive that they affect
the outcome of some of the greatest events. The same was the case with Imphal
Campaign of I.N.A. and Japanese. Because of the lightning attacks of I.N.A. and
Japanese., the Britishers were unable to face the attack and Imphal was on the
verge of falling. Mountbatten, while visiting war-fields, suffered an injury in
his eye. The accident had blinded him in the sense that both his eyes were bandaged.
While narrating the developments of those days, Mountbatten wrote,
"This
accident could hardly have come at a worse time. I had to spend five days in
the American Forward hospital, with both eyes bandaged, in complete blindness.
And just at that moment the Japanese attacked again. They quickly cut off our
IV Corps in the Imphal plain, and a very serious situation developed.
......I persuaded the doctor to unbandage my eyes, and let me out of hospital.
I immediately new to Army Air Headquarters, and there took one of the most
serious decisions of my whole time as Supreme Commander.
On my own responsibility, I took thirty American transport aircraft off the
China supply route, and used them to fly an infantry division into Imphal. This
was done against President Roosevelt's explicit instructions, and although the
division was vitally important in the Battle of Imphal, it was even more
important not to lose the President's trust. So this time I was really sticking
my neck out. But Roosevelt was a man of vision, and he accepted the
situation."9
Even an
ordinary person can understand the gravity of the situation from the accounts
given by Lord Mountbatten. But for the considerate and accommodating approach
of President Roosevelt and the moral support showed by Winston Churchil, the
Prime Minister of England, Mountbatten could have been in a really serious
problem. But for the use of the American Air transport, Mountbatten would have
lost the most important battle of his life. This defeat might have completely
sealed his future career. In his own words,
"Much
of the biggest part of my Air Transport was American. The American pilots and
their C-47 s (the famous Dacotas) did a marvellous job. My Allied Air Commander
in Burma was a great American, General George E. Stratemeyer. In the end I had
61,000 American air and ground crew in my command, out of total of 1,76,000
airmen, and I just don't know what we would have done without them. "10
From this
veiled confession of Mountbatten one can very well understand the seriousness
and gravity of the situation on the Imphal front. Mountbatten, the royal
person, always magnified his achievements. and underrated his failures and
weaknesses. He was a glamorous person and wanted to hide his periods of
desperation and disappointment. Isn't it surprising that in all his writings,
speeches, interviews and expressions through other medias he avoided any
reference to I.N.A.'s involvement in the Burma and Imphal campaign and the role
which Netaji played in this whole campaign. It must be mentioned here that
without Netaji Indian campaign could not have been started. Though he was not
in a position to make considerable contribution in physical form yet tile moral
role which he played, none else was in a position to play. Earlier also, during
1942 the campaign was to be started but since Gen. Mohan Singh and others were
not able to satisfy the Japanese, the campaign had to be abandoned. It was only
due to the faith which the Japanese had in Netaji that the Japanese decided to
start the campaign. Numerically I.N.A. soldiers were very few and
insignificant, but they had to playa very important strategic role. The real
role of Netaji and his I.N.A. was to weaken the morale of the British Indian
Army and create dissensions in them. Mountbatten was conscious of the
propaganda value and demoralising effect which the I.N.A. soldiers could have
on his army. The real role of I.N.A. had to begin after the battle of Imphal.
If Imphal should have fallen, the I.N.A. supported by the Japanese Army would
have entered the plains. Indian masses, on seeing that the soldiers of I.N.A.
were fighting for the liberation of India, would have given all their support
to it. They would have sabotaged the British Indian Army. Mountbatten was so
much horrified at the consequence of the fall of Imphal, that he not only used
all possible means at his disposal to win this battle but also took care to not
to refer to I.N.A. or Netaji. In fact it is because of such bitter experiences
that he advised Nehru not to mention Netaji's name or do anything such as may
lead to the glorification of I.N.A.
Besides
this any Mountbatten wanted to protect the interests of his own country and he
couldn't find any better person than Nehru to achieve his object. On the other
hand Nehru wanted 10 grab the most powerful scat of authority in India after
independence. He couldn't find a better person than Mountbatten to assure the
achievement of his aim. Nehru had always, in the past, sided with the enemies
of Bose. In fact he had attacked Bose at a time when the latter maximum needed
his support. May be that he had some strong differences on principles with
Netaji but it is more true that in Netaji he found a political rival who could
effectively challenge his position after India attained independence. So far as
Lord Mountbattcn was concerned, he was a far-sighted, shrewd and cunning
politician. He knew that it was not possible to keep India slave for long and
it had to be freed. He was keenly interested in protecting the Britishers and
British interest in the post-independence era. Bose was known to be very
contemptuous towards Britishers. S. Patel was also known to have this type of
attitude but Mountbatten was able to change him and win him.
For the
protection and promotion of British interest in India, it was essential that
some such person should be at the helm of affairs as was most agreeable,
gratifying and considerate towards these interests. None could better serve
this purpose than Nehru. The developments in the times to come proved it beyond
doubt that above mentioned observations were really true. It is really very
unfortunate and agonising to complain that history of India has been written in
such a lop-sided and distorted manner and 'falsehood' has been so much propagated
in the name of 'truth' that it may lake many decades of strenuous, committed
and hard labour to convince the countrymen and make them believe that what they
know was not true and what was untrue, has been not only depicted but deeply
injected in their blood as 'true'.
Mountbatten
was the Viceroy of India and then the Governor-General of India during the
period which is called 'Transfer of Power Period' and Nehru was the most
important Indian, representing the Indian side. Both these persons had very
intimate personal and family relations. Availing such an intimacy for personal,
social or national cause is a normal thing but unfortunately, Mountbatten,
because of his smartness, intelligence, long experience, self-confidence and
the weaknesses of his rivals, could better use this intimacy to grind his axe
than what Nehru could do. Scores of books have been written on the relationship
between Nehru and Mountbattens. Whatever has been written in the various books
may not be literally true because quite a good part of it may be based on
speculation and hearsay. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre had a series of
interviews with Mountbatten on his experiences between the period of 16th
August 1947 to June 1948. In these interviews Lord Mountbatten recollected his experience:;
of the days of Transfer of Power, and gave a detailed account of some hitherto
unknown facts. In these interviews Mountbatten disclosed some such startling
facts which, if taken seriously and after analysis found to be true, can
completely transform the very fundamentals of the history of our freedom
struggle and change our views about some of the greatest heroes of Indian
Independence Struggle.
As
already pointed out Mountbatten had special type of relations with Nehru and
these relations considerably influenced the functioning of the Govt. of
Independent India. While commenting about dealing with Nehru, Mountbatten said,
"I
used to see most of my ministers about once a fortnight, but Nehru I saw pretty
much every day. I told him I had no intention of attending Cabinet meetings.
They were quite prepared at the time to have me in but I said, 'No, you must
learn to do without me. You arc the chief executive, you take the chair. I
don't want to be present.' But I said, 'I would appreciate it if I could see
all the Cabinet papers before the meetings. And I'd like to see you before you
go in because I can perhaps help you over some of your problems before you go
in."11
From this
it is quite clear that Mounbatten, though disinterested in attending the meetings
of the cabinet, was interested to see all the documents before these documents
were discussed by the cabinet. Nehru did not object to such an unprincipled
desire of Mountbatten. rather he invited Mountbatten to formally preside over
the meetings. Mountbatten being a shrewd politician, was not in favour of such
a gross violation of the constitutional framework. He knew that he was a
constitutional head and it would have been inappropriate for him to preside
over the meetings but at the same time wanted not only to keep an eye on the
working of the Govt. but also wanted to run the Govt. by proxy through Nehru
who in turn was himself willing to shelve his responsibilities. Availing the
experiences of a friendly person is not unfair but when the person belongs to
the erstwhile rulers, who exploited our nation for more than two centuries and
degraded us like the beasts, was politically unwise and a betrayal of the
nation. No self respecting Indian, particularly those who are strongly
nationalist minded, could have imagined the way Nehru had become a voluntary
and willing puppet in the hands of Mountbatten. It appears to be extremely
paradoxical when the persons like Nehru tried to characterise Netaji as a
'puppet'. The purpose of seeing the papers before being presented to the
cabinet was to see that no such document is considered by the cabinet which may
be harmful and injurious to the interest of the Britishers in India. The
advice. which Mountbatten wanted to give was to assure that nothing of this type
is said or done which may harm the British interest. The extent to which Nehru
was controlled and dominated by Mountbatten will become clear from the
following details given by Mountbatten:
"The
paper was passed around and the Prime Minister said, "Now we come to item
no.3." He did it in a rather unusual way, bless his heart. He had agreed
with me it shouldn't go through, it should be rejected. Instead of saying at
once it should be rejected, he passed it out. Immediately they all Started
jabbering. They all said it was a great idea, and Nehru let them go on and when
they had finished he said, "I think it is a very bad idea," and he
gave the reasons. He said he'd seen His Excellency who disapproved of the paper
and he gave my reason.
But he is only a constitutional head of state, they all said. You don't have to
listen to him. This is a paper we want. What does it matter what he thinks?
Nehru said, "You don't think we asked Mountbatten to stay here simply as a
figurehead? We asked him to stay because he's more experienced than we are as
an administrator. He loves India as much as we do. And what he says we should
do. I'm not interested in what you think, I am interested in what Mountbatten
thinks. He won't have it, and I won't have it. It is thrown out."12
This is
just an example of the extent to which Mountbatten used (misused) Nehru, and
how much importance was given to the use: of Mountbatten by him. It need not be
said that Nehru recognised Mountbatten as the chief guardian of the Indian
interest and the chief spokesman of the Indian point of view. It appears that
Mountbatten had either hypnotised or involved Nehru in such a conspiracy that
the latter had no option but to behave as captive. Can anyone, having some
knowledge of the working of the parliamentary system, think of any situation
where the Prime Minister is so arrogantly, irrationally, ruthlessly and
undemocratically suppressed, overlooked and surpassed the views of the whole
cabinet just to accommodate and honour the views of a constitutional head, and,
more so, when he is a representative of an imperialist regime. Moreover,
Mountbatten had a feeling of self-righteousness and racial superiority. In
spite of being considerably younger than Nehru, Patel and others, at times he
addressed them as 'lad,,'. He felt pride in whatever was English and had a very
poor opinion of whatever was Indian. He belonged to that group of people who
believed that God had sent them to rule over the Indians and educate them. At
one place, in his interview, Mountbatten said,
"I
believe that if the British hadn't put them in prison, they would have been
even less qualified, I mean, they weren't very highly qualified when they did
take over."13
This is
the type of opinion which Mountbatten, about whom Nehru claimed that 'he loved
India as much as we do', had towards the Indians and even about the leaders of
India. It won't be wrong or an exaggeration to say that the slavish attitude of
the persons like Nehru, encouraged Mountbatten to use such discourteous,
rogatory and humiliating expressions about the Indian leaders. The person
(Mountbatten) who 'Could say 'bless his heart', for discarding and ignoring the
so well established norms of the Govt., could not be expected to welcome or
allow the return of the person like Netaji who could dare to confront the
persons like Hitler in the latter's den. If the Prime Minister of England or
Australia would have behaved in the manner in which Nehru behaved, would
Mountbattcn have blessed them also for an identical treatment. Mountbatten,
guided by the interest of his country, and led by the principle of expediency,
forgot that he was setting very bad precedents for an infant parliamentary
democracy. He forgot the treatment which was given to the Prime Minister of
England during the great economic depression, who had deserted the official
policy of his party and with the help of opposition party, on the advise of the
King had ruled over the country for sometime. Mountbatten would have rendered
greater service to India and the people of England if he had decided to serve
the cause of parliamentary democracy rather than serving the interest of his
own people at the cost of a system in whose name England involved many
countries of .the world in the war.
It is
believed that the isolated instances do not establish the maxims. After India
was granted independence, Mountbatten with his family was away to Simla to
relax. The division of Punjab had resulted in the eruption of violence on large
scale and there were serious problems of law and order. The rulers, Indian
leaders silting at Delhi, felt so much frightened and helpless that they found
no way out except to send them emergency message to Simla with the request to
Mountbatten to rush to Delhi. Mountbatten narrated the incident to the interviewers
like this:
"Menon
said, "Your Excellency must return to Delhi". I said, "Don't be
silly, V.P., you must come up here-it can't be essential for me to come back. I
am a Constitutional Governor-General. If my cabinet has something which they
wish me to countersign have them send the documents up here.! shall
countersign! "I can't remember whether he rang me again or whether he then
said, "Well, as a matter of fact the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime
Minister want you to come down."
"Why?"
"They want more than your advice, they want your help."
"Well, I'm not coming, tell them."
He said, "If your Excellency isn't down within 24 hours, don't bother to
come. It'll be too late, we will have lost India."
"All right, V.P., old swine," I said, "I shall come down."
We ordered the train and down we went. "14
This is
another example of how the Indian Administration, under the so-called dynamic,
spirited and inspiring leadership of Nehru, knelt in front of Mountbatten and
made him feel and believe that he was really indispensable for the existence of
India. The expressions like, "We will have lost India" made
Mountbatten behave with greater authority and sense of vanity. Mountbatten
himself felt that whatever was done by Nehru and the others was too much and
the people on learning these facts may behave .differently. That is why he
tried to conceal the things in those days. In the interview he disclosed much
more explosive information. While narrating the chain of incidents after his return
from Simla, he said:
"The
thing was deteriorating and they said, 'We don't know how to hold it'.
I said,"Why not'? You have taken over power."
And Nehru said. "While you were exercising the highest
command in the war, we were in prison. You are a professional, a high level
administrator. We're not arr.ateurs, we just know nothing. You can't just turn
over this country to us, having stayed with us aU our lives with all your
knowledge and experience, then leave us. without any experience or knowledge of
how to do it. Will you run the country?" (That is the extraordinary
thing).
"You
must understand", Nehru said. "You've got to take it. We pledge
ourselves. We shall do whatever you say. We 'U be far more obedient than when
you were Viceroy. Please, take over the country."15
In this
way Nehru offered, rather presented the country's Govt. back to him, the one
who represented the imperialist power which ruled in an inhumane, unjust and
undemocratic manner over us. The details of the disclosure are so clearly and
intensely self-explanatory, and humiliating for a nationalist mind person that
these facts need no elaboration, analysis or clarification. Mountbatten, who
belong to the British Royal family and who must have inherited a considerable
political shrewdness, realised what did this offer mean under the
circumstances. It was just because the Britishers were no longer in a position
to extend their rule in India, otherwise Mountbatten at his own or under the
advice of his seniors in England, might have exposed the real nature and
quality of the so. called great leadership of India and perpetuated their role.
Perhaps the leadership of India could not realise the gravity of the issue but
Mountbatten could do so even at that time. About this offer he said,
"Well,
look, it's terrible, for if it were known that you'd turned over the country to
me, you'd be finished. You'd be a laughing-stock. The Indians keep back the
British Viceroy and then turn the country back to him? This is out of the
question! "16
In this
way Mountbatten warned Nehru and others against the consequences of such a
proposal but those Indian leaders, who claimed themselves to be tigers, nay the
roaring lions on the stage, were so much convinced about their incapacities and
incapabilities to rule that instead of heeding the advice, and trying to gather
the courage, said,
"Well,
we may find ways of disguising this, but if you don't do it, we can't manage
it."
"All
right, "I said it, very reluctantly. "I'll do it, and of course I can
pull the country together because I do know how to do it, but I think you must
all agree that nobody must know about this. Nobody must know you have made this
extravagant offer to me, or these requests; we shall find a solution which will
be done in such a way that it will appear to be constitutionally normal,
correct and proper. "17
In this
way the conspiracy was hatched to befool, sidetrack and hoodwink he whole
nation and the conspirers were none other than our honourable first Prime
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of India along with Mountbatten. All of them
rehearsed like the rehearsal of a scene of the drama so that no mistake may be
committed. Mountbatten narrated the scene of the rehearsal of this most
historical drama played by some of the greatest persons, in the following
words:
"So
you two will ask me. to set up an Emergency Committee in the Cabinet, and I
will agree. Will you do that?"
"Yes."
"All right. You 've asked me. I will take the chair because you invite me
to?"
"Yes, we invite you."
"The Emergency Committee will consist of the people I will nominate."
"Oh, we must have the whole Cabinet!"
"The whole Cabinet?" I said, "It would be disastrous. I don't
want all your odds and sods, I just want the key people. And I want the
Director of Civil Aviation, the Director of Railways."
"You can have the Minister."
I said, "I don't want the Minister at all, I want the civil servants who
are doing it. I want the Chief of Police, I want the head of the Indian medical
services. I want my wife, who will immediately set up a council for all the
voluntary organizations. and she will represent them. The Secretary will be General Erskine-Crum, my Conference Secretary. The minutes will be kept by British stenographers.
The minutes will be typed in the course of the meeting and handed to people as
they go away and be acted on at once. In every case, you invite me to do
this?"
"Yes, we invite you."
"Nobody
will know that you asked me to tell you what to do. All you're doing is you've
left me in the chair. The Prime Minister sits on my right, the Deputy on my
left, and every time I'll always go through the motions of consulting you, and
whatever I say, you're not going to argue with me, we haven't got time. I'll
say, 'I'm sure you wish me to do this,' and you'll say, 'Yes, please.' That's
all I want. I don't want you to say anything else." Patel said,
"Well, can't we
have "
I said, "Not if you're going to delay things. You can go through the
motions of arguing with me so long as you finally do what I say. Do you want me
to run the country or are you going to try and make a mess of it
yourself!"
"Ah, all right ,"he said. "You can run the country."18
In this
way the whole drama was prepared, rehearsed and staged very efficiently. The
nation was handed back to Mountbatten. The things were kept extremely
confidential. Mountbatten didn't confide it to anyone. He has made it
abundantly clear that he didn't have any faith in the Indians, not even the
Union Ministers. He was not prepared to have Indian stenographers even. He had
more faith and found it more appropriate to depend on Lady Mountbatten for
organising the voluntary agencies. On the other hand the Indian leadership
described him as one of their best friends and handed over the nation back to
him. SUCH WAS THE INTEGRITY, COMMITMENT TO NATION, AND SELF CONFIDENCE OF THOSE
WHO CLAIMED THEMSELVES TO BE THE ARCHITECTS OF MODERN INDIA. It is not clear or
known whether Nehru was aware or not of the seriousness of the issues involved
but Mountbatten definitely was. Mountbatten expressed his concern about this
offer in the following words:
"It
was the most extraordinary conversation I've ever had and that's why I didn't
record it. It is a very dangerous thing, really. This is probably the first
time it's been recorded. I told very few of my staff. I struck to the fiction
that Nehru and Patel had invited me to come down because they'd decided to set
up an Emergency Committee in the Cabinet (They didn't even know what an
Emergency Committee was.) They'd asked me to take the chair, and I had with
some reluctance, agreed, provided they would sit on each side of me and tell me
what they wanted me to do. They'd asked if my secretary would do the notes, and
I'd said yes, if it was convenient, and so on."19
When the
interviewers asked him,
"You
have no record in your notes of the conversation?"
Mountbatten
responded,
"I'll
tell you why you haven't got this. It was not done at the time, it was too hot.
What's going to come is very hot, and I wouldn't put it down. It's only now, after 25 years, that I can tell it."2O
IF THESE
FACTS HAD BECOME PUBLIC, IT IS VERY MUCH POSSIBLE THAT SOME FANATIC NATIONALIST
WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE SAME TREATMENT TO NEHRU AS WAS GIVEN TO MAHATMA GANDHI.
THIS IS ONE SENSATIONAL FACT WHICH MOUNTBATTEN THOUGHT THAT HE COULD SHARE WITH
THE WORLD AFTER A QUARTER OF THE CENTURY. THERE CAN BE MORE STARTLING FACTS
WHICH MOUNTBATTEN MIGHT HAVE DECIDED TO KEEP WITH HIMSELF FEARING THAT THE WORLD
MAY NEVER EXCUSE THE CONSPIRATORS FOR THE CONCEALED INFORMATION.
With a
view to establish his own mental, administrative, political maturity or to
expose the weaknesses of the Indian leadership, Mountbatten has quoted another
instance where Indian top political brass failed to come up to the required
level. Another emergency which struck the nation after the independence was the
assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. It was feared that a large scale violence may
follow the murder of the apostle of peace. When Mountbatten learnt about attack
on Gandhi, his press secretary Campbell and Johnson was with him and he told
him,
"If
the old boy dies we're in real trouble."21
On the
way Mountbatten claims to have told his press secretary that the killer was a
Hindu. When Allen asked him, how do you know, Mountbatten said,
"I
don't. But if it is a Muslim we are all finished, so it may as well be a Hindu.
"22
Mountbatten
claims to have summoned S. Baldev Singh. Nehru, Patel and Baldev Singh, all
were in tears. Baldev Singh, the Minister of Defence was at a loss what to do.
Mountbatten said to them,
"Wait
a moment and I'll tell you what to do. Just wait here."I then sent for the
three chiefs of staff, all Englishmen. I turned to Nehru and said,
"You must go to All India Radio and broadcast to the country."
"I can't I am not prepared, I don't know what to say."
I said, "Look, it will come. You go to All India Radio and you, Alan, you
lay on the programme. Tell them to clear the air and stand by for a broadcast
from the P.M."
Again, Nehru protested. He said, "I don't know what to say."
I said, "Look, when you get there, God will tell you what to say. It will
be a great speech." And, of course, it was. I'm not trying to blow my own
trumpet, but this was the difference between a British trained, political
leader and an eastern fatalist. If I'd been in Madras then and not come back to
Delhi, I tremble to think of the inaction there would have been. Nothing would
have happened at all.
I went back into Gandhiji's room, very quickly, voice down, very slowly. I did
it all as though I was in church. I felt I was in a church service, really, and
one was trying to arrange the choir movement. That was the extraordinary
feeling about it. And that, I do know, had a most powerful effect. Nobody
around. I was once more back in charge of the country.
There were two occasions when that happened. Once during in the riots in
Peshawar in April, and then when I went into that room and nothing was
happening. It's the most extraordinary thing, that Indian weakness of not
taking action.
Don't
forget the three C-in-C's were British, and I would like to point out to you
that it was an unusual decision that was made. At the time, it was accepted by
them all and I'm sure Gandhi himself would have approved."23
If
whatever had been claimed by Mountbatten is true, even if partially, it is very
insulting for the Indians. Once again he tried to prove that the Indian
political leadership was unfit to meet any emergency and also that without the
help of Mountbatten, the crisis arising out of the Gandhiji's assassination,
could not have been met effectively. He expressed his faith and pride in the
English officers, political leadership and expressed his distrust in the ruling
capabilities of the Indian leadership. It were the occurrence of unforeseen
emergencies which provided Mountbatten opportunities to play such a role as
enabled him to claim that he in fact was ruling the country. From this we can
imply that if the Britishers would have been in a position to really rule over
India again, Nehru had made it very convenient for them to regain the control
of the country. They could have manipulated to create some such problems as the
Indian political leadership would have failed to solve and it would have
compelled the Britishers to intervene on the request of the Indian political
leadership. It would have enabled the Britishers to prove to the world that
their assertion that Indians are unfit to rule over themselves, was true. It
would have given them legitimate reason to perpetuate their rule over India and
many more patriots would have had to shed their blood TO REGAIN THE RELOST
FREEDOM.
One
strange and surprising thing about the relationship between Mountbatten and
Nehru had been that whereas the Indians gave him the greatest and unqualified
regards, without caring to test his motives and integrity, he treated them with
disdain and contempt. Indians made him believe that he was really indispensable
for their survival. Our political leadership led by Nehru, out of simplicity,
regards, helplessness or necessity, made him believe that he was always right.
HAD NEHRU BORROWED EVEN A LITTLE SENSE OF RESISTANCE OR LEARNT A FEW LESSONS
FROM BOSE HOW TO PLEAD ADVANCE AND ASSERT ONE'S POINT OF VIEW EVEN UNDER THE
MOST ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES, INDIA WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO DISGRACEFULLY TREATED
BY MOUNTBATTEN. Before concluding comments on Mountbatten's real attitude
towards the Indians, let me quote another instance.
In 1921,
Prince of Wales visited India. Mountbatten accompanied him to Kashmir. Prince
of Wales, Lord Mountbatten and all others rode their decorated elephants. When
they were going one Indian Sub Inspector of Police came rushing and told
something to President Sir Arthur Loder. Lord Mountbatten explained the
incident in the following words:
"Sir,
stop them, because there were high tension power cables running around the camp
and they'd hit them." On seeing this, according to Moubtbatten, the Prince
of Wales turned around and said,
"Loder, what does that bloody fool want?" in a loud voice. So Loder
asked him, and the fellow then explained that there were special high tension
power cables running around the camp, and we'd hit them! So he made us turn
round and go back. The next day, the Indian Sub-Inspector of police came to see
Loder and said,
"I think that H.R.H. wish to refer to me personally in the discussion with
you last night."
"Yes," said Loder, "he did."
"Would you mind recalling to mind what he said?"
"Yes, of course, I can remember exactly what he said."
"Because every remark by the Prince of Wales is an honour to my family,
and I want to put it down in my family records." So he wrote,"I am
happy to record the remarks which H.R.H. designed to pass on this occasion. He
said, What the hell does the bloody fool want?"
Mountbatten
added,
"This
gives you some idea what the Indians were like. If the Prince of Wales referred
to him as bloody fool, this was an honour beyond his wildest dreams.' '24
Mountbatten
could make such type of expressions because he came across the persons like
Nehru who could kneel to any extent to lick the feet of political masters or
benefactors. If Mountbatten had to deal with the persons like Netaji who could
go to the extent of physically assaulting the British teacher who had
misbehaved with the Indian students, respectably confront Hitler in latter's
den, get all the benefits from Gen. Tojo without compromising any fundamental
principle, Mountbatten would have never gathered the moral courage to make such
types of comments. It is very unfortunate that we, the people of India, have
been let down more by her own people than by the outsiders. India needed the
leaders like that of Netaji who said,
"Since
the enemy fights with sword. we too should use the sword. The non-violent
struggle should transfrom itself into a violent one. Only if a large number of
Indians undergo the baptism of fire can they win the race and get the reward of
freedom."25
The
defeat of Britain in India, i.e. Britain's withdrawal from India had already
been forecast by Netaji. In 1942 while in Germany, talking to German Admiral
Canaries, Netaji told him,
"Germany
cannot win this war. But this time victorious Britain will lose India, even the
British will not be able to break their promise to give up their dominion over
India. A promise made of their own will in 1940. It is naturally a
disappointment for me at the eleventh hour. My Journey to the far east had to
be abandoned, owing to reason that were purely technical, though everything
possible had been done from the side of the German Govt. to help in the matter.
Nevertheless, I remain an optimist and I have an intuitive feeling that a way
will be found to make the journey possible."26
The
British had started packing their luggage much before 15th August 1947. They
had been so badly shaken cd and weakened that they had no option but to free
India, but wanted to free India in a way which should guarantee India's
association with England. Churchil, the Prime Minister of England was a very
staunch opponent of the idea of granting independence to India. He was not in
favour of so soon giving freedom to India. Since Mountbatten, who claimed
himself to be a trained and smart politician fit enough to meet any emergency,
was finding it difficult to held on to power in India, wanted to accelerate the
process and propone the Independence to India, had to go to Churchil to seek
his support to his idea. He went to Churchil and said,
"I
came to appeal to you... We have to get the Independence Bill passed as soon as
possible."27
Churchil
angrily looked at him and said,
"And
you expect me to help you? To help you destroy two hundred years of British
history? To abandon our duty to those millions whom we have protected and
administered for so long?"28
Mountbatten
said,
"It
is they who will suffer, if we do not get the legislation through quickly,
India will face anarchy on an unimaginable scale.' '29
Churchil
snapped,
"That
is what will happen, any-way, once British administration is withdrawn. It is
all the fault of the leaders, those fanatics, with their obsession to destroy
the Empire... With the loss of India comes Britain's decline as a great power.
Our position in the world will be diminished."30
When
Mountbatten told Churchil that he had a promise from the future dominions that
they shall remain attached to Commonwealth, Churchil remarked,
"At
least... if India remains as part of the Commonwealth, all might not be lost.
The British public will back you... I will help to get the necessary
legislations through Parliament without delay. And in that case, India can have
her damned Independence sooner than she ever expected. "31
In this
way Mountbatten succeeded in persuading Churchil, not in the interest of India
but for the long-term interests of England.
Mountbatten,
for whom Nehru was never short of words to prove him India's best friend, while
speaking in India House in London tried to minimise the losses caused by
communal holocast in India during the partition days. Ismay told his wife about
Mountbatten's views in the following words,
"Only
a hundred thousand people had died, he said, only a small part of the country
had been affected. I was horrified at Dickie's speech... It seems to me
immaterial whether one hundred thousand or a million have actually died: or
whether only three percent of the country is in turmoil. The essential facts
are that there is human, misery on a colossal scale all around one and millions
are bereaved, destitute, homeless, hungry, thirsty and worst of all desperately
anxious and almost hopeless about their future."32
To
Mountbatten the figure of 'One Hundred Thousand Death'is small enough to be
called 'only'. What a friendly, sympathetic attitude he had!
Mountbatten
was neither a friend nor a sympathiser of India. He was a shrewd Britisher who
tried to serve the interest of his country and did it successfully. He was
definitely a friend of Nehru and maintained his friendship with him by all
means. Mountbatten, because of the high position he had held and because of the
Royal links, had some privileges and had access to the Top Secret informations.
This is very clear from the fact that Churchil shared the decision of using the
Atom Bomb in Japan with Mountbatten. In the meeting of the Big Three i.e., the
President of America Truman, Stalin from Russia and Churchil from England had
met at Potsdam. Mountbatten was also called to join them. After the meeting
Mountbatten dined with Churchil. There Churchil told Mountbatten,
"I
have something highly confidential and very important to tell you... The war
with Japan will be over in less than a month. We are going to use a new bomb,
an Atomic Bomb, against the cities of Japan, and the Emperor will be forced to
capitulate. Of course you are not to mention this to a soul."33
Thereafter
American President Truman told him,
"I
have something highly confidential...", and he disclosed the secret to
Mountbatten."34
This gave
Mountbatten great self-confidence and he boastfully claimed,
"The
funny thing is he never told Mac Arthur, so I was a lap ahead of him there.
"35
If such
top-secret things were in the knowledge of Mountbatten, there must not be
anything, at least related to South East Asia, which could not have been in his
knowledge. He must have gathered all the information about the most serious
threat to British regime in India i.e. Netaji S.C.Bose and conveyed it to
Nehru. IF SOMEBODY MIGHT HAVE EVER GRILLED MOUNTBATIEN ON NETAJI'S ISSUE, HE
MUST HAVE DIVULGED VERY VITAL INFORMATION. MOUNTBATIEN THOUGH CLAIMED TO BE A
FRIEND AND A BENEFACTOR OF INDIA BUT HE WAS NOT. HE WAS A CONSPIRATOR WHO SAVED
AND SERVED THE BRITISH INTEREST AND SPOILED AND DAMAGED THE INTEREST OF INDIA.
CHAPTER XIX
Edwina,
Nehru and Netaji
Edwina
Mountbatten was a very intelligent, smart, adventurous, hardworking, charming,
influential, well connected dominating and impressive lady. She, besides having
all the privileges of being the wife of Lord Mountbauen, had a personality of
her own and because of that she earned a privileged position for herself. She
had a very vast experience of meeting and dealing with the powerful political
personalities and the various heads of different nations of the world. Most of
the time she had her independent opinion and always tried to make her own contribution
to political and social activities. It was difficult to ignore her where she
wanted to be the centre of attraction or the centre of activities. She must be
one of those a few ladies of the royal family who had done so much constructive
and socially useful work for the poor and needy. She was very helpful to her
husband who gained many things because of her.
Pt J.L.
Nehru, the first P.M. of India, was also an intelligent, eutopian, handsome and
affluent person. Because of his education abroad, he had learnt the European
culture and this knowledge was very helpful to him in his dealings with
Mountbattens. Edwina and Nehru met in March 1946 at Singapore. She had already
learnt a lot ~bout him. It was essential that Nehru's visit to Singapore should
have been successful from British point of view and not from the Indian point
of view. He had a dinner with Mountbattens and after the dinner he dropped the
idea of laying the wreath on the war memorial. Though it is known that Lord
Mountbatten succeeded in persuading Nehru not to lay the wreath on the war
memorial yet we cannot overlook the role which was played by Edwina Mountbatten
in the whole affair. It was not only the beginning of Nehru's indifferent
attitude towards Netaji or I.N.A. but also the beginning of an extraordinarily
important relationship between Edwina and Nehru. Though initially their
relationship might have been guided by the consideration of mutual convenience
with political factors in mind yet later on, with the passage of time, their relations
became more intimate and personalised. The correspondence exchanged between the
two reveal that they were emotionally involved and shared the secrets with each
other. Well, if the shared secrets should have been about the personal matters,
the nation had not much to do with it because it could be brushed aside as a
personal matter. But from the exchange of correspondence it appears that they
discussed about everything, politics, national plans and even the cabinet
proceedings. Edwina had been writing to Nehru and commenting on the political
developments. She wrote to Nehru in August 1954,
"No
news of any new appointments. I believe there is a battle Royal raging as to
who is to be the next First Sea Lord. Dickie's name is of course frequently
mentioned and continuously attacked in the Express. But there arc others 'in
the running' and many in high places who would like Dickie sent
elsewhere One would like to know sometime so as to plan
one's life."1
This is a
comment about the Govt. matters though because of the involvement of Lord
Mountbatten in it, it can be described as personal also. In another letter she
wrote to Nehru.
"The
first Lord of the Admirality ordered Mountbatten to remain at his post, he did.
Dickie was in a quite ghastly position. His job is to carry out orders. Then
the Govt yielded to international, particularly to American, pressure and
called off the action. On 9th November it was announced that the Prime Minister
was suffering from 'nervous exhaustion,' two days later he left the country for
three weeks rest in Jamaica. On 9th Jan. 1957 Eden announced his resignation
from the Premiership; he also gave up his parliamentary seat."2
In
general also she was very critical and vocal about commenting on the political
developments. Janet Morgan, in her book, while commenting on the role played by
Edwina, has written:
"These
views did Edwina no good. People felt that she was not entitled to have
opinions, still less critical ones, and that she should certainly refrain from
voicing them. Cabinet Ministers were alarmed. Amateurs themselves, frantically
trying to master their portfolios, they disliked being un settled, particularly
by a woman."3
This
shows that she was actively indulging in political developments of her country
and was sharing the information with Pt. Nehru. Janet Morgan has written in her
book,
"When
Nehru was in England, Edwina arranged for Eden to meet him at Broadlands and
she had urged the Foreign Secretary to make an official visit Lo Delhi. The
Adens went in February 1955 and stayed at Prime Minister's house. "4
In this
way Edwina was able to influence the relationship between England and India and
it is also clear that she had access up to the Prime Minister of England also.
She wrote to Nehru about the policies of the British Govt. and the attitude of
some British politicians and the ministers. She wrote to him about the details
of her meetings with the different political leaders. As she was writing to
him, he was also writing to her. Some of these things must have been state
secrets from the point of view of the Govt. It was a security risk from the
point of view of the Govt. of India and the Govt. of England. With such type of
relationship, the British Govt. could expect anything from Pt. Nehru through
Lady Mountbatten and on the other hand Lady Mountbatten could pass on, even if
unconsciously, any vital information relating to the policies and even the army
matters of the British Govt.
All the
above things have been discussed to show that Lady Mountbatten played an active
and strategic role in the political developments of India. Lady Mountbatten
must have been instrumental in conveying the vital information about the Netaji
issue to Nehru and kept on pressurising and persuading him not to talk about
I.N.A. or Netaji. Even after Independence Lady Mountbatten kept on visiting
India almost every year and so did Pt. Nehru by making trips to England. The
correspondence between the two was so regular that initially Edwina was writing
almost daily to him and Pt. Nehru was also not much behind the schedule. With
the passage of time the frequency reduced though the warmth of relationship
between them did not. I DO NOT FEEL IT APPROPRIATE TO REFER TO SOME OF
TEE THINGS WHICH REFLECT THE TRUE NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDWINA AND
NEHRU, BUT STILL I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT TO A GREAT EXTENT IT WAS EDWINA
FACTOR WHICH PROVED TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN MOULDING AND INFLUENCING THE
CONDUCT OF PT. NEHRU TOWARDS NETAJI.
CHAPTER XX
The
Inside Story of Nehru's Attitude Towards Netaji
It was
more than two centuries back on November 27, 1775 that Abigail Adams wrote in a
letter to John Adams,
"I
am more and more convinced that man is a dangerous creature; and that power,
whether vested in 'many or a few, is ever grasping, and like the grave, cries
'Give, give !"1
This has
been true not only when it was said, but also before it and after it Maxim
Gorky, while commenting about the effects of power, said,
"There
is no harm more contemptible poison than power over one's fellow men."2
Hunger for
power has been as old as the man himself. Whenever some contest takes place
between two rival groups or parties having diagonally opposite views, there is
a struggle to win not only against the enemy but also against one's
contemporaries in the intra group contest for supremacy. Unity in diversity and
diversity in unity has been the law of nature. Bigger the organisation,
movement, or scope of activity, greater are likely to be the differences
between those who spearhead the activity or movement The same happened in the
case of Indian freedom struggle also.
There
were two schools of thought guiding the freedom struggle. One set of people
wanted to follow a completely peaceful, constitutional and non-violent method
of struggle whereas the other group wanted to have an aggressive and militant
approach towards the Alien rulers. With the passage of time the movement of
freedom struggle gained momentum and it became quite clear that India would get
independence sooner than later. There were two types of people, one, those who
wanted to sacrifice their all for the achievement of freedom irrespective of
any consideration, whether they would live to see the day of independence or
not, and enjoy the fruits of independence. Second, those who wanted that when the
country became free, they should be at the helm of affairs. Generally the first
group is described as the group of radicals and revolutionaries, and the second
group is described as reformists or moderates. The latter group is very
characteristic in the sense that it keeps itself safe to avail the golden
opportunity.
Similar
things happened in India. One after the other the revolutionaries kept on
sacrificing their lives at the altar of Motherland and the moderates led by
Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru, kept themselves safe for taking over at the time of
transfer of power. The revolutionary, who came closest to overpowering and
almost annihilating the moderates was Netaji S.C. Bose. As we have already
studied it is alleged that he died in an air crash at Taihoku airport. There
was no direct and convincing evidence of his alleged death in the alleged air
crash. As has already been stated almost none believed his death story to be
true. In fact all those who believed the story or disbelieved it, did it on the
basis of hypothetical factors, i.e. without having any concrete evidence to
support their point of view. Those who believed him to be dead had no evidence
to prove that he had died and those who believed that he had not died bad no
evidence to support their point of view. Right from the day the news of alleged
air crash became public, people had raised their doubts about the truthfulness
of the story. The same doubts were echoed in the Indian parliament by Mr.H.V.
Kamath, the veteran parliamentarian who was a close associate of Netaji. When
he raised the issue in Lok Sabha about the circumstances leading to the
disappearance of Netaji, Pt. Nehru replied on Sept. 29, 1945,
"The
matter is in Japan, the whole thing is there. We cannot impose ourselves or an
inquiry committee on the Japanese Govt. Of course, if they chose to inquire, we
will gladly cooperate and give such help as we can... And, as I said, the
initiative must come from the Japanese Govt. in this matter."3
According
to P.T.I. Mr. Nehru added,
"The
question of Netaji's death is settled beyond doubt. There can be no enquiry
about that. If there is an enquiry possibly some additional facts about the
exact circumstances of his death may come to our notice."4
From the
reply given by Pt. Nehru, one can very well assess and analyse what type of
attitude he had towards Netaji? Can any sane or responsible Indian say that it
was not his concern to find truth about Netaji ? If it was not the concern of
Indians, why should the Japanese have taken the initiative in this matter? Why
did Pt. Nehru not feel the necessity of taking the initiative in this
direction? Had he received some confirmatory and conclusive evidence proving
that Netaji had died in the alleged air crash? If he had not received any such
information, then on what grounds could he believe the story to be true ? If
the death had been accepted, did the Congress Party ever passed a condolence
resolution to mourn the death of its former president? Did Pt. Nehru remember
that on September 21st 1945, at Bombay session of the A.I.C.C., Maulana Azad,
the then Congress President, had told the delegates:
"The
circumstances in which the news of death of Bose has reached us and the sources
responsible for the announcement do not make certain that Bose is in fact dead.
Therefore, his name should not appear in the list of those who died since the
last session of AICC."5
Since
once, the Congress Party had decided that no condolence resolution should be
passed because of the lack of any conclusive evidence, before accepting the
story to be true, the Congress Party was supposed to have passed some
resolution condoling the death of Netaji. It is beyond the understanding of
ordinary citizens to make out the reasons behind Nehru asking the Japanese to
take the initiative. Didn't he consider Bose to be an Indian citizen of
prominence? If yes, then why should the initiative not have been taken by him
or the Govt. of India? If he was convinced that the things happening outside
India were not of concern to Indians or Indian National Congress or Indian
Govt. then why did he visit Malaya and other countries to look into the fate of
the Indians there? If he was convinced at heart that the Indians in South East
Asia had not done anything commendable in the freedom struggle, then why did he
go there to enquire into their problems and helped them in solving their
problems? If he was so much opposed (as it appears from his post independence
conduct) on grounds of principles, to the activities of I.N.A., then why did he
feel concerned about the treasure of Azad Hind Govl. and felt the necessity of
making arrangements for its proper utilization? He took care to manage the
assets of Azad Hind Govt. and exploited to the maximum the achievements of
I.N.A., but did he ever, as Prime Minister, try to meet the liabilities of Azad
Hind Govt.? If not, then why not?
In fact
Nehru had always acted in a confused manner-changing his stands and statements
as per convenience and requirement of the situation. At times he completely
disagreed with whatever was done by Netaji, at other times he justified though
conditionally whatever had been done by Netaji. At some moments he felt so much
involved and swayed by whatever was done by Netaji that he claimed that he
might have himself done the same things, perhaps with even more enthusiasm. In
an interview to Press at Simla on 1st July, 1945, when a Journalist asked him,
"What
is your attitude towards Subhas Chandra Bose today?''6
Nehru
replied,
"I
recall the statement which 1 made in reply to a similar question in early 1942
at Calcutta. I had then said that I would fight against S.C. Bose if he came to
India under the auspices of the Japanese Govt., because his coming to India
then would have proved dangerous for the future of India. But, if he comes back
to India after the Japanese war, it will be wrong to adopt a vindictive policy
towards him. It is a different matter, however, on what condition he will be
allowed to return to India. An Indian leader cannot ignore the major motive of
another India and in the case of Subhas Bose, I have no doubt the major motive
has been the independence of India.''7
This
makes it absolutely clear that though Nehru could not withhold his appreciation
of the deeds of Netaji, yet he made it clear that the return of Netaji to India
will be a conditional matter. About the return of Netaji to India, he kept on
changing his views. In another press conference held at Srinagar on 19th August
1945, while recollecting his comments at Calcutta, he said,
"Three
years ago, I was asked in Calcutta what I would do if Subhas Bose led an army
into India on the plea of liberating India. I replied then that I would not
hesitate to resist this invasion, even though I did not doubt that Subhas Bose
and his Indian colleagues and followers were motivated by the desire to free
India, and were in no way mere tools of the Japanese. Nevertheless, they had
put themselves on the wrong side, and functioned under the auspices of the
Japanese. No person could come to India in this manner or under such foreign
auspices. Therefore, whatever the motive of these people, they had to be
resisted in India or outside."8
We see
that in his interview of 1st July 1945, he desired that we should not adopt
vindictive policy against him and in his interview of 19th August he said that
such efforts had to be resisted in India or outside. In fact with the passage
of time his attitude towards Netaji went on becoming increasingly more
unfriendly and unfavourable. Once when Nehru was asked about the role of I.N.A.
and Netaji, he said,
"I
do not know even today what I would have myself done at a time of crisis like
that. For that reason I cannot judge anybody else. One thing however is clear.
No Indian can withhold his praise for his countrymen who fight bravely. The
manner in which Netaji faced the crisis inspires admiration. Perhaps I might
have done the same thing if I were in his position.''9
So we see
that from the point of resisting the efforts of Netaji from inside and outside
India, he came to the point that he might himself have done whatever had been
done by Netaji. How can one justify the actions of somebody better than by
using such expressions. Before critically analysing the real altitude of Nehru
towards Netaji, let us study what he commented at Calcutta on 9th December, 1945,
"The
I.N.A. fought bravely for the freedom of India and large numbers of them died
in that struggle. We honour them for their fight for freedom and for their
sacrifices. Yet the main lesson they teach us is not only the love for the
country and of freedom, but discipline and organization and the unity they
forged among themselves. The communal problem that troubled us so much was
solved by them in their ranks. Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs lived together as
Indians and struggled unitedly for the common cause. We honour them for this
specially, and we honour their great leader, Subhas Chandra Bose. Even when we
differed from him in the past we respected him as a great fighter for India's
freedom. In recent years he showed himself a great organiser and, above all, a
welder of different communities of India into a single body. The facts that
have come out in the recent trial establish that he consistently resisted the
Japanese encroachment on the freedom of the Provisional Govt., which he had set
up, and on the Indian National Army. This Govt. and this army were no puppets
of the Japanese, but were moved by the passion for freedom. Repeatedly they
declared that they would not serve Japanese imperialism. The situation then was
difficult and required a careful handling. Subhas Bose and his colleagues
proved themselves as able leaders in those moments of great crisis and
difficulty. Therefore we have to learn from the Indian National Army how to
build up our unity and how to organise and discipline ourselves."10
From this
statement we learn that Nehru was a great admirer of I.N.A. He appeared to be
highly impressed by the organisation and working of I.N.A. He has conceded this
thing also that Azad Hind Government was not a puppet government as alleged by
Nehru himself earlier. In spite of nursing such type of feelings, he ultimately
disowned I.N.A. This change of attitude was a gradual and continuance process.
From the position of resisting Bose coming to India to paying the richest
compliments to I.N.A., makes even the wisest persons feel confused about the
real motives and standpoint of Nehru.
Though
this mystry appears to be quite complex yet a critical study of the
developments reveal that it is not difficult to identify the turning point. So
long as he had not visited Malaya, he was prepared to go to any extent to annoy
the British authorities and defended the I.N.A. After his visit to Malaya and
meeting with Mountbattens, his attitude underwent complete transformation.
Though it was nice on his part that he undertook the trouble of visiting Malaya
and other South East Asian countries to look into the condition of I.N.A.
people, yet it was not out of the real desire to help the I.N.A. people. He
wanted to control the remnants of I.N.A. and exploit them to the maximum for
his personal political and partiotism purposes. Isn't it strange that he could
find time to go to Malaya but did not feel the necessity or urge to go to
Taihoku to find real truth about the air crash story? He felt concerned about
the funds of Azad Hind Govt. and its proper utilization, but he was not at all
inclined to trace the facts relating to the alleged air crash claimed to be
involving Netaji. At that time like the South East Asian countries, Formosa was
also under the control of the Allies. I don't think there would have been any
difficulty for Nehru to seek permission to visit Formosa if he had so desired.
The Congress Party also did not feel the necessity of sending its delegation to
Formosa. It appears that Nehru was eager to accept the death story of Netaji.
Though it is all hypothetical yet I am very sure that if the alleged death of
Netaji would have been supported by reliable evidence, the Congress would have
sent its delegation to bring the ashes to India.
The real
motives of Nehru can be established by critically analysing the efforts made by
him to trace Netaji. The hard fact is that he neither believed nor disbelieved
the alleged death story of Netaji. He wanted to maintain a calculated silence
over the issue and believing that public memory was short-lived, he thought
that the issue would die its own death in the due course of time but
unfortunately for Nehru, it didn't happen like that. Even today, forty seven
years after the alleged air crash and 28 years after the death of Nehru himself,
there is no dearth of people who disbelieve the alleged crash story. The
followers and admirers of Netaji, disbelieving the whole story, decided to
appoint an independent enquiry commission under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice
Radha Binode Paul, a former Judge of the International War Tribunal. Nehru felt
alarmed at this development and just six days after rejecting the demands for
appointing an enquiry commission in Parliament, he appointed Shah Nawaz
Committee, 'to enquire into the circumstances concerning the departure of
Netaji S.C.Bose from Bangkok on 16th August 1945, his alleged death as a result
of an air crash accident, and subsequent developments therein'. Strangely, even
after the appointment of enquiry committee and before the committee submitted
its report Pt. Nehru announced in the Parliament,
"I
have no doubt today of the fact of Netaji S.C.Bose's death, is, I think settled
beyond doubt"11
After
having delayed the appointment of the enquiry committee for such a long period,
he performed one of the most unethical and immoral acts of forestalling the
verdict of the committee. It is really surprising that Shah Nawaz Committee
without even visiting the site of accident, submitted it<; report upholding
the fact that Netaji had died in the alleged air crash. From the detailed
accounts given above it is quite clear that Pt. Nehru either made no efforts at
his own to find the truth or whatever little efforts he made under compulsion,
were half-hearted and checkmated such efforts by anyone else.
Now the
question arises why Nehru developed such an attitude? Why was he so keenly
interested in establishing the death of Netaji ? What were the real motives
behind such an altitude? The reason as stated by Mr. Durga Dass, a renowned
journalist and biographer of Pt.. Nehru, in his book 'India from Curzon to
Nehru and After', wrote,
"There
is no doubt that had Bose not died in the air crash, he would have proved a
most formidable rival to Nehru and influenced for the better the course of
Indian History after independence."12
Mr. M.
Chalapathi Rau, who in his biography, entitled Jawahar Lal Nehru, after paying
rich tributes to Bose and making an exhaustive comparison of the two
personalities, wrote,
"Both
he and Jawahar Lal might have flourished,complementing each other, and they
would have been strong contenders for the mind and soul of India. "13
In this
way we see that there was a widespread belief that Netaji would have been a
serious and strong challenge to the position of Nehru. Nehru had already
experienced the strength of Netaji in the party elections of 1939, when Subhas
had single handedly outmaneuvered all the old Congress stalwarts. Nehru who had
Started believing himself invincible and indispensable, turned out to be a bad
loser. He was short tempered. It was the fear of threat to his position which
compelled him to develop such an irresponsible and callous altitude towards
such a sensitive issue like that of tracing the whereabouts of Netaji or
finding facts about the alleged air crash.
Another
point in this whole gamout of affair is, was Nehru really not laking any
interest in finding the truth about Netaji ? Since it appears natural even for
the most ordinary mind also to question the authenticity of the air crash
story, this question must have struck the mind of Pt. Nehru also. In spite of
the disturbed international war scene and post war developments, it was not
difficult for Nehru, Congress Party or Govt. of India to find the truth with
the help of Allied Intelligence Agencies. My belief is that he found an answer
and it is because of the knowledge of this answer that he felt scared and
insomniac on the slightest information and rumour about Netaji having been seen
somewhere. It is a common known fact that Nehru made anxious enquiries about
such news items. Why did he .do so? If a man had died, his ghost couldn't
appear and if it had appeared it must have met Nehru too. Since in fact Netaji
didn't die, no ghost could appear. The information about 'Netaji not having
died' was conveyed to Nehru by Mountbattens during his visit to Malaya. It is
after learning this hard fact that Nehru changed his mind and attitude.
Well,
what did Nehru do after knowing the fact that the air crash story was not a
true story? Though publicly he didn't do much yet inwardly he had
correspondence with some heads of foreign states. One example of such
correspondence is the affidavit submitted by Mr. Sham Lal Jain who was the
confidential Steno of Shri Asaf Ali. He claimed that Pt.Nehru dictated the
following letter to Mr. Attlee the Prime Minister of England:
"To
Mr.
Clement Attlee,
Prime
Minister of Britain,
10,
Downing street, London.
Dear
Mr.Attlee,
I
understand from a reliable source that Subhas Chandra Bose, your war criminal,
has been allowed to enter Russian Territory by Stalin. This is a clear
treachery and betrayal of faith by the Russian. As Russia has been an ally of
the British-Americans, it should not have been done. Please take note of it and
do what you consider proper and fit.
Yours sincerely,
(Jawahar Lal Nehru)"14
As we
have seen that the British Govt. kept on considering the various ways to try
Netaji long after the alleged air crash. The nature of discussion which the
Britishers had about Netaji reflects that they had information about the
whereabouts of Netaji. He wanted to make it sure that Netaji was not released
wherever he was. It is not exactly known how much correspondence had been
exchanged because the Govt has not divulged the relevant information but still
it is definite that a considerable correspondence had been exchanged, some of
which was properly filed. When Khosla Commission asked the then Govt. to
produce those files, the Govt. of India reported those files to be either
missing or destroyed. The question arises when and how those files got misplaced
from the personal custody of the Prime Minister? If some files had been
destroyed, as claimed by the Govt., why these files were destroyed? About the
missing files, was any enquiry held as per the standard rules in this respect?
If no enquiry was held, why so ? If any enquiry was conducted, what was its
outcome? About the documents which were destroyed, was it felt by the concerned
authorities that the documents had become irrelevant or were harmful to the
nation? If the documents were not of harmful nature why were these documents
destroyed and not transferred to the Archives or some other institutions where
they could be used by the coming generations for study and investigations.
Moreover, the Prime Minister of the nation belongs to the nation-whatever he
does, he does on behalf of the nation. His accomplishments are national
accomplishments as his failures are national failures.
His
correspondence is national property, why was this national property destroyed?
If the letters from 'father to daughter could be preserved and printed, why
were the letters relating to Netaji destroyed? Netaji had not done anything
which would have embarrassed India's position or damaged the image of India in
any way. If nothing harmful to the national interest was there in these
documents, there was no need to destroy them.
Well,
these documents could have been harmful to some individuals, nay to an
individual. Who could that person be? None except Pt. J.L.Nehru, a persistent
political adversary of Netaji and the first Prime Minister of India. If there
is no apparently convincing reason for destroying those files, the only reason
could be that the files contained letters which would have proved that Pt. J.L.
Nehru had definite information about the whereabouts of Netaji. Those people
who believed Netaji to be dead, always argue that if Netaji had been alive, he
would have definitely come to India. It was possible only if he was free to do
so. If he was under arrest somewhere, how could he come to India? It has
already been stated that Netaji was destined to slip into Russia after reaching
Manchuria by air.
The most
important question is that since the letters have been destroyed, how to
establish whether PI. Nehru had definite information about the whereabouts of
Netaji? Though it is true that the record in India has been destroyed yet the
copies of these destroyed letters must be available in those countries whose
leaders were the addresses of these letters. The affidavit submitted by Mr.
Sham La) Jain is of great importance. The Govt. of England can be requested to
comment on it.
When one
analyses the conduct and approach of Pt. Nehru, one finds that he was more
considerate towards the interest of the Britishers i.e. former rulers of India.
He did not want to embarrass their position. After his visit to Malaya his
attitude had completely changed and he had become more considerate towards the
problems of nation's enemy, i.e. the Britishers. It appears that he was able to
arrive at some understanding with the fomer rulers. They were interested in
protecting their own economic and political interest, and Nehru in turn was
interested to sustain his own political interest. He didn't mind changing his
standpoint completely. As discussed in earlier chapters, at a time when the
Central Assembly was in a .mood to unanimously pass a resolution supporting the
release of twelve members of I.N.A. he played a very treacherous game. In fact.
earlier also a resolution had been passed but this resolution had been vetoed
by Lord Wavell. Once again the Central Assembly was going to pass it
unanimously 'and if it had done so, the position of Britishers would have
become very embarrassing. In order to save the position of Britishers from
getting embarrassed, he succeeded in getting the resolution dropped at the
eleventh hour. If he could do so, what else was impossible for him. He, in
order to secure his own position, neither tried to find true facts about Netaji
nor let the facts become public.
CHAPTER XXI
Netaji: A
Victim of International Conspiracy
Since the
advent of civilisation, the conduct of man, particularly the strong and
ambitious, has been highly influenced by the instinct to dominate others,
specially the comparatively weak, and widen one's area of influence, domination
and affluence. In the history there is hardly any crime which has not been
perpetrated or any intrigue which has not been played by those who aspired for
political, economic, territorial or any such other 'Lust' to be satisfied. It
has been done so often and to such an extent that these crimes have been
legitimised. To gain political, economic or any other affluence, the first hand
relatives have been overthrown, arrested and even assassinated; the war time
allies become enemies, the friends become foes, and what not The nature and
scale of crime is directly proportionate to the scale and magnitude of the
issues and objectives involved.
The
imperialist powers, generally through their Intelligence Agencies, do some such
things, for the gains of their respective countries, as can never even be
imagined by the most criminal gangs of the under-world. America's C.I.A. and
former Soviet Russia's K.G.B. take it as their fundamental right and
prerogative not only to interfere in the internal political affairs of the
other countries, to topple any foreign Govt. which does not fall in line with
the policies of the Govts. of their respective countries but also become an
instrument of political change in their own countries too. They have not spared
even their heads of state. It is suspected that in the assassination of Mr.
John F. Kennedy, the former President of the United States of America, C.I.A.
also had conspired. Jim Garrison, in his book 'JFK On The Trail Of Assassins',
has written:
"We
have learned much about our Intelligence Agencies and what they have done in
our name. Assassination by our C.I.A. is no longer inconceivable, it is
establised historical fact. "1
So much
has been the impact of this issue raised by Jim Garrison, that the then
President of United States of America Mr. George Bush had to announce that all
the secret files related to this controversy, shall be opened to public for
scrutiny.
The case
of K.G.B., is still worse. Stalin, the dictator of Russia, got eliminated many
of his political adversaries through this agency. It has so sweeping and
unrestrained powers that no office, no person in Russia is too high to be
beyond its reach. On 19th August 1991, an unsuccessful effort was made to
overthrow Mr. Mikhael Gorbachev, the President of U.S.S.R. One of the six
conspirators was K.G.B. Chief Mr. V.A. Kryuchkev. Mr. Mikhael Gorbachev escaped
physically unhurt and returned to power because of the stand taken by Mr. Boris
Yelstin, the President of Russian Republic and the refusal of some of the
senior K.G.B. officials to obey their conspiring chief. Though Me. Boris
Yelstin deployed army in a considerable strength to defend the Russian
Parliament in which the meeting was being held to discuss the ways to meet the
challenge of coup leaders, yet one of the top officers of K.G.B. 's elite
'Alpha's' anti-terrorist unit Mr. Mikhael Golovatov claimed that his trained
men could have taken over the Russian Parliament in 20 or 30 minutes. If it had
so happened, the whole political structure of Soviet Russia would have undergone
unforeseen and unprecedented changes. Without the involvement of K.G.B. Chief,
the coup could not have been organised. It is because of the strategic and
sinister role played by K.G.B. that the Emergency Committee of the coup leaders
immediately took over the control of K.G.B. Mr. Mikhael Gorbachev too, after
his release from the captivity, considerably slashed its powers.
The
involvement of these agencies in the politics of other countries is very well
known. It is an open secret that many conspiracies were planned by C.I.A. to
physically liquidate Fidel Castro, the President of Cuba, a Communist,
supported by the Communist world. Russia wanted to use Cuba as her military
base for attack on America and installed long range missiles there. With a view
to check the installation of the Soviet Missiles in Cuba, the United States
blockaded Cuba. It could have led to the third World War. Fortunately Russia
removed the missiles and averted an international crisis. Even in general, the
imperialist countries have been trying to control the smaller, underdeveloped
and developing countries in whatever way it has been posible. In
Guatemala, in 1951, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was elected the President of the
country. He wanted to uplift the poor masses of his country. Since more than
70% of the land was owned by less than 2% population of the country, majority
people were very poor. United Fruit Company, owned by an American, had been
controlling very major part of country's economy and exploiting the poor. Since
the policies of Mr. Guzman were detrimental to the interests of the United
Fruit Company, the Govt. of U.S.A. invaded Guatemala in June 1954 and by
the end of the month forced Mr. Guzman to hand over the power to Col. Carlos
Diaz, a protegy of America. After the successful invasion and overthrow, which
cost C.I.A. $ 20 million, American television announced,
"Led
by Col. Castillo Armens Patriots arose in Guatemala to challenge the Communist
Leadership and to change it. Thus the situation is being cured by the Guatemalans
themselves."2
Since
Guatemala episode there have been hundreds of instances in which the various
intelligence agencies intervened in the internal affairs of smaller countries.
Even India did not lag behind and engineered the creation of Bangladesh. Many
leaders, as did not suit the imperialist countries, have been got eliminated.
NETAJl'S DISAPPEARANCE ALSO, IS ONE OF SUCH MOTIVATED CONSPIRACIES THOUGH THE
CONSPIRATORS WERE DIFFERENT ONES.
For
centuries, India remained the 'hen that laid golden eggs' and repeatedly
invaded and plundered by foreigners. Later on it was described as the pearl of
the world's biggest and the richest empire, the British Empire. It is believed
that Britain's richness multiplied many folds by the exploitation of apparently
poor India. Stung by such hard facts, since quite long Indians had been trying
to liberate their motherland but during the forties of the twentieth century,
this struggle had reached such a stage that the independence looked like a
question of time only. The entrance of some very dynamic elements to this
struggle, both 10 Congress and revolutionaries ranks, accelerated the pace of
struggle. The beginning of the second world war provided the much needed
catalytic agent for the completion of this process of achieving independence.
The greatest and most powerful imperialist power i.e. England, was finding It
difficult to retain its grip on colonies. There was growing unrest everywhere.
Adof Hitler, after experiencing the humiliation of his Fatherland, was desperately
in search of an opportunity to restore the honour of his nation. He finally
launched his offence on 3rd September 1939, marking the beginning of the second
world war. His lightning actions and successes completely exposed the
hollowness of the strength of the British Empire. His biltzkriegs completely
smashed the images of the countries like England and France. The Maginot line
of France could not sustain the strain and the Govt of France, after
abdicating, secured shelter in England. London Itself came under devastating
attacks of the German aeroplanes. This dealt an irreparable blow to the
prestige of England. The Land Lease Agreement between England and America
further humiliated the position of England. This encouraged and inspired the
Indian Freedom Fighters to intensify their efforts so that maximum benefits
could be taken out of the prevailing situation. Some adventurous patriots went
ahead of others and took more daring steps than many could not even imagine.
Netaji's escape from the house-arrest was such an attempt
After
escaping from the house-arrest, Netaji reached Germany where he chalked out his
plans for future action. 'Germans were a little slow in giving their help to
him because their attitude and perception of the international political set up
was different. Hitler thought that since his armies were too far from the
Indian borders, it was not politically expedient to recognise the Provisional
Govt. organised by Netaji. When Russia and Germany were having good relations,
Germany left India for Russia's 'Zone of influence'. Russia had realised that
England won't be able to retain her hold on India and India will be exposed to
exploitation and domination by some foreign nation. Russia wanted to avail the
opportunity and establish her dominance on India. Since colonisation in future
was not possible because of the changed international political situation and
awakening among the underdeveloped or colonised countries, the aim of the
victorious nations of the second world war was not only ~ secure but also to
promote their economic interests throughout the world and maintain their
superiority in different geographical zones of the world. Since India was
underdeveloped and had to be developed, there was a great scope for development
oriented investment in it Besides this, the Soviet Russia, which considered
herself to be the mother of Communism, thought that India, because of the
poverty, was ripe to receive Communist ideology.
It has
never been possible for any imperialist country, even if the most powerful, to
dominate, exploit or use as a satellite, any other country even if the smallest
and weakest, without the concurrence, willing or forced, of the people,
particularly the main leaders of the country. During the last decade of the
freedom struggle, three Indian leaders, Mahatma Gandhi, S.C.. Bose and Jawahar
Lal Nehru had achieved predominant and pre-eminent positions. Since Mahatma
Gandhi had opted for himself the role of a king-maker, he was out of reckoning
for any office. The contest, for the most powerful and prestigious office i.e.
of the Prime Minister, could have been between Netaji S.C. Bose and J.L Nehru.
These two stalwarts, after having a brief period of political friendship, had
gone poles apart. There were fundamental differences between the personalities
and approaches of these two leaders. Nehru was known to be a comparatively
moderate, liberal, non-confrontationist and glory seeking person. He was
basically more adjustable in nature and preferred to follow the middle course
in order to keep scope for adjustments. He could afford to be 'Friendly' even
towards the British rulers, who had exploited and humiliated our country to the
extreme. Persons like him arc better suited to the imperialist powers.
On the
other hand Netaji S.C. Bose was known to be a comparatively more seasoned,
self-made, self-confident, self-respecting, shrewd, adventurous. hard bargainer
and great leader. He was non-compromising on national interests and could face
even the worst situations with confidence and magnanimity. He had already
proved, through his dealings with Adolf Hitler the dictator of Germany,
Mussolini the Dictator of Italy, and Premier, Tojo of Japan that he had
outstanding leadership qualities and potential to effectively and impressively
deal with even the strongest and most powerful leaders of the world, and all
this in spite of the comparatively weak and difficult position in which he was
placed. The way he organised the I.N.A., and infused a new life and spirit in
it, gave ample evidence of his organizational and administrative skill, and the
manner in which the masses responded to his call for recruitment to I.N.A and
made generous and substantial financial contributions, exhibited the
effectiveness of his mass appeal. His capacity and capability to deliver
results, even under the most unfavourable circumstances, had been established
beyond all doubts. IF HE HAD BEEN IN INDIA AND ENTHRONED IN THE SEATS OF
AUTHORITY, THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES, WHO HAD FIXED THEIR EYES ON THE
INDIAN ASSETS, WOULD HAVE FOUND IT REALLY VERY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO
EXPLOIT INDIA TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. SINCE THEY COULDNT EXPECT MUCH ACCOMMODATION
FROM NET AJI S. C. BOSE AND COULD EXPECT EVERYTHING FROM NEHRU, THEY WISHED AND
PREFERRED TO HAVE NEHRU AT THE HELM OF AFFAIRS IN INDIA AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE.
So far as
England was concerned, because of Netaji's enmity towards Britain, she was not
inclined to have Netaji in the seats of authority in India at the time of
Transfer of Power or immediately after that. Britishers had invested very heavy
amount in India and the British Govt. had also great interests to protect.
Hence England wanted to have a favourable and dependable set up at the time of
Transfer of Power in India. Since Netaji was a sworn enemy of England and
wanted to follow the policy of blood for blood, the Britishers could never
trust him. On the other hand, Nehru, because of his comparatively friendly
attitude towards England, and the special type of relationship with
Mountbattens, could be expected to serve the British interests in a much better
manner. So the British Govt. wished that Netaji should never return to India
and come to power. They wanted that Nehru should be at the helm of affairs and
the latter also had fixed his eyes on the office of Prime Minister of India. He
felt and believed that Mountbattens were in a position to help him in the
achievement of his aim. Hence a sort of deal, motivated by mutual interests,
was entered into by Nehru with the British Govt. and all of them agreed to work
together to keep Netaji away from India.
All of
them were saved from facing a very awkward situation of treating or trying
Netaji, in the case of his being captured. Because of the dropping of Atom
Bombs and Japan's decision to surrender, the developments in South East Asia
progressed at such a fast pace that Netaji was left with a very short period to
decide his future plan of action. If these Atom Bombs would not have been used,
Japan would have successfully faced the Allied forces and prolonged the war
atleast for a few months, if not an year. Compelled by the storm of events, he
had to leave Singapore on 16th August 1945 and was destined to go to Russia to
fulfill his mission. Though he was warned against going to Russia by the
Government yet he wanted to take the risk and make another effort for
liberating his motherland from some base in Russia. To the warning of Japanese,
he responded in the following words,
"I
have no illusions and I am prepared to face the worst execution or
imprisonment, by the Russians. I wish to go and take a chance so long as there
seems to be the faintest possibility."3
Ignoring
the warning, Netaji flew into Munchuria. There he surrender to the advancing
Russian armies. He was very hopeful of a favorable response from the Russians
because he himself had leftist approach. But since his escape from the house
arrest. a lot of water had flowed down the river Ganges and whatever he had
done since then, had pushed him in the Axis Block. Some critics had started
describing him as a Fascist. Besides this Russia was an ally of England and it
was apparently not possible and convenient for Russia to ignore the interests
of England also. Netaji was an enemy of England and England could expect her
ally Russia to agree to the advice of the former. Still he went ahead with his
scheme. But unfortunately for him, nay unfortunately for the nation, his plans
misfired, his calculations failed at the most crucial juncture.
Instead
of getting a warm response, he was put under arrest by the Stalin Government.
Stalin is known in the history as one of the most dreaded, ruthless and
ambitious dictators. Many of the mass graves which were considered to be the
work of Hitler's forces, have in fact come out to be the work of Stalin's
forces. Some mass graves in Poland were considered to be work of German army
but recently the government of former Soviet Russia officially conceded that it
was the work of Russian forces and Mr. Mikhael Gorbachev expressed regrets for
it during his visit to Poland. After humiliating Germany in the war, Stalin had
become a giant killer. This had hardened his attitude and further fired his
ambitions. Stalin had developed imperialistic attitude.
India was
of special interest to Stalin because besides economic considerations in the
game of balance of power at the international level, India was likely to playa
significant and decisive role in future. Besides this, as already stated, India
provided a prospective market for future investments. This in fact was the main
interest of Stalin in India. Apparently the Capitalist Block, led by United
States of America. was in a better position to help India in the development
process. Initially our trade with the Capitalist Block constituted more than
80% of the total. In 1950 India had almost no trade with USSR. After India
became Republic in 1950, the trade with Russia increased tremendously and by
1991 the imports had touched Rs. 2548 crores and exports had increased to Rs.
5255 crores. In the 45 years of India's independence the imports from America
increased by only 25 times whereas in the case of Russia it increased by more
than 2500 times. In the case of exports, to America it increased by about 40
times whereas in the case of Russia it increased by more than 5000 times. The
study of these facts reflect that there has been a tremendous increase in the
trade with Russia whereas it has not increased that much with any other country
in the world. It is the fulfillment of the objective of Russian leadership
which they had fixed even before the end of the second world war. By 30th June
1992 India owed to Russia $ 16 billions and was the fourth in the list of
heaviest debtors of Russia. In fact India is at the top of non-communist
debtors to Russia. It helped Russia to tighten its hold on India.
Russia
was the first country with which India started the diplomatic relations. In
fact the diplomatic relations with Russia were established even before the
independence i.e. on 13th April 1947. On 14th April 1947 Pt. J.L. Nehru gave
the following statement:
"Seeking
to preserve and further strengthen the friendly relations between the U.S.S.R.
and India, the Govt. of the U.S.S.R. and Government of India have decided to
exchange diplomatic relations at the embassy level."
Why was
Russia the first and the only country with which India started diplomatic
relations even before independence? Russia did not play any special role in
achieving of India's independence. Why did India fell into the lap of Russia,
is not apparently clear. There must have been some very compelling reasons for
this much priority to the relations with Russia.
As a
critical student of politics, I tried to identify the reasons responsible for
India's so decisive shift towards Russia. According to my analysis Stalin
detained Netaji and used him as a triumph card to secure India's, rather
Nehru's, subservience to fulfill his political aspirations and serve Russia's
interests. Russia conveyed it to England that her prey Netaji S.C. Bose, was
with her. When Pt. Nehru visited Singapore in March; 1946, Mountbatten conveyed
this fact to Nehru and Mountbatten advised Nehru that it was expedient for him
to abandon the cause of I.N.A. and forget about Netaji's issue as it would damage
his political prospects. Since the logic was so clear, simple, straight and
directly linked with his political career, Nehru didn't take much time to
understand, appreciate and realise the gravity of the whole matter. JUST BY
AGREEING TO BE SUBSERVIENT OF RUSSIA, NEHRU, WITHOUT FIRING A BULLET, USING HIS
SWORD, INJECTING POISON, OR DOING ANYTHING OF THIS SORT, GOT RID OF HIS MOST
POWERFUL POLITICAL ADVERSARY. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND ALSO SUCCEEDED IN CREATING AN
ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THEIR FAVORITE PERSON COULD BE THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE
COUNTRY. AFTER ENTHRONING THEIR PUPPET IN POWER, RUSSIA WENT ON TIGHTENING HER
HOLD ON THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SET UP OF INDIA. BECAUSE OF THIS INDIA COULD
NOT ALIGN HERSELF WITH THE CAPITALIST BLOCK AND GET AS MUCH HELP AS IT WAS
POSSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND RUSSIA KEPT ON FEEDING THIS INFANT IN SUCH A WAY
THAT INDIA BECAME A PERMANENT DEPENDENT ON HER. WITH EVERY CRISIS, INDIA HAD TO
DEPEND INCREASINGLY MORE ON RUSSIA AND CONTINUE TO CLING TO HER.
After the
1965 Indo-Pak war, in which Pakistan had been convincingly defeated and India
had gained considerable territorial advantage, Russia volunteered to act as
middle man and work for restoring normal relations between the warring parties.
At Tashkent a Summit of the Prime Minister of India and the President of
Pakistan was held. The Russian leadership worked hard to settle the differences
between the two countries. Since Pakistan had developed a hard attitude and
India was not willing to give undue concessions, it looked almost certain that
the Summit will end in failure and the tension will continue. In fact the press
had already forecasted the failure of the talks. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the then
Prime Minister of India, was not willing to sign this accord as it did not
serve and satisfy the interests of India. It were some last minute hectic
efforts of the Russian leaders A. Kosygin and A. Gromyko which brought about
the accord. It appears that Shastri signed the accord under duress. Shastri,
the simple, sincere, straightforward, strong and uncompromising leader was not
prepared to gift away the gains which the Indian soldiers had earned at the
cost of their lives. HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN PLEASING AND APPEASING THE
RUSSIAN LEADER-SHIP AT THE COST OF INDIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST. Tashkent
agreement was signed on 10th January, 1966 and Lal Bahadur Shastri expired the
next day, allegedly because of the heart-attack, on 11th January. The signing
of the accord under duress and the subsequent death of the apparently unwilling
signatory, raises suspicions about the real cause of the death and the
circumstances which led to the signing of the accord. The fact that Tashkent
agreement was not a fair, rational, judicious and lasting, has been proved by
the Indo-Pak war of 1971. Within six years of signing the accord, both the
countries had to be at war again. Apparently there doesn't seem to be any
relationship between the controversy of disappearance of Netaji and Shastri's
death under suspicious circumstances in Russia, but a deeper look into the
problem reveals that some important link is definitely there between these two
incidents.
It is
suspected that Shastri did not die natural death. He is reported to have died
because of the heart-attack which was apparently on account of signing the
accord which appeared unjust to him. The question arises why was this unjust
accord signed? What could be Russia's interest in pressing Shastri to sign such
an accord? To keep India under her influence, it was essential that India
should be kept under such leadership as would toe the line of Russian bosses
and those bosses, in turn, did everything possible to strengthen the hands of
their 'puppet' rulers in India. But for the use of veto in Security Council in
1971, Bangladesh could not have come into existence and if Bangladesh would not
have come into existence, Indira Gandhi would never have gained the political
strength which she ultimately gained. Russians must have felt that Shastri was
made of a different stuff and had steel nerves and strong will power. They must
have feared that if he stayed in power, at some stage India might not remain
under Russian influence for very long. Hence it was expedient for them to get
rid of Shastri before he returned to India.
The super
powers, now as well as in the past, have not let any leader of developing
countries grow more than their permissible limits. THEY APPEAR TO BE BELIEVING
NOT ONLY IN THE THEORY OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS BUT ALSO IN
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF PROSPERITY AND 'GREAT LEADERSHIP'. Whenever and
wherever any leader has tried to raise his head or tried to give an ambitious
programme to one's nation, one has been suppressed and in case of necessity,
eliminated by those powers which intended to dominate that country. It is a hard
fact that whenever any nation, even if the smallest, has decided to spiritedly
defend her honour at her own or with the help of some other country, has been
able to do so. Under Fidel Castro, Cuba could withstand the onslaughts of
U.S.A.; the high-headed Saddam Hussain could hold the world to ransom and
challenge the world powers; Netaji, who had wide-ranging experiences and superb
leadership qualities, could have easily transformed India into one of the
greatest powers of the world and showed to the world that India was still the
GUIDE of the world. Under his leadership the 'golden sparrow' would have
regained it's health, wings and glitter, but unfortunately it was not to be.
THE DREAMER ARCHITECT OF THE GREAT INDIA HAD BEEN DETAINED AT A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE
FROM THE COUNTRY AND DEPRIVED OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE HIS CONTRIBUTION TO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS COUNTRY.
The rich
and powerful nations are not always right and cannot be taken at their face
value. They are hypocrats. During the second world war England sought the help
of the whole world in the name of democracy but she herself strangulated scores
of democracies in the world. America, which is acting as self-appointed
policeman of Human Rights in the world, even after two centuries of independence,
is unable to guarantee Human Rights to the Blacks in that country. Martin
Luther King Jr., had to pay the price of advocating the cause of human rights
of the Blacks with his life. Abraham Lincoln, who abolished slavery, was gunned
down in the nation of Human Rights. It is unfortunate that the Super Powers
have assumed that they have a legitimate right to be the law-makers of
International Law and the best judges to decide what is in the best interests
of any other country. They have not spared anyone. America and Russia were
allies during the second world war and up to that time even the cold war
between these two countries had not started, yet some American citizens were
detained or executed in Russia during the Stalin regime. Mr. Boris Yelstin in a
letter to American Senate Committee, while commenting about the fate of some
American Prisoners of War, wrote about the discovery of some, "shocking
facts of some of them summarily executed by the Stalin regime. And in a number
of cases being forced to renounce U.S. citizenship." A joint U.S. Russian
Commission on P.O.W.'s has been appointed to find facts about the treatment of
American P.O.W.'s in Russia. In the Korean War a large number of U.S. soldiers
were taken prisoner by North Korea and handed over to Russia where they were
tortured and in some cases executed. Mr. Boris Yelstin, the President of
Russia, during a visit to South Korea offered to hand-over the relevant
material to the Koreans which will throw light on who started the Korean War in
1950s. AS AMERICA HAS BEEN ABLE TO PRESSURISE THE GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA TO
APPOINT A JOINT U.S. RUSSIA COMMISSION AND SOUTH KOREA HAS BEEN ABLE TO
PRESSURISE THE RUSSIANS TO DIVULGE THE REQUIRED INFORMATION, SIMILARLY THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ALSO, IF SERIOUSLY TAKES UP THE MATTER WITH THE GOVERNMENT
OF RUSSIA, VITAL AND CONCLUSIVE INFORMATION CAN BE SECURED ABOUT THE REAL FATE
OF NETAJI.
Netaji
was a victim of international conspiracy in which some Indian leaders and
foreign agencies were involved. Since forty seven years have passed from the
date of alleged air crash, tracing and producing the direct evidence to prove
the allegations against the alleged conspirators, may not be possible under the
circumstances. It is unfortunate that whatever related to Netaji and I.N.A.,
was neither preserved properly nor made available to the people. In fact most
of the material has been destroyed, intentionally or unintentionally, by the
Govt. Late Col. P.K. Sehgal of I.N.A., one of the three Red Fort trial heroes,
in an interview to me, revealed that a film on the activities of I.N.A. was
handed over to Pt J.L. Nehru, the former Prime Minister of India.
Unfortunately, even this film, was destroyed by the Government. Many documents
which had direct or indirect link with the controversy have not been made
public and some of them have been destroyed. Some documents are still with the
British Government, and in the Transfer of Power a very large number of
documents have been published which throw considerable light on the controversy
surrounding Netaji S.C. Bose. Even now it is suspected that quite a large
number of documents have not been published. In some cases incomplete documents
have been published. It is possible that the unpublished parts may be having
conclusive evidence. If the Government takes the initiative, the relevant
documents can be traced. It is on account of the insincere and non-serious
attitude of the most of our leaders that this controversy has remained
unsolved. Unfortunately the credibility of most of our leaders has gone very
low. When the office of the Prime Minister itself is suspected of indulging in
the corrupt practices, nothing more remains to be said or done about the
integrity of our leadership. Bofors issue has exposed the real character of our
national political leadership. In a news published in The Tribune, dated
29.6.1992, a Russian News Paper alleged that the Prime Minister Late Mr. Rajiv
Gandhi was on the pay-list of K.G.B. If even the Prime Minister of the nation
can be suspected to be on the pay-list of K.G.B., an intelligence agency, then
what else is left for any nation to mourn.
The
physical return of Netaji at this stage though appears to be difficult yet it
cannot 'be ruled out. At such an advanced age it may not be possible for him to
make much material contribution to the developments of India, still it will
definitely not only correct many historical distortions and explode many
political myths of the post independence days but also bring an unprecedented
revolution in the country. When it will be proved that Netaji was intentionally
kept away from India through the connivance of the highest placed political
leaders in India, a storm like that of a storm in Russia may build up and
expose the real faces of the so called founders of modern India, India has yet
to see another freedom struggle, a REVOLUTION. This struggle will be for
freedom from social, cultural, educational, political and economic slavery in
which our country has .been thrown by those who were entrusted the task of
steering the nation out of all this turmoil and crisis. JUST AS THE I.N.A.
TRIALS HAD UPROOTED THE LONG ESTABLISHED REGIME OF ENGLAND AND ADVANCED THE
GRANTING OF THE INDEPENDENCE TO INDIA, SIMILARLY THE .REVELATION OF THE FACT
THAT NETAJI HAD NOT DIED IN THE ALLEGED AIR CRASH AND WAS INTENTIONALLY kept
away by the power hungry politicians, will revolutionise the society and
advance and accelerate the process of the economic, social and political
emancipation of India. The aim of this research work is not only to prove that
Netaji didn't die in the alleged air crash but also to prove the involvement of
alleged conspirators, in keeping him away from India, and to inspire the
posterity to work for the fulfillment of Netaji's dreams about India. Netaji
had written in the 'Fundamental Questions of Indian Revolution',
"India
will be called upon to play an important role in world-history in the near
future. We all know that in the seventeenth century England made a remarkable
contribution to world civilisation through her ideas of constitutional and
democratic Government. Similarly, in the eighteenth century, France made the
most wonderful contribution to the culture of the world through her ideas of
'liberty, equality and fraternity'. During the nineteenth century Germany made the
most remarkable 'gift through her Marxian philosophy. During the twentieth
century Russia had enriched the culture and civilisation of the world through
her achievement in proletarian revolution, proletarian Government and
proletarian culture. The next remarkable contribution to the culture and
civilisation of the world, India will be called upon to make."4
Let the
sincerest efforts be made to not only establish the ultimate truth about Netaji
mystery but also to give a practical shape to his dreams.
JAI HIND
